Justia U.S. 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

This cross-appeal arose out of the trial and retrial of plaintiff's claim against his former employer and his supervisor for tortious interference with a job offer from another firm. Upon retrial, the second jury returned a verdict in plaintiff's favor and awarded substantive monetary damages. The court held that the district court abused its discretion in granting the new trial where the verdict, predicated almost entirely on the jury's assessment of credibility, could not be said to have been either egregious or a serious miscarriage of justice. Accordingly, the court reversed the order of the district court, vacated the judgment entered on the basis of the second verdict, and remanded the case to the district court with instructions to reinstate the first verdict and to enter judgment in defendant's favor in accordance with that verdict.

Statek appealed from an order of the district court affirming the order of the bankruptcy court, disallowing its claim against the bankruptcy estate of Coudert and affirming the denial of Statek's motion to reconsider the bankruptcy court's order. The court held that the bankruptcy court should have applied the choice of law rules of the State of Connecticut, where Statek's pre-bankruptcy action against Coudert had been commenced, and not the choice of law rules of New York State, where the bankruptcy court was located. Accordingly, the court vacated the judgment and remanded.

The Bank of New York Mellon, acting in its capacity as trustee of trusts established to hold residential mortgage-backed securities, settled claims that the originator and servicer breached obligations owed to the trusts. Then, as a condition precedent to the settlement, the Bank initiated an Article 77 proceeding in New York Supreme Court to confirm that it had the authority to enter into the settlement under the governing trust documents and that entry into the settlement did not violate its duties under the governing trust agreements. On appeal from an order of the district court denying petitioners' motion to remand the proceeding to New York Supreme Court, the court considered the application of 28 U.S.C. 1453(d)(3) and 1332(d)(9)(C), exceptions to the federal jurisdiction conferred by the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 (CAFA), Pub.L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4. The court held that the case fell within CAFA's securities exception as one that solely involved a claim that "related to the rights, duties (including fiduciary duties), and obligations relating to or created by or pursuant to" a security. Accordingly, the court dismissed the petition for lack of jurisdiction, reversed the order of the district court, and instructed it to vacate its decision and order and remanded the matter to state court.

Petitioner, a native and citizen of the People's Republic of China, appealed the BIA's decision affirming an IJ's finding that she filed a frivolous asylum application. At issue was whether (1) a "frivolousness finding" could be entered against an alien who had withdrawn her asylum application; and (2) an IJ retained any discretion to decline to make a frivolousness finding. The court held that the BIA's conclusion that a withdrawn asylum application could serve as the basis of a frivolousness finding was reasonable, but that the BIA's decision that the IJ lacked discretion not to make such a finding was unpersuasive. Accordingly, the court denied the petition in part and granted in part, vacating the BIA's decision and remanding for further proceedings.

Petitioner, a native and citizen of Ecuador, sought review of the BIA's decision affirming the IJ's denial of his application for cancellation of removal and ordering him removed. At issue was whether the notice requirements of Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) 239(a)(1), 8 U.S.C. 1229(a)(1), were satisfied by service of a Notice to Appear that indicated that the date and time of a hearing would be set in the future, followed by service of a separate notice specifying the precise date and time of the hearing. Also at issue was whether the stop-time rule of INA 240A(d)(1) was triggered by proper notice under section 239(a)(1) even if the notice requirements of section 239(a)(2) were not satisfied. The court held that service of Notice of Appear followed by service of a separate notice indicating the precise date and time of the hearing satisfied the notice requirements of section 239(a)(1). The court also held that, once a petitioner had been served with notice complying with INA 239(a)(1), the stop-time rule of section 240A(d)(1) was triggered, regardless of whether subsequent notices regarding changes in time or place of proceeding complied with section 239(a)(2). Because petitioner could not demonstrate that he was physically present in the United States for a continuous period of ten years immediately prior to his application for relief, he was ineligible for relief in the form of cancellation of removal and adjustment of status under section 240A(b)(1) and therefore, the petition was denied.

Petitioner, a native and citizen of Ireland, sought review of an order of the BIA finding him ineligible for adjustment of status due to his inadmissibility under section 212(a)(6)(c)(ii) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(6)(c)(ii), for falsely representing himself to be a United States citizen. The court concluded that petitioner did not meet his burden of demonstrating that he did not represent himself to be a United States citizen when he checked the "citizen or national" box on an 1-9 Employment Eligibility Verification Form. Accordingly, the court denied the petition for review.

Defendant appealed from a judgment entered in the district court on a plea of possession of a firearm by a felon. After defendant's arrest, defendant inculpated himself when he was questioned by police before he received Miranda warnings and again later, after he was warned. Defendant contended that the subsequent confession must be suppressed because it was obtained through a two-part interrogation technique outlawed as a violation of the Fifth Amendment in Missouri v. Seibert. The court concluded that the subsequent confession was given voluntarily and without coercion, and was not elicited by the proscribed two-step technique. The court also concluded that the confession did not offend the Sixth Amendment because defendant's right to counsel had not yet attached, particularly with regard to the federal offense for which he was prosecuted. Accordingly, the judgment was affirmed.

Defendant appealed from a judgment following his guilty plea to conspiring to distribute and possess with intent to distribute heroin. On appeal, defendant contended that his above-Guidelines sentence was procedurally unreasonable because the district court impermissibly based the sentence on his rehabilitative needs. The court held that the district court did not impose the prison term to promote defendant's rehabilitative needs and that the court's discussion of rehabilitation during the sentencing proceeding was permissible. The court also concluded that defendant's sentence was procedurally and substantively reasonable. Accordingly, the judgment was affirmed.

Defendant pled guilty to several counts of mail and wire fraud, was convicted by a jury of violations of federal campaign finance law, and was sentenced to 292 months in prison. Defendant appealed the resulting judgment of conviction on various grounds, including that the loss calculated for purposes of the Sentencing Guidelines improperly included promised returns on defendant's victims' investments. The court affirmed the district court in all respects, and held that (1) defendant waived any statute of limitations challenge to the indictment by pleading guilty; (2) the district court's admission of the Ponzi scheme evidence was not plain error; (3) the district court did not err by calculating the intended loss amount under the Guidelines to include the loss of putative profits that victims reinvested in defendant's Ponzi scheme; (4) the district court did not abuse its discretion when weighing the factors relevant to defendant's sentence; and (5) under the circumstances of the case, the appointment of a new attorney for sentencing was not required.

Petitioner was convicted, inter alia, of murder and appealed the denial of his petition for a wit of habeas corpus brought under 28 U.S.C. 2254. Petitioner alleged that his rights were violated by the trial court's admission of (1) evidence of uncharged crimes and a tattoo featuring the word "Enforcer" and (2) the testimony of a medical examiner about an autopsy she had not performed. The district court rejected both claims. The court affirmed the judgment, holding that petitioner's first claim was without merit where, in admitting the contested evidence, the trial court reasonably applied New York law in a manner that was not contrary to or an unreasonable application of United States law or the Constitution. The evidence at issue was at least arguably relevant, and even assuming there was error, the evidence was not "so extremely unfair that its admission violate[d] 'fundamental conceptions of justice[.]'" The court also held that petitioner's second claim also failed because the state court's rulings were not contrary to clearly established federal law at the time.