Justia U.S. 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Defendant appealed his conviction for cultivating marijuana plants. The court vacated the judgment and remanded for a new trial, agreeing with defendant that the district court denied him the right to present a meaningful defense by rejecting his proffer of surrebuttal evidence to counter evidence introduced by the government on rebuttal. View "United States v. Cody (Murray)" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a native of the Dominican Republic, petitioned for review of the BIA's dismissal of his appeal from an IJ's decision denying cancellation of removal and the BIA's decision not to reopen his case. The IJ concluded that petitioner had not met his burden of proving the ten years of continuous presence required for cancellation of removal under 8 U.S.C. 1229b(b)(1)(A). The court concluded that the IJ's conclusion was not supported by substantial evidence and the BIA's decision not to reopen proceedings was expressly premised on the same erroneous conclusion. Therefore, the court remanded Case No. 11-1833 for further proceedings. Because the court could not review the BIA's exercise of discretion denying cancellation of removal, the court dismissed Case No. 10-4100. View "Hernandez v. Holder" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against defendant, an attorney, for an alleged violation of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA), 15 U.S.C. 1692. At issue on appeal was whether a defendant remained liable for plaintiff's attorney's fees accrued after defendant offered a settlement that included the maximum available damages and, as mandated by statute, plaintiff's fees and costs, but that did not include an offer of judgment. The court concluded that because defendant's initial offer to settle did not include an offer of judgment, it did not fully resolve the dispute between the parties, and thus further litigation by plaintiff was not per se unreasonable; the district court did not abuse its discretion in awarding full attorney's fees to plaintiff; and, therefore, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Cabala v. Crowley" on Justia Law

Defendant, convicted of drug and firearms offenses, appealed from the district court's denial of his motion for a new sentence reduction under 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(2). The court vacated and remanded, concluding that the district court did not provide a sufficient explanation of its decision not to reduce defendant's sentence despite his eligibility for such a reduction. View "United States v. Christie" on Justia Law

Starbucks filed suit against Black Bear claiming, among other things, trademark dilution in violation of the Federal Trademark Dilution Act (FTDA), 15 U.S.C. 1125(c), 1127. The district court denied Starbucks request for an injunction, concluding that Starbucks failed to prove that Black Bear's "Charbucks" marks at issue were likely to dilute Starbucks' famous "Starbucks" marks. The court concluded that the district court did not err in its factual findings that there was only a minimal degree of similarity between the Starbucks marks and the Charbucks marks and that Starbucks demonstrated only a weak association between the marks. Balancing the section 1125(c)(2)(B) factors and other facts that bear on a likelihood of dilution, the court agreed with the district court that Starbucks failed to show that Black Bear's use of its marks in commerce was likely to dilute the Starbucks marks. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Starbucks Corp. v. Wolfe's Borough Coffee, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs appealed from the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the NYPD on plaintiffs' Fourth Amendment challenge to NYPD Interim Order 52 (IO-52). IO-52 requires the administration of a breathalyzer test to any officer whose discharge of his firearm within New York City resulted in death or injury to any person. The court concluded that the immediate objectives of IO-52 testing were personnel management of, and public confidence in, the NYPD; the identified objectives qualified as "special needs" for purposes of Fourth Amendment reasonableness review because they were distinct from normal law enforcement concerns and incompatible with the warrant and probable cause requirements for law enforcement searches; and the special needs greatly outweighed officers' reduced expectation of privacy with respect to alcohol testing at the time of any firearms discharge causing death or personal injury, thereby rendering warrantless, suspicionless IO-52 testing constitutionally reasonable as a matter of law. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's award of summary judgment to the NYPD on plaintiffs' Fourth Amendment challenge to IO-52. View "Lynch v. City of New York" on Justia Law

This case arose when partners of the law firm Thelen LLP, a registered limited liability partnership governed by California law, voted to dissolve the firm. At issue was whether, for purposes of administering the firm's related bankruptcy, New York law treats a dissolved law firm's pending hourly fee matters as its property. The court certified controlling questions of law to the New York Court of Appeals, concluding that the court could not definitely answer the issue without the guidance of the state court. View "In Re: Thelen LLP" on Justia Law

This case involved shareholders who owned stock in a C Corporation, which in turn held appreciated property. Commissioner appealed the district court's holding that Diebold could not be held liable as a transferee of a transferee under 26 U.S.C. 6901. The court concluded that the standard of review for mixed questions of law and fact in a case on review from the Tax Court was the same as that for a case on review after a bench trial from the district court: de novo to the extent that the alleged error was in the misunderstanding of a legal standard and clear error to the extent the alleged error was in a factual determination. On the merits, the court held that the two requirements of 26 U.S.C. 6901 were separate and independent inquiries, one procedural and governed by federal law, and the other substantive and governed by state law; under the applicable state statute, the series of transactions at issue collapsed based upon the constructive knowledge of the parties involved; and the court vacated the Tax Court's decision and remanded for further proceedings. View "Diebold Foundation, Inc. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs appealed from the district court's grant of defendants' motion for summary judgment on plaintiffs' Truth in Lending Act (TILA), 15 U.S.C. 1601 et seq., claims and denial of plaintiffs' motion for reconsideration of an earlier dismissal of their Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA), 15 U.S.C. 1692 et seq., claims against The Money Store. The court held that the district court erred in concluding that The Money Store was not a "debt collector" under the false name exception to FDCPA liability. Where a creditor, in the process of collecting its own debts, hires a third party for the express purpose of representing to its debtors that the third party is collecting the creditor's debts, and the third party engages in no bona fide efforts to collect those debts, the false name exception exposes the creditor to FDCPA liability. In regards to the TILA claims, the court concluded that the district court correctly determined that, because plaintiffs' mortgage documents did not name The Money Store as the person to whom the debt was initially payable, The Money Store was not a "creditor" under TILA and was therefore not subject to liability. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Vincent v. The Money Store" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed pro se from the district court's order denying his motion for a modification of the conditions of his supervised release to require that supervised release be served in the Eastern District of Michigan, rather than in the District of Vermont, where he was convicted and sentenced. The court vacated and remanded, concluding that the district court had authority to entertain defendant's motion for modification of his supervised-release conditions under 18 U.S.C. 3583(e)(2) and to grant that motion with the qualification specified by the Eastern District of Michigan in its conditional agreement to accept defendant for supervision. The motion for an injunction pending appeal was denied as moot. View "United States v. Murdock" on Justia Law