Justia U.S. 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Several counties and municipalities in New York initiated lawsuits in state courts against two pharmacy benefit managers, Express Scripts, Inc. and OptumRx, Inc., alleging that these companies contributed to the opioid epidemic in their communities. The claims are based on state law and center on the defendants’ alleged practices in negotiating with opioid manufacturers and managing prescription formularies, which plaintiffs contend led to an oversupply of prescription opioids and caused substantial public harm and government expense.The defendants removed the cases to federal court—the United States District Courts for the Southern and Eastern Districts of New York—arguing removal was proper under the federal officer removal statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1), because some of the challenged conduct was performed under contracts with federal agencies, such as the Department of Defense (TRICARE), the Office of Personnel Management (FEHBP), and the Veterans Health Administration. After removal, the plaintiffs amended their complaints to disclaim any claims based on the defendants’ work for federal clients, seeking to have the cases remanded to state court. The district courts accepted the disclaimers and remanded the cases.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the district courts’ decisions. It concluded that the disclaimers were ineffective because the alleged wrongful conduct and resulting harms could not be separated between federal and non-federal clients; the conduct was indivisible. Relying on the Supreme Court's decision in Chevron USA Inc. v. Plaquemines Parish, the Second Circuit held that the defendants satisfied all statutory requirements for federal officer removal: they acted under federal direction, were sued for acts relating to federal authority, and asserted colorable federal defenses. The Second Circuit therefore reversed the remand orders and returned the cases to the district courts for further proceedings. View "County of Westchester v. Express Scripts" on Justia Law

Federal agents began investigating the defendant in early 2021 after receiving information that he was operating a firearms manufacturing and dealing business from his home without the required federal license. Undercover agents arranged the purchase of a semi-automatic firearm and a high-capacity magazine from him, during which he described the magazine as “highly illegal.” Following a year-long investigation, law enforcement executed a search warrant and recovered two unregistered short-barreled rifles and an unregistered suppressor from his residence.A grand jury indicted the defendant on two counts: dealing and manufacturing firearms without a license under federal law, and possession of unregistered National Firearms Act (NFA) firearms (the rifles and suppressor). He moved to dismiss both counts, alleging the NFA violated his Second Amendment rights. The United States District Court for the District of Connecticut denied his motion, holding that the Second Amendment did not cover possession of unregistered rifles and suppressors. The defendant then entered a conditional guilty plea to the NFA count, preserving his right to appeal the denial and his sentence. He was sentenced to twelve months and one day in prison.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the defendant lacked standing to challenge the NFA as amended after his offense because the amendment was not retroactive. The court applied the Bruen framework, assumed without deciding that short-barreled rifles and suppressors are “arms,” but concluded the NFA’s registration and taxation requirements did not meaningfully constrain the defendant’s Second Amendment rights. The court also found no procedural or substantive error in the district court’s sentencing determination. The Second Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "United States v. DeFelice" on Justia Law

A group of employees at the Starbucks Reserve Roastery in New York City wore shirts displaying the name and logo of the Starbucks Workers United union during a national campaign to negotiate a first union contract. Following this, Starbucks asked the employees to change into attire compliant with the company’s dress code, which included policies limiting union-related and other insignia on clothing. Workers United responded by filing an unfair labor practice charge, alleging that Starbucks’ dress code policies violated employees’ rights under the National Labor Relations Act by restricting union expression.The National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) initiated administrative proceedings against Starbucks, focusing on three dress code policies: the One-Pin Policy (limiting employees to one union button), the Issue-Pin Policy (prohibiting buttons or pins advocating political, religious, or personal issues), and the Logo-Shirt Policy (restricting shirts with non-approved logos or writings). An Administrative Law Judge sided with Starbucks regarding the One-Pin Policy—relying on Second Circuit precedent from NLRB v. Starbucks Corp. (“Starbucks I”)—but found Starbucks violated the NLRA with its other policies, applying the Board’s more recent Tesla, Inc. standard. The NLRB reversed the ALJ’s One-Pin Policy finding and concluded all three dress code policies violated the NLRA.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case, granting Starbucks’ petition for review and denying enforcement of the NLRB’s decision invalidating the dress code policies. The court held that the Board’s Tesla test failed to properly balance employer and employee interests, as required by Supreme Court precedent, and that the One-Pin Policy was not an unfair labor practice under binding circuit precedent. The case was remanded to the NLRB for further analysis of the Issue-Pin and Logo-Shirt rules under a more balanced legal standard. View "Siren Retail Corp. v. NLRB" on Justia Law

