Justia U.S. 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Michael Koubek appealed from the district court's refusal to dismiss the contribution claims of third-party plaintiffs, the Hallocks, after Koubek's wife, who was driving Koubek's car from a business meeting, collided with a car driven by one of the Hallocks. Koubek's wife was driving in the car with Mathew Isabella at the time of the accident and Isabella sustained injuries. Isabella was prevented by New York Workers' Compensation Law from suing Koubek's wife, and he eventually obtained workers' compensation benefits. Isabella then sued the Hallocks and the Hallocks filed a third-party complaint against Koubek for contribution and indemnification. At issue on appeal was the conflict between two provisions of New York law: Section 29(g) of New York's Workers' Compensation Law, which provided that workers' compensation was the exclusive remedy of an employee injured by his co-employee's negligence, and Section 388 of New York's Vehicle and Traffic Law, which provided that every owner of a vehicle operated in New York was liable for injuries resulting from the negligent permissive use of that vehicle. The court certified the issue to the New York Court of Appeals and stayed resolution of the appeal. View "Hallock v. Koubek" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed his conviction for transporting a minor for illegal sexual purposes, transporting an unlawfully present alien, and harboring an unlawfully present alien. The court concluded that there was sufficient evidence to convict defendant of transporting a minor in interstate commerce with intent to commit unlawful sexual activity; the district court did not abuse its discretion in giving a supplemental charge to the jury upon receipt of its first note, which the district court described as a modified Allen charge; the district court's jury instructions on harboring an unlawfully present alien was not erroneous; and defendant's argument that the district court committed non-harmless error by sustaining the government's objections to two questions during the victim's cross examination was rejected. The court rejected defendant's remaining arguments and affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "United States v. Vargas-Cordon" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of conspiracy to exceed authorized access to a government computer in furtherance of a narcotics conspiracy. On appeal, defendant principally challenged the supplemental instruction regarding the jury's power to render inconsistent verdicts. The court concluded that the district court's instruction misled the jury as to its duty to follow the law and such error was not harmless where the court could not say with any confidence that it was clear beyond a reasonable doubt that a properly instructed jury would have convicted defendant of felony-level unlawful computer access conspiracy. Accordingly, the court vacated the judgment of conviction based on such error and remanded for further proceedings. View "United States v. Moran-Toala" on Justia Law

Petitioner, who was born in Nigeria and came to the United States when he was four years old, petitioned for review of the BIA's dismissal of an appeal of an IJ's decision denying his motion to terminate his removal proceedings. At issue was whether petitioner's failure to become a lawful permanent resident before turning eighteen years old, when his parents became naturalized citizens when he was seventeen, barred him from claiming derivative citizenship from his parents. In considering petitioner's claim, the court must apply the law in effect when he fulfilled the last requirement for derivative citizenship. In this instance, the law in effect when petitioner applied for lawful permanent residence status after his parents were naturalized was former section 321(a) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), 8 U.S.C. 1432(a). The court concluded that petitioner satisfied the derivative citizenship conditions of section 321(a) and, therefore, granted the petition for review and remanded for further proceedings. View "Nwozuzu v. Holder" on Justia Law

This case arose when the Department imposed penalties on plaintiffs for their violation of a New York law that taxes the sale of cigarettes and provides for the issuance of tax stamps evidencing payment of the required taxes. On appeal, the Department challenged a permanent injunction issued by the district court forbidding it from imposing penalties on plaintiffs under N.Y. Tax Law 481(1)(b)(i). The court concluded that the district court was barred by the comity doctrine from granting injunctive and declaratory relief to plaintiffs because such relief would interfere with the state's administration of its tax laws; the district court erred in finding that section 481(1)(b)(i) constituted a criminal penalty; and, instead, the court concluded that section 481(1)(b)(i) provided for a civil penalty and plaintiffs therefore did not suffer double jeopardy when the Department imposed the penalties on them. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded with instructions to the district court to dismiss the suit with prejudice. View "Abuzaid, et al. v. Woodward" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed his conviction for three counts of possession with intent to distribute and one count of escape. On appeal, defendant argued that the district court erred in holding that his residence in a halfway house as a condition of the modification of his supervised release constituted "custody...by virtue...of [a] conviction of any offense" under 18 U.S.C. 751(a), and that therefore he was not an escapee under the statute. The court held that residence in a halfway house as a condition of post-incarceration supervised release was "custody" for purposes of section 751(a); defendant's placement in the halfway house was part of the original sentence for his 1993 conviction for conspiracy to distribute cocaine; the district court properly denied defendant's motion to suppress evidence seized from the search of an apartment where he resided after leaving the halfway house because defendant did not have an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy; and defendant's residence in the apartment began after he escaped from the halfway house in violation of section 751(a). Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "United States v. Edelman" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed his conviction for knowingly failing to register and update his sex offender registration under the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA), 42 U.S.C. 16911 et seq. Defendant's principal argument on appeal was that SORNA was unconstitutional as applied to him because SORNA was enacted in 2006, defendant had already served his full sentence, left the military and severed any connection to the federal government. The court affirmed the judgment of the district court, concluding that, in light of the Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Kebodeaux, Congress possessed the requisite authority through the Military and Necessary and Proper Clauses to hold defendant to SORNA's registration requirements. View "United States v. Brunner" on Justia Law

E&Y appealed from the district court's order denying its motion to dismiss or stay proceedings, and to compel arbitration, in a putative class action brought by its former employees. At issue on appeal was whether an employee could invalidate a class-action waive provision in an arbitration agreement when that waiver removed the financial incentive for her to pursue a claim under the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 (FLSA), 29 U.S.C. 201, et seq. The court held that the FLSA did not include a "contrary congressional command" that prevented a class-action waiver provision in an arbitration agreement from being enforced by its terms. The court also held that, in light of the supervening decision of the Supreme Court in American Express Co v. Italian Colors Restaurant, the employee's argument that proceeding individually in arbitration would be "prohibitively expensive" was not a sufficient basis to invalidate the action waiver provision at issue here under the "effective vindication doctrine." Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Sutherland v. Ernst & Young LLP" on Justia Law

Petitioner, convicted of first-degree rape, first-degree sodomy, and second-degree burglary, appealed the district court's denial of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus. After petitioner was charged, petitioner elected to represent himself pro so. The trial judge introduced petitioner's standby counsel to the jury as his attorney and later corrected the mischaracterization by reintroducing him as a "legal advisor." On appeal, petitioner challenged the judge's introduction, arguing that it violated his Sixth Amendment right to self-representation. The court concluded that the state proceeding did not result in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States. Further, McKaskle v. Wiggins did not support petitioner's position because standby counsel's extremely limited participation was simply not substantial or frequent enough to have seriously undermined petitioner's appearance before the jury in the status of one representing himself. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Ramos v. Racette" on Justia Law

Fahs, a general contractor, filed suit against defendant, a construction supervisor with DOT, alleging First Amendment and Equal Protection claims. On appeal, Fahs challenged the district court dismissal of its claims. The court affirmed the dismissal of the First Amendment claim where Fahs's speech was not on a matter of public concern but rather on matters of purely personal significance, and affirmed the dismissal of the Equal Protection claim where the only differential treatment alleged in the complaint took place outside the limitations period. The court considered Fahs's remaining arguments and found them unpersuasive. View "Fahs Construction Group, Inc. v. Gray" on Justia Law