Justia U.S. 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Velez moved from Ecuador at age 16 to live with her half-sister, Sanchez, Sanchez’s sister Munoz, and their mother, Yolanda Munoz, and perform housework and babysitting. The relationship deteriorated and Velez believed that she was being isolated and that promises were not kept. She sued under the Alien Tort Statute, 28 U.S.C. 1350, the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. 201-19, and New York state law. The district court dismissed certain claims, including breach of contract claim, allowed the parties to complete discovery and submit additional materials, then found sua sponte that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over ATS claims and converted them to a claim for a civil remedy under the Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act, 18 U.S.C. 1595, but granted summary judgment to defendants on all federal claims. The Second Circuit affirmed dismissal of the contract and ATS claims and vacated and remanded with respect to FLSA and state law claims. View "Velez v. Sanchez" on Justia Law

African-American firefighters brought a Title VII discrimination (42 U.S.C. 2000e) claim, based on 1998 and 2002 promotional examinations for the position of fire lieutenant. The district court ruled in favor of the city, finding that Buffalo had demonstrated that the test was job related and consistent with business necessity, despite the disparate impact of the 1998 examination on African Americans, and that plaintiffs were barred from challenging the job relatedness and business necessity of similarly derived examinations. The Second Circuit affirmed: an employer can show that examinations having a disparate impact on a protected class are job related and supported by business necessity when the analysis that produced the test relied on data not specific to that employer. While employer-specific data may make it easier for an employer to carry its burden in Title VII analysis, such evidence is not required as a matter of law. In this case, an independent state agency determined, based on empirical, expert, and anecdotal evidence drawn from fire departments across New York and the nation, that the job of fire lieutenant, wherever performed, involves common tasks requiring essentially the same skills, knowledge, abilities, and personal characteristics; and developed a general test based on those findings. View "M.O.C.H.A. Soc'y, Inc. v. City of Buffalo" on Justia Law

An Agreement was signed by ISC and by Gerber, treasurer of Nobel, under which ISC was to manage $200 million of Nobel assets; the Agreement provided for arbitration. Months later, ISC filed a petition to compel arbitration. Nobel argued that the court lacked personal jurisdiction and that the Agreement had been fraudulently procured by ISC, a firm with no history of asset management, and Gerber, who, without authority, had signed in exchange for a kickback. The district court denied the petition, noting that the American Arbitration Association had refused to arbitrate, because rules specified in the Agreement were incompatible with AAA arbitration. On remand, discovery problems arose; the court allowed withdrawal by ISC counsel; ISC filed notice of voluntary dismissal without prejudice and requested that the judge recuse himself because of his conversation with counsel about reasons for withdrawal. The court denied recusal, vacated notice of dismissal, and rescheduled the trial. ISC unsuccessfully attempted to obtain a stay. At trial, ISC declined to call witnesses or introduce evidence; the court dismissed with prejudice. The Second Circuit affirmed. Even if ISC counsel conveyed extrajudicial information, denial of recusal was appropriate. ISC’s purported voluntary dismissal was improper because Rule 41(a)(1)(A)(i) does not apply to petitions to compel arbitration. View "ISC Holding AG v. Nobel Biocare Fin. AG" on Justia Law

In 2005 Truman and partners purchased a vacant commercial building for $175,000, insured for $4,250,000 in fire-related losses. The property, without the building, was worth more than with the building. After a minor accidental fire, Truman told an employee that if it ever caught fire again, just get out. Considering leasing, Truman stated that it would make more money if it burnt. By late 2006, Truman had less than $5,000 in personal bank accounts. Premiums were paid through November 17. The building burned down November 12. Truman, Jr. confessed that he had burned the building at his father’s direction. State charges were dismissed because of inability to corroborate junior’s testimony, as required under New York law. Truman was charged with aiding and abetting arson, 18 U.S.C. 844(i); mail fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1341; use of fire in commission of a felony, 18 U.S.C. 844(h); and loan fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1341. Following a guilty verdict the district court granted acquittal and conditionally granted a new trial. The Second Circuit vacated and remanded for sentencing. Junior’s refusal to answer certain questions did not render his testimony incredible as a matter of law, and his prior state testimony was nonhearsay. Truman was not prejudiced by improper cross-examination or summation argument references to the cooperation agreement. View "United States v. Truman" on Justia Law

