Justia U.S. 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The individual in this case is a litigant who had previously been subject to a filing sanction by the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. The sanction required that, before submitting any future appeal or other proceedings in that court, the individual must first obtain leave of the court to file such materials. The current matter involved the individual’s attempt to initiate further proceedings related to a case involving a municipality.Previously, the United States District Court for the Western District of New York had been involved in the underlying litigation. Following actions in that court, the matter was appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. Subsequently, the Second Circuit imposed a leave-to-file sanction on the individual due to his filing history. After this sanction was imposed, the individual attempted to file a motion to recall the mandate in his ongoing case without first obtaining leave from the court, as required by the sanction order.Upon review, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit clarified that its prior leave-to-file sanction applies broadly. This includes not only new cases but also filings in ongoing and previously filed cases. The court denied the individual’s motion for leave to file and found the motion to recall the mandate moot. The main holding is that a litigant subject to a leave-to-file sanction must obtain permission from the court before submitting any new filings in any case, including those initiated before the sanction was imposed. View "Lettieri v. Town of Colesville" on Justia Law

Customs officers at JFK Airport conducted a random search of an aircraft arriving from Jamaica and discovered ten packages of cocaine hidden in the avionics compartment. After removing the drugs, officers replaced them with four “sham bricks,” one containing a transponder to signal movement. Paul Belloisi, an aircraft mechanic, drove to the plane in a maintenance vehicle, entered the avionics compartment, triggered the transponder, and exited empty-handed. Evidence at trial showed Belloisi was not assigned to the plane, possessed a jacket lined with slits likely for smuggling small items, and had suspicious communications with an individual named “Lester.” Belloisi claimed he was attempting to fix the air conditioning, but other testimony contradicted this account.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York presided over Belloisi’s jury trial, where he was convicted of conspiracy to possess a controlled substance with intent to distribute, conspiracy to import a controlled substance, and importation of a controlled substance. The trial court denied his post-trial motion for judgment of acquittal and sentenced him to 108 months in prison. Belloisi appealed, contending the evidence was insufficient to show he knew the smuggled items were controlled substances rather than other contraband.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case under the standard that a conviction must be supported by evidence sufficient for a rational juror to find each element beyond a reasonable doubt. The Second Circuit held that the government failed to prove that Belloisi possessed knowledge that the items in the compartment were controlled substances, rather than other contraband. Accordingly, the court reversed the convictions and remanded the case for entry of a judgment of acquittal. View "United States v. Belloisi" on Justia Law

A businessman from Kazakhstan alleged that he was wrongfully detained and psychologically coerced by the country’s National Security Committee into signing unfavorable business agreements, including waivers of legal claims and a forced transfer of valuable company shares. The business at issue, CAPEC, operated in Kazakhstan’s energy sector and held significant assets, some of which were allegedly misappropriated by fellow shareholders and transferred through U.S. financial institutions. The plaintiff claimed these actions harmed him economically, including the loss of potential U.S.-based legal claims.Following unsuccessful litigation in Kazakhstan, the plaintiff initiated suit in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York, seeking to invalidate the coerced agreements and recover damages under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), the Alien Tort Statute, and other state and federal laws. The district court dismissed the complaint for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, finding that the plaintiff, as a permanent resident alien, could not establish diversity jurisdiction against foreign defendants, that the alleged torts occurred outside the U.S., and that the plaintiff failed to allege a domestic injury required for civil RICO claims. The court denied leave to amend, determining that any amendment would be futile.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the matter de novo, affirming the district court’s judgment. The Second Circuit held that claims against the National Security Committee were barred by the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, as its conduct was sovereign rather than commercial. For the individual defendants, the court found that the plaintiff failed to allege a domestic injury under RICO, as the harm and racketeering activity occurred primarily in Kazakhstan. The court further concluded that amendment of the complaint would have been futile. The judgment was affirmed. View "Yerkyn v. Yakovlevich" on Justia Law

Getty Images Holdings, Inc. became a publicly traded company after merging with CC Neuberger Principal Holdings II, a special purpose acquisition company. Alta Partners, LLC and CRCM Institutional Master Fund (BVI) Ltd., along with CRCM SPAC Opportunity Fund LP, acquired warrants to purchase Getty stock. The warrants’ exercise was governed by a warrant agreement requiring both an effective registration statement and a current prospectus for the underlying shares. After the merger, Getty filed two relevant registration statements: a Form S-4 and a Form S-1. Alta and CRCM attempted to exercise their warrants in August 2022, when Getty’s stock price was significantly higher than the warrant strike price, but Getty refused, claiming the contractual conditions for exercise were unmet.The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York reviewed breach of contract claims brought by Alta and CRCM. The court granted summary judgment for the plaintiffs, finding as a matter of law that the conditions of the warrant agreement had been satisfied. Specifically, it held the Form S-4 was an effective registration statement for the warrant shares and the accompanying prospectus was current at the time the plaintiffs attempted to exercise their warrants. The court awarded damages based on the stock price at the time of the breach but limited Alta’s recovery, denying damages for warrants purchased after Getty’s refusal to honor the redemption.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. It held that Getty breached the warrant agreement because the required registration statement and prospectus conditions were met on the relevant dates. The court concluded that damages should be calculated using the market price of the shares at the time of breach and upheld the limitation on Alta’s damages for post-breach warrant purchases. The affirmance applies to all aspects of the district court’s rulings challenged on appeal. View "Alta Partners, LLC v. Getty Images Holdings, Inc." on Justia Law

