Justia U.S. 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff appealed from the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Merck and the dismissal of her products liability claim for failure to provide an adequate warning regarding the risks associated with Fosamax. Fosamax has allegedly been linked to osteonecrosis of the jaw and plaintiff claimed that Merck should have known of a possible link between the drug and the condition. At issue was whether the district court erred in granting Merck's summary judgment motion after discrediting expert testimony from plaintiff's treating physician. Because the physician's expert testimony contained contradictions that were unequivocal and inescapable, unexplained, arose after the motion for summary judgment was filed, and were central to plaintiff's failure-to-warn claim, the court held that the district court did not err in determining that there was no genuine dispute of material fact raised by the later testimony. View "In Re: Fosamax Products Liability Litigation" on Justia Law

Petitioner appealed from the district court's denial of his petition for writ of habeas corpus. The district court held that petitioner's trial counsel was not constitutionally defective for failing to challenge a second offender notice filed by the government, which caused the five year mandatory minimum sentence for petitioner's convictions to increase to ten years. Given the defense bar's long-held position that Connecticut narcotics convictions categorically qualified under 21 U.S.C. 851, it did not constitute ineffective assistance for trial counsel to fail to challenge the second offender notice. Even if trial counsel's performance was deficient, there was not a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "McCoy v. United States" on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed from the district court's grant of summary judgment denying injunctive relief from New York's statutory handgun licensing requirement. The district court concluded that the statute limited the grant of handgun licenses to domiciliaries of the state and plaintiff was a part-time New York resident who was not a domiciliary of the state. The court held that certification of the statute's interpretation to the New York Court of Appeals was warranted. View "Osterweil v. Bartlett" on Justia Law

Plaintiff sued her employer, alleging violations of Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. 12131 et seq. Plaintiff alleged that her job as a librarian at the Library was terminated because of behavior symptomatic of her chronic mental illness. Because the court concluded that Title II did, in some circumstances, require reasonable departures from standards established by state laws, the court vacated the district court's judgment of dismissal in that respect. Because the court concluded, based principally on the structure of the ADA, that Title II did not apply to employment discrimination, the court affirmed the district court's judgment of dismissal of that claim. View "Mary Jo C. v. New York State and Local Retirement Sys." on Justia Law

Kathy Joy Kirkendall and her co-plaintiffs filed this putative class action suit, pursuant to the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. 1002-1461, which included claims for redetermination of benefits and for improper amendment of plan terms. Plaintiffs filed suit without first availing themselves of the procedure described for "benefits claims" in pension plan documents and the district court dismissed based on Kirkendall's failure to exhaust her administrative remedies. The court held that because Kirkendall reasonably interpreted the plan's exhaustion requirement not to apply to a determination of future benefits and did not exhaust her administrative remedies as a result, she was not required to exhaust her administrative remedies. The court also held that Halliburton's actions did not constitute an amendment within the meaning of ERISA section 204(g). View "Kirkendall et al v. Halliburton, Inc. et al" on Justia Law

This case stemmed from defendant's arrest for bank fraud. The government appealed the district court's denial of its motion in limine to admit a state court temporary restraining order as evidence against defendant. The court held that, because the government was seeking to admit the state court order for a non-hearsay purpose and because the district court's analysis pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 403 did not account for the order's probative value if offered to show knowledge, the court vacated the district court's order and remanded for further proceedings. View "United States v. Dupree" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a former sergeant with the Hartford Police Department, appealed the district court's grant of summary judgment to defendants where plaintiff alleged, inter alia, that defendants wrongfully failed to promote him and defendants instigated several internal affairs investigations into his conduct on the basis of his race or national origin. With respect to plaintiff's discrimination claims, the court held that he failed to introduce factual evidence that defendants' nondiscriminatory reasons for the investigation and failure to promote him were pretextual or that plaintiff's race or national origin was a motivating favor. With respect to Chief Croughwell, although the court agreed with plaintiff that his statement to the press implicated a matter of public concern, the court affirmed the judgment on the district court's alternative ground that Chief Croughwell was protected from liability by qualified immunity. View "Garcia v. Hartford Police Dept." on Justia Law

This case stemmed from bankruptcy court proceedings between MCI and CNI where MCI sought to recover from CNI allegedly unpaid telecommunications services. CNI counterclaimed. At issue on appeal was whether the district court properly granted relief under Rule 4(a)(6) to CNI when it claimed that it never received the Civil Rule 77(d) notice and therefore failed to file a timely notice of appeal. The court agreed with the district court that CNI met the express preconditions of Rule 4(a)(6). The court held that relief under the rule was discretionary and its grant in this case was inappropriate. The failure to receive Civil Rule 77(d) notice was entirely and indefensibly the fault of CNI's counsel. Granting such relief in these circumstances was at odds with the purposes and structure of the procedural scheme. Accordingly, the court reversed the order granting the motion to reopen and dismissed CNI's appeal as untimely. View "In re: WorldCom, Inc. v. MCI Worldcom Communications" on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed from the district court's judgment denying his motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and granting the motion for summary judgment by Lloyds. At issue was whether federal common law or state law provided the meaning of "arbitration" within the Federal Arbitration Act, 8 U.S.C. 201-208. The court held that the meaning of "arbitration" under the Act was governed by federal common law. The court concluded that the district court properly decided that it had subject matter jurisdiction over this suit by applying cases resting in federal common law and that the district court properly granted summary judgment to Lloyds. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Bakoss v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyds of London" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, victims and families of victims of terrorist attacks committed in Israel between 1995-2004, brought claims under the Anti-Terrorism Act, 18 U.S.C. 2333, and the Alien Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. 1350, seeking monetary damages from Arab Bank. Plaintiffs alleged that Arab Bank provided financial services and support to terrorists during this period, facilitating the attacks. On appeal, Arab Bank challenged the district court's orders imposing sanctions pursuant to Rule 37(b) for its failure to comply with several of that court's discovery-related orders, and petitioned the court under 28 U.S.C. 1651 for a writ of mandamus directing vacatur of the district court's sanctions order. The court concluded that the sanctions order was not a reviewable collateral order, and therefore dismissed Arab Bank's appeal for want of jurisdiction. The court also concluded that this was not an appropriate case for issuance of the extraordinary writ of mandamus, since the court agreed with plaintiffs that Arab Bank had not established that it had a clear and indisputable right to such drastic relief or that review after final judgment would not provide adequate relief. Accordingly, the court dismissed the appeal and denied the petition for mandamus. View "Linde v. Arab Bank, PLC" on Justia Law