Justia U.S. 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs, seeking to represent a class of customers with poor credit who purchased used automobiles from defendants, appealed from a judgment of the district court dismissing their complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. The complaint asserted that defendants violated the Truth in Lending Act (TILA), 15 U.S.C. 1601, et seq., and various state laws by burying hidden finance charges in the prices that plaintiffs were charged for these automobiles where defendant advertised the newer, more valuable used cars in its inventory at market prices, but sold the older, less valuable used cars to subprime credit customers for prices substantially higher than the market prices listed in the same guide. The court held that because the complaint did not contain any allegation for which it could plausibly be inferred that defendants failed to disclose a finance charge to plaintiffs, the judgment of the district court was affirmed.

Plaintiff sued defendants for various violations of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e et seq., and parallel provisions of the New York City Human Rights Law, N.Y.C. Admin. Code 8-101 et seq., after defendants terminated plaintiff. A jury found that plaintiff's termination was in retaliation for complaints he made about his supervisor and it awarded compensatory and punitive damages. Both parties appealed numerous issues related to pre-trial, trial, and post-trial proceedings. The court held that it need not determine whether the district court was authorized to grant such relief since the court read the parties' joint submission as effectively stipulating to a new jury trial, the result of which was an award in the reduced amount of $190,000, rendering the district court's judgment final. The court affirmed the decision of the district court that plaintiff's original punitive damages award was unconstitutionally excessive. The court further held that the district court lacked jurisdiction to correct its clerical mistake without first obtaining leave from this court to do so, but now the court granted that leave nunc pro tunc. The court finally held that because the remaining issues raised in both parties' appeals were without merit, the court affirmed the district court's judgment in its entirety.

Defendant, a former Senator in the New York State Legislature, appealed from a judgment entered in district court following his conviction of two counts of mail fraud; one count of conspiracy to commit mail fraud and federal-program fraud; and one count of conspiracy to commit mail fraud, federal-program fraud, and wire fraud. On appeal, defendant contended principally that the district court abused its discretion in denying his motion to withdraw his guilty plea, erred in calculating the imprisonment range recommended by the advisory Sentencing Guidelines, and erred in ordering restitution without proof that the persons characterized by the government as victims were directly harmed by his offense conduct. The court considered all of the parties' contentions in support of their respective positions and, except as indicted, have found them to be without merit. Accordingly, the court vacated the August 23, 2010 order and remanded for further proceedings with respect to the amount of restitution to be ordered and the judgment of conviction, as well as all other aspects of defendant's sentence, were affirmed.

Plaintiff sued her former employer, alleging violations of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e-17, claiming compensatory damages for disparate treatment and hostile work environment. Plaintiff also brought parallel state law claims and sought backpay and reinstatement under Title VII and attorneys' fees. On appeal, plaintiff challenged the district court's rulings on the post-trial motions regarding backpay, her state law claims, and the hourly rate applied to the award of attorneys' fees. The court held that because a backpay award required a separate inquest, a district court could not deny an award of backpay because it believed that an award of compensatory damages was sufficient. Accordingly, on remand, the district court was directed to hold a separate inquest as to backpay. The court also held that because the district court abused its discretion in its "specific finding" that plaintiff was not entitled to backpay, the district court should consider in the first instance on remand whether plaintiff was entitled to reinstatement or, in the alternative, front pay. The court further held that plaintiff abandoned her state law claims because she did not pursue the matter diligently. Accordingly, the court did not abuse its discretion in denying plaintiff's motion to remove its "abandonment" reference. The court finally held that the district court's award of attorneys' fees, while perhaps lagging behind the market, was not an abuse of discretion.

This case stemmed from continuing disputes between Argentina and its various private creditors. Argentina and its Brady bondholders entered into a Continuation of Collateral Pledge Agreement that extended the security interest in the tendered bonds' collateral during its transfer and liquidation. Capital Ventures International (CVI) held certain non-Brady bonds on which Argentina also defaulted and chose to sue Argentina to collect on the defaulted bonds it held, seeking to attach Argentina's reversionary interest in the Brady collateral. At issue was whether the attachments blocked the proposed exchange and whether the district court properly modified the attachments to allow the exchange. The court held that CVI was entitled to maintain its attachments even though a quirk of the bonds' Collateral Pledge Agreement meant that the attachments would effectively block the proposed exchange between Argentina and the Brady bondholders. Therefore, the court reversed the district court's orders that modified the attachments to permit the exchange.

The New York City Transit Authority (NYCTA) appealed from an order of the district court enjoining the enforcement of an NYCTA policy requiring third parties to obtain the consent of those contesting notices of violations before NYCTA's Transit Adjudication Bureau in order to observe such hearings. At issue was whether the public had a right to access these proceedings. The court held that the First Amendment guaranteed the public a presumptive right of access to the NYCTA's adjudicatory proceedings and that the NYCTA had not overcome that presumption.

Defendant and co-defendant were convicted of multiple fraud-related felonies. Defendant timely appealed his criminal conviction and moved to withdraw his direct criminal appeal with leave to reinstate it after he had finished pursuing an application for a writ of habeas corpus. In the alternative, defendant moved for a six month extension to file his appellate brief. The court held that the interests of judicial economy and fairness disfavored staying defendant's direct appeal. The court held, however, that staying the direct appeal by six months would not seriously prejudice the government or the co-defendant. Therefore, the court denied the defendant's motion to withdraw his direct appeal and granted defendant's request for the six month extension.

Petitioner sought review of the BIA's order of removal claiming that the Chinese government had persecuted him because he attended an underground Christian church in China. The government moved to dismiss the petition pursuant to the fugitive disentitlement doctrine. The court denied the motion to dismiss where the court, by exercising its discretion, determined that the fugitive disentitlement doctrine, which was an equitable doctrine, was inapplicable to petitioner's case. Having denied the government's motion to dismiss, the court addressed the merits of petitioner's case in a summary order.

This case stemmed from a contractual arrangement known as a "cash-settled total return equity swap agreement" between the parties. The parties appealed the judgment of the district court finding defendants in violation of section 13(d) of the Williams Act, 15 U.S.C. 78m(d), and permanently enjoining them from future violations. The court considered only whether a section 13(d) violation occurred with respect to CSX shares owned outright by defendants acting as a group. Because the district court did not make findings sufficient to permit appellate review of a group violation of section 13(d) with respect to outright ownership of CSX shares, the court remanded for further consideration. An earlier order affirmed the denial of an injunction against the voting of shares acquired by defendants while they were not in compliance with section 13(d). The court explained that ruling on the ground that injunctive "sterilization" of shares was not available when shareholders had adequate time to consider the belated Williams Act disclosures before the relevant shareholder's vote. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded in part.

Plaintiffs appealed from a judgment of the district court vacating summary judgment for defendants where plaintiffs alleged that defendants, operator of a calcium carbonate mineral processing facility, were liable for creating an "imminent and substantial endangerment" within the meaning of the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976 (RCRA), 42 U.S.C. 6901-92. Liability was predicated upon a finding that aminoethylethanolamine (AEEA) was present in defendants' waste. The court held that plaintiffs' claim that AEEA presented an imminent and substantial endangerment in violation of the RCRA was properly dismissed under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)96) where plaintiffs' failure to specify arsenic in their notice of intent to sue (NOI) supported the district court's dismissal of the endangerment claim and the open dumping claim. The court held that the dismissal of the action would not prohibit plaintiffs from again giving notice to defendants and filing its suit in compliance with RCRA's notice and delay requirements upon future discovery of potential violations of the federal environmental laws. Accordingly, the judgment was affirmed.