Justia U.S. 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Defendant appealed his federal kidnapping conviction, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to prove that he held his kidnapping victim against the victim's will. The court concluded that the evidence was sufficient to demonstrate that defendant, after tricking his victim into a minivan, intended to continue holding the victim against his will - and so defendant did - before robbing and killing the victim, and leaving his body along the road. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "United States v. Corbett" on Justia Law

Defendant pled guilty to one count of conspiring to provide material support to a designated foreign terrorist organization. On appeal, defendant argued that the indictment to which he pled guilty failed to adequately allege a nexus between his alleged conduct and the United States, as required by the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment before a criminal statute may apply extraterritorially. The court concluded that defendant's argument was waived because the existence of a territorial nexus was not an element of subject-matter jurisdiction. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "United States v. Yousef" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed his conviction on one count of making false statements to the Government, one count of obstruction of justice, and one count of mail fraud. The court held that there was no per se violation of the Sixth Amendment right to be represented by one's counsel of choice and to effective assistance of counsel when a district court, after defense counsel has become incapacitated, appoints counsel, over defendant's objection, to deliver the defense summation, notwithstanding the fact that appointed counsel did not witness the presentation of the evidence. Defendant's Sixth Amendment claim failed because the district court's decision to appoint substitute counsel was reasonable and defendant showed no prejudice arising from that appointment. The court also held that the evidence was sufficient for a jury to convict on all three counts. View "United States v. Griffiths" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit against defendants, alleging, inter alia, that Barclays knowingly misrepresented its cost of borrowing funds by submitting false information for the purpose of calculating the London Interbank Offered Rate (LIBOR), in violation of section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Securities and Exchange Commission Rule 10b-5. The court held that the district court erred in concluding, prior to any discovery, that plaintiffs failed to plead loss causation where plaintiffs' allegations that the June 28, 2012 decline in Barclay's stock price resulted from the revelation of Barclay's misrepresentations of its 2007-2008 LIBOR rates and defendant Diamond's conference call misrepresentation of Barclays's borrowing costs presented a plausible claim. The court also held that the district court correctly concluded that Barclays's statements in its SEC filings relating to the company's internal control requirements were not materially false. Accordingly, the court vacated in part, affirmed in part, and remanded. View "Carpenters Pension Trust v. Barclays PLC, et al." on Justia Law

Sonera, a Dutch holding corporation, filed suit in district court to enforce a final arbitration award against Cukurova, the parent company of a large Turkish conglomerate. The district court held that it had personal jurisdiction over Cukurova based primarily on the New York contacts of several companies with which Cukurova is affiliated. The Supreme Court's decision in Daimler AG v. Bauman reaffirms that general jurisdiction extends beyond an entity's state of incorporation and principal place of business only in the exceptional case where its contacts with another forum are so substantial as to render it "at home" in that state. Even assuming that the activities of Cukurova's affiliates can be ascribed to it for the purpose of general jurisdiction analysis, Cukurova lacks sufficient contacts with New York to render it "at home" there. Accordingly, the court reversed in part, vacated in part, and remanded. View "Sonera Holding B.V. v. Cukurova Holding A.S." on Justia Law

Defendant appealed from his sentence after pleading guilty to failure to register as a sex offender. Defendant argued that the district court should have dismissed the indictment because at the time of defendant's interstate travel, the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA), 18 U.S.C. 2250 and 42 U.S.C. 16911, was not applicable to pre-Act offenders such as lot. The court concluded that the Final Rule postdates defendant's travel to Vermont and was therefore not applicable; because the court found that the Sentencing, Monitoring, Apprehending, Registering, and Tracking (SMART) Guidelines validly extended SORNA's applicability to pre-Act offenders, the court need not decide whether the Interim Rule had the same effect; and defendant's constitutional claims were without merit. The court also concluded that the district court did not commit error by imposing an eight-level sentencing enhancement under U.S.S.G. 2A3.5(b)(1)(C) for commission of a sex offense while in failure-to-register status. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "United States v. Lott" on Justia Law