This case concerns a dispute between two sophisticated energy companies over a merger agreement. In December 2017, Trireme entered into an agreement with Innogy Renewables US, LLC, a subsidiary of a German energy company, to transfer valuable development companies related to wind and solar projects in exchange for an upfront payment and the possibility of future milestone payments. The agreement included provisions restricting Innogy from transferring these assets without Trireme’s consent. After a complex asset swap and corporate restructuring involving Innogy’s parent company and other entities, Trireme alleged that the assets were transferred within the corporate family in violation of the agreement.Previously, Trireme filed a lawsuit—referred to as Trireme I—in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, alleging breaches of other sections of the merger agreement but not the section concerning asset transfers. Later, Trireme sought to amend its complaint to add this new breach-of-contract claim. The district court denied the motion to amend, finding that Trireme had not acted diligently to discover the claim and was on notice of the potential breach before filing the initial action. Trireme did not pursue an appeal of this denial but instead filed a new lawsuit asserting the same claim. The district court dismissed the new case on grounds of res judicata.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s dismissal. The court held that when a party seeks to assert a claim in a new action after unsuccessfully moving to amend its complaint in a prior action, courts should consider several factors, including whether the denial was on the merits, whether the plaintiff failed to appeal, the timing of the claim, the plaintiff’s diligence, and whether the plaintiff was represented by counsel. Applying these factors, the Second Circuit concluded that res judicata barred Trireme’s new claim and affirmed the judgment. View "Trireme Energy Development v. RWE Renewables" on Justia Law

Several individuals, including Richard and Jocelyn Markowitz, John and Elizabeth van Merkensteijn, and pension funds they controlled, were found by a jury to have defrauded the Danish tax authority (Skat) by submitting false claims for tax refunds. The defendants conceded before trial that they were never entitled to the refunds under the U.S.-Denmark tax treaty, admitting that they had not owned Danish shares or received dividends subject to Danish withholding tax. However, they argued that they had been misled by a London-based trading partner into believing otherwise and were unaware that the refund claims submitted on their behalf were fraudulent.The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York presided over the case after it was consolidated as part of multidistrict litigation. The defendants unsuccessfully moved to dismiss Skat’s claims, contending that the common law revenue rule barred the suit. The district court held that because the defendants never owned the relevant Danish stocks or paid taxes, Skat’s claims were for commercial fraud rather than enforcement of Danish tax law. After trial, the jury found each defendant liable, and the district court entered judgments totaling over $476 million based on Skat’s gross payments and prejudgment interest.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that Skat’s lawsuit was not barred by the revenue rule because it did not seek to enforce foreign tax laws, but rather sought recovery for fraud. The court also found no abuse of discretion in the district court’s exclusion of certain evidence and upheld the sufficiency of evidence supporting judgments against Jocelyn Markowitz and Elizabeth van Merkensteijn under an agency theory. The Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. View "Skatteforvaltningen v. Markowitz" on Justia Law

A native and citizen of Poland entered the United States without inspection in 1999 and adjusted to lawful permanent resident status in 2006. Between 2006 and 2008, he participated in a conspiracy to retaliate against employees who had sued his employer for wage violations, including hiring individuals to commit violent acts and intimidation. He pleaded guilty in 2012 to conspiracy to retaliate against witnesses and parties to an official proceeding, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1513(b) and (f), and was sentenced to 364 days’ imprisonment.Removal proceedings were initiated by the Department of Homeland Security. Before an Immigration Judge, he argued that his conviction was not for a crime involving moral turpitude (CIMT) and that the offense was not committed within five years of his admission. The Immigration Judge denied his motion to terminate removal, finding the conviction was categorically a CIMT and met the timing requirement. He sought relief under the Convention Against Torture and a hardship waiver, but was denied by a second Immigration Judge. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) dismissed his appeal. On a previous petition for review, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit remanded for the BIA to reconsider the CIMT determination. The BIA again concluded the conviction was categorically a CIMT.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the BIA’s decision. It held that conspiracy to retaliate against witnesses in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1513(b) is categorically a crime involving moral turpitude, and that the CIMT ground for removability is not unconstitutionally vague as applied. The court also declined to reconsider arguments already rejected in the earlier petition. The petition for review was denied. View "Dziedziach v. Blanche" on Justia Law

Three teachers at a public high school, who openly identify as members of the LGBTQ+ community, were directed by school district officials to remove pride flags and stickers from their classrooms. The officials cited a district policy that restricted displays to only the American and New York State flags, characterizing other flags and certain stickers as “political.” While the teachers complied, they alleged that other non-sanctioned displays, such as sports flags and stickers for student organizations, were allowed to remain. The teachers also recounted differing treatment regarding permission slips for an LGBTQ+ club field trip. They filed suit, claiming violations of their First and Fourteenth Amendment rights, as well as employment discrimination under federal, state, and local law.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York dismissed the complaint. The court found the individual officials entitled to qualified immunity on the First Amendment claims, ruled that there was no plausible showing of discriminatory intent for the equal protection claims, determined no adverse employment actions occurred for Title VII purposes, and declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state and local law claims.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment, though it relied on different reasoning for the First Amendment claim. The Second Circuit held that classroom wall and door decorations by teachers constitute speech pursuant to their official duties under Garcetti v. Ceballos, and therefore, the school district could regulate or restrict such speech without violating the teachers’ First Amendment rights. The court further held that the teachers failed to plausibly allege selective enforcement based on impermissible motives or any adverse employment actions, and found no abuse of discretion in the district court’s decisions regarding the state claims and leave to amend. View "Dolce v. Connetquot Cent. Sch. Dist." on Justia Law

