Justia U.S. 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

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The case pertains to Ariel Jimenez, who owned and operated a tax preparation business in Bronx, New York. Between 2009 and 2015, Jimenez led a large-scale tax fraud and identity theft scheme, purchasing stolen identities of children to falsely claim them as dependents on clients' tax returns. Through this scheme, Jimenez obtained millions of dollars, which he laundered by structuring bank deposits, investing in real estate properties, and transferring the properties to his parents and limited liability companies. Following a jury trial, Jimenez was convicted of conspiracy to defraud the United States with respect to tax-return claims, conspiracy to commit wire fraud, aggravated identity theft, and money laundering.On appeal, Jimenez raised two issues. First, he claimed that the district court’s jury instruction regarding withdrawal from a conspiracy was erroneous. Second, he alleged that the evidence supporting his conspiracy convictions was insufficient. The United States Court of Appeals For the Second Circuit affirmed the conviction. The court held that the district court’s jury instruction on withdrawal from a conspiracy was a correct statement of the law and that the evidence supporting Jimenez's conspiracy convictions was sufficient. The court found that Jimenez had failed to effectively withdraw from the conspiracy as he continued to benefit from it. View "United States v. Jimenez" on Justia Law

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John D. Whitfield's application for a job as a Youth Development Specialist with the New York City Administration for Children’s Services (ACS) was rejected. Whitfield alleged that the rejection was discriminatory and violated his First and Fourteenth Amendment rights. He initially challenged the decision in New York State Supreme Court through an Article 78 proceeding, which was dismissed. He then initiated a federal court action, which was also dismissed by the District Court on res judicata grounds. The District Court determined that the state court proceeding was a “hybrid” proceeding where Whitfield could have pursued the claims he raises in the federal action.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit disagreed, concluding that the state court adjudicated the matter as a pure Article 78 proceeding, not as a hybrid. Therefore, the state court lacked the power to award Whitfield the full scope of relief he now seeks in this action, and the District Court erred by dismissing the amended complaint on res judicata grounds. The judgment of the District Court was vacated and the case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Whitfield v. City of New York" on Justia Law

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The case involves a dispute over the legality of an agreement between River 1, LLC, an American company, and Viking USA LLC, a subsidiary of a Swiss company, under federal maritime law. The United States Maritime Administration (MARAD) had confirmed the legality of the agreement as a "time charter" under 46 U.S.C. § 56101(a)(i). However, American Cruise Lines argued that the agreement should be construed as a "bareboat" charter which is not covered under the standing blanket approval of MARAD, and thus, grants a foreign company impermissible control of an American vessel.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed MARAD's decision. It found that the agreement didn't grant Viking exclusive possession and control of the cruise ship in a way that blackletter maritime law recognizes as sufficient to create a bareboat charter. It noted that the ship's crew was provided by River 1, the vessel master was overseen by River 1, and River 1 bore primary responsibility for the ship’s day-to-day maintenance and care. Viking's ability to set the itinerary was consistent with the maritime law definition of a time charter.The court also rejected American Cruise Lines' allegations that MARAD failed to follow the notice and comment provisions applicable to this case. It concluded that MARAD fully complied with the new procedural requirements imposed by the National Defense Authorization Act of 2021. View "American Cruise Lines v. United States of America" on Justia Law

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The defendant-appellant, Alex Oliveras, was sentenced to sixty-three months' imprisonment and a three-year supervised release term for possessing cocaine with intent to distribute and possessing a firearm in furtherance of drug trafficking. On appeal, Oliveras challenged the imposition of a special condition of his supervised release that allowed for suspicionless searches by a probation officer.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that the "special needs" doctrine of the Fourth Amendment permits, when sufficiently supported by the record, the imposition of a special condition of supervised release that allows suspicionless searches of the defendant's person, property, vehicle, place of residence, or any other property under their control by a probation officer. However, the court also found that the district court exceeded its discretion in imposing that special condition here. The court explained that the district court failed to make the individualized assessment required to support the special condition under 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d), including a sufficient explanation as to how the condition was reasonably related in this particular case to the applicable statutory factors under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) and involved no greater deprivation of liberty than was reasonably necessary under those factors. Therefore, the Court of Appeals vacated the Search Condition and remanded the case to the district court for further consideration of whether it is necessary to impose the Search Condition in this particular case and, if so, for the district court to explain the individualized basis for imposing the Search Condition. View "United States v. Oliveras" on Justia Law

