Justia U.S. 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Dr. Ahmed Diaa Eldin Ali Hussein, a dual citizen of Egypt and the United States, sought to enforce an Egyptian administrative court ruling and a related ministerial decree in the United States. These rulings purportedly entitled him to compensation for the expropriation of his shares in the SIMO Middle East Paper Company by the Egyptian government in the 1990s. Hussein filed an enforcement action in New York State court against Dr. Mohamed Ahmed Maait, the Egyptian Minister of Finance, in his official capacity.The case was removed to the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York by Maait, albeit after the 30-day deadline for removal. The District Court found that Egypt was the real party in interest and allowed the late removal under Section 1441(d) of the U.S. Code, which permits enlargement of the removal period for cause. The court then dismissed the suit under Rule 12(b)(1) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, concluding that Egypt was immune under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA) and that no exceptions to this immunity applied.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the District Court's decision. The appellate court agreed that Egypt was the real party in interest, as Hussein's claims were fundamentally against the Egyptian government and sought compensation from the public treasury. The court also upheld the District Court's finding of cause to extend the removal period, noting the lack of prejudice to Hussein and the procedural challenges faced by Maait in securing U.S. counsel. Finally, the appellate court determined that Hussein had waived any argument regarding exceptions to FSIA immunity by not raising them on appeal. Thus, the dismissal for lack of jurisdiction was affirmed. View "Hussein v. Maait" on Justia Law

Eight Black homeowners in New York City sued a lending institution and affiliated entities, alleging that the lender violated federal, state, and city antidiscrimination laws. They claimed the lender made mortgage refinancing loans with high default interest rates to Black and Latino individuals in poor neighborhoods who had no income, no assets, and low credit scores but high equity in their homes, and then foreclosed on the loans when the individuals defaulted. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York entered a final judgment awarding four homeowners $722,044 in compensatory damages and four others nominal damages.The lender appealed, arguing that the district court erred in three ways: by finding the homeowners' claims timely under the doctrine of equitable tolling and the discovery rule of accrual, in its instructions to the jury on disparate impact and disparate treatment theories of discrimination, and in holding that a release-of-claims provision in a loan modification agreement signed by two homeowners was unenforceable as a matter of law.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case. The court concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in holding that the homeowners' claims were timely under the doctrine of equitable tolling. The court also found no error in the district court's instructions to the jury on disparate impact and disparate treatment theories of discrimination. Finally, the court agreed that the release-of-claims provision in the loan modification agreement was unenforceable as a matter of law. Accordingly, the Second Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Saint-Jean v. Emigrant Mortg. Co., Inc." on Justia Law

Richard Hoffer filed a lawsuit against the City of Yonkers, the City of Yonkers Police Department, and several individual police officers under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, claiming that the officers used excessive force during his arrest. The case went to trial, and the jury returned a verdict in favor of the officers. Hoffer appealed the district court's decision, specifically challenging the court's denial of his request for an adverse inference instruction due to a missing video of him being tased.The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York presided over the initial trial. Hoffer requested an adverse inference instruction based on the missing video, arguing that the video was crucial evidence. The district court denied this request, finding insufficient evidence to prove that the video was intentionally destroyed to deprive Hoffer of its use in litigation. The jury ultimately found in favor of the officers, and Hoffer's subsequent motion to set aside the verdict was also denied.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that to impose sanctions under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37(e)(2), it must be proven by a preponderance of the evidence that a party acted with an "intent to deprive" another party of the lost information. The court clarified that the lesser "culpable state of mind" standard, which includes negligence, does not apply to Rule 37(e)(2) sanctions. Applying this standard, the Second Circuit concluded that the district court did not err in denying Hoffer's request for an adverse inference instruction and affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Hoffer v. Tellone" on Justia Law

