Justia U.S. 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

C.B., a 34-year-old man with developmental and psychiatric disabilities, died while residing at the Valley Ridge Center for Intensive Treatment, a secure state-run facility operated by the New York State Office for People with Developmental Disabilities. Although C.B. was admitted voluntarily, the facility imposed substantial restrictions on his liberty, including limits on leaving the premises and accessing medical care. In the days leading up to his death from cardiomyopathy, C.B. exhibited clear symptoms of heart failure and repeatedly asked staff for help, but his pleas were allegedly ignored or inadequately addressed by his caretakers.J.M., C.B.’s mother and administrator of his estate, brought suit in the United States District Court for the Northern District of New York, alleging violations of C.B.’s substantive due process rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, as well as state law claims for negligence and medical malpractice. The district court granted summary judgment for the defendants on the federal claim, holding that C.B., as a voluntarily admitted resident, had no constitutional right to adequate medical care, and declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims. The court also denied J.M.’s motion to amend her complaint to add a new defendant, finding lack of diligence.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that C.B. was entitled to substantive due process protections regardless of his voluntary admission status. The court clarified that when the state exercises sufficient control over a resident’s life such that the individual cannot care for himself, due process guarantees apply, consistent with Youngberg v. Romeo, Society for Good Will to Retarded Children, Inc. v. Cuomo, and DeShaney v. Winnebago County Department of Social Services. The Second Circuit vacated the district court's judgment and remanded for further proceedings. View "J.M. v. Sessions" on Justia Law

Two commercial truck drivers, residents of Connecticut, began working as delivery drivers for a baked goods company through a staffing agency, classified as W-2 employees. After several months, the company required them to create corporations and enter into “Distributor Agreements” in their capacities as presidents of those corporations to continue working. These agreements included mandatory arbitration clauses and disclaimed an employee-employer relationship. Despite the new contractual arrangement, the drivers’ daily responsibilities remained unchanged, consisting of picking up baked goods from the company’s warehouse and delivering them to retail outlets.Seeking relief under Connecticut wage and overtime laws, the drivers initiated a putative class action in Connecticut Superior Court. The baked goods company removed the case to the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut, invoking diversity jurisdiction. The company then moved to compel arbitration pursuant to the contractual arbitration clauses. The drivers opposed, arguing that the agreements were “contracts of employment” exempt from the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) under § 1, that they were not bound in their individual capacities, and that the clauses were unenforceable. The District Court ruled in favor of the company, granting the motion to compel arbitration, and held that the agreements were not “contracts of employment” under § 1 of the FAA.On interlocutory appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the District Court’s order de novo. The Second Circuit held that the agreements, though signed by corporate entities created at the company’s request, were “contracts of employment” within the meaning of § 1 of the FAA, as they were contracts for the performance of work by workers. Consequently, the court vacated the District Court’s order compelling arbitration and remanded for further proceedings. View "Silva v. Schmidt Baking Distribution, LLC" on Justia Law

The case centers on a defendant who participated in a series of armed robberies targeting narcotics traffickers. Two particular robberies, one in Elmont and another in the Bronx, resulted in the deaths of two individuals. The defendant was involved in planning the Elmont robbery, though not present during it, and actively participated in the Bronx robbery. A superseding indictment charged him with conspiracy and attempt to commit Hobbs Act robbery, as well as conspiracy to distribute large quantities of marijuana.Following a jury trial in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, the defendant was acquitted of attempted robbery in the Elmont incident but convicted on the other charges, including conspiracy and attempt related to the Bronx robbery, and conspiracy to distribute marijuana. The district court initially imposed lengthy sentences on all counts, running them concurrently. The defendant later challenged his convictions under two firearm-related counts after Supreme Court decisions clarified the definition of a “crime of violence.” The government agreed, and those convictions were vacated. At resentencing, the district court imposed consecutive sentences of 180 months each for conspiracy and attempt to commit Hobbs Act robbery, and a concurrent 60-month sentence for the drug conspiracy.On appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, the defendant argued the district court erred by imposing consecutive sentences on the two Hobbs Act charges because they related to the same underlying robbery, and the aggregate exceeded the statutory maximum for a single Hobbs Act offense. The Second Circuit held that conspiracy and attempt are distinct offenses under the Hobbs Act, and Congress permits consecutive sentences for such convictions, even if the total exceeds the maximum for one offense. The court affirmed the district court’s judgment and rejected additional challenges to sentencing calculations and procedures. View "United States v. Gunn" on Justia Law