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In the early morning hours of September 8, 2018, Mabior Jok was standing outside a bar in Burlington, Vermont, when Joseph Corrow, an officer of the Burlington Police Department, approached the group. The details of what happened next are fiercely disputed, but it's agreed that Corrow took Jok to the ground, resulting in Jok hitting his head, losing consciousness and being taken to the hospital. Jok was charged with disorderly conduct, but the charge was later dismissed. Subsequently, Jok brought a lawsuit against Corrow and others, alleging, among other things, that Corrow used excessive force against him in violation of his Fourth Amendment rights.Corrow moved for summary judgment on several grounds, including that he was entitled to qualified immunity. The United States District Court for the District of Vermont denied the motion, concluding that there were genuine disputes of material fact and hence, summary judgment could not be granted on the basis of qualified immunity. Corrow then filed an interlocutory appeal of the denial.The United States Court of Appeals For the Second Circuit found that Corrow failed to establish appellate jurisdiction because he continued to assert disputes of fact, and no pure question of law was presented for review. The Court concluded that it did not have jurisdiction to review the denial of qualified immunity as the denial was based on the presence of disputed material facts. Therefore, the interlocutory appeal was dismissed due to lack of appellate jurisdiction. View "Jok v. City of Burlington" on Justia Law

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The case in question involves a dispute over the use of the term "red gold" in the marketing of wristwatches. The plaintiff-appellant Solid 21, a luxury jewelry and watch business, owns a trademark in RED GOLD® since 2003. Defendant-appellee Breitling, a luxury watch manufacturer, uses the term “red gold” in its advertisements, product listings, and catalogues. Solid 21 argued that Breitling's use of the term amounted to trademark infringement, claiming it was likely to cause confusion, leading customers to mistakenly believe that Solid 21 was affiliated with Breitling’s products.The United States District Court for the District of Connecticut granted summary judgment for Breitling, finding that the company used the term “red gold” permissibly under the Lanham Act’s fair use defense. Solid 21 appealed this decision, insisting that material issues of fact precluded summary judgment for Breitling.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit disagreed and affirmed the district court's judgment. The court reasoned that Breitling used the term "red gold" in a descriptive sense, not as a mark, and in good faith. The court also pointed out that Solid 21 failed to provide sufficient evidence to create a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Breitling was acting in bad faith while using the term “red gold.” View "Solid 21, Inc. v. Breitling USA, Inc." on Justia Law

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The plaintiff-appellant, Maurice Cotton, an inmate, filed a civil rights lawsuit against corrections officials at the Green Haven Correctional Facility. He alleged that he was wrongfully denied a transfer to another prison facility and retaliated against for filing grievances related to the transfer request. Cotton sought permission to proceed in forma pauperis (IFP), which allows indigent prisoners to pay filing fees through a structured payment plan linked to their prison accounts. The district court denied Cotton's IFP request, concluding that he had accumulated "at least three" strikes under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) due to previous lawsuit dismissals.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit vacated and remanded the district court's decision, ruling that the district court erred in its interpretation of the three previous lawsuits. According to the appellate court, not all of Cotton's previous lawsuits counted as PLRA strikes. The court further explained that a dismissal under Heck v. Humphrey does not automatically count as a PLRA strike, arguing that the key consideration is whether the dismissal is based on the merits of the case or if it was merely a matter of timing or sequencing. Therefore, the appellate court concluded that the district court incorrectly denied Cotton's request for IFP status, warranting a remand for further proceedings. View "Cotton v. New York State Office" on Justia Law

