Justia U.S. 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Several individuals, including Richard and Jocelyn Markowitz, John and Elizabeth van Merkensteijn, and pension funds they controlled, were found by a jury to have defrauded the Danish tax authority (Skat) by submitting false claims for tax refunds. The defendants conceded before trial that they were never entitled to the refunds under the U.S.-Denmark tax treaty, admitting that they had not owned Danish shares or received dividends subject to Danish withholding tax. However, they argued that they had been misled by a London-based trading partner into believing otherwise and were unaware that the refund claims submitted on their behalf were fraudulent.The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York presided over the case after it was consolidated as part of multidistrict litigation. The defendants unsuccessfully moved to dismiss Skat’s claims, contending that the common law revenue rule barred the suit. The district court held that because the defendants never owned the relevant Danish stocks or paid taxes, Skat’s claims were for commercial fraud rather than enforcement of Danish tax law. After trial, the jury found each defendant liable, and the district court entered judgments totaling over $476 million based on Skat’s gross payments and prejudgment interest.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that Skat’s lawsuit was not barred by the revenue rule because it did not seek to enforce foreign tax laws, but rather sought recovery for fraud. The court also found no abuse of discretion in the district court’s exclusion of certain evidence and upheld the sufficiency of evidence supporting judgments against Jocelyn Markowitz and Elizabeth van Merkensteijn under an agency theory. The Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. View "Skatteforvaltningen v. Markowitz" on Justia Law

A native and citizen of Poland entered the United States without inspection in 1999 and adjusted to lawful permanent resident status in 2006. Between 2006 and 2008, he participated in a conspiracy to retaliate against employees who had sued his employer for wage violations, including hiring individuals to commit violent acts and intimidation. He pleaded guilty in 2012 to conspiracy to retaliate against witnesses and parties to an official proceeding, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1513(b) and (f), and was sentenced to 364 days’ imprisonment.Removal proceedings were initiated by the Department of Homeland Security. Before an Immigration Judge, he argued that his conviction was not for a crime involving moral turpitude (CIMT) and that the offense was not committed within five years of his admission. The Immigration Judge denied his motion to terminate removal, finding the conviction was categorically a CIMT and met the timing requirement. He sought relief under the Convention Against Torture and a hardship waiver, but was denied by a second Immigration Judge. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) dismissed his appeal. On a previous petition for review, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit remanded for the BIA to reconsider the CIMT determination. The BIA again concluded the conviction was categorically a CIMT.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the BIA’s decision. It held that conspiracy to retaliate against witnesses in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1513(b) is categorically a crime involving moral turpitude, and that the CIMT ground for removability is not unconstitutionally vague as applied. The court also declined to reconsider arguments already rejected in the earlier petition. The petition for review was denied. View "Dziedziach v. Blanche" on Justia Law

Three teachers at a public high school, who openly identify as members of the LGBTQ+ community, were directed by school district officials to remove pride flags and stickers from their classrooms. The officials cited a district policy that restricted displays to only the American and New York State flags, characterizing other flags and certain stickers as “political.” While the teachers complied, they alleged that other non-sanctioned displays, such as sports flags and stickers for student organizations, were allowed to remain. The teachers also recounted differing treatment regarding permission slips for an LGBTQ+ club field trip. They filed suit, claiming violations of their First and Fourteenth Amendment rights, as well as employment discrimination under federal, state, and local law.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York dismissed the complaint. The court found the individual officials entitled to qualified immunity on the First Amendment claims, ruled that there was no plausible showing of discriminatory intent for the equal protection claims, determined no adverse employment actions occurred for Title VII purposes, and declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state and local law claims.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment, though it relied on different reasoning for the First Amendment claim. The Second Circuit held that classroom wall and door decorations by teachers constitute speech pursuant to their official duties under Garcetti v. Ceballos, and therefore, the school district could regulate or restrict such speech without violating the teachers’ First Amendment rights. The court further held that the teachers failed to plausibly allege selective enforcement based on impermissible motives or any adverse employment actions, and found no abuse of discretion in the district court’s decisions regarding the state claims and leave to amend. View "Dolce v. Connetquot Cent. Sch. Dist." on Justia Law

