Justia U.S. 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Christopher Pence was investigated after arranging, through the dark web, for the murder of Francesco and Christina Cordero, with whom he and his wife had a contentious relationship following the adoption of the Corderos' children. Pence provided the purported hitman with the Corderos' personal information and paid over $16,000 in Bitcoin. The FBI traced the online activity and cryptocurrency transaction to Pence’s Utah residence, but acknowledged that others in the household could have accessed the devices involved. After obtaining a search warrant, law enforcement executed an early morning raid on Pence’s home, subsequently separating him from his family and inviting him to speak voluntarily in an FBI vehicle parked outside.Following these events, Pence was questioned by agents in the vehicle without being handcuffed or physically restrained and was told he was not under arrest and did not have to answer questions. After a period of rapport-building, agents confronted him with evidence of his involvement in the murder-for-hire scheme, prompting Pence to confess before receiving Miranda warnings. Over two hours into the encounter, agents read Pence his rights, after which he continued to speak. Pence moved to suppress his pre-Miranda statements in the United States District Court for the Northern District of New York, arguing he was in custody during the interrogation. After an evidentiary hearing, the district court denied the motion, finding Pence was not in custody and thus Miranda warnings were not required at the time of his confession. Pence subsequently entered a conditional guilty plea and was sentenced.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the district court’s factual findings for clear error and legal conclusions de novo. The court held that, under the totality of the circumstances, a reasonable person in Pence’s position would not have believed he was in custody. The judgment of the district court was affirmed. View "United States v. Pence" on Justia Law

The case concerns a noncitizen, a native and citizen of Ecuador, who entered the United States without authorization around 1999. In 2009, he was convicted of reckless assault of a child and sentenced to three years in prison. During removal proceedings in 2010, the immigration judge advised him that his conviction made him ineligible for voluntary departure and offered removal instead. The noncitizen, after confirming his understanding of his rights and waiving his right to counsel and appeal, was removed to Ecuador in 2011. He later reentered the United States without permission and was arrested in 2021. In 2022, he was charged with aggravated illegal reentry.In the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, the defendant moved to dismiss the criminal information, arguing that recent Supreme Court precedent established he had, in fact, been eligible for voluntary departure at his 2010 hearing, and that the immigration judge’s erroneous advice rendered the proceedings fundamentally unfair. The District Court, relying on prior Second Circuit precedent from United States v. Sosa, excused the defendant’s failure to exhaust administrative remedies and granted the motion to dismiss, finding his waiver of appeal was not knowing and intelligent due to the immigration judge’s mistake.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case. It held that the Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Palomar-Santiago made clear that all three requirements of 8 U.S.C. § 1326(d)—exhaustion of administrative remedies, deprivation of opportunity for judicial review, and fundamental unfairness—are mandatory and cannot be excused by courts. Because the defendant failed to exhaust administrative remedies and was not deprived of the opportunity for judicial review, he was barred from collaterally attacking his removal order. The Second Circuit reversed the District Court’s dismissal and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "United States of America v. Mejia" on Justia Law

The plaintiff, David John Campbell, brought suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Broome County, the City of Binghamton, various officials and employees, and an unnamed New York State Police Trooper. He alleged that his rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments were violated in a series of incidents beginning in May 2022, related to his efforts to maintain or regain possession of firearms that he claimed he was licensed to possess. Specifically, Campbell described interactions with local law enforcement concerning the surrender and non-return or damage of his firearms, a traffic stop that he claimed was undocumented, and two police entries into his home in January 2023, during which firearms and other items were allegedly seized.The United States District Court for the Northern District of New York dismissed Campbell’s amended complaint sua sponte under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e), finding the allegations factually frivolous. The district court also ruled, in the alternative, that the complaint failed to allege the personal involvement of certain individual defendants and did not contain sufficient facts to support municipal liability under Monell v. Department of Social Services. The court denied Campbell leave to further amend his complaint.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed most of the district court’s dismissal, agreeing that the majority of Campbell’s claims were frivolous, that there were insufficient allegations of personal involvement for most individual defendants, and that the municipalities could not be held liable. However, the Second Circuit vacated and remanded the dismissal of Campbell’s Fourth Amendment claim against Officer Nicholas Mushalla, finding that the allegations regarding Mushalla’s search of Campbell’s home and seizure of property on January 13, 2023, were sufficient to state a claim. In all other respects, the judgment was affirmed. View "Campbell v. Broome County" on Justia Law

