Justia U.S. 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in January, 2013
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Defendant appealed from convictions for racketeering conspiracy in violation of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 18 U.S.C. 1962(d), murder in aid of racketeering, and unlawful possession of a firearm. The court considered all of defendant's claims on appeal, and as to those issues for which the record was sufficiently developed, the court found his claims to be without merit. The court affirmed the judgment of the district court, without prejudice to defendant's filing a motion pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 2255 to pursue his claim that his attorney did not advise him of his rights to testify. View "United States v. Gomez" on Justia Law

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Plaintiff, a native and citizen of Albania, appealed the district court's dismissal of his complaint, holding that it lacked jurisdiction to review the decision of the CIS to deny plaintiff's application for a waiver of inadmissibility pursuant to section 212(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), 8 U.S.C. 1182(i). Because the plain language of the INA provided that judicial review of such decisions was available only for "constitutional claims or questions of law raised upon a petition for review filed with an appropriate court of appeals," the district court correctly determined that it lacked jurisdiction to adjudicate plaintiff's claims. The court need not consider the government's remaining arguments that plaintiff's removal from the United States rendered this appeal moot and that plaintiff failed to identify any legal errors in the CIS's decision. View "Shabaj v. Holder" on Justia Law

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Defendant was convicted of bank robbery, using fire to commit a felony, and attempting to obstruct an official proceeding. Defendant appealed. The court concluded that the evidence was sufficient to prove that defendant used fire to commit the bank robbery and the court was satisfied that his conviction did not offend Due Process. The court also concluded that there was sufficient evidence to support his conviction for attempting to obstruct an official proceeding. Finally, the court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion by allowing the government to cross-examine defendant about his plan to obstruct his New Jersey state criminal trial. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. Desposito" on Justia Law

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Kentucky commenced this action in Kentucky state court against Purdue, alleging that Purdue violated Kentucky law by misleading health care providers, consumers, and government officials regarding the risks of addiction associated with the prescription drug OxyContin, which Purdue manufactures, markets, and sells. Following transfer from the Eastern District of Kentucky to the Southern District of New York, the district court granted Kentucky's motion to remand, concluding that it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction because the suit did not meet the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005's (CAFA), Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4, requirements. Purdue appealed the remand order under 28 U.S.C. 1453(c)(1). The court held that the district court correctly determined that Kentucky's action was not a class action as defined in CAFA, and therefore the case was properly remanded. Accordingly, the petition for leave to appeal was denied. View "Purdue Pharma, L. P. v. Commonwealth of Kentucky" on Justia Law

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Defendant appealed from the district court's holding that defendant was liable to plaintiff, contending that it was entitled to the benefit of a contractual limitation on liability contained in a contract between its sub-bailor and a shipper. At issue was whether, under the Carmack Amendment, 49 U.S.C. 14706, or the federal common law of bailment, a third-party contractor was entitled to receive the benefit of a liability limitation in a contract between a shipper and a carrier where the contract did not extend the limitation to third parties. Because the court determined that - under either body of law - liability limitations extended to third-party contractors only if the contract clearly stated that they did, and because the court identified no error in the district court's finding on negligence, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Royal Sun Alliance Ins. PLC v. UPS Supply Chain Solutions, Inc." on Justia Law

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Plaintiff appealed the district court's dismissal of his complaint for failure to state a viable section 16(b) disgorgement claim pursuant to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. 78p(b). At issue was whether the "short-swing profit rule" applied when a corporate insider sold shares of one type of stock issued by the insider's company and purchased shares of a different type of stock in that same company. The court held, absent any guidelines from the SEC, that section 16(b) did not apply to transactions of this sort involving separately traded, nonconvertible stocks with different voting rights. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Gibbons v. Malone" on Justia Law

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The NRC granted Entergy an exemption from compliance with certain fire safety regulations at its Indian Point nuclear plant operating unit No. 3. Plaintiffs alleged that the NRC's award of the exemption to Entergy violated the Administrative Procedures Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. 551 et seq., the Atomic Energy Act (AEA), 42 U.S.C. 2011 et seq., and the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), 42 U.S.C. 4321 et seq. The court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Entergy on all of these claims except in one respect. Insofar as plaintiffs contended that the NRC granted the challenged exemption in violation of NEPA's regulations, which allowed for public involvement where appropriate and practicable, the court concluded that the agency record did not permit a reviewing court to determine whether a reasoned basis existed for the NRC's decision not to afford any such public involvement in the exemption decision. View "Brodsky v. United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission" on Justia Law

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Plaintiff and his wife appealed the district court's grant of summary judgment to defendants, two officers. The suit sought damages for the seizure of plaintiffs who were ordered to return to their automobile, a disorderly conduct arrest, and an alleged malicious prosecution, all claimed to have been precipitated by plaintiff's "giving the finger" to a police officer. The court held that there was a question of whether a motor vehicle stop occurred; there was a question of whether there was probable cause for the arrest for disorderly conduct; and it was error for the district court to dismiss the malicious prosecution claim based on dictum in Burg v. Gosselin. Accordingly, the court vacated the judgment dismissing all three of plaintiffs' claims and remanded for further proceedings. View "Swartz, et al v. Insogna, et al" on Justia Law