Justia U.S. 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff filed a qui tam action pursuant to 31 U.S.C. 3729 alleging that defendants fraudulently billed Medicare/Medicaid for medical procedures performed by unsupervised residents. At issue was whether the court had appellate jurisdiction over plaintiff's appeal from the district court's judgment and order dismissing his complaint and denying leave to amend. Also at issue was whether the district court abused its discretion by declining to reconsider its order that denied plaintiff's request for leave to amend. Further at issue was whether the district court erred in imposing an order granting sanctions under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 or, alternatively, 28 U.S.C. 1927. The court held that it lacked appellate jurisdiction where plaintiff's Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) motion failed to toll his deadline to timely file a notice of appeal. The court also held that the district court properly exercised its discretion when it denied plaintiff's Rule 60(b) motion where plaintiff had not requested permission to amend as of right and that it made no mistake in not divining that he actually intended to do so. The court further held that the district court properly exercised its discretion to sanction pursuant to section 1927 and did not need to reach the court's alternative Rule 11 sanctions ruling.

Plaintiff sued defendant, National Union Fire Insurance Company of Pittsburgh ("National Union"), claiming disability benefits under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 after a trip and fall injury. At issue was where plaintiff's presence at work precluded her from showing that she was disabled during that period and whether a reasonable factfinder could conclude that she was disabled within the meaning of National Union's plan. The court held that an employee's continued presence at her place of employment did not preclude a finding of disability when there was evidence that the employee was incapable of performing her job. The court also held that summary judgment in favor of defendant was improper when evidence presented by plaintiff indicated that there was a genuine issue of material fact where a reasonable factfinder could conclude that plaintiff was entitled to disability benefits under the plan.

Plaintiff, convicted in New Jersey of endangering the welfare of children and placed on probation for five years, appealed a summary judgment order in favor of the State of New York Executive Department Division of Parole ("Division") when plaintiff asked the New Jersey parole authorities to move to New York. At issue was whether the Division violated the Interstate Compact for Adult Offender Supervision ("Compact") when it agreed to the transfer provided that plaintiff accepted certain special conditions including notifying his employer of his conviction and his lifetime supervised release, as well as allow the Division to install monitoring software on his computer. The court held that summary judgment was proper and that the Division did not violate the Compact by imposing conditions on the transfer where the Compact was merely an agreement between states and not a source of private rights of action for the offenders whose interstate movement it governed.

Plaintiff, as a subrogee of a regional affiliate of the American Automobile Association Mid-Atlantic, Inc. ("AAAMA"), sued the liability insurers of the American Automobile Association ("AAA") seeking indemnification for payments made by plaintiff in settlement of a personal injury action. At issue was whether the district court erred in finding that AAAMA was an additional insured. The court held that the district court erred in finding that AAAMA was an additional insured where AAAMA's liability did not arise out of AAA national's operations.

Intervenors appealed an order granting plaintiffs' and defendants' joint motion for orders approving their Settlement Agreement and Mutual Release of Claims related to property damage claims that arose from the terrorist attacks of September 11th, 2001. At issue was whether the district court's application of New York state settlement rules was contrary to, and thus preempted by, the Air Transportation Safety and System Stabilization Act of 2001 ("ATSSSA"). Also at issue was whether the district court failed to make a proper evaluation of the fairness of the settlement agreement, and that the court erred in crediting the proposed settlement payments to the contributing defendants' respective liability limits under ATSSSA. The court held that the ATSSSA did not preempt New York state's "first-come first served" settlement rule and that the proposed settlement payments pursuant to the settlement agreement properly reduced the contributing defendants' remaining liability under the ATSSSA's liability limits. The court also held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in finding that plaintiffs and defendants entered into their settlement in good faith.

Purchasers of Parmalat Capital Finance Limited ("Parmalat") debt and equity securities filed class action lawsuits against Parmalat and others for securities fraud ("Appellants"). At issue was whether the district court erred in exercising jurisdiction over plaintiffs' claims pursuant 28 U.S.C. 1334(b) and whether the district court properly declined to abstain from exercising that jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1334(c)(2). The court held that the district court properly exercised removal jurisdiction where the estate at issue in a 11 U.S.C. 304 proceeding, wherever located, could conceivably be affected by the state law actions. The court also held that the district court erred in determining that appellants failed to file motions for abstention where the district court should have focused on the timely administration of the estate, not the section 304 proceeding.

