Justia U.S. 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs appealed the district court's dismissal of their claims against four trusts to which their loans and mortgages were assigned in transactions involving the mortgagee bank, and against those trusts' trustee. The district court granted defendants' motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, finding that plaintiffs were neither parties to nor third-party beneficiaries of the assignment agreements and therefore lacked standing to pursue the claims. It is undisputed that in 2009 or 2010, each plaintiff was declared to be in default of his mortgage, and foreclosure proceedings were instituted in connection with the institution of said foreclosure proceedings, the trustee claimed to own each of plaintiff's mortgage and that plaintiffs are not seeking to enjoin foreclosure proceedings. Assuming that these concessions have not rendered plaintiffs' claims moot, the court affirmed the district court's ruling that plaintiffs lacked standing to pursue their challenges to defendants' ownership of the loans and entitlement to payments. Plaintiffs neither established constitutional nor prudential standing to pursue the claims they asserted. View "Rajamin v. Deutsche Bank Nat'l Trust Co." on Justia Law

After the jury returned a verdict in favor of ING on its breach of contract claims, the jury awarded ING attorney's fees under Georgia law. UPS moved under Rule 59(e) to amend the judgment to set aside the award of attorney's fees or, alternatively, for a new trial on the issue of attorney's fees. The court held that the district court erred in setting the verdict aside in light of UPS's failure to move for relief under Rule 50(a) and the existence of evidentiary support in the record for the jury's verdict. The court also concluded that a new trial was not warranted. Accordingly, the court reversed the order granting UPS's motion and remanded with instructions to reinstate the verdict and resolve ING's motion to set attorney's fees. View "ING Global v. United Parcel Service Oasis Supply Corp." on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed the district court's dismissal of his original complaint against DIL and his amended complaint against DIL's wholly-owned subsidiary, Daikin America. Plaintiff, a white male of United States origin, alleged that DIL and Daikin discriminated against him on the basis of his race and national origin. Plaintiff claimed that, for discriminatory reasons, Daikin America did not consider terminating any of the Japanese rotational employees or any employees of Japanese national origin who had been hired directly by Daikin America. The court concluded that, under the standards articulated in Cook v. Arrowsmith Shelburne, Inc., plaintiff sufficiently alleged that DIL was part of a "single integrated enterprise" with Daikin America to be properly named as a codefendant; plaintiff plausibly alleged a claim of race and national origin discrimination against both defendants; and, therefore, the court vacated and remanded for further proceedings. The court affirmed the judgment of the district court dismissing plaintiff's breach of contract claim because he failed to allege that either defendant maintained a written policy of terminating employees only for cause. View "Brown v. Daikin America Inc." on Justia Law

Non-Settling Defendants seek to overturn a partial final judgment approving the settlement of certain putative class actions. The settled claims were brought by Investor Plaintiffs who were individual and institutional investors in so-called Bernard Madoff feeder funds managed by the Fairfield Greenwich Group (Settling Defendants). The Non-Settling Defendants challenged a provision in the settlement agreement that provides that investors who filed claims under the settlement submit to the district court's jurisdiction for the sole purpose of participating in the settlement and not for any other purpose. The court joined its sister circuits in holding that a settlement which does not prevent the later assertion of a non-settling party's claims, does not cause the non-settling party "formal" legal prejudice. Therefore, the court concluded that the Non-Settling Defendants did not have standing to object to the settlement. The court declined to address the remaining issues on appeal and dismissed for lack of standing. View "Pricewaterhousecoopers, LLP, et al. v. Bhatia, et al." on Justia Law

Defendants Reed, Johnson, and Gonzalez appealed their convictions for conspiracy to commit Hobbs Act robbery and one count of attempted Hobbs Act robbery, both in violation of 18 U.S.C. 1951, and one count of possession and use of a firearm during a crime of violence resulting in the death of another. The court concluded that Reed's Sixth Amendment right to counsel may well have attached when the Grand Jury voted a true bill of indictment against him. The court need not decide that question, however, because any error in admitting at trial the lineup identification of Reed was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Other issues raised by defendants are considered in a summary order issued simultaneously with this opinion. View "United States v. Reed" on Justia Law