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This case arose from a Securities & Exchange Commission (SEC) enforcement action against Mohammed Ali Rashid, a former senior partner at the private equity firm Apollo Management L.P. Rashid was accused of breaching his fiduciary duties to the Apollo-affiliated private equity funds he advised by submitting fraudulent expense reports, which were eventually paid by the funds. The district court held that Rashid was not liable under § 206(1) of the Investment Advisers Act because he was not aware that the funds, rather than Apollo, would pay for his expenses. However, the court found Rashid liable under § 206(2) of the Act, concluding he was indifferent and therefore negligent as to which entity would pay for his expenses.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed the district court's decision. The appellate court held that it was not reasonably foreseeable to Rashid that the funds would pay for his expenses, concluding that Rashid did not breach his duty of care to the funds or proximately cause their harm. The court noted that while Rashid's actions were serious and likely criminal, they did not constitute fraud against the funds as required under § 206(2) of the Investment Advisers Act. The court also found that Rashid did not breach his duty of care to the funds, as he could not have reasonably known that the funds would cover his expenses. The court concluded that Rashid did not proximately cause the funds' harm, as Apollo's intervening actions in overbilling the funds were not reasonably foreseeable to Rashid. View "SEC v. Rashid" on Justia Law

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The case in question involves an appeal by Joseph William Foley against the United States Tax Court's dismissal of his deficiency protest due to untimeliness. Foley filed a protest against a notice of deficiency issued by the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) for the 2014 and 2015 tax years, but his filing came 1,393 days after the 90-day deadline.Foley's petition was filed under small tax case procedures, which is a less formal process meant for cases where the deficiency amount is under $50,000. The IRS moved to dismiss Foley’s petition for redetermination due to its untimeliness. Foley then appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, arguing that the Tax Court's decision was made on jurisdictional grounds, not on merit, and therefore should not be impeded by the non-reviewability provision of the small tax case procedures.The Court of Appeals disagreed with Foley's argument. It held that the Tax Court's dismissal of his petition did constitute a "decision", as defined by the Internal Revenue Code. The Court of Appeals explained that a "decision" includes a dismissal for lack of jurisdiction, which was the case for Foley’s petition. Therefore, according to the language of the Internal Revenue Code, jurisdictional dismissals like Foley's are indeed unreviewable under small tax case procedures.The Court of Appeals also disagreed with Foley's alternative argument that his case never became a "small case" due to the Tax Court's jurisdictional dismissal, and thus falls outside of the non-reviewability provision. The court noted that Foley had initially requested small-case procedures, and despite the Commissioner’s motion to dismiss his petition as untimely, Foley never moved to rescind his small-case election. Hence, the Tax Court dismissed a case that was subject to small tax case procedures, and the Court of Appeals is without jurisdiction to review Foley's appeal. Consequently, the court granted the Commissioner's motion and dismissed Foley’s appeal. View "Foley v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue" on Justia Law

Posted in: Tax Law
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In this case, five former customers of Peregrine Financial Group, Inc., a defunct futures commission merchant, filed a class action lawsuit against various defendants, including JPMorgan Chase Bank and National Futures Association. They claimed that their investments were wiped out due to fraudulent activities by Peregrine's CEO. The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York dismissed the federal claims as time-barred and declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state-law claims.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the lower court's decision. The main issue addressed by the Second Circuit was whether a party could compel a district court to exercise subject-matter jurisdiction on a theory of jurisdiction that the party raised untimely.The Court held that a party may not do so. The Court distinguished between objecting to a federal court's exercise of jurisdiction, which a party could do at any stage in the litigation, and invoking the district court’s jurisdiction, which can be forfeited if not raised timely. Therefore, although federal courts must ensure they have jurisdiction, there is no corresponding obligation to find and exercise jurisdiction on a basis not raised by the parties. The Court concluded that the district court was within its discretion to decline to consider the untimely raised theory of jurisdiction. View "Behrens v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A." on Justia Law