Federal law enforcement agents investigated the defendant after he sold crack cocaine to a confidential informant in three controlled buys in Suffolk County, New York. Based on these transactions, agents executed a search warrant at his residence and seized drugs, firearms, packaging materials, and cash. The defendant pleaded guilty in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York to possession with intent to distribute cocaine and cocaine base, and possession of firearms in connection with drug trafficking.At sentencing, the district court considered the defendant’s background and criminal history and imposed a sentence of 120 months’ imprisonment, followed by five years of supervised release. The court orally pronounced certain mandatory and special conditions of supervised release, but did not recite or specifically incorporate by reference the full set of standard conditions recommended by the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines or the Probation Department. The written judgment included thirteen standard conditions and several special conditions, some of which expanded on or added new requirements not mentioned orally.Nearly three years after judgment, the defendant filed a pro se notice of appeal. Although the appeal was untimely under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(b), the government did not timely raise the issue, and the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit determined the objection was forfeited. The court reviewed the merits of the appeal and held that the district court erred by imposing the standard conditions and certain special conditions without proper oral pronouncement or clear judicial determination. The Second Circuit remanded the case with instructions to vacate the thirteen standard conditions and three special conditions (mental health treatment, substance abuse treatment, and search condition), allowing the district court to conduct further proceedings and potentially reimpose these conditions in compliance with procedural requirements. The judgment was otherwise affirmed. View "United States v. Harris" on Justia Law

The defendant was born and raised in Lebanon and was recruited into Hizballah, a designated foreign terrorist organization, in 1996. He received various forms of military-type training, including weapons, explosives, and surveillance, and participated in operations against Israeli targets. After moving to the United States in 2000, he continued his involvement with Hizballah by traveling back to Lebanon for further training and assignments. In 2004 and 2005, he received advanced explosives and surveillance training, including field exercises and site surveillance in Istanbul and New York City, where he documented potential targets for Hizballah. His activities with Hizballah ceased in spring 2005.The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York indicted the defendant in 2019 on multiple counts, including receiving military-type training from Hizballah (Count Three). After a jury trial, he was found guilty on Count Three and two other counts, and sentenced to ten years’ imprisonment for Count Three, with a sentencing enhancement under the United States Sentencing Guidelines for terrorism-related offenses. Neither the parties nor the district court recognized that the relevant statute (18 U.S.C. § 2339D) was enacted in December 2004, or that certain enhancements and waivers only applied to post-March 2006 conduct.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that although the district court erred by not instructing the jury to consider only post-enactment conduct, there was no reasonable probability the jury would have acquitted due to substantial evidence of post-enactment conduct. The court also concluded that the retroactive application of the statute of limitations waiver was permissible because the original limitation period had not expired. However, the court vacated the sentence, finding plain error in the application of the terrorism enhancement and remanded for resentencing. The convictions were affirmed, but the sentence was vacated and remanded. View "United States v. Saab" on Justia Law

Juan and Catherine Reyes, both United States citizens, maintained a jointly-held foreign bank account in Switzerland that contained over two million dollars, representing the majority of their assets and a significant source of their income. Despite being asked by both their accountant and the IRS about foreign accounts, the Reyeses did not disclose their interest in the account on tax forms for 2010, 2011, and 2012, nor did they file the required Report of Foreign Bank and Financial Accounts (FBAR). After the IRS discovered the omission and assessed civil penalties for willful failure to file FBARs for those years, the Reyeses did not pay, resulting in the United States initiating suit to convert those penalties into a money judgment.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York granted summary judgment in favor of the United States, finding that the Reyeses' conduct was at least reckless and therefore "willful" under 31 U.S.C. § 5321. The court imposed enhanced penalties and also applied a six percent late payment penalty under 31 U.S.C. § 3717(e)(2) and relevant Treasury regulations. The Reyeses contested both the determination of willfulness and the application of the late payment penalty, arguing that recklessness should not suffice for willfulness and that the penalty rate should be discretionary.Reviewing the case de novo, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that "willful" as used in 31 U.S.C. § 5321 encompasses reckless conduct, aligning its interpretation with that of other circuits and Supreme Court precedent. It further determined that the undisputed evidence established the Reyeses acted recklessly and that summary judgment was appropriate. The appellate court also concluded that the six percent late payment penalty imposed by the district court was mandatory under controlling Treasury Department regulations. The Second Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court in all respects. View "United States of America v. Reyes" on Justia Law

