Justia U.S. 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Eddie Harp was shot and killed in his car outside a hospital in New Haven, Connecticut, in October 1992. Maleek Jones was tried and convicted in 1995 for Harp’s murder, receiving a 65-year sentence. The prosecution relied primarily on the testimony of Tyrone Spears, an eyewitness who had confessed to the shooting and implicated Jones. Spears’s account was contradicted by Sheila McCray, a nurse and disinterested eyewitness, who told police she saw only two shooters and identified neither as Jones. Despite knowledge of McCray’s statements, Jones’s trial counsel, Leo Ahern, failed to investigate, contact, or call McCray as a witness, and instead told Jones’s family to hire a private investigator, which they could not afford. No physical evidence tied Jones to the crime.Following his conviction, Jones unsuccessfully appealed to the Connecticut Appellate Court, which upheld the verdict and directed ineffective assistance claims to habeas proceedings. He then filed two state habeas petitions. The first, heard in 2009, did not directly address Ahern’s failure to investigate McCray; the court found no prejudice from counsel’s conduct. The second, heard in 2015, involved McCray’s testimony for the first time, but the court questioned her recollection and again denied relief. The Connecticut Appellate Court and Supreme Court affirmed both denials.After exhausting state remedies, Jones pursued federal habeas relief in the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut. The district court granted his petition, finding ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to investigate and call McCray, and also faulted the exclusion of exculpatory evidence. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment solely on the ineffective assistance claim. The Second Circuit held that counsel’s failure to investigate and present testimony from a key disinterested eyewitness constituted deficient performance and prejudiced Jones, satisfying the standard under Strickland v. Washington and the requirements of AEDPA. View "Jones v. Carlos" on Justia Law

Three New York State residents brought a lawsuit challenging several New York City rules regulating the acquisition, sale, registration, and carry of handguns. The plaintiffs alleged that these rules violated their rights under the Second Amendment. One plaintiff claimed he could not afford the mandatory fees required to obtain a handgun license. Two other plaintiffs, who held licenses, asserted that City rules prevented them from registering more than two handguns to their carry licenses and from carrying more than one handgun at a time. They also challenged a rule imposing a 90-day waiting period between handgun purchases, and the prior-authorization process for acquiring handguns.The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York granted the City’s motion to dismiss the complaint. That court dismissed some claims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, finding that the plaintiffs failed to show injury-in-fact necessary for standing regarding certain acquisition and registration requirements. It found standing for other claims, such as the one-gun-carry rule, the two-gun-registration rule, the 90-day purchase rule, and the licensing fees. However, the court dismissed these claims for failure to state a claim, concluding at the first step of the Bruen analysis that the challenged rules did not regulate activity covered by the Second Amendment’s plain text.Reviewing the case, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of claims for lack of jurisdiction and the dismissal of the fees challenge, relying on Kwong v. Bloomberg. However, the Second Circuit vacated the district court’s dismissal of challenges to the one-gun-carry rule, the 90-day purchase limitation, and the two-gun-carry-license registration rule. The court held that these rules regulate conduct covered by the Second Amendment, requiring further analysis at the second step under Bruen. The case was remanded for further proceedings regarding those claims. View "Mills v. New York City" on Justia Law

The plaintiff operated an animal rescue in New York and was formerly employed by the Ulster County Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals (SPCA). After her termination from the SPCA, she opened her own rescue, but was accused by SPCA officers and a competing rescuer of neglecting and abusing animals. Based on these accusations, an arrest warrant and search warrant were obtained, leading to her arrest and a search of her home. She was charged with misdemeanors under New York animal welfare laws. The prosecution ultimately ended in an adjournment in contemplation of dismissal (ACOD), with the charges dismissed after the government admitted it could not prove its case.In the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of New York, the plaintiff brought claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and § 1985, alleging unlawful search, false arrest, malicious prosecution, and violations of her First and Fourteenth Amendment rights, along with state-law claims. Some defendants moved to dismiss only certain claims, but the district court dismissed the entire complaint with prejudice, including claims no party had moved to dismiss, and denied leave to amend most claims. The court reasoned that the ACOD did not constitute a favorable termination for malicious prosecution and found deficiencies in the other claims.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case de novo. The court held that an ACOD can constitute a favorable termination for Section 1983 malicious prosecution claims, overruling prior circuit precedent in light of Thompson v. Clark, 596 U.S. 36 (2022). However, it affirmed dismissal of the malicious prosecution claim because the complaint did not allege any post-arraignment deprivation of liberty. The court vacated dismissal of certain claims, finding the district court abused its discretion in denying leave to amend, and remanded for further proceedings, while affirming dismissal of other claims on futility grounds. View "Brill v. Ulster County" on Justia Law