The European Community filed suit against RJR, alleging that RJR directed, managed, and controlled a global money-laundering scheme with organized crime groups in violation of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) statute, 18 U.S.C. 1961 et seq., laundered money through New York-based financial institutions and repatriated the profits of the scheme to the United States, and committed various common law torts in violation of New York state law. The court concluded that the district court erred in dismissing the federal and state law claims; the court disagreed with the district court's conclusion that RICO cannot apply to a foreign enterprise or to extraterritorial conduct; the court concluded that, with respect to a number of offenses that constitute predicates for RICO liability and were alleged in this case, Congress had clearly manifested an intent that they apply extraterritorially; and, as to the other alleged offenses, the Complaint alleged sufficiently important domestic activity to come within RICO's coverage. The court also concluded that the district court erred in ruling that the European Community's participation as a plaintiff in this lawsuit destroyed complete diversity; the European Community is an "agency or instrumentality of a foreign state" under 28 U.S.C. 1603(b) and therefore, qualified as a "foreign state" for purposes of 28 U.S.C. 1332(a)(4); and its suit against "citizens of a State or of different States" came within the diversity jurisdiction. Accordingly, the court vacated and remanded for further proceedings. View "European Community v. RJR Nabisco, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), 5 U.S.C. 552, seeking documents related to the drone attacks that killed three United States citizens. Plaintiffs sought information concerning the attacks, notably, documents prepared by DOJ's Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) setting forth the Government's reasoning as to the lawfulness of the attacks. The district court dismissed on motions for summary judgment. The court concluded that a redacted version of the OLC-DOD Memorandum must be disclosed; a redacted version of the classified Vaughn index submitted by OLC must be disclosed, including the number, title, and description of all documents, with the exception of certain listing numbers; [redacted]; the Glomar and "no number, no list" responses were insufficinetly justified; DOD and CIA must submit Vaughn indices to the District Court for in camera inspection and appropriate redaction; and the OIP search was sufficient. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. View "The New York Times Company v. United States" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed a putative class action against MERS in state court asserting claims related to MERS's facilitation of the provision of "Esign" mortgages to consumer-borrowers. MERS appealed the district court's grant of a motion to remand to New York state court on the ground that MERS's notice of removal was untimely. The court reversed and held that, in Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA) cases, the 30-day removal periods of 28 U.S.C. 1446(b)(1) and (b)(3) are not triggered until the plaintiff serves the defendant with an initial pleading or other paper that explicitly specifies the amount of monetary damages sought or sets forth facts from which an amount in controversy in excess of $5,000,000 can be ascertained. The court also held that where a plaintiff's papers failed to trigger the removal clocks of sections 1446(b)(1) and (b)(3), a defendant may remove a case when, upon its own independent investigation, it determines that the case is removable. Therefore, the 30-day removal periods of sections 1446(b)(1) and (b)(3) are not the exclusive authorizations for removal in CAFA cases. In this instance, plaintiffs never served MERS with a complaint or subsequent document explicitly stating the amount in controversy or providing MERS with sufficient information to conclude the threshold amount in controversy was satisfied. Therefore, the removal clocks of section 1446(b)(1) and (b)(3) did not commence. After MERS determined upon its independent investigation that section 1332(d) conveyed CAFA federal jurisdiction because the amount in controversy, number of plaintiffs, and minimal diversity requirements were satisfied, it properly removed the case by alleging facts adequate to establish the amount in controversy in its notice of removal. Accordingly, the court vacated and remanded. View "Cutrone v. Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc." on Justia Law

Defendant plead guilty to charges of transporting, receiving, and possessing child pornography. On appeal, defendant challenged the district court's determination that his prior state court conviction for Sexual Abuse in the Third Degree in violation of N.Y. Penal Law 130.60(2) subjected him to increased penalties under 18 U.S.C. 2252A(b)(1) and (b)(2) because it constituted a prior conviction under a state law "relating to aggravated sexual abuse, sexual abuse, or abusive sexual conduct involving a minor or ward." Applying the categorical approach, the court had little trouble concluding that defendant's prior conviction subjected him to enhanced sentencing. The court carefully considered defendant's remaining arguments and found them to be without merit. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "United States v. Allen" on Justia Law