C.B., a 34-year-old man with developmental and psychiatric disabilities, died while residing at the Valley Ridge Center for Intensive Treatment, a secure state-run facility operated by the New York State Office for People with Developmental Disabilities. Although C.B. was admitted voluntarily, the facility imposed substantial restrictions on his liberty, including limits on leaving the premises and accessing medical care. In the days leading up to his death from cardiomyopathy, C.B. exhibited clear symptoms of heart failure and repeatedly asked staff for help, but his pleas were allegedly ignored or inadequately addressed by his caretakers.J.M., C.B.’s mother and administrator of his estate, brought suit in the United States District Court for the Northern District of New York, alleging violations of C.B.’s substantive due process rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, as well as state law claims for negligence and medical malpractice. The district court granted summary judgment for the defendants on the federal claim, holding that C.B., as a voluntarily admitted resident, had no constitutional right to adequate medical care, and declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims. The court also denied J.M.’s motion to amend her complaint to add a new defendant, finding lack of diligence.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that C.B. was entitled to substantive due process protections regardless of his voluntary admission status. The court clarified that when the state exercises sufficient control over a resident’s life such that the individual cannot care for himself, due process guarantees apply, consistent with Youngberg v. Romeo, Society for Good Will to Retarded Children, Inc. v. Cuomo, and DeShaney v. Winnebago County Department of Social Services. The Second Circuit vacated the district court's judgment and remanded for further proceedings. View "J.M. v. Sessions" on Justia Law

Two commercial truck drivers, residents of Connecticut, began working as delivery drivers for a baked goods company through a staffing agency, classified as W-2 employees. After several months, the company required them to create corporations and enter into “Distributor Agreements” in their capacities as presidents of those corporations to continue working. These agreements included mandatory arbitration clauses and disclaimed an employee-employer relationship. Despite the new contractual arrangement, the drivers’ daily responsibilities remained unchanged, consisting of picking up baked goods from the company’s warehouse and delivering them to retail outlets.Seeking relief under Connecticut wage and overtime laws, the drivers initiated a putative class action in Connecticut Superior Court. The baked goods company removed the case to the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut, invoking diversity jurisdiction. The company then moved to compel arbitration pursuant to the contractual arbitration clauses. The drivers opposed, arguing that the agreements were “contracts of employment” exempt from the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) under § 1, that they were not bound in their individual capacities, and that the clauses were unenforceable. The District Court ruled in favor of the company, granting the motion to compel arbitration, and held that the agreements were not “contracts of employment” under § 1 of the FAA.On interlocutory appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the District Court’s order de novo. The Second Circuit held that the agreements, though signed by corporate entities created at the company’s request, were “contracts of employment” within the meaning of § 1 of the FAA, as they were contracts for the performance of work by workers. Consequently, the court vacated the District Court’s order compelling arbitration and remanded for further proceedings. View "Silva v. Schmidt Baking Distribution, LLC" on Justia Law

The case centers on a defendant who participated in a series of armed robberies targeting narcotics traffickers. Two particular robberies, one in Elmont and another in the Bronx, resulted in the deaths of two individuals. The defendant was involved in planning the Elmont robbery, though not present during it, and actively participated in the Bronx robbery. A superseding indictment charged him with conspiracy and attempt to commit Hobbs Act robbery, as well as conspiracy to distribute large quantities of marijuana.Following a jury trial in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, the defendant was acquitted of attempted robbery in the Elmont incident but convicted on the other charges, including conspiracy and attempt related to the Bronx robbery, and conspiracy to distribute marijuana. The district court initially imposed lengthy sentences on all counts, running them concurrently. The defendant later challenged his convictions under two firearm-related counts after Supreme Court decisions clarified the definition of a “crime of violence.” The government agreed, and those convictions were vacated. At resentencing, the district court imposed consecutive sentences of 180 months each for conspiracy and attempt to commit Hobbs Act robbery, and a concurrent 60-month sentence for the drug conspiracy.On appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, the defendant argued the district court erred by imposing consecutive sentences on the two Hobbs Act charges because they related to the same underlying robbery, and the aggregate exceeded the statutory maximum for a single Hobbs Act offense. The Second Circuit held that conspiracy and attempt are distinct offenses under the Hobbs Act, and Congress permits consecutive sentences for such convictions, even if the total exceeds the maximum for one offense. The court affirmed the district court’s judgment and rejected additional challenges to sentencing calculations and procedures. View "United States v. Gunn" on Justia Law