Justia U.S. 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The Bank filed this interpleader action to determine ownership of funds held on deposit in an account in the name of the Federal Directorate of Supply and Procurement (FDSP), an entity organized under the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY). The account was frozen pursuant to an executive order during the Bosnian War. Yugoimport, a Serbian entity, claimed full ownership of the funds as successor-in-interest to the FDSP. The Republics of Croatia and Slovenia contend that the funds should be divided among the states succeeding the SFRY under a multilateral treaty, the Succession Agreement. The court held that interpretation of the Succession Agreement was governed by the Vienna Convention and that the FSPA was an agency of the SFRY. Therefore, the court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment to the Republics. View "Yugoimport v. Republic of Croatia, Republic of Slovenia" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against his former business associates, alleging that they directed a paramilitary unit of the Bangladeshi national police to detain and torture him in order to force him to turn over his ownership interest in a telecommunications company. Defendants were found liable for violations under the Alien Tort Statute (ATS), 28 U.S.C. 1350, and the Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991 (TVPA), 106 Stat. 73, note following 28 U.S.C. 1350. The court held that the conduct giving rise to this action occurred within the territory of another sovereign and, therefore, under Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum, Co., could not form the basis of an action under the ATS; the general verdict rule did not require that the judgment against defendants be vacated with respect to plaintiff's claim under the TVPA because the jury necessarily found Defendant Khan liable under that statute in returning a general verdict in favor of plaintiff; plaintiff's claim under the TVPA was based on actionable torture, and permissibly predicated on agency theories of liability; and the district court did not err in allowing plaintiff to testify regarding certain statements made to him by foreign police agents, who were agents or coconspirators. Accordingly, the court reversed in part and affirmed in part, remanding for further proceedings. View "Chowdhury v. Worldtel Bangladesh Holding, Ltd." on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed the district court's dismissal of his complaint for failure to state a claim, arguing that the procedures employed by the Commission in investigating, evaluating, and resolving his claim of discrimination violated due process. As defendants did not have a duty to perform any activity that they allegedly failed to perform, the court agreed with the district court that not performing such actions was not a violation of the process to which plaintiff was entitled. Further, the court rejected plaintiff's argument that the Commission's procedures facially violated due process. The court held that the procedures of the Commission, which included administrative and judicial review, satisfied due process and affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Rosu v. City of New York, et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit in district court in Vermont against the Diocese and its former priest, alleging that the priest transported plaintiff from New York to Vermont for the purpose of sexually abusing him, and did sexually abuse him. The Diocese, a New York special act corporation with its principal office in Albany, subsequently petitioned the court for a writ of mandamus directing the district court in Vermont to dismiss the case against it for lack of personal jurisdiction. The court granted the Diocese's petition, concluding that this was an extraordinary case warranting mandamus relief where the court considered (a) the irreparable harm caused by a needless foray into prior abuse investigations within the Diocese, exposing victims and their families to grueling inquires that would not be undertaken in the absence of the district court's erroneous ruling, (b) the clarity of the district court's error and futility of remand, and (c) the opportunity in this case to shed light on the Supreme Court's most recent expressions on general jurisdiction, especially as applied to religious and other charitable organizations, constituted "exceptional circumstances" that warrant the issuance of the writ. View "In Re: Roman Catholic Diocese of Albany, NY" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed a qui tam action against DHL under the False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. 3729 et seq., alleging that DHL billed the United States jet-fuel surcharges on shipments that were transported exclusively by ground transportation. On appeal, plaintiffs challenged the district court's dismissal for failure to satisfy a statutory notice requirement. The court concluded that the 180-day rule, which barred a challenge to a shipping charge before the STB, could not apply to a qui tam action under the FCA. Accordingly, the court vacated and remanded. View "United States v. DHL Express (USA), Inc." on Justia Law

A Vermont statute requires all "health insurers" to file with the State reports containing claims data and other "information relating to health care." Liberty Mutual sought a declaration that the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. 1001 et seq., preempted the Vermont statute and regulation. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Vermont. The court held that the reporting requirements of the Vermont statute and regulation have a "connection with" ERISA plans and were therefore preempted as applied. The court's holding was supported by the principle that "reporting" is a core ERISA function shielded from potentially inconsistent and burdensome state regulation. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded with instructions to enter judgment for Liberty Mutual. View "Liberty Mutual Ins. Co. v. Donegan" on Justia Law

This litigation arose out of the failure of WaMu and the assumption of WaMu's assets and liabilities by Chase from the FDIC, acting in its capacity as WaMu's receiver. On appeal, the FDIC and Chase challenged the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Hillside. The district court concluded that Hillside, which owned premises leased by WaMu before the financial crisis, had third-party standing to enforce the alleged assignment of WaMu's real estate lease to Chase under a purchase agreement between the FDIC and Chase, even though the FDIC validly repudiated the lease under section 212(e) of the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989, 12 U.S.C. 1821(e), and the parties to the purchase agreement asserted that it did not in fact assign the lease. The court held that Hillside lacked prudential standing to litigate whether WaMu's liabilities were assigned to Chase under the agreement because it was neither a contracting party nor a third-party beneficiary under the agreement. Accordingly, the court vacated and remanded with instructions to dismiss the complaint. View "Hillside Metro Associates, LLC v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against defendants alleging that they violated Title I of the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act (LMRDA), 29 U.S.C. 411 et seq., by denying him membership in IBT Local 817 in retaliation for his complaints about a union member. The district court held that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction because plaintiff pleaded facts affirmatively establishing that he was neither a member nor a member in substance of the union. The court affirmed the judgment of the district court, concluding that plaintiff failed to plead facts establishing that he was even a member "in substance." The court clarified that the LMRDA conferred subject matter jurisdiction over claims brought by members in substance as well as by formal union members. View "Brady v. Int'l Brotherhood of Teamsters, et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against the Union alleging that it breached its duty of fair representation. The Union filed a motion for partial judgment on the pleadings, arguing that plaintiff's claim was time-barred. The court held that the statute of limitations on plaintiff's claim accrued when the arbitrator issued his final award even though the collective bargaining agreement provided that the arbitrator's decision shall be final and binding subject to appeal by either party. Further, a state court action to vacate the arbitration award did not toll that limitations period. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's grant of the Union's motion. View "Kalyanaram v. Am. Ass'n. of Univ. Professors at The N.Y. Inst. of Tech., Inc." on Justia Law