Justia U.S. 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Petitioner appealed the district court's denial of his petition for habeas corpus brought under 28 U.S.C. 2254, which claimed a violation of his Sixth Amendment right to a public trial. The claim rested on the New York state trial judge's failure to make specific findings justifying the removal of petitioner's twelve-year-old brother from the courtroom during trial. At issue was whether New York's intermediate appellate court exorbitantly misapplied New York law when it held that petitioner failed to preserve this claim for state appellate review. The court held that the sparse record prevented it from saying definitively that defense counsel properly objected or requested that the brother remain in court. The court also held that because the New York appellate court's finding that this claim was not preserved for appellate review was an independent and adequate state ground for decision, which barred review of the claim by federal courts, the court affirmed.

This was an appeal from three orders: (1) denying summary judgment to Wachovia on the ground that appellee had adequately requested reinstatement to his prior employment position following a period of active military duty; (2) awarding liquidated damages, in an amount equal to the award of backpay and granting equitable relief to appellee following a bench trial on damages after a jury found Wachovia liable for violating the Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act (USERRA), 38 U.S.C. 4313, in failing to reemploy appellee promptly to a position of like seniority, status, and pay following his military services; and (3) denying Wachovia's motion for judgment as a matter of law, or, in the alternative, for a new trial. The court held that because it found no error in the district court's thoughtful and well-reasoned opinions, the court affirmed.

This case arose out of the attempts of two federal agencies to disgorge funds from Janet Schaberg, the ex-wife of alleged Ponzi-scheme artist Stephen Walsh. Schaberg subsequently appealed from a memorandum decision and orders of the district court granting preliminary injunctions freezing Schaberg's assets. In response to certified questions, the New York Court of Appeals held that (a) proceeds of a fraud could constitute marital property, and (b) when part or all of the marital estate consisted of the proceeds of fraud, that fact did not, as a matter of law, preclude a determination that a spouse paid fair consideration according to the terms of New York's Debtor and Creditor Law section 272. The court held that because those rulings undermined the key legal assumptions supporting the preliminary injunctions, the court vacated those orders, without prejudice to further proceedings applying the legal principles pronounced by the New York Court of Appeals.

Plaintiff appealed pro se an order dismissing his complaint against defendants for failure to state a claim. Plaintiff alleged that medical care providers, Christopher Aiken and Dr. James Hohensee, at the Niagara County Jail, were deliberately indifferent to plaintiff's medical needs during his incarceration at the jail. Plaintiff also appealed from a judgment dismissing his claims against the remaining defendants, alleging that excessive force on the part of corrections officers, Paul Curcione, Jeff Chawer, and Sergeant Tammy Williams. The court held that plaintiff's complaint fell short of alleging a deliberate indifference on the part of Nurse Practitioner Aikin and Dr. Hohensee to his serious medical needs. Therefore, the district court properly dismissed the complaint without leave to amend where issues of medical judgment could not be the basis of a deliberate indifference claim where evidence of deliberate indifference was lacking. The court also held that the district court properly granted summary judgment in favor of Williams for plaintiff's failure to exhaust the requisite administrative review process as to Williams. The court further held that the exhaustion requirement of the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), 42 U.S.C. 1997e(a), was satisfied by an untimely filing of a grievance if it was accepted and decided on the merits by the appropriate prison authority. Therefore, plaintiff had met the exhaustion requirement of his original filing and the district court's contrary determination was erroneous. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part and vacated in part, remanding for further proceedings.

Defendant, James Gansman, appealed from a judgment convicting him of insider trading under the so-called "misappropriation theory." At issue was whether the district court erred in declining to adopt an instruction proposed by Gansman setting forth a theory of the defense based in part on SEC Rule 10b5-2, 17 C.F.R. 240.10b5-2. The court held that Gansman was entitled to assert a defense theory that he did not have the requisite intent to commit securities fraud, and that in defining the nature of his relationship with Donna Murdoch, a woman with whom he was having an affair, to the jury, he had the right to use language found in Rule 10b5-2. The court held that, nevertheless, Gansman was not entitled to a new trial in the circumstances presented because the slightly modified instruction given by the district court was legally sufficient. Gansman raised a number of other challenges to his conviction, all of which were without merit. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court.

This case arose when plaintiff, by her mother and natural guardian, brought a medical malpractice action under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), 28 U.S.C. 1346, 2401, 2671-2680, claiming that the injury plaintiff sustained at birth might have been caused by her doctor. At issue was whether plaintiff's claim was "forever barred" by the FTCA's two-year statute of limitations period. The court held that, because plaintiff failed to comply with the two-year limitations period set out in section 2401(b) and because equitable tolling, even if available, was unwarranted, the judgment of the district court dismissing the complaint as untimely was affirmed.

Defendant pleaded guilty to transporting and possessing child pornography in violation of 18 U.S.C. 2252A(a)(1), and (a)(5)(B). The district court sentenced defendant to 121 months' imprisonment and ordered him to pay restitution to finance future counseling costs of one of the victims depicted in the images and videos. On appeal, defendant challenged the restitution order and his sentence. The court agreed with defendant that, based on the facts in this case, defendant's possession of the victim's images was no a substantial factor in causing her loss. The court held, however, that the district court committed no procedural or substantive error in imposing the sentence of imprisonment. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part and reversed in part.

Plaintiff, an inmate at Great Meadow Correctional Facility (Great Meadow), filed suit, pro se, in district court against three Great Meadow employees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that he had been improperly denied access to medically-prescribed therapeutic diets, resulting in violations of his Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment and of his Fourteenth Amendment right to due process. Plaintiff, subsequently represented by counsel, appealed the revocation of his in forma pauperis status, as well as the decision of the district court to grant summary judgment to one of the defendants, James Pagano. The court held that, based on its recent decision in Mills v. Fischer, any action dismissed on the ground of absolute prosecutorial immunity was presumed "frivolous" for purposes of 28 U.S.C. 1915(g). The court also held that the remainder of plaintiff's arguments on appeal were without merit. Accordingly, the orders of the district court revoking plaintiff's in forma pauperis status and granting Pagano summary judgment were affirmed.

Petitioners appealed the decision and order of the Department of Labor Benefits Review Board reversing the ALJ's dismissal of respondent's claim for benefits under the Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, 33 U.S.C. 901-50, as extended by the Defense Base Act, 42 U.S.C. 1651-54, as untimely. The Board determined that the ALJ's principal finding on the issue of timeliness was not supported by substantial evidence. The court held that because the ALJ's factual finding with respect to constructive awareness was not supported by substantial evidence, the Board did not overstep the limits of its appellate jurisdiction when it reversed the finding. Accordingly, the order of the Board was affirmed.