A public hospital in New York contracted with a new parking management company to provide valet services, replacing a previous vendor whose employees were represented by a union and were covered by a collective bargaining agreement (CBA). After winning the contract, the new company considered retaining the existing unionized valet attendants but ultimately did not hire any of them, despite initially recruiting them. Instead, the company posted job listings for the same roles and hired other workers, leaving the former unionized employees without jobs. Evidence suggested that the new company’s refusal to hire was motivated by the employees’ union affiliation.After the union filed an unfair labor practice charge, the Regional Director of the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) filed a petition with the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York, seeking a temporary injunction under § 10(j) of the National Labor Relations Act. The requested injunction would have required the company to reinstate the discharged employees, recognize the union, and bargain in good faith. The district court denied the petition in a brief text order, finding no cognizable irreparable harm and noting the delay in seeking relief. Meanwhile, an Administrative Law Judge found that the company violated the Act by refusing to hire the unionized employees and failing to recognize and bargain with the union.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the district court’s denial. The Second Circuit held that the district court’s order violated Rule 52(a)(2) by failing to provide adequate findings and conclusions. The Second Circuit further found that the Regional Director had met all four prongs required for a § 10(j) injunction: likelihood of success on the merits, irreparable harm, balance of equities, and public interest. The court reversed the district court’s order and remanded for entry of the requested injunction. View "Poor v. Parking Systems Plus, Inc." on Justia Law

A South Korean entertainment company that owns trademarks for the popular “Baby Shark” song and related products brought a lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York against dozens of China-based businesses. The company alleged these businesses manufactured or sold counterfeit Baby Shark merchandise, violating trademark, copyright, and unfair competition laws. Seeking to stop the alleged counterfeiting, the company obtained temporary and preliminary injunctions and moved to serve the defendants by email, arguing that this method was appropriate under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(f)(3).After the plaintiff served process by email, most defendants did not respond, leading to default judgments against many of them. However, two defendants appeared and challenged the court’s jurisdiction, arguing that service by email violated the Hague Service Convention, to which both the United States and China are parties. The district court agreed, finding that the Convention did not permit service by email on parties in China, and dismissed the claims against these defendants without prejudice for improper service. The plaintiff appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision. The appellate court held that the Hague Service Convention does not allow email service on defendants located in China, as China has expressly objected to alternative methods such as those in Article 10 of the Convention. The court further held that neither Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(f)(2) nor any purported emergency exception permitted email service in these circumstances. The court also upheld the denial of a default judgment, finding no abuse of discretion. Accordingly, the dismissal of the claims against the two China-based defendants for lack of proper service was affirmed. View "Smart Study Co., LTD v. Shenzhenshixindajixieyouxiangongsi" on Justia Law

A nonprofit organization that publishes content critical of United States immigration policy was issued a subpoena by the New York Attorney General’s office seeking documents related to its governance, finances, and relationships with vendors and contractors. The organization alleged that the subpoena was motivated by a desire to suppress its viewpoints and thus violated its rights under the First Amendment and the New York State Constitution. The Attorney General, however, maintained that the investigation was prompted by concerns about possible self-dealing and regulatory noncompliance.After the subpoena was issued, the nonprofit partially responded but maintained objections. It then filed a federal lawsuit seeking damages and an injunction against enforcement of the subpoena, claiming the subpoena was retaliatory and unconstitutional. Shortly thereafter, the Attorney General initiated a special proceeding in New York State Supreme Court to compel compliance. The organization moved to dismiss or stay the state proceeding, raising constitutional arguments. The state court ruled against the nonprofit, ordering compliance with the subpoena (with some redactions allowed), and the New York Appellate Division, First Department affirmed. The New York Court of Appeals dismissed a further appeal.The United States District Court for the Northern District of New York denied the nonprofit’s request for a preliminary injunction and dismissed the federal claims, holding that they were precluded by the earlier state court judgment under the doctrine of res judicata. The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment, holding that the state court’s decision was final and on the merits, involved the same parties and subject matter, and therefore barred the federal claims. The court also dismissed as moot the appeal of the denial of preliminary injunctive relief. View "VDARE Foundation, Inc. v. James" on Justia Law

A distributor of television programming alleged that three groups of broadcasters, including two that were so-called “sidecar” entities of a larger broadcaster, engaged in a horizontal price-fixing conspiracy. The distributor claimed that the broadcasters coordinated through a common negotiator to demand supracompetitive retransmission fees during contract renewal talks. When the distributor declined to pay the demanded rates, it lost access to the broadcasters’ stations in certain markets, resulting in blackouts for subscribers and subsequent lost profits.Prior to this appeal, the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York reviewed the case. The district court granted the broadcasters’ motion to dismiss the federal antitrust claims, concluding that the distributor lacked antitrust standing. Specifically, the district court found that there was no antitrust injury because the distributor did not actually pay the alleged supracompetitive prices, and that the distributor was not an efficient enforcer since its injuries were indirect and speculative. Consequently, the district court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the distributor’s remaining state law claims.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the district court’s judgment. The Second Circuit held that the distributor plausibly alleged an antitrust injury, as lost profits from a reduction in output (subscriber losses caused by blackouts resulting from price fixing) are a cognizable form of antitrust injury. The court further held that the distributor is an efficient enforcer because it was the direct target of the alleged conspiracy and had a preexisting course of dealing with the broadcasters. The Second Circuit reversed the district court’s dismissal of the federal antitrust claims, vacated the decision to decline supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims, and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "DirecTV, LLC v. Nexstar Media Group, Inc." on Justia Law

