Sarmiento v. United States

Plaintiffs appealed an order of the district court granting in part and denying in part the motion of defendant to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim. Plaintiffs contended that the IRS wrongfully withheld tax refunds to which plaintiffs were entitled as the result of the IRS's misinterpretation of contractual language in Offer-in-Compromise (OIC) agreements that plaintiffs entered into with the IRS. The principal issue on appeal was whether specialized tax terms in an OIC agreement derived their meaning from the Internal Revenue Code or from ordinary "plain English." The court held that, when used in IRS standard form documents, specialized tax terms such as "refund" and "overpayment" were interpreted in light of the Internal Revenue Code. Further, tax refunds made pursuant to the Economic Stimulus Act of 2008, I.R.C. 6428, related to the 2007 tax year, and so those refunds fell with the OIC agreements' temporal limitation. Finally, plaintiffs' agreement to forfeit their interest in "any" tax refund for the 2007 tax year encompassed anticipated as well as unanticipated tax refunds. Based on these holdings, the court concluded that the IRS correctly withheld the tax refunds at issue in this action from plaintiffs under the express terms of the OIC agreements.

Akinsade v. Holder

Petitioner, a noncitizen from Nigeria, petitioned for review of the BIA's decision affirming the IJ's decision finding petitioner removable under Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) section 237(a)(2)(A)(iii), 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii), because his conviction of embezzlement by a bank employee under 18 U.S.C. 656 constituted an aggravated felony. The court held that because none of the facts to which petitioner actually and necessarily pleaded to establish the elements of his embezzlement revealed whether that offense was committed with a specific intent to defraud, it was error for the BIA to infer that his conviction was an offense involving fraud or deceit. Accordingly, the court granted the petition for review, vacated the BIA's decision, and remanded for further proceedings.

United States v. Litwok

Defendant appealed her conviction of one count of mail fraud and three counts of tax evasion for calendar years 1995-1997. On appeal, defendant contended that the trial evidence was insufficient to support her convictions and that the mail fraud and the tax evasion counts were improperly joined. The court agreed with the sufficiency challenges relating to the tax evasion counts for 1996 and 1997 and reversed her convictions on those counts. The court vacated defendant's convictions for mail fraud and tax evasion for 1995 on the ground that those counts were improperly joined, and remanded the case to the district court for further proceedings.

United States v. Ramos

Defendant appealed his conviction following his guilty plea to illegally transporting aliens within the United States; assisting an inadmissible alien in entering the United States; and illegally being present in the United States after having previously been removed. On appeal, defendant contended, inter alia, that the district court miscalculated the applicable sentencing range under the Sentencing Guidelines by adding two points to his criminal history pursuant to U.S.S.G. 4A1.1(d) for his commission of an offense while under a criminal justice sentence. The court held that defendant's knowledge that he was subject to a term of supervised release was not required for the district court to impose an enhancement based on the fact that defendant committed the instant crimes while "under a[] criminal justice sentence." The court declined to reach defendant's ineffective assistance claim and dismissed without prejudice. With regard to defendant's remaining claims, the court found them to be without merit. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment.

Morris v. Holder

Petitioner, a native and citizen of the Grenadines, petitioned for review of the BIA's order affirming the IJ's finding that he was removable based on his second-degree assault conviction in violation of New York Law 120.05(2) and on the basis of petitioner's conviction of attempted criminal possession of a controlled substance in the seventh degree in violation of New York Penal Law 110 and 220.3. The court concluded that a conviction for second-degree assault under section 120.05(2) categorically constituted a "crime of violence" for the purposes of 18 U.S.C. 16(b). The court also concluded that the Supreme Court's decision in Padilla v. Kentucky did not overturn the court's precedent holding that the Ex Post Facto Clause was not applicable in the deportation and removal context. Accordingly, the court dismissed the petition.

Higgins v. Holder

Petitioner, a native and citizen of Jamaica, petitioned for review of the BIA's denial of his requests for cancellation of removal and a waiver of inadmissibility. The court held that a conviction for witness tampering under Connecticut General Statutes 53a-151 constituted an "offense relating to obstruction of justice" within the meaning of 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(S), and that petitioner was therefore ineligible for relief. His conviction stemmed from allegations that petitioner sexually assaulted a minor and later instructed her that, if she talked to the police, she should tell them that "nothing ever happened." Accordingly, the court dismissed the petition for review.

United States v. Zangari

Defendant, a securities broker, pleaded guilty to charges related to his conduct involving a bribe greater than $70,000. On appeal, defendant contended that the district court erred in calculating restitution insofar as it ordered both restitution and forfeiture in the amount of defendant's gains from the fraudulent scheme underlying his conviction. The court held that it was error for the district court to substitute defendant's gains for the victims' losses in calculating restitution, but declined to exercise the court's discretion to notice the error, as defendant failed to object in the district court, and had failed on appeal to show that the error affected his substantial rights or undermined the fairness, integrity, and public reputation of judicial proceedings.

Terranova v. State of New York

Plaintiffs, motorcyclists, appealed from a jury verdict finding New York State Troopers not liable for injuries that plaintiffs sustained, including one plaintiff who sustained mortal injuries during a traffic stop. Plaintiffs claimed that the troopers violated plaintiff's Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable seizure through the use of excessive force. The court held that the district court did not err by declining to instruct the jury regarding the use of "deadly force" in addition to a correct instruction on excessive force. Accordingly, the judgment was affirmed.

United States v. Aleynikov

Defendant, a computer programmer employed by Goldman Sachs & Co., appealed his conviction for stealing and transferring proprietary computer source code of Goldman's high frequency trading system in violation of the National Stolen Property Act (NSPA), 18 U.S.C. 2314, and the Economic Espionage Act of 1996 (EEA), 18 U.S.C. 1832. Defendant argued, inter alia, that his conduct did not constitute an offense under either statute because: (1) the source code was not a "stolen" "good" within the meaning of the NSPA, and (2) the source code was not "related" to a product "produced for or placed in interstate or foreign commerce" within the meaning of the EEA. The court agreed and concluded that defendant's conduct did not constitute an offense under either the NSPA or the EEA, and that the indictment was therefore legally insufficient. Accordingly, the court reversed the judgment of the district court.

In re: Quigley Company, Inc.

This case required the court to address the scope of federal bankruptcy jurisdiction over suits against non-debtor third parties, as well as the scope of a stay issued pursuant to 11 U.S.C. 524(g)(4). Pfizer and Quigley appealed from a judgment in the district court reversing the Clarifying Order of the bankruptcy court and holding that the Law Offices of Peter G. Angelos (Angelos) could bring suit against Pfizer for claims based on "apparent manufacturer" liability under Pennsylvania law. The court determined that it had jurisdiction to hear the appeal; that the bankruptcy court had jurisdiction to issue the Clarifying Order; and that the Clarifying Order did not bar Angelos from bringing the suits in question against Pfizer. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court.