Justia U.S. 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

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George Guldi, a former Suffolk County legislator and disbarred real estate attorney, conspired with his former girlfriend, Victoria Davidson, to deceive a mortgage servicer, Ditech Financial LLC, into wiring them $253,236. The funds did not belong to either of them. A jury convicted Guldi of wire fraud, bank fraud, and conspiracy to commit wire fraud and bank fraud. He was sentenced to 36 months of imprisonment followed by three years of supervised release.The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York oversaw the trial. The jury found sufficient evidence to support the existence of a conspiracy, fraudulent intent, and aiding and abetting. The district court also found no reversible error in its jury instructions on conspiracy, wire fraud, and fraudulent intent. Additionally, the court properly considered Guldi’s medical needs during sentencing.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed Guldi’s convictions, finding that sufficient evidence supported the jury’s findings and that the district court did not err in its jury instructions. However, the appellate court concluded that the district court erred in applying a two-offense-level enhancement under the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines for using “sophisticated means” to commit or conceal the offense. The appellate court determined that this procedural error rendered Guldi’s sentence procedurally unreasonable.As a result, the Second Circuit affirmed the judgment of conviction but vacated and remanded Guldi’s sentence for resentencing consistent with its opinion. View "United States v. Guldi" on Justia Law

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Josiah Galloway sued five current and former Nassau County detectives, alleging they violated his constitutional right to a fair trial by improperly inducing witnesses to identify him as the perpetrator of a 2008 crime, coercing a witness to sign a statement implicating him, and withholding evidence of these deficiencies in violation of Brady v. Maryland. Galloway also sued Nassau County for state-law malicious prosecution. Galloway was exonerated after serving nearly a decade in prison for a crime he did not commit.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York denied the detectives' motion for summary judgment, which included a claim of qualified immunity. The court adhered to this decision on reconsideration. The detectives and the county appealed, seeking to reverse the denial of their motion for summary judgment. However, the appellate court's jurisdiction was limited to the defense of qualified immunity and only as a matter of law.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that by 2008, it was clearly established that detectives could not rig witness identifications, coerce a witness to sign a false inculpatory statement, or ensure that the state withheld Brady evidence from the defense. Therefore, the district court did not commit legal error in rejecting the detectives' qualified immunity defenses. The court dismissed Nassau County's appeal and affirmed the district court's decision in all other respects. View "Galloway v. County of Nassau" on Justia Law

Posted in: Civil Rights
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In 2021, Xeriant, Inc., an aerospace company, sought financing for a joint venture and connected with Auctus Fund LLC, a hedge fund. Auctus agreed to lend approximately $5 million through a convertible promissory note, allowing Auctus to convert the debt into shares of Xeriant's common stock if the loan was not repaid in cash. When Xeriant failed to repay the loan, Auctus attempted to convert the debt into stock, but Xeriant rejected the request and filed a lawsuit seeking to void the contract under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, claiming Auctus was not a registered securities dealer.The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York dismissed Xeriant's complaint, holding that the contract did not obligate Auctus to act as a dealer, and thus, the agreement was not void under Section 29(b) of the Exchange Act. The court found that the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), not private parties, enforces the registration requirement under Section 15(a) of the Exchange Act.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The appellate court agreed that Xeriant failed to allege a sufficient claim for rescission under Section 29(b) because the contract did not require Auctus to engage in unlawful dealer activity. The court concluded that the contract could be performed lawfully and was not inherently illegal. Therefore, the contract could not be rescinded under Section 29(b) of the Exchange Act. The court also held that Xeriant's claim was timely filed, as the facts underlying Auctus's alleged status as an unregistered dealer were not appreciable until the SEC filed its complaint in June 2023. View "Xeriant, Inc. v. Auctus Fund LLC" on Justia Law

