Justia U.S. 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

In 1953, New York and New Jersey entered into the Waterfront Commission Act, establishing the Waterfront Commission of New York Harbor to govern operations at the Port of New York‐New Jersey. At that time, individual pieces of cargo were loaded onto trucks, driven to the pier, and then unloaded for loading, piece‐by‐piece, onto the vessel. Similarly, arriving cargo was handled piece-by-piece. Containerization transformed shipping: a shipper loads cargo into a large container, which is loaded onto a truck and transported to the pier, where it is lifted aboard a ship. Continental operates warehouses, including one at 112 Port Jersey Boulevard, Jersey City. Continental picks up containers from the Global Marine Terminal, transports them to the Warehouse, unloads them, and removes their contents. Continental stores the freight and provides other services, such as sampling, weighing. and wrapping. In 2011, the Commission advised Continental that it was required to obtain a stevedore license, concluding that the property line and building of the 112 Warehouse were within 1,000 yards of a pier. Continental sought a declaratory judgment. The Second Circuit affirmed the district court holding that Continental engages in stevedoring activities at the warehouse and that the warehouse is an ʺother waterfront terminalʺ under the Act and within the Commission’s jurisdiction. View "Cont'l Terminals, Inc. v. Waterfront Comm'n of N.Y. Harbor" on Justia Law

D'Amico filed suit to enforce an English court's judgment on a forward freight agreement (FFA) between D'Amico and Primera. On appeal, D'Amico challenged the district court's dismissal of its complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The district court granted Primera's motion to dismiss, holding that the suit did not fall under the federal courts' admiralty jurisdiction because the English judgment was not rendered by an admiralty court and the claim underlying the judgment was not deemed to be maritime under English law. The court concluded that, under 28 U.S.C. 1333, United States courts have jurisdiction to enforce a judgment of a foreign non-admiralty court if the claim underlying that judgment would be deemed maritime under the standards of U.S. law. Because the district court did not consider this question, the court remanded to the district court to make that determination in the first instance. Therefore, the court vacated the judgment and remanded. View "D'Amico Dry Ltd. v. Primera Maritime, et al." on Justia Law

Petitioners filed a petition for limitation on liability after visitors of their powerboat were involved in a fistfight on a floating dock operated by Claimant. At issue was whether federal admiralty jurisdiction extended to tort claims arising from a physical altercation among recreational visitors on and around a permanent dock surrounded by navigable water. The court held that federal admiralty jurisdiction did not reach the claims at issue because this type of incident did not have a potentially disruptive effect on maritime commerce. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's dismissal of the action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. View "Tandon v. Ulbrick" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, injured while working on the Motor Vessel Liberty Sun, filed suit against his employer and others asserting claims for damages under a negligence theory and an admiralty cause of action against the owners of "unseaworthy" vessels. The court declined to adopt the maritime rescue doctrine and held that the correct standard of care in maritime injury cases is that of a reasonable mariner under the circumstances. Since evidence supported the conclusion that abnormal forces were acting on the Liberty Sun at the time, she was not unseaworthy as a matter of law. The court considered plaintiff's remaining arguments and found them to be without merit. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Barlow, Jr. v. Liberty Maritime, et al." on Justia Law

American, a corporation in the business of transporting petroleum products by water, filed suit against the City for common law negligence and for violation of 33 U.S.C. 494, which required that a drawbridge over navigable water be opened promptly by the persons owning or operating such bridge upon reasonable signal for the passage of boats and other water craft. Due to a mechanical malfunction, which American alleged was the result of negligence, the City did not open the Pelham Parkway Bridge, delaying American's tug and barge for approximately two and a half days. At issue was whether, under maritime law, an owner of a vessel could be awarded damages for economic loss due to negligence in the absence of physical damage to its property. Although the court concluded that Robins Dry Dock & Repair Co. v. Flint has been overread to establish a rule barring damages for economic loss in the absence of an owner's property damage, the court believed that the rule has been so consistently applied in admiralty that it should continue to be applied unless and until altered by Congress or the Supreme Court. View "American Petroleum and Transport v. City of New York" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed an in rem action in federal court laying claim to the intact shipwreck of an early nineteenth century wooden schooner at the bottom of Lake Erie under admiralty law as the finder and salvor of the sunken vessel. New York intervened, asserting title under state law and the Abandoned Shipwreck Act, 43 U.S.C. 4101 et seq. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of New York. The court concluded that abandonment could be inferred from circumstantial evidence and affirmed the judgment of the district court on the basis that the record demonstrated by clear and convincing evidence that the shipwreck was abandoned within the meaning of the Act. The court also concluded that plaintiff failed to raise a material dispute of fact on this issue. View "Northeast Research, LLC v. One Shipwrecked Vessel" on Justia Law