The defendant operated a business exchanging bitcoin for cash, advertising his services online and charging commission fees. Over several months, undercover DEA agents arranged multiple transactions with the defendant, exchanging large amounts of bitcoin for cash. During these exchanges, the agent initially claimed the bitcoin came from an online business but later said it was from drug sales. Despite this disclosure, the defendant continued the exchanges. Ultimately, he was arrested after arranging another large transaction.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York indicted the defendant on charges of money laundering and operating an unlicensed money transmitting business. During jury selection, the defense objected to the seating of a juror who expressed positive views toward law enforcement and negative views about financial crimes. The court denied the challenge for cause, empaneling the juror. The jury convicted the defendant on both counts. At sentencing, the court included all transactions with the undercover agent in calculating the offense level and imposed a term of imprisonment and supervised release.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit addressed several issues. It held that the district court did not abuse its discretion by empaneling the challenged juror, given the juror’s assurances of impartiality. The court further held that exchanging bitcoin for cash constitutes “money transmitting” under 18 U.S.C. § 1960 and its implementing regulations, and that the evidence was sufficient to sustain the conviction. Additionally, the court found no error in the district court’s supplemental jury instruction clarifying that such exchanges qualify as transfers of funds. Finally, the court dismissed the defendant’s sentencing challenges as moot because he had completed his prison term and raised no issues regarding supervised release. The judgment of the district court was otherwise affirmed. View "United States v. Goklu" on Justia Law

A New York citizen brought suit in federal court against a federally chartered corporation headquartered in Washington, D.C., alleging disability discrimination under New York law. The plaintiff invoked diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332, arguing that the defendant should be considered a citizen of the District of Columbia based on its principal place of business, even though it was not incorporated under the laws of any state.In the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York, the defendant moved to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, asserting that federally chartered corporations are not citizens of any state for diversity purposes absent unusual circumstances. The plaintiff initially argued for a judge-made expansion of diversity jurisdiction but later abandoned this theory in favor of a statutory argument based on § 1332(c)(1). The district court dismissed the complaint, finding that diversity jurisdiction was not established because the statute does not extend state citizenship to federally chartered corporations. The court also denied the plaintiff’s post-judgment motions for reconsideration and to reopen the case to pursue possible federal claims.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that § 1332(c)(1) applies only to corporations incorporated by a state or foreign state, not to federally chartered corporations. The court reasoned that the statute’s principal-place-of-business provision does not operate independently of the state-of-incorporation provision, and Congress did not intend to expand diversity jurisdiction to reach federally chartered corporations generally. The Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and its refusal to reconsider or reopen the case. View "Schneiderman v. American Chemical Society" on Justia Law

The case centers on the bankruptcy proceedings of Ho Wan Kwok, who filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection after a creditor, Pacific Alliance Asia Opportunity Fund L.P. (“PAX”), obtained a $116 million judgment against him in New York. One of the key assets at issue was a mega-yacht, the Lady May, which Kwok claimed not to own. The yacht was registered to HK International Funds Investments (USA) Limited, LLC (“HK”), an entity whose only member was Kwok’s daughter, Mei Guo. HK had no business operations, employees, or assets other than the Lady May, a smaller boat, and an escrow account funded by another entity controlled by Kwok. Disputes arose regarding whether HK was simply Kwok’s alter ego, used to shield assets from creditors.In prior proceedings, the New York State Supreme Court found that Kwok controlled and enjoyed the Lady May, despite formal ownership being in HK’s name, and held Kwok in contempt for violating a court order. After Kwok filed for bankruptcy, HK sought to assert its ownership of the yacht in the bankruptcy court. The bankruptcy court appointed a Chapter 11 trustee, who counterclaimed that HK was Kwok’s alter ego and that its assets belonged to the bankruptcy estate. The bankruptcy court granted summary judgment for the trustee. Mei Guo and HK appealed, but the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut affirmed the bankruptcy court’s decision, finding no genuine issue of material fact regarding HK’s status as Kwok’s alter ego.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s judgment. The court held that the Chapter 11 trustee had standing under section 544 of the Bankruptcy Code to bring a reverse veil-piercing claim on behalf of the estate’s creditors. The court further found that, under Delaware law, the only reasonable conclusion was that HK was Kwok’s alter ego, and its assets properly belonged to the bankruptcy estate. View "In re: Kwok" on Justia Law