Edward Mangano, the former County Executive of Nassau County, New York, and his wife, Linda Mangano, were involved in a public corruption case. Edward Mangano was accused of accepting bribes from Harendra Singh, a businessman, in exchange for using his influence to secure loan guarantees from the Town of Oyster Bay for Singh's businesses. Singh provided various gifts and a no-show job for Linda Mangano, paying her approximately $100,000 annually. The Manganos were also accused of conspiring to obstruct a federal grand jury investigation into these bribes by fabricating stories about Linda's employment.In the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York, Edward Mangano was convicted of conspiracy to commit federal programs bribery, honest services fraud, and related substantive offenses. Linda Mangano was convicted of conspiracy to obstruct justice, obstruction of justice, and making false statements to federal officials. The district court sentenced Edward Mangano to 12 years in prison and Linda Mangano to 15 months.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case. The court found that the district court properly instructed the jury on the conspiracies to commit honest services fraud and obstruction of justice, and that the evidence was sufficient to convict the Manganos on those charges. However, the court concluded that the evidence was insufficient to convict Edward Mangano of conspiracy to commit federal programs bribery or the related substantive offense. Consequently, the Second Circuit reversed the district court's judgment in part, affirming the convictions related to honest services fraud and obstruction of justice, but reversing the convictions related to federal programs bribery. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with the appellate court's opinion. View "United States v. Mangano" on Justia Law

Givaudan SA, a Swiss multinational manufacturer of flavors and fragrances, entered into a business relationship with Conagen Inc., a Massachusetts-based synthetic biology company. In 2016, the two companies executed a term sheet outlining several potential transactions, including Givaudan's purchase of a 5% equity stake in Conagen for $10 million and an exclusivity agreement for Conagen's intellectual property. Givaudan paid the $10 million and received the shares, but negotiations on the exclusivity agreement failed.Givaudan sued Conagen in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, claiming breach of contract, promissory estoppel, and unjust enrichment, seeking the return of its $10 million. After a bench trial, the district court found Conagen not liable on all claims and dismissed the case. Givaudan appealed the dismissal of its breach of contract claim.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court's decision, holding that Givaudan failed to prove damages, an essential element of a breach of contract claim under Delaware law. The court found that the $10 million payment for the 5% equity stake was a completed transaction and not contingent on the successful negotiation of the exclusivity agreement. The court also determined that the term sheet was a binding preliminary agreement that established a duty to negotiate in good faith, but Givaudan did not incur any costs or expenses that would qualify as reliance damages. Thus, the judgment of the district court was affirmed. View "Givaudan v. Conagen" on Justia Law

Robert Sylvester Kelly, also known as R. Kelly, was convicted in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York of racketeering and Mann Act violations. The evidence presented at trial showed that Kelly, with the help of his associates, exploited his fame to lure and abuse young girls and women over a period of twenty-five years. Kelly isolated his victims, controlled their lives, and subjected them to verbal, physical, and sexual abuse.The district court sentenced Kelly to 360 months' imprisonment for racketeering and additional concurrent sentences for the Mann Act violations. Kelly was also fined and ordered to pay restitution to two victims. Kelly appealed his convictions, challenging the sufficiency of the evidence, the constitutionality of the state laws underlying his federal convictions, the empaneling of certain jurors, ineffective assistance of counsel, and the district court's evidentiary rulings and restitution orders.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed Kelly's appeal. The court found that there was sufficient evidence to support Kelly's convictions, including the underlying state and federal violations. The court also held that the New York state law was constitutional as applied to Kelly and that Kelly's challenges to the California state law were untimely. The court found no evidence of juror bias or ineffective assistance of counsel during voir dire. The court also upheld the district court's evidentiary rulings and restitution orders, finding no abuse of discretion.The Second Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court, concluding that Kelly's arguments on appeal were without merit. View "United States v. Kelly" on Justia Law

John Doe, an individual with a serious mental illness, sued James V. McDonald, M.D., New York’s Commissioner of Health, and other defendants, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief under the Americans with Disabilities Act, the Rehabilitation Act, the Fair Housing Act, and Article 78 of the New York Civil Practice Law and Rules. Doe alleged that New York State regulations discriminated against him by preventing his readmission to Oceanview Manor Home for Adults, a Transitional Adult Home (TAH) where he previously resided. After filing the suit, the State allowed Doe to return to Oceanview, amended the regulations to permit readmission of former TAH residents with serious mental illness, and removed Oceanview’s classification as a TAH.The United States District Court for the Northern District of New York denied the State’s motion for summary judgment, which argued that Doe lacked standing. The district court granted the State leave to file an interlocutory appeal. On appeal, the State contended that the district court erred in finding standing because Doe lacked a concrete plan to leave and seek readmission to Oceanview.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case and determined that the State’s jurisdictional challenge should be assessed as a question of mootness, not standing, because it addressed events occurring after Doe filed the suit. The court found that Doe’s suit was moot because the State had allowed Doe to return to Oceanview, amended the regulations, and removed Oceanview’s TAH classification. Consequently, there was no reasonable expectation that the alleged violation would recur.The Second Circuit dismissed the appeal, vacated the district court’s order, and remanded the case with instructions to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. View "Doe v. McDonald" on Justia Law