This case stemmed from a maritime contract entered into by Blue Whale and Development. Blue Whale filed a complaint in district seeking to attach property belonging to Development's alleged alter ego, HNA, in anticipation of a future arbitration award against Development pursuant to Rule B of the Supplemental Rules for Certain Admiralty and Maritime Claims. The court concluded that the district court properly applied federal maritime law to the procedural question of whether Blue Whale's claim sounded in admiralty, and the claim did sound in admiralty because it arose out of a maritime contract; the issue of the claim's prima facie validity was a substantive inquiry; however, the district court's application of English law to this question was improper because the charter's party's choice-of-law provision did not govern Blue Whale's collateral alter-ego claim against HNA; and drawing on maritime choice-of-law principles, the court held that although federal common law did not govern every claim of this nature, federal common law did apply here, primarily because of the collateral claim's close ties to the United States. Accordingly, the court remanded for reconsideration of the prima facie validity of Blue Whale's alter-ego claim under federal common law. View "Blue Whale Corp. v. Grand China Shipping Dev. Co., Ltd., et al." on Justia Law

A class of seafarers sought, as part of unearned wages, overtime pay from Maersk that they would have earned from the time of their discharge until the end of their respective voyages. On appeal, Maersk challenged the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the seafarers. The court concluded that the district court correctly determined that the application of general maritime law could be limited, but not abrogated, in collective bargaining agreements (CBAs); the CBA at issue here did not address the inclusion of overtime pay in the calculation of Plaintiff Padilla's unearned wages; the unearned wages included overtime pay where the seafarer reasonably expected to earn overtime pay on a regular basis throughout his service in an amount that was not speculative and would have earned it "but for" an illness or injury; and, given that overtime was a substantial and routine component of the seafarer's compensation, they were entitled to overtime payments because, under general maritime law, they must be placed in the same position they would have been in had they not been injured or disabled. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment, including the district court's denial of Maersk's motion to amend the judgment. View "Padilla v. Maersk Line, Limited" on Justia Law

Appellants, the M/V Akili, its owner, and manager, appealed from the district court's judgment holding that it was liable in rem for damage to cargo shipped aboard the vessel. Ferrostaal cross-appealed from the holding that the owner and manager were not liable in personam under a bailment theory. At issue was whether (1) an in rem proceeding rendering the Akili liable for damage to, or loss of, cargo was unavailable in this matter because a vessel was not a "carrier" within the meaning of the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act (COGSA), 46 U.S.C. 30701, and (ii) the free-in-and-out provision in the Voyage Charter Party purportedly absolving the Akili of in rem liability was enforceable. The court held that the first issue was essentially irrelevant because a vessel's in rem liability for damage to cargo existed under maritime common law, not COGSA, for a violation of a carrier's contractual or statutory obligations. The court resolved the second issue against enforcement of the free-in-and-out provision so far as it might be construed to prevent in rem liability of the vessel. In doing so, the court did not decide whether COGSA applied as a matter of law to this voyage because, even if it did not, the Voyage Charter Party's Clause Paramount contractually incorporated the Hague-Visby rules prohibiting a carrier from contracting for a waiver of its obligations regarding damage to cargo. The court also held that there was no in personam liability for the owner and manager where the carriers remained responsible for delivery of the goods and maintained exclusive control and custody over the cargos through agents they hired directly. View "Man Ferrostaal, Inc. v. M/V Akili" on Justia Law

GFK, a shipowner, appealed from the district court's dismissal of its action for declaratory judgment that it was not contractually bound to arbitrate a fuel agreement with AM, a marine fuel supply company. The court held that the district court properly exercised admiralty jurisdiction over the case even though plaintiff disclaimed the existence of any maritime contracts. However, concluding that the district court prematurely resolved disputed factual issues over whether the actual fuel purchaser had authority to bind GFK to the alleged contracts with AM, the court vacated the district court's judgment and remanded for further proceedings. View "Garanti Finansal Kiralama A.S. v. Aqua Marine and Trading Inc." on Justia Law