Giuffre, an authorized dealer of Hyundai automobiles under a contract with that company's domestic affiliate (HMA), filed suit against HMA seeking to enjoin termination of the contract. HMA terminated its contract with Giuffre after a state court concluded that the dealer had engaged in fraudulent, illegal, and deceptive business practices - a clear breach of the contract terms. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of HMA, concluding that the breach was incurable and that HMA was entitled to terminate the contract immediately, notwithstanding the terms of section 463 of the New York Vehicle and Traffic Law. The court affirmed, concluding that section 463 did not abrogate the common law with respect to incurable breaches of contract. View "Giuffre Hyundai, Ltd. v. Hyundai Motor America, Inc." on Justia Law

Asarco appealed from the district court's dismissal of its Second Amended Complaint. As part of its Chapter 11 bankruptcy, the bankruptcy court approved two settlement agreements related to the environmental contamination of the Everett Smelter and the Monte Cristo Mining area in Washington State. Asarco paid the United States as a result of those settlements and the Port of Everett $50.2 million for costs related to the remediation of the sites. Asarco then sought contribution, directly and as a purported subrogee, from the Trustees of the residuary trust created by the will of John D. Rockefeller Sr. in 1937. At issue was whether, in 2014, the Trustees may be made to contribute to cleanup costs of environmental contamination allegedly caused by corporations controlled by Rockefeller in Washington State between 1892 and 1903. Assuming arguendo that New York law permitted the imposition of liability on testamentary beneficiaries in this instance, the court concluded that the district court properly dismissed Asarco's contribution claims because they were barred by the applicable three-year statute of limitations, and its subrogation claims because Asarco was not a subrogee. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Asarco LLC v. Goodwin" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit alleging that CitiMortgage's responses to requests for information about her mortgage violated the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (RESPA), 12 U.S.C. 2601-2617; the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA), 15 U.S.C. 1692-1692p; and N.Y. General Business Law (GBL) section 349. The district court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6). The court concluded that plaintiff failed to allege that CitiMortgage did not properly designate a qualified written address (QWR) or that any or her lawyer's letters were sent to the designated address. Because plaintiff's lawyer's letters are not QWRs, CitiMortgage's RESPA duties were not triggered, and therefore the district court properly dismissed the RESPA claims. The district court did not err in dismissing the FDCPA claims where the amended complaint failed to alleged that CitiMortgage qualified as a debt collector under the FDCPA. The district court did not err in dismissing the section 349 claim where CitiMortgage's QWR address notice was not inadequate. Finally, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court and denied her request for leave to amend. View "Roth v. CitiMortgage Inc." on Justia Law

Continental issued claims-made liability policies to the architectural firm responsible for designing and overseeing the construction of a building for the DASNY. In this declaratory judgment action, the insurer appealed from the district court's ruling on summary judgment that the two design flaws in the same structure were not "related." The court concluded that the 2002 Demand Letter could not be fairly read to concern the Ice Control Issue; and, focuses entirely on the Steel Girt Tolerance Issue, it could not be fairly read as an omnibus claim concerning all architectural defects in the Baruch College building; the court agreed with the district court that the Steel Girt Tolerance Issue and the Ice Control Issue arose from two unrelated wrongful acts; and, therefore, the court affirmed the district court's declaration that the two issues were unrelated. However, the court concluded that the district court abused its discretion by awarding prejudgment interest from the date of the settlement agreement itself. Accordingly, the court vacated the award and remanded for further proceedings. View "Dormitory Authority v. Continental Casualty Co." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against defendants after she was temporarily removed from the office of the Clinton County Election Commissioner during her candidacy for Beekmantown Town Justice. Plaintiff alleged that her removal from office under Clinton County Local Law No. 1 was an unconstitutional retaliation for the exercise of her First Amendment rights in running for elective office. The court agreed with the district court that plaintiff's evidence failed to show a genuine issue of material fact supporting her claim of unconstitutional retaliation. The court affirmed the district court's judgment insofar as it dismissed her federal claim. The court vacated, however, the district court's grant of summary judgment for defendants on plaintiff's claim seeking a declaratory judgment that Local Law No. 1 is void under New York state law. The timing of the claim raises a substantial question whether the claim was moot. Therefore, the court remanded to the district court to consider the question of mootness in the first instance. View "Castine v. Zurlo" on Justia Law