Justia U.S. 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff, employed as a security officer by defendant, contended that he was sexually harassed by a co-worker and brought an action against defendant, asserting claims for constructive discharge, hostile environment sexual harassment, and retaliation under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e et seq. The court held that the district court properly granted defendant's motion for judgment as a matter of law dismissing the retaliation claim because a reasonable employee in plaintiff's situation would not have been deterred from engaging in protected activities. The district court also correctly held that, even assuming the jury could have reasonably found plaintiff on his retaliation claim, defendant was entitled to judgment as a matter of law on the award of punitive damages because a reasonable jury could find that defendant sought to, and did, address defendant's claims in good faith. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court.

Plaintiffs, Wachovia Bank and WCM, appealed from a judgment of the district court dismissing their action seeking to enjoin an arbitration proceeding brought by VCG before the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority, Inc. (FINRA), against WCM in connection with a credit default swap (CDS) transaction between VCG and WCM. The district court granted VCG's motion for an order compelling arbitration and dismissed the complaint, ruling that the FINRA Code of Arbitration Procedure for Customer Disputes provided for arbitration of disputes between a FINRA member and its customers, and that, as WCM was a FINRA member and negotiated part of the CDS agreement entered into by VCG and Wachovia Bank, VCG should be considered a customer of WCM within the meaning of the FINRA Code. On appeal, plaintiffs contended that the district court erred in ruling that VCG was a customer of WCM. The court held that no rational factfinder could infer that VCG was a customer of WCM. Therefore, Wachovia and WCM were entitled to summary judgment in their favor. The court considered all of VCG's contentions on appeal and found them to be without merit. Accordingly, the judgment of the district court was reversed and the matter remanded for the entry of judgment in favor of plaintiffs, enjoining VCG from proceeding with its FINRA arbitration against WCM with respect to VCG's 2007 credit default swap agreement with Wachovia Bank.

Petitioner, a New York state prisoner serving a 10-year sentence for first-degree robbery, appealed a judgment by the district court denying his pro se petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Although the district judge granted petitioner a Certificate of Appealability (COA), the COA did not specify the issue or issues on which it was granted. Therefore, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 2253(c)(2)-(3), the court remanded the case for specification of the issue or issues on which the COA was granted.

Defendant appealed from his conviction of four counts of use of the mail or wires in furtherance of fraud that deprived the United Nations, his former employer, of its intangible right to his honest services in violation of 18 U.S.C. 1341, 1343, 1346; one count of corrupt receipt of things of value with intent to be rewarded with respect to official business in violation of 18 U.S.C. 666; and one count of conspiracy in violation of 18 U.S.C. 371. The court held that the United Nations expressly waived defendant's immunity, and even if it had not, defendant himself waived any claim of immunity by failing to raise the issue until the trial was complete. The court also held that the United Nations Participation Act, 22 U.S.C. 287e, which authorized the payment of the United States' dues to the United Nations, was both a "federal program" and a "benefit" within the meaning of Section 666, which encompassed bribes as well as illegal gratuities. The court further held that Section 1346 was broad enough to encompass honest services fraud committed by a foreign worker of the United Nations, that defendant was properly sentenced as a "public official" under U.S.S.G. 2C1.1., and that the district court committed no error in ordering defendant to pay restitution in the form of remitting a portion of his salary at the United Nations, which amounted to what defendant was paid during the time he was suspended pending investigation of the conduct underlying his conviction. Accordingly, the judgment was affirmed.

Defendant, a previously convicted felon, appealed his conviction for possession of a firearm and ammunition. On appeal, defendant contended that the district court's failure to suppress his pre-arrest statements made without Miranda warnings violated the Fifth Amendment, and that the warrantless search of his bedroom violated the Fourth Amendment. The court held that while the public safety exception to Miranda justified the officers' initial questioning of defendant, their subsequent warrantless search of his bedroom violated the Fourth Amendment.

