Justia U.S. 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff, a labor organization that represented a bargaining unit of defendant's employees, filed a formal grievance with defendant, challenging defendant's discontinuation of dues "checkoff," or deduction of dues from employees' paychecks, and seeking collection and remittance of all back dues with interest. At issue was whether the district court erred in concluding that the parties' dispute over checkoff of union dues was subject to arbitration pursuant to their expired collective-bargaining agreement. The court held that plaintiff's contractual right to checkoff of union dues survived expiration of the agreement and therefore, subjected the parties' disputes to arbitration.

Respondents appealed the district court's grant of habeas relief to petitioner where petitioner had been convicted of first-degree murder. At issue was whether the trial court abused its discretion by precluding defense counsel from cross-examining a witness about a document that contained multiple hearsay. The court held that the trial court's preclusion of cross-examination on the document was not so clearly an abuse of its broad discretion, to balance the probative and prejudicial aspects of potential cross-examination, that the state appellate court's failure to find such an abuse of discretion was an unreasonable application of clearly established law. Therefore, the court reversed the district court's grant of habeas corpus.

Petitioner, proceeding pro se, sought leave to file a successive habeas corpus petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 2254 where she was convicted of reckless manslaughter and depraved indifference murder in connection with the death of her infant child. At issue was whether petitioner's due process rights were violated when New York's appellate courts violated her application for a writ of error coram nobis where she alleged that she was denied effective assistance of counsel in her district court appeal. The court denied the petition and held that petitioner did not raise a claim cognizable under section 2254 where a section 2254 petition was not a proper vehicle for challenging deficiencies in a state post-conviction proceeding.

Plaintiff, an African-American, sued defendants pro se alleging violations of 42 U.S.C. 1983 and state law where plaintiff was charged with a traffic violation by a state trooper and where plaintiff alleged that the charge was false and that the trooper's actions were motivated by plaintiff's race. At issue was whether the district court abused its discretion when it denied plaintiff's motion to reopen his case, which the district court had administratively closed, because of plaintiff's failure to obtain counsel. The court held that the district court abused its discretion by denying the motion where the inability of an individual litigant to obtain counsel was not a basis for denying him his statutory right to pursue his case pro se.

Plaintiff, Penguin Group (USA) Inc. ("Penguin"), filed suit in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York against defendant, an Oregon not-for-profit corporation with its principal place of business in Arizona, alleging that defendant's posting of four Penguin books on the Internet violated Penguin's copyrights in works that it had published. In answer to a question the court certified to the New York Court of Appeals, that court concluded that "[in] copyright infringement cases involving the uploading of a copyrighted printed literary work onto the Internet, ... the situs of injury for purposes of determining long-arm jurisdiction under [the relevant section of New York's long-arm-jurisdiction statute is] ... the location of the copyright holder." Accordingly, the court held that the Court of Appeals' decision compelled it to conclude, for purposes of the personal jurisdiction analysis pursuant to New York's long-arm statute, that the situs of Penguin's alleged injury was New York. Therefore, the judgment dismissing Penguin's complaint was vacated and the case remanded to the district court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion and with the Court of Appeals' response to the certified question.

Plaintiffs appealed from judgments dismissing their class-action complaints seeking to hold defendants (collectively, "Rating Agencies") liable as underwriters or control persons for misstatements or omissions in securities offering documents in violation of sections 11 and 15 of the Securities Act of 1933 ("1933 Act"), 15 U.S.C. 77k(a)(5), 77o(a). At issue was whether the Rating Agencies were "underwriters" as defined by 15 U.S.C. 77b(a)(11) because they helped structure securities transactions to achieve desired ratings. Also at issue was whether the Rating Agencies were "control persons" because of their alleged provision of advice and direction to primary violators regarding transaction structures under section 77o(a) of the 1933 Act. The court held that plaintiffs' section 11 claims that the Rating Agencies were "underwriters" was properly dismissed because the Rating Agencies' alleged structuring or creation of securities was insufficient to demonstrate their involvement in the requisite distributional activities. The court also held that plaintiffs' "control person" claims under section 77o(a) were properly dismissed because the Rating Agencies' provision of advice and guidance regarding transaction structures was insufficient to permit an inference that they had the power to direct the management or policies of alleged primary violators of section 11. The court further held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying implicitly plaintiffs' cursory requests for leave to amend.

