Justia U.S. 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Appellant, a lawyer, was convicted of one count of conspiracy to obstruct justice, eight counts of attempted obstruction of justice; one count of bribery; and one count each of importation and possession of electronic surveillance equipment. On appeal, appellant challenged, among other things, the government's use of a confidential informant to meet with him and discuss the defense of his client. These meetings, which were recorded, revealed appellant's plans for the bribery and intimidation of potential trial witnesses against his client, who subsequently pled guilty. The court held that, in the circumstances of this case, the government's use of the informant was entirely proper, that the convictions concerning the surveillance equipment should be vacated, and that the convictions on all other counts should be affirmed. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for entry of a corrected judgment.

This case arose when plaintiff alleged that Citigroup, along with various rating agencies, airlines, and municipalities, conspired to block the use of her finance structure to issue Airline Special Facility bonds. Plaintiff subsequently appealed from a judgment of the district court dismissing her complaint and from the district court's order denying her postjudgment motion for reargument and reconsideration of the dismissal and for leave to replead. On appeal, plaintiff argued that the district court erred by, inter alia, dismissing the complaint without granting leave to replead, denying the postjudgment motion, and exercising supplemental jurisdiction to deny the remaining state law claims. The court held that the district court, in denying the postjudgment motions, applied a standard that overemphasized considerations of finality at the expense of the liberal amendment policy embodied in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Accordingly, the court vacated the order denying the postjudgment motion and so much of the judgment as retained supplemental jurisdiction and dismissed plaintiff's state law claims. The court remanded for further proceedings.

Defendant appealed from a judgment of conviction and sentence, arguing that his rights under the Ex Post Facto Clause were violated by the application of the 2008 Sentencing Manual to a murder conspiracy that concluded in 1989. Defendant contended that his alleged violation and his ignorance of his ex post facto rights rendered the appeal-waiver provision in his plea agreement unenforceable. The court rejected defendant's claims and held that the plea waiver was enforceable. Accordingly, the court dismissed defendant's appeal.

Petitioner was convicted of one count of depraved indifference murder in violation of New York Penal Law 125.25(2) after his estranged wife died from a single gunshot wound to the head at point-blank range. At issue was whether, under the law as it existed when petitioner's conviction became final, the evidence was legally sufficient to support a conviction for depraved indifference murder. As a preliminary matter, the court held that the district court erred in finding that the applicable law of depraved indifference murder was the law in effect when petitioner was convicted at trial. The court held that, although perhaps some point-blank shootings could still have been categorized as depraved indifference murder when petitioner's conviction became final, by that time, under any reasonable view of the evidence adduced at trial, petitioner's point-blank shooting, which was either undoubtedly intentional or accidental in the course of a struggle, could not support a depraved indifference murder conviction. As such, by upholding petitioner's conviction for depraved indifference murder in July 2004, the state courts unreasonably applied federal law. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded with instructions to grant the petition for a writ of habeas corpus.

Defendant appealed her conviction of immigration offenses after the district court denied her motion to suppress testimony from the officer who questioned her without Miranda warnings on her arrival at John F. Kennedy International Airport. At issue was whether the district court correctly ruled that the officer's questioning failed to rise to the level of a "custodial interrogation" under Miranda and thus, whether that court properly admitted into evidence defendant's statements to the officer. The court held that, in light of the totality of the circumstances, a reasonable person in defendant's position would not have considered what occurred to be the equivalent of a formal arrest. Therefore, it followed that defendant was not in "custody" and that, for this reason alone, Miranda warnings were not required. Accordingly, the district court correctly denied the motion to suppress the officer's testimony.

Following a jury trial in district court, plaintiff won partial victory on his claims under the Family Medical Leave Act (FMLA), 29 U.S.C. 2615. Plaintiff and defendant cross-appealed. Plaintiff argued that, on his unsuccessful retaliation claim, the jury should have adopted the standard set forth for Title VII retaliation in Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Railway Co. v. White. Plaintiff also appealed the award of only $204 in attorneys' fees on his one successful claim, that defendant interfered in his exercise of FMLA rights. Defendant cross-appealed the denial of its Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50 motion for judgment as a matter of law on the interference claim. The court affirmed the district court's denial of defendant's motion. The court vacated and remanded for a new trial on the retaliation claim because the district court erred in rejecting the Burlington Northern jury charge and this error prejudiced plaintiff. The court also vacated the award of attorneys' fees and remanded for recalculation in conformity with the lodestar method.

This was a consolidated appeal from, inter alia, an order of the district court lifting an asset freeze for the purpose of authorizing the interlocutory sale of a vacation home owned by relief-defendant Lynn A. Smith. The magistrate judge held in relevant part that the sale was necessary to preserve the value of the asset pending resolution of the merits of the action. The court held that there was no error in this finding and held that it was not an abuse of discretion to lift the asset freeze in order to authorize the sale. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court.

This instant appeal arose from the suppression of certain custodial statements made by defendant shortly after his arrest. In light of the Supreme Court's decision in Berghuis v. Thompkins, the government sought reconsideration and reversal of an order of suppression entered by the district court and previously affirmed by this court. The court reconsidered the district court's order of suppression in this case and vacated that order because the court agreed with the government that Berghuis constituted "an intervening change in controlling law," and because the court further agreed that Berghuis compelled a different outcome on these facts.

Petitioner, a former stockbroker, sought review of an order of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), which found that he willfully violated the antifraud provisions of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 (Exchange Act), 15 U.S.C. 78j(b), 17 C.F.R. 240.10b-5, by orchestrating a scheme that allowed certain customers to engage in late trading of mutual funds, and that he aided and abetted and caused the failure of his firm to keep accurate books and records, in violation of the Exchange Act's recordkeeping requirements. At issue was whether the SEC's order, which barred petitioner from working in the securities industry, issued a cease and desist order against him, ordered him to disgorge his unjust enrichment amount plus interest, and imposed a civil penalty, should be vacated. The court denied the petition and affirmed the SEC's order because petitioner's conduct clearly violated the Exchange Act's antifraud and recordkeeping provisions and because the penalties imposed by the SEC were not unreasonable.

Plaintiffs appealed from a judgment of the district court dismissing their class-action complaint, which asserted a single claim against MetLife under ERISA, 29 U.S.C. 1001 et seq. Plaintiffs alleged that through the use of "retained asset accounts" (RAAs), MetLife breached fiduciary duties imposed by ERISA by retaining and investing for its own profit life insurance proceeds due them under employee benefit plans that MetLife administered. The court held that the district court correctly determined that plaintiffs failed to state a claim, since MetLife discharged its fiduciary obligations under ERISA when it established the RAAs in accordance with the plans at issue, and did not misuse "plan assets" by holding and investing the funds backing the accounts. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court.