Justia U.S. 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs appealed from Judge Jones's quashing of a subpoena directed to Jesse Eisinger, a former Wall Street Journal (WSJ) reporter, based on New York's journalists' Shield Law, New York Civil Rights Law 79-h. At issue was the qualified privilege under the Shield Law with regard to news that was both unpublished and not obtained under a promise of confidentiality. The underlying action in this matter was brought by plaintiffs against Goldman Sachs where plaintiffs' claims arose out of Goldman's service as plaintiffs' financial advisor in a sale of their company. Plaintiffs sought to depose Eisinger regarding two articles published in the WSJ. The district court granted Eisinger's motion to quash, holding that: (i) Eisinger, as a journalist, could claim the Shield Law's protection; (i) the information sought was covered by the Shield Law; and (iii) plaintiffs failed to overcome the privilege by establishing through "clear and convincing evidence" that the testimony "would be critical and relevant" to the maintenance of their claim. The district court noted that the testimony "invariably require[d] disclosure of the unpublished details of the newsgathering process." The court affirmed and held that the description of the oral argument and the findings of the district court rendered it virtually self-evident that the Shield Law would protect Eisinger from compelled testimony.

Defendant appealed his conviction for substantive and conspiratorial racketeering stemming from his involvement with the Genovese organized crime family. The court concluded that: (1) Racketeering Act One stated valid subpredicate offenses under the Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. 1951(a), (b)(2), for substantive and conspiratorial extortion of intangible rights under the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959 (LMRDA), 29 U.S.C. 501(a), and the jury's finding that such offenses were proved was supported by sufficient evidence; (2) the evidence was sufficient to permit a reasonable jury to find the requisite pattern of racketeering proved; (3) the district court's admission of challenged evidence did not exceed its discretion under Fed. R. Evid. 401, 403, or 801(d)(2)(E); various challenges to the district court's jury instructions were without merit; and the challenged sentence was reasonable both as a matter of procedure and substance. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court.

Defendant appealed from a judgment of the district court granting plaintiff's motion to compel outstanding attorneys' fees owed to plaintiff by defendant in connection with plaintiff's representation of defendant in a federal criminal proceeding. The court held that ancillary jurisdiction existed over the fee dispute and that the district court did not abuse its discretion in exercising that jurisdiction. The court also held that defendant forfeited many of the issues he raised on appeal and the court found no merit in his arguments based on the Constitution. Therefore, the court affirmed the district court's judgment.

Petitioner, a registered representative and principal with various brokerage firms over the years, sought review of a final order of the Commission, which concluded that he willfully failed to disclose the existence of certain tax liens filed against him. The Commission's conclusion that petitioner acted willfully, which followed his appeal of various determinations of the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA) and its predecessor, the National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD), subjected him to statutory disqualification from the securities industry. The court concluded that there was substantial evidence supporting the SEC's factual finding that petitioner failed to disclose the liens on his Forms U-4 and that the liens were material. Moreover, the SEC did not abuse its discretion when it determined that petitioner's conduct constituted a willful violation of the securities provisions relating to applications and registration. Therefore, the court denied the petition and affirmed the Commission's order.

In this case, the district court found that plaintiff's claims against defendant were preempted by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. 1001 et seq., because they arose under defendant's Pension Plan (Plan) and not separately and independently out of plaintiff's written employment agreement (Agreement). On appeal, plaintiff argued that the additional benefits he sought were based on a promise separate and independent from the Plan. The court held that the district court properly denied plaintiff's motion to remand the case to state court because plaintiff's state law claims were preempted by ERISA where the Agreement merely described the benefits plaintiff would receive as a Plan member and it made no promises of benefits separate and independent from the benefits under the Plan. The suit was properly removed to federal court, the district court had federal jurisdiction over the case, and remand to state court was not warranted. The district court properly dismissed plaintiff's action for failure to state a plausible claim. Finally, the court considered plaintiff's remaining arguments and concluded that they were without merit. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court.

