Justia U.S. 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in September, 2012
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Defendant pleaded guilty to drug charges. On appeal, defendant argued that the district court erred by applying the ten-year mandatory minimum in 21 U.S.C. 841(b)(1)(B) without first concluding that a ten-year sentence was "not greater than necessary" to achieve the sentencing objectives listed in 18 U.S.C. 3553(a)(2). The court rejected defendant's argument and held that a statutory mandatory minimum provision constrained a district court's discretion under section 3553(a) when it "specifically provides" for a minimum sentence. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. Carter" on Justia Law

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The State appealed from the district court's grant of petitioner's petition for a writ of habeas corpus. After petitioner's initial sentence was vacated on the ground that it was illegal, the state court resentenced him to a term he contended was higher than his initial sentence and that, as a result, this higher sentence was presumptively vindictive under North Carolina v. Pearce. Because the court concluded that the Appellate Division's determination that the Pearce presumption did not apply to petitioner's resentence was not an unreasonable application of Supreme Court law, the court reversed. View "Somerville v. Hunt" on Justia Law

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Petitioner, a native and citizen of Albania, sought review of the BIA's order reversing the decision of the IJ, which granted her application for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture. The IJ found that petitioner testified credibly and belonged to a particular social group at risk of being kidnapped and forced into prostitution. Because the court found that young, unmarried Albanian women did not constitute a social group for asylum purposes, the court denied the petition for review. View "Gjura v. Holder" on Justia Law

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This appeal concerned a longstanding land-use dispute between the Church and the Town over the Church's plan to build a worship facility and school on land that it owned within the Town. The Town appealed from the district court's holding that they violated the Church's rights under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), 42 U.S.C. 2000cc et seq., as well as the First Amendment, the Equal Protection Clause, and New York constitutional and statutory law. The court concluded that the Town's arguments on appeal were without merit and concluded that the district court correctly applied the law, discerning no clear error in its factual findings. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Fortress Bible Church v. Feiner" on Justia Law

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Plaintiff, a retail consumer of electricity in New York City, sued KeySpan, a producer of electricity in New York, alleging that it colluded with one of its rivals to increase installed capacity prices. Plaintiff also alleged that Morgan Stanley, a financial firm, facilitated KeySpan's anticompetitive conduct. Plaintiff subsequently appealed from the district court's dismissal of his federal and state antitrust claims against KeySpan and Morgan Stanley. The court agreed with the district court that plaintiff lacked standing to pursue his federal claims because he was an indirect purchaser and that his claims were otherwise barred by the filed rate doctrine. View "Simon v. Keyspan Corporation" on Justia Law

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The Department appealed summary judgment to R.E. and M.E. on their claim for tuition reimbursement under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), 20 U.S.C. 1400 et seq, and summary judgment to R.K. on her claim for tuition reimbursement under the IDEA. Plaintiff E.Z.-L. also appealed. The court held that courts must evaluate the adequacy of an individualized educational program (IEP) prospectively as of the time of the parents' placement decision and could not consider "retrospective" testimony regarding services not listed in the IEP. However, the court rejected a rigid "four-corners rule" that would prevent a court from considering evidence explicating the written term of the IEP. In R.E., the court found that the Department offered the student a free and appropriate public education (FAPE) and reversed the decision of the district court. In R.K., the court found that the Department failed to offer the student a FAPE and affirmed the decision of the district court. In E.Z.-L., the court found that the Department offered the student a FAPE and affirmed the decision of the district court. View "R.E. v. New York City Dept of Education; R.K. v. New York City Dept of Education; E.Z.-L v. New York City Dept of Education " on Justia Law

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This case arose when plaintiffs submitted Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), 5 U.S.C. 552, requests to defendants for "any and all documents containing guidance" provided by the OLC to any representatives of HHS or USAID "relating to the enforcement" of the pledge requirement purporting to require all organizations that receive funds for HIV/AIDS and anti-trafficking work to have "a policy explicitly opposing prostitution and sex trafficking." Defendants subsequently appealed from the district court's order granting summary judgment for plaintiff, denying defendants' cross-motion for summary judgment. The court ordered disclosure by defendants of three memoranda prepared by the OLC because they were not covered by the deliberative process exemption, 5 U.S.C. 552(b)(5), from the general requirement of disclosure contained in the FOIA. The court concluded that one such memorandum was incorporated by reference in a USAID document such that the protection of the exemption was surrendered, but that the other two were not and retained their exempt status. View "Brennan Center for Justice v. United States Department of Justice" on Justia Law

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Plaintiff sued defendants, Queens County Assistant District Attorneys, alleging that defendants' interrogation of her following the arrest of her boyfriend, former New York State Senator Hiram Monserrate, violated her civil rights. Defendants appealed from the denial of absolute immunity in an action brought under, inter alia, 42 U.S.C. 1983. The court concluded that, viewed through the eye of a reasonable prosecutor, defendants' acts in the present case were well within their legitimate functions as prosecutors. Because the objective circumstances triggered absolute immunity, the court vacated the district court's order denying absolute immunity and remanded for further proceedings. View "Giraldo v. City of New York" on Justia Law

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This case arose when WWP sued Shinkong seeking damages and injunctive relief arising out of the failure of a joint venture between the parties. On appeal, WWP challenged the district court's order striking its expert report and claim for money damages after it attempted to file its expert disclosures seven weeks late, and later granting Shinkong summary judgment. Because the court found that WWP lacked sufficient notice of such severe consequences for late filing; an opportunity to respond before being sanctioned; and because the court found the penalty far exceeded the transgression, the court vacated and remanded for further proceedings. View "World Wide Polymers, Inc. v. Shinkong Synthetic Fibers Corp." on Justia Law

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Defendant, the school district superintendent, appealed from the district court's order denying his motion for summary judgment with regard to plaintiff's claim that she was fired in retaliation for her reports of financial malfeasance. The court concluded that plaintiff, a payroll clerk typist for the school district, was speaking pursuant to her official duties as a public employee and her speech was therefore not protected by the First Amendment. Accordingly, the court held that defendant was entitled to summary judgment. View "Ross v. Lichtenfeld" on Justia Law