Plaintiffs, four taxi cab drivers and the New York Taxi Workers Alliance ("Alliance"), sued the City of New York and its Taxi and Limousine Commission when plaintiffs' licenses to drive taxi cabs was automatically suspended without a hearing when plaintiffs were arrested on criminal charges. At issue is whether the Alliance has standing where it has expended resources to assist its members who face summary suspension by providing initial counseling and making an effort to explain the urgency of the situation to criminal defense lawyers. Also at issue was whether a pre-suspension hearing was required to comport with due process and whether a post-deprivation hearing comported with due process. The court held that the Alliance had standing even if only a few suspended drivers were counseled by the Alliance where it experienced a "perceptible impairment" sufficient to demonstrate an "injury in fact" and the Alliance had an interest specific to it that was independent of individual drivers. The court also held that a pre-suspension hearing was not required after weighing the three factors in the Mathews test and that the factual record was inadequate to permit summary judgment with respect to the plaintiffs' claim that the post-deprivation hearing was insufficient to provide due process.

Plaintiffs, four taxi cab drivers and the New York Taxi Workers Alliance ("Alliance"), sued the City of New York and its Taxi and Limousine Commission when plaintiffs' licenses to drive taxi cabs was automatically suspended without a hearing when plaintiffs were arrested on criminal charges. At issue is whether the Alliance has standing where it has expended resources to assist its members who face summary suspension by providing initial counseling and making an effort to explain the urgency of the situation to criminal defense lawyers. Also at issue was whether a pre-suspension hearing was required to comport with due process and whether a post-deprivation hearing comported with due process. The court held that the Alliance had standing even if only a few suspended drivers were counseled by the Alliance where it experienced a "perceptible impairment" sufficient to demonstrate an "injury in fact" and the Alliance had an interest specific to it that was independent of individual drivers. The court also held that a pre-suspension hearing was not required after weighing the three factors in the Mathews test and that the factual record was inadequate to permit summary judgment with respect to the plaintiffs' claim that the post-deprivation hearing was insufficient to provide due process.

Defendants appeal convictions involving the distribution of controlled substances, conspiracy to distribute and posses with intent to distribute controlled substances, and money laundering conspiracy. At issue was whether an error in giving a conscious avoidance jury instructions was prejudicial to defendants and whether the government must prove that the laundered funds at issue in this case were the profits, rather than merely the gross revenues of one of the defendant's prescription drug sales enterprise under United States v. Santos. The court affirmed defendants' convictions and held that any error in instructing the jury on a conscious avoidance theory was not prejudicial to the defendants where there was overwhelming evidence presented at trial that defendants knew or reasonably should have known that the doctors and pharmacists upon whom they relied were acting in bad faith. The court also held that Santos, as applied to the sale of contraband, permitted a conviction for money laundering conspiracy even absent proof that the laundered funds were profits.

Defendant appealed a judgment following a plea of guilty to illegal reentry into the United States after he was deported to the Dominican Republic when he finished serving his prison sentence for first degree manslaughter. At issue was whether defendant's sentence of 42 months' imprisonment was substantively unreasonable where the defendant claimed that the district court's sentence was unduly harsh in view of the factors in 18 U.S.C. 3553(a) and where the 16-level Guideline enhancement applicable to re-entrants with certain prior convictions was not based on review of past sentencing practices and empirical studies, was overly harsh, and was greater than necessary in view of fast track programs. The court held that defendant's sentence was not substantively unreasonable where the district court considered the nature and circumstances of his offense and the history and characteristics of the defendant under 18 U.S.C. 3553(a). The court also held that the 16-level Guideline enhancement was not substantively unreasonable where defendant's claims were without merit, the sentence was not unreasonably harsh when it reflected the serious nature of offenses, and where sentences in fast-track districts could not be compared with sentences in non-fast-track districts in order to demonstrate that the latter were longer than necessary.