Justia U.S. 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

This case arose when an oil tanker sank off the cost of Spain, releasing large quantities of oil into the ocean. Spain subsequently appealed the district court's holding that defendants were entitled to summary judgment because, in the circumstances presented, Defendant ABS and its subsidiaries did not owe Spain a duty in tort in connection with ABS's inspection of the tanker. Without reaching that issue, the court concluded that even if such a duty were owed, Spain did not introduce evidence sufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact as to whether defendants recklessly breached the duty. Therefore, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Reino De Espana v. Bureau of Shipping" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a seaman, contracted lymphoma and sued his former employer, a tugboat operator, seeking maintenance and cure. The doctrine of maintenance and cure concerns the vessel owner’s obligation to provide food, lodging, and medical services to a seaman injured while serving the ship. Undisputed evidence established that the seaman had lymphoma during his maritime service, but the disease did not present any symptoms at all until after his service. The district court granted summary judgment for the tugboat operator. The Second Circuit reversed. Because the seaman’s illness indisputably occurred during his service, he is entitled to maintenance and cure regardless of when he began to show symptoms. View "Messier v. Bouchard Transp." on Justia Law

The owners of each of the three vessels involved in the collision at issue appealed the district court's allocation of liability. In addition, the owners of the M/V Clary contended that they were entitled to limit their liability under the Limitation of Liability Act, 46 U.S.C. 30505, and the manager of that vessel asserted that the district court erred in finding it liable for the collision under common law. The court found no error in the district court's allocation of liability. The court found, however, clear error in the district court's determination that the Clary Owners were not entitled to limit their liability. The court declined to address the Clary manager's argument that liability was limited because the argument was not raised. Therefore, the court affirmed in part and vacated and remanded in part.

Plaintiff appealed from the district court's judgment dismissing for want of subject matter jurisdiction plaintiff's complaint seeking exoneration from or limitation of liability pursuant to the Exoneration and Limitation of Liability Act (Limitation Act), 46 U.S.C. 30501 et seq. Plaintiff initiated this limitation proceeding following an accident that took place when defendant intended to go fishing as a passenger aboard plaintiff's fishing vessel, slipped and fell on a ramp leading from the marina to a floating dock that passengers were required to traverse in order to access the vessel. The court held that defendant's accident did not occur on or over navigable waters and so this action fell outside the traditional scope of federal admiralty jurisdiction. The court also held that the Limitation Act did not provide an independent jurisdictional basis for petitions that arose from incidents not occurring on or over navigable waters. Accordingly, the judgment of the district court was affirmed.

Plaintiff appealed from an order of the district court vacating the attachment, pursuant to Rule B of the Supplemental Rules for Admiralty or Maritime Claims and Asset Forfeiture Actions of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, of a check issued by the district court clerk made payable to defendant. At issue was whether the validity of a Rule B attachment of a treasury check issued from the Southern District's Court Registry Investment System (CRIS), representing the proceeds of electronic funds transfers whose attachment was vacated under Shipping Corp. of India Ltd. v. Jaldhi Overseas Pte Ltd. The court held that the jurisdictional defect that led to the vacatur under Jaldhi likewise precluded the attachment of the same funds in the CRIS. Accordingly, the judgment was affirmed.

The interlocutory appeals subject to the motion before the court arose from conjoined multi-party actions stemming from a maritime disaster during which the M/V Rickmers Genoa vessel collided with the M/V Sun Cross vessel in the Yellow Sea. On their motion to dismiss appeals from two interlocutory orders for summary judgment entered in their favor in the district court, or in the alternative, for consolidation of the appeals in the captioned actions involving claims arising out of the maritime casualty, the ESM party defendants contended that the appeals were premature and not authorized by the maritime interlocutory appeal statute, 28 U.S.C. 1292(a)(3), and that consolidation of the appeals was warranted by reason of equity and economy. The court held that, given that the district court had determined conclusively all of the claims against the ESM parties, and that decision was unaffected by any remaining claims, the court could exercise appellate jurisdiction over the present appeals under section 1292(a)(3). Delaying appeal merely because a "final judgment" as to all of the claims against all of the parties had not been issued would defeat the interlocutory nature of section 1292(a)(3) and effectively render the statute a nullity in the modern era of litigation in which admiralty suits frequently involved multiple parties and claims. Therefore, the motion to dismiss was denied. The court granted, however, the motion brought by ESM insofar as they sought consolidation because the appeals arose from the same conjoined multi-party litigation in the district court, and consolidation would be both efficient and equitable for the disposition of the appeals. Moreover, consolidation was unopposed.