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Roger Alberto Lainez was born in El Salvador in 1970 to parents who never married. He and his mother immigrated to the United States in 1979 as lawful permanent residents, and his mother became a naturalized U.S. citizen in 1985. Lainez's father never naturalized and did not participate in raising him. Lainez faced removal proceedings due to convictions for several crimes, including robbery and burglary.In 2009, the government initiated removal proceedings against Lainez, citing his aggravated felony convictions and crimes involving moral turpitude. Lainez, representing himself, claimed U.S. citizenship derived from his mother's naturalization. In 2012, an Immigration Judge (IJ) rejected his citizenship claim and ordered his removal. Lainez did not appeal but later sought a certificate of citizenship, which was denied. In 2017, Lainez filed a complaint in federal district court seeking a declaratory judgment of U.S. citizenship, which was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. The Second Circuit Court of Appeals recognized his nonfrivolous citizenship claim and suggested he seek to reopen his immigration case. Lainez filed a motion to reconsider or reopen the proceedings in 2020, which the IJ denied. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) dismissed his appeal in 2021.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case and concluded that Lainez's paternity was not "established by legitimation" under former § 321(a)(3) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA). The court determined that El Salvador's 1983 constitution, which equalized the rights of children regardless of their parents' marital status, did not establish Lainez's paternity by legitimation. Consequently, Lainez derived U.S. citizenship from his mother's naturalization. The court granted Lainez's petition for review, vacated the order of removal, and remanded to the BIA with instructions to terminate the removal proceedings. View "Lainez v. Bondi" on Justia Law

Posted in: Immigration Law
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Plaintiff SeanPaul Reyes, who frequently posts videos of his interactions with police on YouTube, challenged a New York City Police Department (NYPD) policy that prohibits video recording inside police facilities. Reyes, who had been arrested twice for recording inside police stationhouses, argued that the policy violated his rights under the First Amendment and the New York State and New York City Right to Record Acts (RTRAs). He sought a preliminary injunction to prevent the City from enforcing the policy and to remove signs stating the policy.The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York granted Reyes a preliminary injunction based on his state and local law claims, despite finding that he was unlikely to succeed on his First Amendment claim. The court concluded that Reyes demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits of his RTRAs claims, irreparable harm, and that the public interest favored an injunction.The City of New York appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, arguing that the district court erred in exercising supplemental jurisdiction over the state and local claims and in finding that Reyes met the requirements for a preliminary injunction. The Second Circuit found no abuse of discretion in the district court's exercise of supplemental jurisdiction or its determination of irreparable harm. However, the court noted that the resolution of whether Reyes is likely to succeed on the merits and whether the public interest favors an injunction depends on the interpretation of the RTRAs.Given the lack of clear guidance from New York courts on whether the RTRAs afford a right to record inside police stationhouses, the Second Circuit certified the following question to the New York Court of Appeals: Does either N.Y. Civ. Rights Law § 79-p or N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 14-189 afford individuals the right to video record law enforcement activities inside public facilities, specifically inside the publicly accessible lobbies of police stationhouses, notwithstanding the NYPD policy forbidding such recording? The decision on the appeal is reserved pending the response from the New York Court of Appeals. View "Reyes v. City of New York" on Justia Law

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Dr. Sari Edelman, a female rheumatologist, was employed by the New York University (NYU) hospital system. After nearly five years of employment without disciplinary issues, she had disputes with Joseph Antonik and David Kaplan regarding her office space. Edelman claimed that Antonik used a gender-based slur and behaved aggressively, and that Kaplan's subsequent handling of the issue was discriminatory. She lodged complaints with NYU human resources, alleging gender discrimination and hostile behavior. Her employment contract was not renewed the following year, leading to her termination.Edelman sued various NYU entities and individual employees, asserting claims under the federal and New York Equal Pay Acts, Title VII, the New York State Human Rights Law, and the New York City Human Rights Law. The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York granted partial judgment as a matter of law (JMOL) in favor of some defendants and dismissed certain claims. The jury found in favor of Edelman on her retaliation claims against NYU and Antonik, awarding her $700,000 in damages, but found for the defendants on all other claims. The District Court later granted judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV) for the defendants, vacating the jury's verdict in favor of Edelman.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case. The court concluded that there was sufficient evidence to support the jury's verdicts in Edelman's favor on her retaliation claims against NYU and Antonik. The court vacated the District Court's grant of JNOV for these claims and remanded with instructions to reinstate the jury's verdict. The court also vacated the District Court's decision granting JMOL in favor of Kaplan on the retaliation claim and remanded for a new trial on that claim. The judgment on the remaining claims was affirmed. View "Edelman v. NYU Langone Health System" on Justia Law