The Seneca Nation of Indians ("Seneca Nation"), Unkechauge Indian Nation ("Unkechauge Nation"), St. Regis Mohawk Tribe ("Mohawk Tribe"), Cayuga Indian Nation of New York ("Cayuga Nation"), and Oneida Nation of New York ("Oneida Nation") (collectively, "plaintiffs") sought to enjoin amendments to New York's tax law which were designed to tax on-reservation cigarette sales to non-member purchasers. At issue was whether New York's amended tax law interfered with plaintiffs' tribal sovereignty and violated their immunity from state taxation. The court held that plaintiffs failed to demonstrate a likelihood of success on the merits of their claims that the precollection scheme impermissibly imposed a direct tax on tribal retailers, or alternatively, imposed an undue and unnecessary economic burden on tribal retailers; and that the coupon and prior approval systems interfered with their rights of self-government and rights to purchase cigarettes free from state taxation. Accordingly, the district court abused its discretion in granting the Oneida Nation's motion for preliminary injunction and correctly rejected the Seneca Nation's, Cayuga Nation's, Unkechauge Nation's, and Mohawk Tribe's motions for preliminary injunctions.

Plaintiff appealed from a judgment dismissing a three-count complaint arising from the renegotiation of certain investment-advisory agreements. The court certified a question to the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts as to the circumstances under which that state's business judgment rule could be asserted in response to a shareholder derivative suit under the Massachusetts Business Corporations Act, Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 156D, 5.44. Upon the receipt of the answer, the court affirmed the district court's dismissal of two of plaintiff's claims brought pursuant to various provisions of the Investment Company Act, 15, U.S.C. 80a-15(a), and Massachusetts state law. Regarding the third claim, a derivative state law claim for breach of fiduciary duty to which the certified question related and as to which the district court granted a motion to dismiss, the court vacated the judgement and remanded with instructions to convert the motion to dismiss to a motion for summary judgment, and to rule on that motion, after further discovery if further discovery was warranted.

Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and other similarly situated current and former Black & Decker (U.S.) Inc. ("B&D") employees, sued B&D asserting three sets of claims under the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA"), 29 U.S.C. 201 et seq., and the New York Labor Law ("NYLL"), N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Regs. tit. 12 section 142-2.2. At issue was whether B&D owed plaintiff compensation for all the time he spent commuting between home and the job site ("commute time claims") and overtime hours that plaintiff allegedly worked but did not record ("off-the-clock claims"). The court held that the district court properly granted B&D summary judgment on the commute time claims where, even if plaintiff's activities were integral and indispensable to his principal activities, they did not render the entirety of his commute time compensable under the FLSA. The court also held that plaintiff raised genuine issues of material fact on his off-the-clock claims where plaintiff presented sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to conclude that he had shown the amount of his uncompensated work as a matter of just and reasonable inference.

K&L Gates LLP ("K&L Gates") filed a motion to lift two protective orders prohibiting disclosure of communications made during mediation. Savage & Associates, P.C. ("Savage") filed a cross-motion to enjoin K&L Gates from raising questions about the validity of certain provisions of a settlement agreement as a defense to malpractice in a related action. At issue was whether the district court properly denied both K&L Gates' motion and Savage's cross-motion. The court held that the district court did not err in the denial of K&L Gates' motion where K&L Gates failed to demonstrate a compelling need for the discovery, failed to show that the information was not otherwise available, and failed to establish that the need for the evidence was outweighed by the public interest in maintaining confidentiality. The court also held that the district court did not err in holding that K&L Gates was not barred from asserting a defense challenging the validity of any provision of the settlement agreement in connection with the related malpractice action currently pending against the law firm.