The plaintiff, a former Senior Reimbursement Manager at a national pharmacy provider, alleged that her employer engaged in a scheme to overcharge government healthcare programs such as Medicare and Medicaid. She claimed the company exploited billing system discrepancies and other tactics to cause overpayments, including billing for deceased patients and miscoding pharmacy types for higher reimbursements. The company allegedly concealed these overpayments in its internal accounting and, after a period, transferred the unreturned funds into its own revenues. The plaintiff reported these practices to management and internal audit, but the issues persisted.After filing a complaint in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York, the plaintiff amended her allegations. The District Court dismissed all federal claims with prejudice, finding that the plaintiff did not meet the heightened pleading standards for fraud required under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b) for “direct” False Claims Act (FCA) claims (those based on submitting fraudulent invoices or statements to the government). The court also denied leave to further amend the complaint, and denied reconsideration.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case de novo. The Second Circuit affirmed the District Court’s dismissal of the plaintiff’s direct FCA claims, holding that she did not identify any specific fraudulent submissions to the government, nor adequately allege that such information was solely within the defendants’ control. However, the Second Circuit vacated the dismissal of the “reverse” FCA claim, which is based on knowingly retaining government overpayments. The court found the plaintiff sufficiently alleged that the company had an obligation to return identified overpayments and knowingly concealed or improperly avoided that obligation. The case was remanded for further proceedings on the reverse FCA claim. View "United States v. Amerisource Bergen Corp." on Justia Law

Two plaintiffs, one individual and one advocacy organization, filed suit against a ridesharing company, alleging discrimination against persons with mobility-related disabilities. They claimed the company violated the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and New York State Human Rights Law (NYSHRL) by failing to make wheelchair accessible vehicles (WAVs)—that accommodate fixed-frame wheelchairs—available in all regions it operates, instead of only nine cities. The plaintiffs proposed several modifications to the company’s policies and practices to increase WAV availability in Westchester County, New York, and sought class certification for affected residents and visitors.The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York held a bench trial. After reviewing the evidence, the court found that the plaintiffs failed to demonstrate either that the rideshare platform’s limited menu constituted a barrier to WAV access or that their proposed modifications would effectively or reasonably achieve WAV transportation in the relevant regions. The court also determined that the evidence did not show the proposed modifications were likely to be effective, and that the defendant’s proof established the modifications would not be reasonable. As a result, the district court dismissed the plaintiffs’ claims.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the district court’s findings for clear error and considered plaintiffs’ arguments regarding evidentiary burdens and the effectiveness of proposed modifications. The Second Circuit concluded that plaintiffs bore the burden of persuasion as to effectiveness, and only a light burden of production as to reasonableness. The appellate court found no error in the district court’s application of these standards and affirmed the judgment, holding that the plaintiffs failed to show their proposed modifications would effectively provide WAV service in Westchester County. View "Lowell v. Lyft, Inc." on Justia Law

An elderly patient, after contracting COVID-19, received remote medical treatment from an out-of-state physician who prescribed multiple medications, including prednisone. Prednisone is known to carry a risk of peptic ulcer disease, especially in older individuals, and the physician did not prescribe mitigating medication to counteract these side effects. The patient subsequently developed a perforated ulcer and died from organ failure. The estate brought suit against the physician for negligence, lack of informed consent, and violation of the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act (CUTPA).The estate initially filed the action in Connecticut Superior Court, and the physician removed it to the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut. The physician moved to dismiss, arguing immunity under the Public Readiness and Emergency Preparedness Act (PREP Act) and contending the CUTPA claim was not viable. The District Court dismissed the CUTPA claim but denied the motion to dismiss the negligence and informed consent claims, concluding PREP Act immunity did not apply.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the physician qualified for PREP Act immunity because he was a licensed health professional who prescribed a covered countermeasure (prednisone) for COVID-19, and the prescription had a causal relationship with the patient’s death. The court also held that the CUTPA claim was impermissible because it was based on alleged professional negligence rather than business or entrepreneurial conduct. The Second Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the CUTPA claim, reversed the District Court’s denial of PREP Act immunity, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Waters v. Kory" on Justia Law