Justia U.S. 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Petitioner, a native of Jamaica, sought review of an order of the Board of Immigration Appeals ("BIA") affirming the decision of an immigration judge denying his motion to terminate the removal proceedings brought against him, after his criminal convictions, on the grounds that he had not derived U.S. citizenship through the naturalization of his father. At issue was whether petitioner had been "legitimated" under Jamaican law within the meaning of 8 U.S.C. 1101(c)(1) even though his parents never married, with the result that he had obtained derivative citizenship as a consequence of the naturalization of his father. The court remained unsure as to the precise definition the BIA had adopted for determining whether a "child" had been "legitimated" under the law of a particular jurisdiction for purposes of section 1101(c)(1). The court was also unclear as to the legal and/or logical basis for the BIA's interpretation. Accordingly, the court remanded to the BIA to address these two issues and the petition for review was granted.

Plaintiff appealed from a judgment entered by the district court granting an oral motion of defendants, plaintiff's former employer, for judgment as a matter of law pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50 with respect to plaintiff's claims arising under section 4312(a) of the Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act ("USERRA"), 38 U.S.C. 4301 et seq, where plaintiff was eventually terminated by defendants after returning to work upon completion of his call to active duty by the Army. At issue was whether the district court erred in granting the motion where plaintiff claimed that defendants discriminated against him on account of his military service. The court affirmed the judgment and held that there was no reasonable basis to find a violation of section 4312(a) where plaintiff was rehired with the same title, salary, and other conditions of employment after his immediate return from military service.

Petitioner, a native and citizen of Brazil, sought review of an order of the Board of Immigration Appeals ("BIA") which dismissed his appeal of an immigration judge's ("IJ") decision ordering his removal and denied his motion for remand or continuance. At issue was whether the BIA abused its discretion in denying petitioner's request for a continuance. The court held that to the extent the BIA denied petitioner's request for a continuance on the basis that it lacked the authority to grant the continuance, the denial constituted legal error where IJs have broad discretionary authority to grant a motion for continuance for good cause shown and where IJs and the BIA had jurisdiction over motions for continuances in removal proceedings where they already had jurisdiction in light of Matter of Hashmi. The court also held that the BIA failed to provide a rational explanation for its ruling when it failed to evaluate the merits of granting or denying petitioner a continuance based on the specific facts on the record and therefore, on remand, the BIA should either follow the Hashmi factors or explain why application of those factors was inappropriate.

In June 2009, defendant filed an arbitration demand against plaintiff alleging claims for wrongful termination and breach of contract based on plaintiff's failure to pay a performance bonus. Defendant subsequently filed a new demand for arbitration in October 2010, which included his original claims plus claims of fraud and breach of contract, after the arbitrator denied his motion to amend the original arbitration demand when he discovered evidence suggesting that plaintiff had padded estimated revenues for defendant's companies by $17 million. Plaintiff argued on appeal that the district court erred by not granting its motion for a preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order; that defendant's withdrawal from the first arbitration waived his right to a second arbitration; and that the first arbitration's October Order, denying defendant leave to amend, was an enforceable arbitration award. The court held that the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. 16(b)(4), precluded the court's review of the district court's order refusing to enjoin the arbitration. The court also held that a final decision with respect to an arbitration required an official dismissal of all claims and thus, where the district court stayed proceedings in lieu of dismissal, the decision was not final. The court further concluded that an arbitration award was a final adjudication of a claim on the merits and a procedural ruling that denied leave to amend was not an award since the decision had no effect on the merits of the proposed claims. Accordingly, the court dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.