The plaintiff, a former Senior Reimbursement Manager at a national pharmacy provider, alleged that her employer engaged in a scheme to overcharge government healthcare programs such as Medicare and Medicaid. She claimed the company exploited billing system discrepancies and other tactics to cause overpayments, including billing for deceased patients and miscoding pharmacy types for higher reimbursements. The company allegedly concealed these overpayments in its internal accounting and, after a period, transferred the unreturned funds into its own revenues. The plaintiff reported these practices to management and internal audit, but the issues persisted.After filing a complaint in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York, the plaintiff amended her allegations. The District Court dismissed all federal claims with prejudice, finding that the plaintiff did not meet the heightened pleading standards for fraud required under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b) for “direct” False Claims Act (FCA) claims (those based on submitting fraudulent invoices or statements to the government). The court also denied leave to further amend the complaint, and denied reconsideration.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case de novo. The Second Circuit affirmed the District Court’s dismissal of the plaintiff’s direct FCA claims, holding that she did not identify any specific fraudulent submissions to the government, nor adequately allege that such information was solely within the defendants’ control. However, the Second Circuit vacated the dismissal of the “reverse” FCA claim, which is based on knowingly retaining government overpayments. The court found the plaintiff sufficiently alleged that the company had an obligation to return identified overpayments and knowingly concealed or improperly avoided that obligation. The case was remanded for further proceedings on the reverse FCA claim. View "United States v. Amerisource Bergen Corp." on Justia Law

Two plaintiffs, one individual and one advocacy organization, filed suit against a ridesharing company, alleging discrimination against persons with mobility-related disabilities. They claimed the company violated the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and New York State Human Rights Law (NYSHRL) by failing to make wheelchair accessible vehicles (WAVs)—that accommodate fixed-frame wheelchairs—available in all regions it operates, instead of only nine cities. The plaintiffs proposed several modifications to the company’s policies and practices to increase WAV availability in Westchester County, New York, and sought class certification for affected residents and visitors.The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York held a bench trial. After reviewing the evidence, the court found that the plaintiffs failed to demonstrate either that the rideshare platform’s limited menu constituted a barrier to WAV access or that their proposed modifications would effectively or reasonably achieve WAV transportation in the relevant regions. The court also determined that the evidence did not show the proposed modifications were likely to be effective, and that the defendant’s proof established the modifications would not be reasonable. As a result, the district court dismissed the plaintiffs’ claims.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the district court’s findings for clear error and considered plaintiffs’ arguments regarding evidentiary burdens and the effectiveness of proposed modifications. The Second Circuit concluded that plaintiffs bore the burden of persuasion as to effectiveness, and only a light burden of production as to reasonableness. The appellate court found no error in the district court’s application of these standards and affirmed the judgment, holding that the plaintiffs failed to show their proposed modifications would effectively provide WAV service in Westchester County. View "Lowell v. Lyft, Inc." on Justia Law

An elderly patient, after contracting COVID-19, received remote medical treatment from an out-of-state physician who prescribed multiple medications, including prednisone. Prednisone is known to carry a risk of peptic ulcer disease, especially in older individuals, and the physician did not prescribe mitigating medication to counteract these side effects. The patient subsequently developed a perforated ulcer and died from organ failure. The estate brought suit against the physician for negligence, lack of informed consent, and violation of the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act (CUTPA).The estate initially filed the action in Connecticut Superior Court, and the physician removed it to the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut. The physician moved to dismiss, arguing immunity under the Public Readiness and Emergency Preparedness Act (PREP Act) and contending the CUTPA claim was not viable. The District Court dismissed the CUTPA claim but denied the motion to dismiss the negligence and informed consent claims, concluding PREP Act immunity did not apply.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the physician qualified for PREP Act immunity because he was a licensed health professional who prescribed a covered countermeasure (prednisone) for COVID-19, and the prescription had a causal relationship with the patient’s death. The court also held that the CUTPA claim was impermissible because it was based on alleged professional negligence rather than business or entrepreneurial conduct. The Second Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the CUTPA claim, reversed the District Court’s denial of PREP Act immunity, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Waters v. Kory" on Justia Law

The defendant pled guilty to conspiring to traffic firearms after law enforcement in Bridgeport, Connecticut, discovered evidence linking him to the illegal purchase and distribution of about twenty guns. The investigation began when he arrived at a hospital with a gunshot wound, and further inquiry revealed multiple firearm purchases, sales to prohibited persons, and the use of tools to obliterate serial numbers. Messages found on his phone confirmed his awareness that his actions were unlawful and indicated attempts to cover up his conduct.The United States District Court for the District of Connecticut adopted the Presentence Report’s Guidelines range of 51 to 63 months but sentenced the defendant to 84 months’ imprisonment, an upward variance. The court justified this by referencing the seriousness of the offense, the number of firearms involved, the obliteration of serial numbers, the defendant’s knowledge that buyers were prohibited persons, and his failure to assist law enforcement in recovering the trafficked firearms.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the procedural and substantive reasonableness of the sentence. The appellate court held that the district court committed procedural error by increasing the sentence based, in substantial part, on the defendant’s refusal to cooperate with law enforcement, which is impermissible. Additionally, the district court erred by imposing an upward variance based on factors already included in the Guidelines calculation, without explaining why those factors warranted greater weight in this case, as required by United States v. Sindima. The Second Circuit found these errors to be plain and determined that they affected the fairness of the proceedings.Accordingly, the Second Circuit vacated the sentence and remanded the case for resentencing before a different district judge, to ensure the appearance of justice is preserved. View "United States v. Bagley" on Justia Law

