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Plaintiffs, formerly civil immigration detainees treated for serious mental illnesses, filed a 42 U.S.C. 1983 action against the county and others, alleging that the failure to engage in discharge planning or to provide them with discharge plans upon release violated their substantive due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. The Second Circuit vacated the district court's grant of defendants' motion to dismiss. The court held that plaintiffs have adequately stated a Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process claim, because they plausibly alleged that they had serious medical needs requiring discharge planning and that defendants' failure to provide discharge planning to plaintiffs constituted deliberate indifference. Accordingly, the court remanded for further fact finding and further proceedings. View "Charles v. Orange County" on Justia Law

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The government appealed the district court's grant of defendant's motion to vacate a portion of the jury's guilty verdict. Defendant was convicted of conspiracy to distribute 100 grams or more of heroin as well as several other narcotics and firearms violations. In this case, the parties agree that the government proved beyond a reasonable doubt that 89 grams of heroin were attributable to the conspiracy. The Second Circuit affirmed and held that the evidence at trial was insufficient to permit a reasonable jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt that the conspiracy involved an additional 11 grams of heroin. The court remanded for sentencing. View "United States v. Pauling" on Justia Law

Posted in: Criminal Law

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The trust appealed the district court's grant of the law firm's request for a percentage fee awarded from the common settlement fund. The fee award was compensation for the law firm's representation of a class of plaintiffs that settled securities law claims against BioScript. The trust was a member of the class and objected to the fee award. The Second Circuit affirmed and held that, regardless of whether the claims settled here were initiated under fee‐shifting statutes, the common‐fund doctrine properly controls the district court's allocation of attorneys' fees from a common settlement fund. The court explained that class plaintiffs have received the benefit of counsel's representation and assumption of the risk that the lawsuit will not render a recovery, and thus the class may be fairly charged for counsel's assumption of contingent risk. Therefore, the court held that the district court was entitled to exercise its discretion in awarding either a percentage‐of‐the‐fund fee or a lodestar fee to class counsel. View "Fresno County Employees' Retirement Assoc. v. Isaacson/Weaver Family Trust" on Justia Law

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Plaintiffs filed suit under New York tort law, alleging that defendants conspired with and aided and abetted the Sudanese regime in its commission of widespread atrocities. The Second Circuit reversed the district court's dismissal of the complaint under Civil Rule of Procedure 12 (b)(6), holding that the district court misapplied the act of state doctrine and erroneously determined that the adult plaintiffs' claims were untimely. In this case, considering the lack of evidence introduced by defendants that genocide is the official policy of Sudan, and the countervailing evidence that genocide blatantly violates Sudan's own laws, the court held that there was simply no "official act" that a court would be required to "declare invalid" in order to adjudicate plaintiffs' claims. Furthermore, the court held that the atrocities to which defendant asked the court to defer can never be the basis of a rule of decision capable of triggering the act of state doctrine, because circuit precedent prohibits the court from deeming valid violations of non-derogable jus cogens norms irrespective of the consent or practice of a given state. The court also held that plaintiffs' claims under the act of state doctrine were timely. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Kashef v. BNP Paribas S.A." on Justia Law

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The Second Circuit denied a petition for review of the BIA's decision dismissing petitioner's appeal from the IJ's order of removal on the ground that petitioner had been convicted of an aggravated felony crime of violence. The court held that petitioner's prior conviction for second degree assault under New York Penal Law 120.05(1) is a crime of violence as defined in 18 U.S.C. 16(a), because it requires that defendant cause a serious physical injury to another with the intent to do so. Therefore, the conviction met section 16(a)'s physical force requirement. View "Thompson v. Barr" on Justia Law

