Justia U.S. 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Petitioner appealed from the district court's denial of habeas corpus relief after finding that he did not derive citizenship from his father. The district court ruled that petitioner was not in his father's "legal custody" when his father naturalized. The court concluded that the district court erred because it relied on an unenforceable Dominican Republic custody award where New York had jurisdiction to determine custody. Accordingly, the court vacated the judgment and remanded for further proceedings.

Plaintiff alleged that Chase willfully and maliciously provided false information about his finances to Equifax, a consumer credit reporting agency. Chase removed the suit to federal court and moved for dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6), arguing that plaintiff's claims were preempted by the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA), 15 U.S.C. 1681t(b)(1)(F). Plaintiff appealed from the district court's dismissal of his state common law tort claims. The court affirmed the judgment of the district court, holding that the FCRA preempted plaintiff's state law claims against Chase.

Plaintiff filed suit under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. 1132(a)(1)-(3), seeking to recover funds that were erroneously removed from his pension fund account and credited to that of his former wife. The district court entered judgment against the Plan, including the principal amount, accumulated earnings, and pre-judgment interest. On appeal, the Plan argued that enforcement of the judgment was prohibited by the terms of the pension agreement, ERISA's anti-alienation provision, and other provisions of federal and state law. The Plan also argued that the district court's award of accumulated earnings was inconsistent with the court's decision in Dobson v. Hartford Financial Services Group. The court considered all the Plan's arguments and found that none of them warranted reversal of the district court's judgment that the Plan must pay plaintiff what he was due, whether or not it could succeed in recovering the funds that it, through no fault of plaintiff's, erroneously paid to his former wife.

The government appealed from two interlocutory orders. The first order suppressed cocaine seized from defendant's person incident to his warrantless arrest, as well as statements made by defendant, based on a lack of probable cause to support the arrest. The order also suppressed evidence seized from defendant's residence pursuant to the execution of a search warrant on the ground that without the reference to the cocaine seized from defendant's person, the warrant application did not establish probable cause to search the residence. The second order denied the government's motion for reconsideration of the suppression decisions in the first order. The court held that the district court erred in determining that defendant's warrantless arrest was not supported by probable cause, and thus, evidence seized from defendant's person and residence, as well as the statements made by defendant during and after his arrest, should not have been suppressed. Accordingly, the judgment was reversed and remanded.

Claimant appealed from a judgment of the district court ordering the forfeiture to plaintiff United States, pursuant to 22 U.S.C. 401(a), of certain communication-jamming devices, to wit, the defendant-in-rem Jammers, owned by claimant and a company of which he was the majority shareholder and CEO. On appeal, claimant contended that the district court erred in dismissing his claim, arguing principally that the stipulation he signed was void on the grounds that it was signed under duress and without consideration. The court held that, as a matter of New York law, no consideration for claimant's agreement to the release was needed; and thus, if consideration was absent, its absence did not make the stipulation invalid. The court also held that claimant's assertions did not meet any part of the test of duress. The court further held that the district court correctly granted the government's motion to strike or for summary judgment on the ground of claimant's lack of Article III standing. Accordingly, the judgment was affirmed.

Plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief, alleging that recently-enacted amendments to the New York City Administrative Code, commonly known as the "pay-to-play" rules, violated the First Amendment by unduly burdening protected political speech and association, the Fourteenth Amendment by denying equal protection of the laws, and the Voting Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 1973. The challenged provisions (1) reduced below the generally-applicable campaign contribution limited the amounts that people who have business dealings with the city, including lobbyists, could contribute to political campaigns; (2) denied matching funds for contributions by people who have business dealings with the city and certain people associated with lobbyists; and (3) extended the existing prohibition on corporate contributions to partnerships, LLCs, and LLPs. The court affirmed summary judgment as to all three provisions, finding that the laws were closely drawn to address the significant governmental interest in reducing corruption or the appearance thereof.

Petitioner, wanted in his native Greece on charges related to the kidnapping and murder of a minor, was certified extraditable after a hearing in the district court, notwithstanding certain arguments he made regarding Greece's compliance, vel non, with its own criminal procedure. This appeal required the court to clarify the proper role of a district court considering a petition for a writ of habeas corpus challenging an extradition order. The court held that the district court erred by placing the burden of proof in the habeas proceeding on the United States rather than on petitioner and by engaging in an improper inquiry into Greece's compliance with its own laws. The court reaffirmed that a court considering an extradition request - or a petition for habeas corpus seeking collateral review of an extradition order - could review the demanding government's compliance with its own laws only insofar as it was necessary to ensure that the provisions of the federal extradition statute and relevant extradition treaty have been met. The court further held that petitioner had not carried his burden of proving that the requirements of the treaty were met. Accordingly, the court reversed the judgment, vacated the writ, and remanded the cause to the district court with instructions to enter a certificate of extraditability and order of commitment.

Plaintiff appealed from a judgment of the district court dismissing her disability discrimination claim under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. 12101 et seq., as untimely. The court concluded that the 90-day limitations period provided by 42 U.S.C. 2000e-5(f)(1) began to run when a right-to-sue letter issued by the EEOC was first received either by the claimant or by the claimant's counsel. Therefore, because plaintiff initiated this action 93 days after her presumptive receipt of the right-to-sue letter, the district court properly held that her claim was time-barred. Accordingly, the judgment was affirmed.

Defendant appealed from a conviction of 16 counts of aiding and assisting in the preparation of false federal income tax returns and was sentenced to concurrent terms of 41 months incarceration, three years' supervised release, and restitution and a special assessment. The court affirmed the conviction except with respect to certain aspects of the sentence, as to which the judgment was vacated and remanded for: (1) resentencing within the range authorized by statute, and (2) amendment of the restitution order to: (a) determine whether the State and the City of New York were victims entitled to restitution, (b) exclude payments already made by the five taxpayer-clients to the IRS, and (c) exclude losses associated with a 2001 tax return that did not serve as a basis for any of the 16 counts of conviction.

Plaintiff appealed from the dismissal of its complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and from the district court's order denying its motion for reconsideration. Plaintiff asserted, inter alia, claims against defendants under the First and Fourth Amendments and under the Right to Financial Privacy Act, 12 U.S.C. 3401-3422, as well as under state constitutions and various anti-wiretapping, consumer protection, and deceptive trade practices laws. On appeal, plaintiff argued that the district court erred by holding that it lacked standing, by denying jurisdictional discovery, and by denying it leave to amend its complaint. The court held that the district court correctly determined that plaintiff did not have Article III standing to assert its claims. Consequently, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying plaintiff's request for jurisdictional discovery and for leave to amend its complaint. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment and order of the district court.