Five individuals who participated as peaceful protesters and independent journalists at demonstrations outside the U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) facility in Portland, Oregon, alleged that federal law enforcement officers targeted them with non-lethal crowd-control munitions such as tear gas and pepper balls. The plaintiffs claimed this was retaliation for exercising their First Amendment rights. The protests, which occurred between June 2025 and February 2026, often involved both peaceful dissent and significant unrest, including vandalism, trespassing, and obstruction of law enforcement. The plaintiffs were exposed to crowd-control devices during these protests, frequently while in proximity to unlawful activity.The United States District Court for the District of Oregon issued a preliminary injunction prohibiting federal officers from using non-lethal munitions except against individuals posing an imminent threat of physical harm, and ordered that agents’ uniforms be redesigned with conspicuous identifying markings. The district court also certified a provisional class encompassing all individuals who had protested or reported on DHS activities at the Portland ICE facility since June 2025, and denied the government’s motion to stay the injunction pending appeal.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the district court’s orders. The Ninth Circuit vacated the preliminary injunction and provisional class certification, holding that the plaintiffs did not demonstrate a likelihood of success on their First Amendment claim. The court found no evidence of an unwritten policy or pattern of retaliation by DHS and held that law enforcement may use non-lethal force to clear crowds and restore order without waiting for an imminent threat of physical harm. The injunction was found to be overbroad, improperly granting relief to non-parties, and unworkable. The class certification was vacated for lack of commonality and failure to satisfy Rule 23(b)(2)’s indivisible-remedy requirement. View "United States v. Robinson" on Justia Law

A nonprofit organization planned to run several political advertisements critical of socialism and the Democratic Socialists of America ahead of the 2025 New York City Mayoral Election. New York’s independent expenditure disclosure law, which requires entities spending money on political elections to register and disclose information about their expenditures, was interpreted by state regulators to cover these advertisements, as the only citywide candidate affiliated with the DSA was running for mayor. The organization feared enforcement of the law against its ads and sought judicial relief.After filing its complaint in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, the organization moved for a preliminary injunction to prevent the State from enforcing the disclosure law against its advertisements before the upcoming election. The district court denied this emergency motion. The organization then appealed the denial to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit while the underlying challenge to the law was stayed in the district court at the organization’s request.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit dismissed the appeal as moot. The court explained that the motion for preliminary injunction sought relief only for an injury related to the 2025 mayoral election, which had already occurred, making it impossible for the appellate court to grant effectual relief. The court further held that the “capable of repetition, yet evading review” exception to mootness did not apply because the underlying action remained pending in the district court, and thus could still be litigated and reviewed in the future. The appeal was therefore dismissed for lack of a live controversy, with instructions that any future appeals concerning preliminary injunctions in this matter would be heard by the same panel. View "Am. Future Fund, Inc. v. N.Y. Bd. of Elections" on Justia Law

The petitioner, Edwin Madden, was convicted in New York state court in 1994. He first challenged his conviction by filing a habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. §2254 in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York in 1998, which was dismissed without prejudice. In 2001, he filed another habeas petition in the same district court, which was dismissed as time-barred in 2003. Madden’s subsequent requests to file successive habeas petitions were denied by the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in 2006 and 2007. In 2021, Madden moved to reopen his 2001 case, claiming new constitutional violations based on evidence discovered in 2015.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York construed Madden’s 2021 motion as a successive habeas petition and dismissed it for lack of jurisdiction, holding that Madden had not obtained the required authorization from the Second Circuit to file a successive application. The district court also denied Madden’s motion for reconsideration. Madden appealed, arguing that his claims raised debatable constitutional questions.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case and found that the district court erred in dismissing Madden’s successive habeas petition rather than transferring it to the Second Circuit, as required by established procedure. The appellate court vacated the district court’s judgment, construed Madden’s appeal as a motion for authorization to file a successive habeas petition, and denied that motion. The court held that Madden did not make the required prima facie showing that his claims relied on a new rule of constitutional law made retroactive by the Supreme Court, or that he presented newly discovered facts that, if proven, would establish by clear and convincing evidence that no reasonable factfinder would have found him guilty. Madden’s other motions were denied as moot. View "Madden v. Herbert" on Justia Law

The defendant participated in a scheme to traffic counterfeit luxury goods, using a Manhattan storage facility to store and distribute items such as clothing, shoes, and accessories marked with counterfeit trademarks. Law enforcement executed search warrants and seized over 50,000 counterfeit items from units rented by the defendant. She was charged with one count of trafficking in counterfeit goods and pleaded guilty without a plea agreement.The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York held a Fatico hearing to resolve disputed facts relevant to sentencing, including the value of the counterfeit goods and whether the defendant played a supervisory role. The court found the defendant had an aggravating role, applied a two-level enhancement under the Sentencing Guidelines, and determined the value of the goods justified a twenty-level enhancement. The court calculated an advisory Guidelines range of 87 to 108 months’ imprisonment but imposed a downward-variant sentence of 24 months’ imprisonment, three years’ supervised release, and restitution of $189,626.60 to the victim brands for investigative fees.On appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, the defendant raised three arguments: that the district court misapplied 28 U.S.C. § 994(j) regarding non-custodial sentences for first offenders, that the court’s enhancements were not supported by the evidence, and that the restitution order was improper. The Second Circuit rejected each argument. It held that Section 994(j) directs the Sentencing Commission, not sentencing courts, and does not require a non-custodial sentence. The court found no clear error in the application of the aggravating role and value enhancements, and concluded the restitution award was proper under the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act. The court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "United States v. Sow" on Justia Law