The defendant was convicted in 2009 by a jury of four drug offenses involving crack cocaine, including conspiracy and possession with intent to distribute. The offenses involved quantities that, at the time, triggered severe mandatory minimum sentences under federal law. The defendant also had two prior New York State drug convictions, which increased his sentencing exposure. He was originally sentenced to life imprisonment and life terms of supervised release.After his conviction and sentence were affirmed by the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit and certiorari was denied by the Supreme Court, the defendant sought relief under the First Step Act of 2018. The district court for the Northern District of New York first denied his motion for a reduced sentence but, following the Supreme Court’s decision in Concepcion v. United States and a remand from the Second Circuit, the district court resentenced him to time served and eight years of supervised release. The district court believed it had discretion to reduce the mandatory minimum supervised release term based on nonretroactive changes to the law and the Sentencing Guidelines.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed whether the district court could impose a supervised release term below the eight-year statutory minimum set by 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(B) when resentencing under § 404(b) of the First Step Act. The court held that Congress made clear that changes to the mandatory minimums in § 401 of the First Step Act do not apply retroactively except in narrow circumstances not present here. The Supreme Court’s decision in Concepcion does not permit district courts to disregard applicable statutory mandatory minimums. Accordingly, the Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment imposing an eight-year supervised release term. View "United States v. VanHoesen" on Justia Law

Cory Martin was charged with murder-for-hire, conspiracy to commit murder-for-hire, fraud, and identity theft after he killed Brandy Odom in April 2018. Martin’s then-girlfriend, Adelle Anderson, had taken out life insurance policies on Odom and promised Martin the proceeds upon Odom’s death. Following the murder, Anderson attempted to collect on the fraudulent policies but was unsuccessful. Law enforcement discovered Odom’s remains, secured Anderson’s cooperation, and prosecuted Martin based in large part on Anderson’s testimony.The case was heard in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York. At trial, Martin argued Anderson was the mastermind and that he was uninvolved, but the jury rejected this, finding Martin guilty on all counts. Anderson, having cooperated, pleaded guilty in a separate proceeding and received probation due to her history of abuse and other mitigating factors. Martin was sentenced to life imprisonment for the murder-for-hire offenses, along with additional sentences for the fraud and identity theft charges. He appealed, challenging the sufficiency of the evidence, the adequacy of the jury instructions, the inclusion of an aiding-and-abetting instruction, and alleging spillover prejudice affecting his other convictions.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s judgment. The appellate court held that the evidence was sufficient to support the murder-for-hire convictions under 18 U.S.C. § 1958, clarifying that the statute’s “consideration” requirement does not demand a formal employment relationship but rather a reciprocal inducement—an exchange of the murder for a promise of pecuniary value. The Second Circuit also found the jury instructions were proper, the aiding-and-abetting instruction was justified, and no impermissible spillover prejudice had occurred. The district court’s judgment was affirmed in all respects. View "United States v. Martin" on Justia Law

The case centers on whether John A. Sarcone III lawfully served as Acting U.S. Attorney for the Northern District of New York. After the departure of the Senate-confirmed U.S. Attorney, Sarcone was appointed as Interim U.S. Attorney for 120 days under 28 U.S.C. § 546. When his term expired, the district court did not appoint a permanent replacement, leaving the office vacant. The Department of Justice then reassigned the prior First Assistant to another role and designated Sarcone as the new First Assistant (FAUSA), claiming this made him Acting U.S. Attorney under the Federal Vacancies Reform Act of 1998 (FVRA). Sarcone subsequently issued two grand jury subpoenas to the New York State Attorney General’s Office regarding investigations into the National Rifle Association and Donald J. Trump.The United States District Court for the Northern District of New York granted the New York Attorney General’s motion to quash the subpoenas, holding that Sarcone had not lawfully become Acting U.S. Attorney under the FVRA since he was not the First Assistant at the time the vacancy arose. The court also found that the Attorney General’s general delegation of all U.S. Attorney duties to Sarcone was an impermissible circumvention of the FVRA. The court disqualified Sarcone from further involvement in the investigations.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision. The court held that the FVRA only permits automatic succession by a First Assistant who is already in office when the vacancy arises. It further held that a general delegation of all duties is not a lawful means to install an acting official, as it would undermine the FVRA’s exclusivity provision. Because the government did not substantively contest Sarcone’s disqualification on appeal, the court treated that issue as forfeited and affirmed the district court’s order. View "In re Grand Jury Subpoenas to the Office of the New York State Attorney General" on Justia Law