Sealed Appellant 1, the former CEO of a publicly traded company, and Sealed Appellants 2 and 3, a lawyer and law firm that represented him and the company, appealed an order from the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York. The district court compelled Sealed Appellants 2 and 3 to produce documents withheld under attorney-client privilege in response to grand jury subpoenas. The court found that the crime-fraud exception to attorney-client privilege applied, as there was probable cause to believe that communications between Sealed Appellants 1 and 2 were made to criminally circumvent the company’s internal controls.The district court concluded that the company had an internal control requiring its legal department to review all significant contracts. It found that Sealed Appellant 1 and Sealed Appellant 2 concealed settlement agreements with two former employees who had accused Sealed Appellant 1 of sexual misconduct. These agreements were not disclosed to the company’s legal department or auditors, violating internal controls and resulting in false statements to auditors.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case. It first determined that it had jurisdiction under the Perlman exception, which allows for immediate appeal when privileged information is in the hands of a third party likely to disclose it rather than face contempt. On the merits, the court found no abuse of discretion in the district court’s application of the crime-fraud exception. It held that there was probable cause to believe that the communications were made to circumvent internal controls, thus facilitating or concealing criminal activity. Consequently, the Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s order compelling the production of the documents. View "In Re: Grand Jury Subpoenas Dated September 13, 2023" on Justia Law

Cardinal Motors, Inc. filed a lawsuit against H&H Sports Protection USA Inc., alleging that H&H unlawfully copied the design of its motorcycle helmet, "The Bullitt." Cardinal claimed trade dress infringement and unfair competition under Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act and analogous state laws. Cardinal described two alternative trade dresses for The Bullitt: the "General Trade Dress" and the "Detailed Trade Dress," each specifying various design features of the helmet.The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York dismissed Cardinal's complaint with prejudice, ruling that Cardinal failed to articulate a precise expression of the trade dress, including how it was distinct. The court focused on the General Trade Dress and did not separately consider the sufficiency of the Detailed Trade Dress, assuming it was inadequate based on the General Trade Dress.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case and concluded that the district court erred in its application of the articulation requirement for trade dress infringement cases. The appellate court clarified that the articulation requirement is separate from the distinctiveness requirement. A plaintiff satisfies the articulation requirement by listing with precision the features that comprise its trade dress, without needing to prove distinctiveness at this stage.The Second Circuit held that both the General Trade Dress and the Detailed Trade Dress were articulated with the requisite precision. Therefore, the district court's dismissal was incorrect. The appellate court vacated the judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings to determine whether Cardinal's trade dress claims meet the elements of distinctiveness, likelihood of confusion, and nonfunctionality. The district court was also instructed to address Cardinal's state law claims of unfair competition. View "Cardinal Motors, Inc. v. H & H Sports Prot. USA Inc." on Justia Law

Xerox Corporation filed a petition under Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA) for injunctive and declaratory relief against Local 14A, Rochester Regional Joint Board, Xerographic Division Workers United (the Union). After the collective bargaining agreement (CBA) between Xerox and the Union expired, Xerox terminated retiree benefits. The Union argued that Xerox could not unilaterally terminate vested benefits and sought to enforce the expired agreement’s arbitration provision. Xerox sought to stay and enjoin arbitration.The United States District Court for the Western District of New York granted Xerox’s petition, concluding that the Union’s grievance was not arbitrable under the expired CBA. The district court reasoned that the Union failed to identify language in the agreement that could be understood to have promised vested benefits beyond the agreement’s expiration. Additionally, the reservation-of-rights clause in plan documents barred an interpretation that benefits had vested.On appeal, the Union argued that the district court erred. The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit agreed with the Union. The appellate court found that the Union identified language that could be reasonably understood as guaranteeing benefits beyond the contract’s expiration or as constituting deferred compensation. Furthermore, the reservation-of-rights clause in plan documents did not conclusively bar an interpretation that benefits had vested. To discern the parties’ intent, the appropriate trier of fact would need to consult extrinsic evidence.Accordingly, the Second Circuit vacated the district court’s judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Xerox Corporation v. Local 14A, Rochester Regional Joint Board, Xerographic Division Workers United" on Justia Law