Justia U.S. 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Goldman Sachs appealed from an order of the district court denying their motion to compel arbitration of plaintiff's claims of gender discrimination. Plaintiff and others alleged that Goldman Sachs engaged in a continuing pattern and practice of discrimination based on sex against female employees in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000 et seq., and the New York City Human Rights Law, Administrative Code of the City of New York 8-107 et seq. On appeal, plaintiff contended that the arbitration clause in her agreement must be invalidated because arbitration would preclude her from vindicating a statutory right. The court disagreed and held that the district court erred in denying the motion to compel arbitration where plaintiff had no substantive statutory right to pursue a pattern-or-practice claim. Accordingly, the court reversed the judgment of the district court. View "Parisi v. Goldman, Sachs & Co." on Justia Law

Plaintiff sought to recover benefits as the beneficiary of a term life insurance policy upon the death of the insured. The district court entered judgment in favor of the insurance company, holding that it was entitled to rescind the policy because of a material misrepresentation made by the insured in securing the policy, and that plaintiff was therefore not entitled to a benefit. The court affirmed the judgment where plaintiff conceded that the insurance application contained information the insured knew to be untrue when the policy was delivered - that he had Stage IV colon cancer - and where the insurance company would not have issued the policy had the information been correct. View "Smith v. Pruco Life Ins. Co. of N.J." on Justia Law

MES claimed that the Corps unfairly terminated three of its construction/renovation contracts. On appeal, MES and its President contended that the district court erred as a matter of law in ruling that their Bivens action was precluded by the Contract Disputes Act of 1978 (CDA), 41 U.S.C. 7101 et seq. The court held as a preliminary matter that it lacked jurisdiction to review MES's President's claim because the text and caption of the original timely notice of appeal failed to identify MES's President as a party appealing from the judgment. Accordingly, the court dismissed MES's President's appeal and only address MES's challenge to the judgment of dismissal. The court concluded that, in enacting the CDA, Congress created a comprehensive scheme for securing relief from the United States for any disputes pertaining to federal courts. The existence of that statutory scheme precluded MES from pursuing Bivens claims against federal employees in their individual capacities for alleged violations of due process or the First Amendment in terminating MES's federal construction contracts with the Corps. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "M.E.S., Inc. v. Snell" on Justia Law

The Companies, Cookson and Vesuvius, appealed the district court's judgment denying their motion for summary judgment and granting the cross-motion of the Union. After the Companies closed a facility that Vesuvius had operated, Vesuvius and the Union entered into a Facility Closure Agreement (FCA). Both parties subsequently disputed whether the agreement required Vesuvius to pay a retiree medical allowance (RMA) to certain eligible employees. The district court held that the FCA imposed such a requirement. The court affirmed, holding that the district court correctly interpreted the parties' agreement and that the Union, as party to that agreement, had standing to enforce it even where the benefits of enforcement accrued to third-party retirees. View "United Steel v. Cookson America, Inc." on Justia Law

This appeal arose out of a proceeding brought to remedy securities fraud and recover assets that were the fruits of the fraud. The issues on appeal related to enforcement of, and compliance with, an order freezing various assets. The Trust and various individuals appealed from the magistrate judge's sanctioning of certain individuals. The court dismissed the appeals of Jill Dunn and David Wojeski for lack of jurisdiction, affirmed the sanction order as to Lynn Smith, and remanded to allow the Trust to contest the court's order regarding the disposition of trust property and for the magistrate judge to give additional guidance to the receiver as to disposition of the Trust property. View "SEC v. McGinn, et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, former customers of Sterling Foster, for which Bear Stearns, as a clearing broker, performed certain settlement and record-keeping functions, alleged that Bear Stearns violated section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. 78j(b), by participating in Sterling Foster's market manipulation scheme. Bear Stearns pursued this interlocutory appeal from a decision and order of the district court granting in part and denying in part plaintiffs' motion for certification of a class pursuant to Rule 23(b)(3). The court concluded that plaintiffs' allegations failed to trigger a duty of disclosure to Sterling Foster's clients such that the Affiliated Ute Citizens of Utah v. United States presumption of reliance applied. Therefore, plaintiffs failed to satisfy Rule 23(b)(3)'s predominance requirement. Accordingly, the court reversed the judgment of the district court. View "Levitt v. J.P. Morgan Securities, Inc." on Justia Law

The NRDC appealed from the district court's grant of summary judgment to the government. At issue was whether the NRDC had standing under Article III to bring this action to compel the FDA to finalize its regulation of triclosan and triclocarban, two chemicals used in over-the-counter antiseptic antimicrobial soap. The court held that the NRDC presented sufficient evidence of standing to withstand summary judgment as to the regulation of triclosan because standing could be based on exposure to a potentially dangerous product. The NRDC's evidence established that triclosan is potentially dangerous and that at least one of its members was frequently exposed to triclosan-containing soap. The court held, however, that the NRDC presented no evidence of members' direct exposure to triclocarban and failed to establish a particularized injury. View "Natural Resources Defense Council v. United States Food and Drug Admin." on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed from the district court's grant of Aetna's motion for summary judgment on the issue of whether the insurer improperly denied plaintiff long-term disability benefits under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. 1001 et seq. Because Aetna's reservation of discretion was sufficient to compel use of the arbitrary and capricious standard of review, the court affirmed summary judgment to Aetna on its denial of benefits. The court also held that Aetna's action seeking return of overpaid benefits was properly brought under 29 U.S.C. 1132(a)(3) as an equitable counterclaim. Accordingly, the court reversed the district court's denial of summary judgment on the counterclaim. View "Thurber v. Aetna Life Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs sued the administrators of CAAIG contending that they breached their fiduciary duties to CAAIG under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. 1001 et seq., by failing to ensure that CAAIG had sufficient assets with which to satisfy the judgment. The district court agreed and entered judgment against the Plan Administrators. The court concluded that LIHS had standing under ERISA 502(a) as a fiduciary of the Plan; the Underfunding Claim and EOC Suffolk Delinquency Claim were timely; the Administrators conceded that the breach of a contractual obligation in the Plan documents constituted a breach of their fiduciary duties under section 404(a)(1) of ERISA; and the Administrators breached their fiduciary duties with respect to the Underfunding Claim and the EOC Suffolk Delinquency Claim. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "L.I. Head Start Child Dev. Servs., Inc. v. Economic Opportunity Comm'n of Nassau Cnty., Inc." on Justia Law

A jury found that plaintiff failed to prove her claim that the shooting of her family's dog by a law enforcement officer during the execution of a search warrant of her home was an unconstitutional seizure in violation of the Fourth Amendment. On appeal, plaintiff contended that defendants' failure to train its officers regarding non-lethal means to secure dogs and to formulate a plan to restrain plaintiff's dog using non-lethal means rendered the officer's shooting of her dog unconstitutional as a matter of law. The court concluded that a reasonable jury could have found that no amount of planning or training would have changed the outcome in this case. Plaintiff offered no evidence that any non-lethal means of controlling her dog would have allowed the officer to quickly escape the "fatal funnel" and effectively execute the no-knock warrant. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's judgment. View "Carroll v. County of Monroe" on Justia Law