A lawful permanent resident was convicted in 1999 of second-degree criminal sale of a controlled substance under New York law. In 2000, an Immigration Judge determined this conviction made him removable as both an aggravated felony and controlled substance offense and ordered his deportation. He was deported to the Dominican Republic. Over the following years, he reentered the United States twice without authorization, was convicted each time for illegal reentry, and the original 2000 removal order was reinstated for both removals. Following a third unauthorized reentry, he was again charged with illegal reentry. He then moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing that his original removal order was fundamentally unfair because his underlying conviction was not actually a removable offense, as clarified by the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in United States v. Minter.The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York denied his motion to dismiss. The district court concluded that, although there had been a procedural error in the original removal order, the defendant could not show prejudice because his subsequent illegal reentry convictions would themselves have rendered him removable. The district court thus found that the defendant had failed to meet the prejudice requirement under 8 U.S.C. § 1326(d).On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that the district court erred by relying on the later reinstatements of the invalid 2000 removal order. The Circuit explained that those reinstatements were not new removal orders and could not serve as independent predicates for the illegal reentry charge. The proper inquiry is whether the original removal order was fundamentally unfair and prejudicial, which it was. The court vacated the judgment and remanded for further proceedings. The related appeal was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. View "United States v. Rodriguez" on Justia Law

In this case, the petitioner was convicted in 2012 of several offenses related to drug trafficking and violence, including attempted Hobbs Act robbery and two counts of using or brandishing a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). The firearm convictions were predicated on the attempted robbery and a murder committed during a narcotics conspiracy. The attempted robbery involved physically assaulting a drug dealer with a firearm. The district court sentenced the petitioner to a total of 100 years in prison, including consecutive sentences for the § 924(c) convictions.After his conviction and unsuccessful direct appeal, the petitioner filed an initial motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, which was denied. He then sought permission to file a second § 2255 motion, arguing that the Supreme Court’s decisions in United States v. Davis (which struck down § 924(c)’s residual clause as unconstitutionally vague) and United States v. Taylor (which held that attempted Hobbs Act robbery does not qualify as a "crime of violence" under the elements clause) required vacatur of his firearm brandishing conviction. The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York reviewed the trial record and concluded that the petitioner’s conviction for brandishing a firearm during the attempted robbery was based on the elements clause, not the residual clause.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s order denying the petitioner’s second § 2255 motion. The Second Circuit held that because the petitioner’s conviction was based on the elements clause, his claim relied only on a statutory change, not on a new rule of constitutional law, and thus did not satisfy the requirements for a successive habeas petition under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act. The court also rejected his argument regarding the second firearm conviction as foreclosed by precedent. View "Barnes v. United States of America" on Justia Law

A Texas-based firearms retailer sold and shipped large quantities of unfinished firearm frames and receivers to New York, including products easily convertible into untraceable “ghost guns.” State and city authorities in New York alleged that the retailer intentionally marketed and sold these products to purchasers likely to be legally prohibited from owning firearms. The authorities claimed this resulted in increased gun violence and compelled them to spend additional resources on law enforcement, public health, and community services.Following these lawsuits, the retailer demanded that its liability insurers provide defense and indemnification under policies that covered damages caused by an “accident.” The insurers denied coverage and sought a declaratory judgment in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, arguing that the underlying suits did not allege harm resulting from an “accident” as required under Texas law and the policies’ terms. The district court granted summary judgment for the insurers, finding that the complaints alleged intentional conduct with expected consequences, not an “accident.” The judgment also encompassed indemnification after the parties agreed that the same reasoning applied.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case de novo. It held that, under Texas law, the policies only covered injuries arising from an “accident,” which is defined as a fortuitous, unexpected, and unintended event. The Court concluded the underlying lawsuits described intentional acts by the retailer that led to expected injuries, rather than accidental harm. Therefore, the insurers had no duty to defend or indemnify the retailer in these lawsuits. The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Granite State Insurance Co. v. Primary Arms, LLC" on Justia Law