Posted in: Criminal Law

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A Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA) violation "occurs," for the purposes of the FDCPA's one‐year statute of limitations, when an individual is injured by the alleged unlawful conduct. The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment for defendants on plaintiff's FDCPA claim. The court held that plaintiff's claim was time-barred because plaintiff filed suit one year and one day after Citibank froze his accounts. Furthermore, even if the discovery rule applied to FDCPA claims as a general matter, plaintiff's claim was still time-barred. Finally, plaintiff was not entitled to equitable tolling because he did not diligently pursue his rights. View "Benzemann v. Houslanger & Associates, PLLC" on Justia Law

Posted in: Banking, Consumer Law

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IQ filed suit against three large dental supply distributors, alleging that defendants violated federal and state antitrust laws, as well as common law tort claims. The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of IQ's claim that it has antitrust standing to challenge the boycott of SourceOne and the state dental associations (SDAs) that had partnered with SourceOne. However, the court found that IQ's antitrust and tort claims may go forward on the direct boycott allegations. In this case, IQ was an efficient enforcer of the antitrust laws solely with respect to its allegations that it has been directly boycotted by the actions of defendants. Accordingly, the court vacated in part and remanded for further proceedings. Finally, IQ's state law antitrust claims and common law tort claims were also vacated and remanded, but only to the extent that they relied on IQ's allegations that it suffered harm as a result of the direct boycott. View "IQ Dental Supply, Inc. v. Henry Schein, Inc." on Justia Law

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The Second Circuit denied a petition for review of the BIA's order of removal based on petitioner's conviction for an aggravated felony. The court held that petitioner's conviction for conspiracy in the second degree to commit a felony -- murder in the second degree in this case -- under New York law was an aggravated felony. The court applied the categorical approach and held that second degree murder is clearly an aggravated felony within the federal definition. View "Santana-Felix v. Barr" on Justia Law

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Plaintiff filed a whistleblower action under Section 806 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act against CGI, alleging that he was unlawfully fired in retaliation for his complaints about and objections to an allegedly fraudulent scheme developed by CGI's executives. The district court held that the Sarbanes-Oxley claim survived summary judgment, but later dismissed plaintiff for lack of standing due to his parallel bankruptcy proceeding. After the bankruptcy case closed, plaintiff moved to be substituted in as the proper party-in-interest. The district court granted plaintiff's motion and then dismissed the case on grounds of judicial estoppel. The Second Circuit held that the district court exceeded its discretion by invoking the judicial estoppel doctrine. The court held that where, as here, a pro se debtor has listed his pending litigation on the Statement of Financial Affairs (SOFA), rather than the Schedule B as it was constituted at the time of plaintiff's filing, and then disclosed it to the trustee and the bankruptcy court prior to discharge of his debt, and the trustee and the bankruptcy court were on sufficient notice to take steps to protect the creditors' interests, the debtor is not estopped from pursuing that litigation by virtue of the doctrine of judicial estoppel. The court explained that, for estoppel to apply, there must be greater indicia than presented here of an intent to deceive the court for the debtor's benefit. Accordingly, the court vacated the judgment and remanded for further proceedings. The court affirmed the district court's grant of partial summary judgment to CGI on the state-law breach of contract claim, holding that the dismissal order was rendered moot by virtue of later developments. View "Ashmore v. CGI Group" on Justia Law

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The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of plaintiff's claims for breach of contract, copyright infringement, misappropriation, and unfair competition arising from its sale of equipment and software for an automated assembly system. The court held that defendants' conduct did not breach Section 8.2(d) of the Equipment Purchase Agreement (EPA) and was non‐infringing because that provision permitted defendants to reproduce and use the station and server source code; defendantsʹ adaptation of the server source code was non‐infringing because it was authorized by 17 U.S.C. 117(a); Universalʹs contract claim that defendantsʹ modification of the server source code breached the EPA was preempted by the Copyright Act; Universalʹs claim of misappropriation of trade secrets was time‐barred; and MTA did not unfairly compete with Universal because its conduct was not in bad faith. View "Universal Instruments Corp. v. Micro Systems Engineering, Inc." on Justia Law

Posted in: Business Law, Contracts