Defendants appealed from May 17, 2010 judgments of conviction entered by the district court for possession with intent to distribute a mixture of 3, 4-Methylenedioxymethamphetamine ("MDMA"), methamphetamine, and N-Benzylpiperazine ("BZP"), all Schedule I controlled substances, in violation of 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1),(b)(1)(C) and 21 U.S.C. 846. At issue was whether the district court engaged in clearly erroneous fact-finding that led to a procedurally unreasonable sentence when it determined that the controlled substance referenced in the United States Sentencing Guidelines, U.S.S.G. 2D1.1, that was mostly related to the mixture found in defendants' possession, was MDMA or "ecstasy." The court held that there was insufficient evidence in the record to conclude that the appropriate substitute for the mixture contained in the pills found in defendants' possession was MDMA and therefore, remanded the case to the district court with instructions to conduct an evidentiary hearing to determine the composition of the pills for the purposes of U.S.S.G. 2D1.1.

This dispute arose from the district court's decision to award an attorney $515,179.28 in attorney's fees pursuant to the Fair Labor Standards Act's fee shifting provision, 29 U.S.C. 216(b), for work performed in successfully litigating a case against the City of New York ("city"). The attorney did not keep contemporaneous records and the city appealed the award, arguing that it violated the New York State Ass'n for Retarded Children, Inc. v Carey rule, which explicitly required that such records be kept. The court held that, because a district court's "personal observation" of an attorney's work was not by itself a sufficient basis for permitting a deviation and awarding fees in the absence of contemporaneous records, the most recent order of the district court reinstating its original award of attorney's fees was vacated and the case remanded for further proceedings.

Appellants appealed from an order of the district court denying its motion, made after a preliminary injunction was vacated by the court, to recover damages against an injunction bond posted by appellee. At issue was whether the district court correctly concluded that the damages sought were not proximately caused by the injunction, and that, in deciding this issue, the district court should have applied a presumption in favor of recovery against the bond. The court held that a wrongfully enjoined party was entitled to a presumption in favor of recovery against an injunction bond and that the district court's decision was insufficient to permit meaningful appellate review. Accordingly, the court vacated the order and remanded for reconsideration and clarification.

Defendant was sentenced to 14 months imprisonment and 18 months of supervised release for violating two conditions of his previous term of supervised release. At issue was whether the district court had the power to revoke the supervised release finding that defendant had violated a condition of supervised release when he failed to report changes in employment and residence. The court vacated and held that the district court retained jurisdiction to revoke supervised release because the delays in adjudicating the revocation petitioner were reasonably necessary under 18 U.S.C. 3583(i). The court also held that the district court erred by finding that defendant violated the asserted condition, based on the district court's view of the "purpose" of the condition, rather than the "clear and specific" meaning that a person of ordinary intelligence would attribute to it.

A debtor, his wife, and sister ("appellants") sought to reopen debtor's Chapter 7 bankruptcy case for the purpose of pursuing an adversary proceeding against the trustee of debtor's estate and one of the trustee's bondholders. At issue was whether the district court properly determined that the bankruptcy court did not abuse its discretion in denying appellants' motion to reopen and properly dismissed appellants' complaint. The court held that the bankruptcy court acted well within its discretion in denying the motion where the adversary claims against the trustee were entirely without merit. The court also held that, in light of the meritless appeal, appellants and their counsel were ordered to show cause as to why they should not be sanctioned.

Plaintiffs, former students of Ithaca High School, claimed that defendants violated their First and Fourteenth Amendment rights by prohibiting the publication of a sexually-explicit cartoon in the Ithaca High School student newspaper ("IHS newspaper") and by prohibiting the on-campus distribution of an independent student newspaper containing the same cartoon. At issue was whether the district court erred in holding that the IHS newspaper was a limited public forum. The court concluded that the IHS newspaper was a limited public form and held that defendants lawfully prohibited the publication of the sexually-explicit cartoon pursuant to the standards for regulation of speech set forth in Bethel School District Number 403 v. Fraser and Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier. The court also held that defendants lawfully prohibited the on-campus distribution of the sexually-explicit cartoon in an independent student newspaper pursuant to Fraser and that the court need not reach the question of whether defendants' prohibition of the on-campus distribution of the independent student newspaper was lawful under Tinker v. DesMoines Indep. Cmty. Scho. Dist.