Defendant appealed from a judgment convicting him of (1) conspiracy to violate the Iranian Transaction Regulations (ITR) and operate an unlicensed money-transmitting business; (2) violating the ITR; (3) operating an unlicensed money-transmitting business; and (4) two counts of making false statements in response to government subpoenas. On appeal, defendant argued that the district court erred in several respects when instructing the jury on the conspiracy, ITR, and money-transmitting counts; defendant was entitled to a new trial on the false statement counts because the government constructively amended the indictment; the government committed misconduct in its rebuttal summation, which he claimed necessitated a new trial on all counts; and defendant should be resentenced because the district court miscalculated the applicable offense level. The court reversed Count One to the extent it alleged a violation of the ITR as an overt act and vacated and remanded to the extent it was based on the money-transmission violation as an overt act; reversed Count Two; vacated and remanded Count Three; and affirmed Counts Four and Five.

Defendant was a crack cocaine offender who was convicted after trial and sentenced in 1996 to a 292-month term of imprisonment. On January 14, 2008, defendant filed a motion in district court pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(2) seeking a reduction of his sentence. Specifically, defendant sought to benefit from the 2007 decisions by the United States Sentencing Commission to (a) reduce the sentences for offenses involving crack and (b) make the reductions retroactive. The district court denied the motion on the ground that defendant was not eligible for a sentence reduction. Defendant timely appealed. The court held that defendant was indeed eligible for a reduction where the district court should exercise its broad discretion under section 3582(c)(2). Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded the case to the district court for a determination of whether defendant should receive a reduction.

The interlocutory appeals subject to the motion before the court arose from conjoined multi-party actions stemming from a maritime disaster during which the M/V Rickmers Genoa vessel collided with the M/V Sun Cross vessel in the Yellow Sea. On their motion to dismiss appeals from two interlocutory orders for summary judgment entered in their favor in the district court, or in the alternative, for consolidation of the appeals in the captioned actions involving claims arising out of the maritime casualty, the ESM party defendants contended that the appeals were premature and not authorized by the maritime interlocutory appeal statute, 28 U.S.C. 1292(a)(3), and that consolidation of the appeals was warranted by reason of equity and economy. The court held that, given that the district court had determined conclusively all of the claims against the ESM parties, and that decision was unaffected by any remaining claims, the court could exercise appellate jurisdiction over the present appeals under section 1292(a)(3). Delaying appeal merely because a "final judgment" as to all of the claims against all of the parties had not been issued would defeat the interlocutory nature of section 1292(a)(3) and effectively render the statute a nullity in the modern era of litigation in which admiralty suits frequently involved multiple parties and claims. Therefore, the motion to dismiss was denied. The court granted, however, the motion brought by ESM insofar as they sought consolidation because the appeals arose from the same conjoined multi-party litigation in the district court, and consolidation would be both efficient and equitable for the disposition of the appeals. Moreover, consolidation was unopposed.

Plaintiff appealed from the judgment of the district court dismissing its suit for improper venue on the basis of a forum selection clause mandating Ireland as the appropriate venue for the contract dispute between the parties. The court held that the forum selection clause at issue was permissive, not mandatory, because the clause contained no specific language of exclusion evidencing an intent by the parties to give the Irish Courts exclusive jurisdiction or make Ireland an obligatory venue for disputes arising out of the agreement. The court held that because permissive forum selection clauses contemplated that jurisdiction could be proper in more than one forum, the district court's dismissal for improper venue was improper. Therefore, the court vacated and remanded.

These consolidated appeals, which have been returned to the court on remand from the United States Supreme Court, once again called upon the court to consider whether - and, if so, on what grounds - the Oneida Indian Nation of New York (OIN) was entitled to restrain the Counties from foreclosing upon certain fee-title properties, acquired on the open market by the OIN in the 1990's, for which the OIN had refused to pay property tax. The court held that the OIN had abandoned its claims premised on tribal sovereign immunity from suit as well as its claims based upon the Nonintercourse Act, 25 U.S.C. 177. The court also held that the district court erred in ruling that the Counties' redemption-notice procedures failed to comport with due process. The court further held that the district court should not exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the OIN's state-law claims. The court finally affirmed as to several ancillary matters.