Krist claimed that defendant, a New York City restaurant, discriminated against her on the basis of her disabilities in violation of of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. 12181-12189; New York State Executive Law 290-301; and New York City Administrative Code 8-101 to 8-703 by attempting to restrict her access and that of her service dog to the restaurant and by verbally harassing her on account of her disability and use of the service dog. The district court dismissed. The Second Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments that the ADA imposes a code of civility and that the trial court erroneously imposed a requirement that plaintiff prove intentional discrimination. View "Krist v. Kolombos Rest. Inc." on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to a two-count information that charged him with producing child pornography, 18 U.S.C. 2251(a) and possessing child pornography, 18 U.S.C. 2252A(a)(5)(B), (b)(2), and was sentenced to concurrent sentences of imprisonment for 240 months and 120 months and 40 years of supervised release with numerous conditions. The Second Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument that his plea was defective because the district court did not advise him of the possibility of civil commitment as a sexually dangerous person at the end of his prison term under the Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006, 18 U.S.C. 4248(a) (2006).The court was not required by due process or Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure to advise of the possibility of civil commitment. View "United States v. Youngs" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a seaman, contracted lymphoma and sued his former employer, a tugboat operator, seeking maintenance and cure. The doctrine of maintenance and cure concerns the vessel owner’s obligation to provide food, lodging, and medical services to a seaman injured while serving the ship. Undisputed evidence established that the seaman had lymphoma during his maritime service, but the disease did not present any symptoms at all until after his service. The district court granted summary judgment for the tugboat operator. The Second Circuit reversed. Because the seaman’s illness indisputably occurred during his service, he is entitled to maintenance and cure regardless of when he began to show symptoms. View "Messier v. Bouchard Transp." on Justia Law

Based on GT’s audit of the financial statements of its client, Winstar, plaintiffs (Winstar stockholders) claimed that GT committed securities fraud under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. 78j(b), and made false and misleading statements in an audit opinion letter, 15 U.S.C. 78r. The district court dismissed. The Second Circuit remanded, finding that triable questions of fact exist as to whether GT acted with scienter in making alleged misrepresentations in its audit opinion letter, whether plaintiffs purchased Winstar’s stock in actual reliance on those representations, and whether plaintiffs suffered losses as a result. View "Gould v. Winstar Commc'n, Inc." on Justia Law

Convicted of conspiracy to distribute and to possess with intent to distribute cocaine, heroin, ketamine, and morphine, 21 U.S.C. 846; distribution and possession with intent to distribute cocaine and attempting to distribute and to possess with intent to distribute morphine and ketamine, 21 U.S.C. 812, 841(a)(1), and 841(b)(1)(C), defendant, a previously convicted felon, was sentenced to four concurrent terms of 120 months, the mandatory minimum. The Second Circuit remanded for resentencing, noting that the indictment did not properly allege any quantified amount of cocaine, so that defendant should have been sentenced under 21 U.S.C. 841(b)(1)(C), the penalty provision that does not depend on quantity and does not, except in circumstances not present here, provide a mandatory minimum prison term. View "United States v. Gonzalez" on Justia Law

A jury convicted defendant of conspiracy, (Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C. 1962(d)), and being a felon in possession of a firearm, (18 U.S.C. 922(g)). The district court upheld the firearm conviction, but vacated the RICO conviction and dismissed the conspiracy count from his indictment. The court stated that the attempt to prosecute conspiracy to violate the Contraband Cigarette Trafficking Act, 18 U.S.C. 2341, failed for unconstitutional vagueness in New York Tax Law, 471, which delineated the parameters of a CCTA violation. The Second Circuit reversed, holding that a prior decision to certify questions regarding Section 471 to the state’s highest court did not indicate that that statute was unconstitutionally vague. The court rejected a claim that the CCTA was inapplicable to defendant given New York’s “forbearance policy,” under which the state refrained from collecting taxes on cigarette sales transacted on Native American reservations. The forbearance policy did not signal a choice not to enforce tax laws when enforcement would be possible, but represented a concession to the difficulty of state enforcement, complex jurisdictional issues surrounding reservation-based cigarette sales, and the politically combustible nature of bootlegging prosecutions. Congress enacted the CCTA to provide federal support to states struggling with those circumstances. View "United States v. Morrison" on Justia Law