Justia U.S. 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs appeal from the district court's order denying their motion for remand to state courts. This is an interlocutory appeal of a question certified by the district court, calling for interpretation of the jurisdictional provisions of the Edge Act, 12 U.S.C. 632. Whether the district court's denial of remand was proper turns on whether the dispute falls within section 632. The court concluded that the dispute did not fall within section 632's grant of jurisdiction so that removal from state to federal court was not authorized by the statute. Therefore, the court vacated the district court's order denying remand. View "AIG v. Bank of America" on Justia Law

These appeals, heard in tandem, challenged two separate judgments entered in the district court in favor of TD Bank and Capital One, respectively, dismissing plaintiffs' claims that the banks violated Article 52 of the New York Civil Practice Law and Rules (CPLR), as amended by the Exempt Income Protection Act (EIPA), 2008 N.Y. Laws Ch. 575. Plaintiffs, as judgment debtors, alleged that the banks failed to provide them with certain required notices and forms, restrained their accounts, and assessed them fees, all in violation of the EIPA. Because these appeals presented unresolved questions of law, the court reserved decision and certified the issues to the New York State Court of Appeals. View "Cruz v. TD Bank, N.A." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs appealed from the district court's dismissal of their action brought under the Anti-Terrorism Act (ATA), 18 U.S.C. 2331 et seq., against UBS, alleging that plaintiffs were direct or indirect victims of terrorist attacks in Israel facilitated by UBS's furnishing of United States currency to Iran, which the U.S. Department of State had listed as a state sponsor of terrorism. The district court dismissed plaintiffs' First Amended Complaint (FAC) for lack of standing and failure to state a claim. On appeal, plaintiffs contended principally that the FAC alleged a chain of causation between transfers of funds to Iran by UBS and plaintiffs' injuries at the hands of various terrorist groups sponsored by Iran, sufficient to establish traceability for purposes both of standing and of stating a claim under the ATA. The court concluded that the FAC was sufficient to show Article III standing but insufficient to state a claim on which relief could be granted. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Rothstein v. UBS AG" on Justia Law

This case stemmed from defendant's arrest for bank fraud. The government appealed the district court's denial of its motion in limine to admit a state court temporary restraining order as evidence against defendant. The court held that, because the government was seeking to admit the state court order for a non-hearsay purpose and because the district court's analysis pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 403 did not account for the order's probative value if offered to show knowledge, the court vacated the district court's order and remanded for further proceedings. View "United States v. Dupree" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed claims against Wachovia for willful noncompliance with certain provisions of the Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. 1681s-2(a) and for common law defamation. The court held that the district court correctly concluded that there was no private cause of action for violations of section 1681s-2(a). Because the complaint only alleged violations of 1681s-2(a)(1), (2), and (8), the district court properly granted summary judgment on plaintiff's claims under the Act. The court also held that the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying leave to amend in regards to plaintiff's failure to state a claim under section 1681s-2(b) in light of plaintiff's delay and the prejudice to Wachovia. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Longman v. Wachovia Bank NA" on Justia Law

LSED sought to rescind an agreement to purchase bond insurance from FGIC and recover its $13 million premium payment. LSED based its claim on failure of cause, a tenet of Louisiana law that required all contracts be supported by cause. Because the court found that the principal cause of the agreement between the parties was the purchase of bond insurance to protect the bondholders in the event of default, not to reduce the interest rate LSED paid to borrow money, the court affirmed the district court's decision. View "In Re: Merrill Lynch & Co., Inc." on Justia Law

Argentina appealed from permanent injunctions entered by the district court designed to remedy Argentina's failure to pay bondholders after a default in 2001 on its sovereign debt. The district court granted plaintiffs summary judgment and enjoined Argentina from making payments on debt issued pursuant to its 2005 and 2010 restructurings without making comparable payments on the defaulted debt. The court held that an equal treatment provision in the bonds barred Argentina from discriminating against plaintiffs' bonds in favor of bonds issued in connection with the restructurings and that Argentina violated that provision by ranking its payment obligations on the defaulted debt below its obligations to the holders of its restructured debt. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court; found no abuse of discretion in the injunctive relief; and concluded that the injunction did not violate the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA), 28 U.S.C. 1602-1611. However, given the need for clarity as to how the injunctions were to function, the court remanded for further proceedings. View "NML Capital, Ltd. v. The Republic of Argentina" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, in two separate appeals, challenged the grant of motions to dismiss in favor of the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA) and the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC). The court affirmed the district courts' conclusion that 12 U.S.C. 4617 precluded judicial review of a Directive issued by the FHFA to Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and the Federal Home Loan Banks. The court also held that plaintiffs have failed to show that it was likely, as opposed to merely speculative, that their claims against the OCC would be redressed by vacatur of the Bulletin at issue, and therefore, the claims against the OCC were properly dismissed for lack of standing. View "Town of Babylon v. Federal Housing Finance Agency; Natural Resources Defense Council v. Federal Housing Finance Agency" on Justia Law

In 2002, Lehman Brothers International Europe (LBIE) created the "Dante Programme" by which certain special purpose entities issued notes of collateralized debt obligations (the Notes). The Notes were purchased by appellants as well as other investors. The same special purpose entities entered into a swap agreement with Lehman Brothers Special Financing Incorporated (LBSF) whereby LBSF agreed to pay amounts due under the Notes in exchange for certain interests in the collateral that secured the Notes. Appellants and LBSF had competing interests in the Collateral. LBSF subsequently commenced an adversary proceeding in the bankruptcy court against the trustees of the Dante Programme and the issuers of the Notes, seeking declaratory relief with respect to priority in the Collateral. The court held that in the circumstances here, the bankruptcy court's denial of appellants' motions to intervene in the adversary proceeding was a final appealable order. Accordingly, the court vacated and remanded. View "In re: Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff commenced this action, on behalf of herself and the 181 other individuals in New York State who had received student loan collection letters from defendant. At issue was whether a debt collector's inaccurate representation to a debtor that her student loans were "ineligible" for bankruptcy discharge was a "false, misleading, or deceptive" debt collection practice, in violation of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA), 15 U.S.C. 1692 et seq. The court held that it was because the least sophisticated consumer would interpret defendant's letter as representing, incorrectly, that bankruptcy discharge of her loans was wholly unavailable to her. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded. View "Easterling v. Collecto, Inc." on Justia Law