Justia U.S. 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff, a prison inmate, appealed from the judgment of the district court dismissing his complaint against defendants after granting defendants' motion for summary judgment on plaintiff's individual claims for damages arising from defendants' refusal to give plaintiff antiviral treatment for his Hepatitis C. Because the district court did not adequately explain why it granted defendants' motion for summary judgment on plaintiff's claims for damages, the court vacated the judgment and remanded to the district court to address more fully defendants' motion. Because the district court misinterpreted the parties' settlement agreement with respect to the recovery of reasonable costs, the court vacated that part of the its order denying plaintiff's application for reimbursement of out-of-pocket expenses and remanded the issue to the district court to determine in its discretion whether to grant plaintiff's application for such costs.

The owners of each of the three vessels involved in the collision at issue appealed the district court's allocation of liability. In addition, the owners of the M/V Clary contended that they were entitled to limit their liability under the Limitation of Liability Act, 46 U.S.C. 30505, and the manager of that vessel asserted that the district court erred in finding it liable for the collision under common law. The court found no error in the district court's allocation of liability. The court found, however, clear error in the district court's determination that the Clary Owners were not entitled to limit their liability. The court declined to address the Clary manager's argument that liability was limited because the argument was not raised. Therefore, the court affirmed in part and vacated and remanded in part.

National Grid challenged the constitutional and statutory authority of the District, a New York public benefit corporation, to assess it for benefits that its property along the Hudson River received from a dam and reservoir that the District operated. National Grid argued that the District's assessment and apportionment scheme was federally preempted by the Federal Power Act (FPA), 16 U.S.C. 803(f), 821, and that even if the assessment authority existed, all assessments made prior to 2010 violated National Grid's protection rights under the U.S. Constitution and constituted impermissible takings under the U.S. and New York State constitutions. Because the FPA did not preempt the District's authority under New York state law to assess National Grid as it did here, the court affirmed the district court's judgment as to federal preemption. The court further found that National Grid had abandoned its appeal of the district court's dismissal of the DEC from this action, and in any event, that the district court's dismissal of the DEC was proper. However, because the court concluded that abstention was not warranted as to National Grid's remaining constitutional claims, the court remanded those claims to the district court for resolution, expressing no view on their merits.

Petitioner appealed from an order of the district court granting respondent's motion to quash subpoenas issued pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1782. Petitioner sought assistance from the district court to order discovery from three non-parties for use in a securities fraud action he filed in Germany. The district court allowed the discovery and the relevant subpoenas were issued. However, before any discovery was produced, respondent moved to vacate that order and quash the subpoenas. The district court granted the motion and ruled that the requested discovery could not be "for use" in the German tribunal because it was unlikely to be admitted in the foreign jurisdiction. The court reversed the order, concluding that the "for use" requirement was not limited to the actual receipt of materials into evidence in the foreign proceeding.

Plaintiff challenged defendant's denial of coverage under the terms of an insurance policy provided under the National Flood Insurance Program, a program created by Congress that subsidized flood insurance for individuals and businesses in areas of high flood risk. Plaintiff argued that defendant's denial of coverage excused compliance with the terms of the policy. Because the court must strictly interpret the terms of governmental insurance policies backed by federal funds, and because the policy required compliance with a proof of loss requirement that plaintiff admitted he did not follow, the court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment to defendant.

This appeal concerned a First Amendment challenge to a New York rule requiring attorneys to identify themselves as certified specialists to make a prescribed disclosure statement. At issue was whether Rule 7.4 of the New York Rules of Professional Conduct, N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Regs. tit. 22 section 1200.53(c)(1), which required a prescribed disclaimer statement to be made by attorneys who stated that they were certified as a specialist in a particular area of law either violated plaintiff's freedom of speech or was unconstitutionally vague. Because enforcement of two components of the required disclaimer statement would violate the First Amendment and because the absence of standards guiding administrators of Rule 7.4 rendered it unconstitutionally vague as applied to plaintiff, the court reversed with directions to enter judgment for plaintiff.

Plaintiffs appealed a decision and order of the district court granting the motions to dismiss filed by defendants, LCB and AmEx. Plaintiffs, all Israeli residents, were allegedly injured or their family members killed or injured, by rockets fired by Hizballah, a Lebanese terrorist organization, into northern Israel in July and August 2006. Plaintiffs asserted that Israeli law governed their negligence claim while AmEx maintained that New York law governed. The district court dismissed plaintiffs' negligence claim against AmEx, evaluating the claim under New York state law. Because the court concluded that New York law would apply even if a conflict between the laws of the relevant jurisdiction existed because New York had the greatest interest in the litigation, and that plaintiffs did not have a viable claim against AmEx under New York law, the judgment of the district court insofar as it was in favor of AmEx was affirmed.

Plaintiffs, nine Cayman Island hedge funds, appealed from a judgment of the district court dismissing their complaint with prejudice. At issue was whether foreign funds' purchases and sales of securities issued by U.S. companies brokered through a U.S. broker-dealer constituted "domestic transactions" pursuant to Morrison v. National Australia Bank Ltd. While the court concluded that the complaint did not sufficiently allege the existence of domestic securities transactions, the court concluded that plaintiffs should be given leave to amend the complaint to assert additional facts suggesting that the transactions at issue were domestic. Specifically, the court held that to sufficiently allege the existence of a "domestic transaction in other securities," plaintiffs must allege facts indicating that irrevocable liability was incurred or that title was transferred within the United States. Because there has been significant ambiguity as to what constituted a "domestic transaction in other securities," plaintiffs should have the opportunity to assert additional facts leading to the plausible inference that either irrevocable liability was incurred or that title passed in the United States. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court in part, reversed in part, and remanded the case for further proceedings.