An incarcerated individual at Green Haven Correctional Facility was disciplined following an incident in which he was accused of assaulting correctional officers after a dispute involving his legal materials. The individual maintained that he was authorized to possess the materials and alleged he was physically assaulted by officers. He was charged with violent conduct and, after a disciplinary hearing, was sentenced to 270 days in the special housing unit (SHU), ultimately serving at least 180 days. At his disciplinary hearing, the individual was denied the opportunity to call certain witnesses and present documentary evidence, which he claimed violated his due process rights.The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York reviewed the case after the individual, representing himself, brought a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against several Department of Corrections officials. The district court granted summary judgment for the defendants, holding that the individual’s SHU confinement did not implicate a protected liberty interest under the standard set by Sandin v. Conner, and therefore no due process protections were required. The court did not address other arguments, including qualified immunity or personal involvement of certain defendants.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit disagreed with the district court. It held that the duration of the disciplinary confinement—whether measured as 180 days served, 270 days imposed, or longer—constitutes an atypical and significant hardship in relation to ordinary prison life. Therefore, the confinement implicated a protected liberty interest and triggered due process protections. The court vacated the district court’s judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion, leaving other issues for the district court to address. View "Vidal v. Venettozzi" on Justia Law

The petitioner, a Jamaican national who became a lawful permanent resident of the United States in 1971, was removed from the country in 2007 following a 1996 conviction under New York law for the attempted sale of a “narcotic drug.” Many years later, based on a recent Second Circuit decision—United States v. Minter—that held the relevant New York statute was broader than its federal counterpart, the petitioner filed a motion to reconsider or reopen his removal order, arguing that the legal basis for his removal no longer applied. He filed this motion within thirty days of the Minter decision.The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) denied the petitioner’s motion, concluding that he had not demonstrated the due diligence necessary to warrant equitable tolling of the filing deadlines for such motions. The BIA reasoned that an earlier Second Circuit case, Harbin v. Sessions, should have prompted the petitioner to file sooner. The BIA interpreted the petitioner’s arguments as asserting that Harbin constituted a fundamental change in the law sufficient to support his motion, and therefore found his delay unreasonable.On review, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit found that the BIA mischaracterized the petitioner’s arguments and misunderstood the legal significance of the Harbin and Minter decisions. The court held that the petitioner’s rights to relief did not arise until Minter, and he was not required to file earlier motions based on law that had not yet changed. The Second Circuit therefore held that the BIA abused its discretion, vacated the BIA’s order, granted the petition for review and motion to stay removal, and remanded the case to the BIA for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "Ramsay v. Bondi" on Justia Law

Minority shareholders of an Argentine oil and gas company, previously privatized in 1993, became involved in litigation after the Argentine government expropriated a majority stake in the company in 2012. The government’s acquisition of shares was conducted without making a public tender offer to minority shareholders, a process that was explicitly required by the company’s bylaws to protect such shareholders in the event of a takeover. The plaintiffs, consisting of Spanish entities and a New York hedge fund, had acquired significant stakes in the company, and after the expropriation, they claimed that they suffered substantial financial losses due to the government’s failure to comply with the tender offer requirement.The plaintiffs sued in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, asserting breach of contract and promissory estoppel claims under Argentine law against both the Argentine Republic and the company. After extensive litigation, the district court found in favor of the plaintiffs on their breach of contract claims against the Argentine Republic, awarding over $16 billion in damages, but granted summary judgment to the company, finding it had no obligation to enforce the tender offer provision. The court also dismissed the promissory estoppel claims.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that the plaintiffs' breach of contract damages claims against the Argentine Republic and the company were not cognizable under Argentine law, reasoning that the bylaws did not create enforceable bilateral obligations between shareholders and that Argentine public law governing expropriation precluded such claims. The court affirmed the dismissal of the promissory estoppel claims and judgment in favor of the company, but reversed the judgment against the Argentine Republic, remanding for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "Petersen Energía v. Argentine Republic" on Justia Law

A federal prisoner challenged the calculation of his earned time credits under the First Step Act by the Bureau of Prisons, arguing that the Bureau’s failure to properly apply these credits prevented his timely transfer from prison to prerelease custody. While the petition was pending, the prisoner was transferred to a residential reentry center, a form of prerelease custody, though he still had a significant number of unused credits. The Bureau had already used some credits to move up the start date of his supervised release, but the remaining credits were not applied.The United States District Court for the District of Connecticut determined that, although his original request for transfer to prerelease custody was moot, the petition should be construed more broadly as requesting application of remaining time credits to reduce the length of his supervised release. The district court concluded that the First Step Act required such credits to be used to shorten the prisoner’s supervised release and ordered the Bureau of Prisons to calculate and communicate the remaining credits for that purpose.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case and held that the relevant statutory provision, 18 U.S.C. § 3632(d)(4)(C), allows earned time credits only to accelerate a prisoner’s move from incarceration to prerelease custody or to an earlier start of supervised release, but not to reduce the length of a term of supervised release itself. The court found that, once the prisoner was transferred to prerelease custody and his credits were applied to start supervised release early, his petition became moot. The Second Circuit therefore vacated the district court’s judgment and remanded with instructions to dismiss the case as moot. View "Rivera-Perez v. Stover" on Justia Law