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In 2017, Gladys Eudosia Toalombo Yanez, a native and citizen of Ecuador, was placed in removal proceedings for entering the United States without inspection. She conceded removability and applied for cancellation of removal, arguing that her deportation would cause "exceptional and extremely unusual hardship" to her U.S. citizen children. The Immigration Judge (IJ) denied her application, finding that she did not meet the burden of proving the required level of hardship. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed the IJ's decision, agreeing that the evidence did not demonstrate the necessary hardship.Toalombo Yanez appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, arguing that the BIA's hardship determination was not supported by the evidence and that the BIA retroactively applied a new legal standard to her case. Initially, the government argued that the court lacked jurisdiction over these issues. However, following the Supreme Court's decision in Wilkinson v. Garland, the government conceded that the court had jurisdiction to review the agency's hardship determination and the retroactivity claim.The Second Circuit held that the appropriate standard of review for the hardship determination is clear error. Upon review, the court found that the agency did not err in concluding that Toalombo Yanez failed to demonstrate the required hardship for cancellation of removal. The court also reviewed the retroactivity claim de novo and concluded that the BIA did not impermissibly retroactively apply any new rules. Therefore, the Second Circuit denied the petition for review. View "Yanez v. Bondi" on Justia Law

Posted in: Immigration Law
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William Hines was convicted in the United States District Court for the Northern District of New York for receipt and possession of child pornography found on his cellphone and laptop. Hines had pleaded guilty but reserved the right to appeal the denial of his motion to suppress evidence obtained from the search of his cellphone. Hines argued that his girlfriend, K.S., acted as an agent of the police when she used his password to unlock his cellphone, observed child pornography, and showed the images to a police officer, thus violating his Fourth Amendment rights.The district court held an evidentiary hearing and found that K.S. acted independently and not as a government agent when she unlocked the phone and showed the images to the police officer. The court concluded that the private search did not implicate the Fourth Amendment and denied the motion to suppress the evidence obtained from the subsequent search warrant.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the burden lies with the defendant to show that a private search constituted governmental action implicating the Fourth Amendment. The court found no error in the district court's determination that Hines failed to meet this burden. The court concluded that K.S. acted independently and not as a government agent, and thus, the private search did not violate the Fourth Amendment. Consequently, the evidence obtained from the search warrant was admissible. The Second Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "United States v. Hines" on Justia Law

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Nakul Karkare, a surgeon affiliated with AA Medical, P.C., brought an action against the International Association of Bridge, Structural, Ornamental & Reinforcing Iron Workers Local 580 (the Union) to recover unpaid benefits under section 502(a)(1)(B) of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA). Karkare, holding a power of attorney for Patient JN, claimed the Union failed to fully reimburse AA Medical for surgical services provided to Patient JN, a beneficiary under the Union’s self-funded insurance plan. The Union reimbursed only $1,095.92 of the $153,579.94 billed by AA Medical.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York dismissed the complaint sua sponte, concluding that a power of attorney did not permit Karkare to maintain an ERISA cause of action on behalf of Patient JN, as it was distinct from an assignment of claim. Karkare did not provide proof of a valid assignment but argued that the power of attorney was sufficient. The district court disagreed and dismissed the complaint, later denying Karkare’s motion for reconsideration.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case and concluded that Karkare lacked standing under Article III of the United States Constitution to bring the action. The court determined that Karkare was suing in his own name and not on behalf of Patient JN, despite holding a power of attorney. The court held that a power of attorney does not confer Article III standing to file suit in the attorney-in-fact’s own name. However, the court remanded the case to the district court to consider whether Patient JN should be permitted to be substituted into the action pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 17. The judgment was affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Karkare v. International Ass'n of Bridge, Structural, Ornamental & Reinforcing" on Justia Law

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A man was accused in Ecuador of repeatedly sexually abusing his partner’s ten-year-old daughter over the course of a year, beginning in August 2016. The alleged abuse included digital penetration and other sexual acts, accompanied by threats to the victim and her family. After the allegations surfaced, the man fled to the United States in 2018. Ecuador requested his extradition, and U.S. authorities arrested him in July 2024. The extradition request was based on charges of sexual abuse under Ecuadorian law, which does not require penetration, unlike the offense of rape.A magistrate judge in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York held an extradition hearing, excluded the defendant’s proposed expert testimony about Ecuadorian evidentiary law, and certified his extradition, finding probable cause that he committed acts constituting rape as defined in the extradition treaty. The defendant then filed a habeas corpus petition in the district court, arguing that sexual abuse was not an extraditable offense, that the magistrate judge erred in excluding his expert, and that humanitarian concerns should preclude extradition. The district court denied the petition, rejecting all arguments.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case. It held that extradition is permissible when the underlying conduct matches an offense listed in the relevant treaty, regardless of the specific charge’s name in the requesting country. The court found probable cause that the defendant’s conduct constituted rape, an extraditable offense. It also held that the magistrate judge did not abuse her discretion in excluding the expert testimony and reaffirmed that humanitarian concerns are for the Executive Branch, not the courts, to consider. The Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. View "Lalama Gomez v. United States" on Justia Law