Petitioner was convicted in New York state court of second-degree murder on a theory of depraved indifference to human life in violation of New York Penal Law 125.25[2]. Petitioner appealed the judgment of the district court denying his petition for writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. 2254, contending that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction, arguing that the killing could only properly have been found to have been intentional, and not reckless as required under New York law for a conviction of depraved indifference murder. The court could not conclude that the evidence was insufficient to support the jury's entirely reasonable verdict where petitioner impulsively decided to confront his ex-girlfriend, the victim, just hours before the attack, which occurred on a public street, and struck multiple blows with his knife in the direction of both the victim and the victim's daughter.

St. Paul appealed from the district court's grant of a petition by Scandinavian to vacate an arbitral award in St. Paul's favor and denying a cross-petition by St. Paul to confirm the same award. St. Paul had initiated the arbitration to resolve a dispute concerning the interpretation of the parties' reinsurance contract. The principal issue on appeal was whether the failure of two arbitrators to disclose their concurrent service as arbitrators in another, arguably similar, arbitration constituted "evident partiality" within the meaning of the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), 9 U.S.C. 10(a)(2). The court concluded, under the circumstances, that the fact of the arbitrators' overlapping service in both the Platinum Arbitration and the St. Paul Arbitration did not, in itself, suggest that they were predisposed to rule in any particular way in the St. Paul Arbitration. As a result, their failure to disclose that concurrent service was not indicative of evident partiality. Therefore, the court reversed and remanded with instruction to the district court to affirm the award.

Defendant pleaded guilty to four counts of a multi-count superseding indictment, including a charge of conspiracy to import 100 grams or more of heroin and five kilograms or more of cocaine, and was sentenced to 120 months' imprisonment. Defendant subsequently appealed his conviction and sentence. Because there was an inadequate factual basis for defendant's guilty plea with respect to the quantity of drugs for which he was responsible, the court remanded to the district court with instructions to vacate the judgment of conviction and for further proceedings.

The City appealed from a district court order requiring it to pay plaintiff damages, attorneys' fees, and costs for retaliation against her in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e et seq., and state law, for making complaints of gender discrimination. Plaintiff cross-appealed, principally challenging the dismissal of her retaliation claims against individual defendants and denying her additional damages and attorneys' fees. The court concluded that the City's appeal provided no basis for overturning the judgment against the City. The court also concluded that plaintiff's cross-appeal merited only in its challenges to (A) the dismissal, on qualified immunity grounds, of her New York State Human Rights Law (HRL), N.Y.Exec. Law 296 et seq., claim against defendant Rick Guy, and (B) the grant of summary judgment dismissing her main discrimination claims under the HRL against the City and defendant Roy Bernardi, and that plaintiff was entitled to trial of those discrimination claims. The court held, however, that a trial of the erroneously dismissed HRL discrimination claims alone could lead to an award of damages that would be duplicative, in whole or in part, or the compensation plaintiff was awarded in the present judgment. Accordingly, the court concluded that if there was to be a trial of the HRL discrimination claims, that trial must be combined with a retrial of plaintiff's Title VII and HRL retaliation claims against the City and her HRL retaliation claim against Guy.

Plaintiffs appealed from the judgment of the district court dismissing as time-barred their putative class action complaint against their former employer and the employer's pension plan for benefits alleged to be due under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. 1001 et seq. Plaintiffs asserted that the district court erred when it looked past the six-year New York limitations period for contract actions; applied part of the New York regime known as the "borrowing statute," which directed it to Pennsylvania law; and ruled that Pennsylvania's four-year limitations period barred plaintiffs' claims. The court held that in an action for benefits under 29 U.S.C. 1132, the court applied the forums state's statute of limitations, including its borrowing statute. Therefore, the district court was correct in applying New York's borrowing statute and plaintiffs' claims were untimely under Pennsylvania law.