Two companies that compete in the financial technology sector became involved in a dispute after one, SS&C (which had acquired Advent), alleged that its competitor, Arcesium, misappropriated trade secrets from its Geneva portfolio accounting software. Previously, Advent and Arcesium had entered into a Hosted Reseller Agreement (HRA) that allowed Arcesium to sublicense Geneva to its own customers and provide related services, subject to confidentiality and non-disclosure provisions. The HRA specifically prohibited Arcesium from using Geneva to develop competing products. After the HRA expired, SS&C alleged that Arcesium used its access to Geneva to develop competing software, Trinity and Nautilus, by copying proprietary features and methods, in violation of their agreements.The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York dismissed SS&C’s trade secret misappropriation claims, holding that while SS&C sufficiently alleged the existence of trade secrets, it did not adequately allege that Arcesium misappropriated those secrets. The district court also denied SS&C’s motion to vacate the dismissal and to amend its complaint, after considering documents referenced in the complaint and crediting Arcesium’s interpretations of those documents.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the district court’s order de novo. The appellate court held that SS&C’s complaint contained sufficient factual allegations to plausibly state a claim for trade secret misappropriation under the Defend Trade Secrets Act, including direct and circumstantial allegations of use and improper acquisition. The Second Circuit found that the district court improperly engaged in fact-finding and inappropriately credited Arcesium’s version of contested facts at the pleading stage. The court reversed the district court’s dismissal of the trade secret misappropriation claims and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "SS&C Technologies Holdings, Inc. v. Arcesium LLC" on Justia Law

The plaintiff, a borrower, sent a qualified written request (QWR) for information concerning the servicing of her mortgage to the loan servicer and master servicer. After she received no response, her attorney prepared and sent a second QWR, for which she incurred a legal fee and postage costs. She alleged that the defendants’ failure to respond prevented her from correcting errors on her account, resulting in over $70,000 in improper fees and interest being added to her loan balance due to a subsequent mortgage modification.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York previously reviewed the case. The District Court dismissed the plaintiff’s first amended complaint for failure to allege damages, but allowed her to amend the complaint. In her second amended complaint, the plaintiff sought to recover the increased interest and fees resulting from the mortgage modification, the attorney’s fee for preparing the second QWR, and the postage cost for mailing it. The District Court denied all relief and dismissed the second amended complaint.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the District Court’s judgment. The Second Circuit held that the increased interest and fees resulting from the mortgage modification were not recoverable under the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (RESPA) because they were not caused by the defendants’ servicing of the mortgage. The court further ruled that legal fees for preparing the second QWR did not constitute “actual damages” under RESPA, since the statute separately provides for attorney’s fees only in successful actions, which did not apply here. Finally, the court held that the $3.20 postage cost was too trivial to warrant recovery under the de minimis doctrine. The judgment of the District Court was affirmed. View "Murray v. Newrez LLC" on Justia Law

In 2016, Venezuela’s state-owned oil company, PDVSA, initiated a bond exchange offer allowing holders of unsecured notes due in 2017 to swap them for new, secured notes due in 2020. As collateral, PDVSA pledged a controlling interest in CITGO Holding, Inc., a major U.S.-based subsidiary. About 39% of the 2017 noteholders participated. PDVSA defaulted on the 2020 notes in October 2019, raising the risk that creditors could seize the CITGO collateral. This took place during significant political upheaval in Venezuela, including disputes over the country’s legitimate government and control of PDVSA.The PDV Entities filed suit in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, seeking to declare the bond exchange and related agreements void and unenforceable. They argued that Venezuelan law, specifically Article 150 of the Venezuelan Constitution, required National Assembly approval for such a transaction, which was not obtained. They also asserted that resolutions from the Venezuelan National Assembly in 2016 and 2019 invalidated the transaction as acts of state. The district court initially ruled for Defendants, holding that New York law applied and that the act-of-state doctrine did not bar enforcement. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit certified questions to the New York Court of Appeals, which held that Venezuelan law governs the validity of the notes.Upon remand, the district court concluded that the bond exchange did not violate Venezuelan law because only contracts executed by the Republic or its organs—not state-owned enterprises like PDVSA—are subject to the National Assembly approval requirement under Article 150. The district court also reaffirmed that the act-of-state doctrine did not apply due to the extraterritorial nature of the transaction. On further appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed. The court held that National Assembly approval was not required, the governing documents were valid under Venezuelan law, and the act-of-state doctrine did not bar enforcement. View "leos v. MUFG" on Justia Law