Justia U.S. 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Debtor, a New York City tenant, filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy and listed the value of her apartment lease on Schedule B as personal property exempt from the bankruptcy estate as a "local public assistance benefit." At issue was whether the value inherent in debtor's rent-stabilized lease as a consequence of the protections afforded by New York's Rent Stabilization Code, N.Y. Comp. Code R. & Regs. tit. 9, 2520.1, made the lease, or some portion of its value, exempt from debtor's bankruptcy estate as a "local public assistance benefit" within the meaning of New York Debtor and Creditor Law 282(2). The court certified this unsettled issue to the New York Court of Appeals, which held that a rent‐stabilized lease qualified as a local public assistance benefit. Rejecting the Trustee’s argument that “benefits” should be limited to cash payments, the court noted that the rent‐stabilization program had “all of the characteristics of a local 10 public assistance benefit” under the statute and that an exemption was consistent with the purpose of protecting a debtor’s essential needs, including housing. The Second Circuit then reversed and remanded to allow Debtor to claim the exemption from her bankruptcy estate. View "Santiago-Monteverde v. Pereira" on Justia Law

The Chapter 7 bankruptcy trustee appealed the district court's holding that the bankruptcy court did not have jurisdiction to order that he and his retained professionals be compensated for their services using the assets of a 401(k) plan pursuant to the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 29 U.S.C. 1001 et seq. The court concluded that, in this case, no "arising under" jurisdiction exists and no "related to" jurisdiction exists. Accordingly, the court concluded that bankruptcy courts do not have jurisdiction to award compensation to the trustee in these circumstances and affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Kirschenbaum v. U.S. Dept. of Labor" on Justia Law

The Trustee for the Bernard L. Madoff Investment Securities LLC (BLMIS) under the Securities Investor Protection Act (SIPA), 15 U.S.C. 78aaa et seq., filed suit against hundreds of BLMIS customers who withdrew more from their accounts than they had invested and profited from Madoff's scheme. Defendants moved to dismiss the actions on the ground that the payments received by BLMIS customers were securities-related payments that cannot be avoided under 11 U.S.C. 546(e). Section 546(e) establishes an important exception to a trustee's clawback powers and provides that certain securities-related payments, such as transfers made by a stockbroker in connection with a securities contract, or settlement payments cannot be avoided in bankruptcy. The court affirmed the district court's conclusion that the payments were shielded by section 546(e) and dismissal of the relevant claims under Rule 12(b)(6). View "In re: Bernard L. Madoff Investment Securities LLC" on Justia Law

Dynegy filed a voluntary Chapter 11 bankruptcy petition. Charles Silsby then filed a securities class action complaint against Dynegy and others alleging dissemination of false and misleading information and failure to disclose material facts about Dynegy's financial performance and prospects, in violation of securities laws. Stephen Lucas was appointed lead plaintiff in Silsby v. Icahn, the securities class action litigation. In this appeal, Lucas challenged the district court's conclusion that he lacked standing to opt out of or object to the joint reorganization plan on behalf of the putative class in the securities litigation. The court concluded that Lucas' status as lead plaintiff of the putative class in the district court securities litigation did not automatically extend to the bankruptcy proceedings; because Lucas did not seek application of Rule 23 in bankruptcy court, he represented no one but himself; and since he opted out of the release in his individual capacity, Lucas lacks standing to appeal the order confirming the Plan. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "In re: Dynegy, Inc.," on Justia Law

In these consolidated appeals, holders of unredeemed consumer gift cards issued by the former book retailer (Borders or Debtors) seek to vacate the district court's dismissal as equitably moot appellants' challenges to three Bankruptcy Court orders. The court held that the analysis outlined in Frito-Lay, Inc. v. LTV Steel Co., which governs the Circuit's equitable mootness analysis in Chapter 11 reorganizations - also governs the court's mootness analysis in Chapter 11 liquidations; appellants are subject to the presumption of mootness created by the liquidation Plan's substantial consummation, and have failed to satisfy the five Chateaugay factors, as would be necessary to rebut that presumption; and the district court acted within its discretion in dismissing the appeals as equitably moot. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "In re: BGI, Inc." on Justia Law

The Liquidating Trustee filed a federal income tax refund claim in bankruptcy court. The bankruptcy court ruled that the Liquidating Trustee was entitled to a $3.8 million tax refund, and that the reorganization extinguished the government's setoff rights. The district court affirmed the refund but reversed the setoff rights. On appeal, the Liquidating Trustee sought a mandate directing affirmance of the final order of the bankruptcy court in toto, and argued that the issue of the bankruptcy court's subject matter jurisdiction over the refund claim was waived when the government withdrew its own appeal in this case. The court held that the bankruptcy court lacked jurisdiction over the Liquidating Trustee's refund claim and that the jurisdictional defense was not waived by the government's withdrawal of its appeal. The bankruptcy court lacked jurisdiction to award the refund because Congress authorized a bankruptcy estate, not a plan-appointed estate representative, to administratively exhaust a refund claim before bringing that claim in bankruptcy court, and because the refund claim here was not filed with the IRS by a bankruptcy trustee.View "United States v. Bond" on Justia Law

The Trustee for the liquidation of Bernard L. Madoff Investment Securities LLC (BLMIS) and the bankruptcy estate of Bernard L. Madoff, initiated adversary proceedings seeking to block the settlement of three lawsuits, none of which involved BLMIS or the Madoff estate as a party. The Trustee argued that the settlements in these cases would hinder his ability to recoup fraudulent transfers he alleged BLMIS made to the settling defendants. The court affirmed the district court's dismissal of the Trustee's claims because the Trustee was not entitled to declaratory and injunctive relief and the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying his requests for injunctive relief.View "Picard v. Fairfield Greenwich Ltd." on Justia Law

This appeal involves a dispute between the Trustee, appointed to protect public customers and creditors in the liquidation of LBI, and purchasers of LBI's assets over the entitlement to two sets of LBI assets: (1) the Margin Assets and (2) the Clearance Box Assets (CBAs). The district court held that Barclays was entitled to both the Margin Assets and the CBAs, and was conditionally entitled to the Rule 15c-3 Assets. The Trustee appealed from the Margin Assets and CBA rulings. Barclays cross-appealed from the Rule 15c3-3 Assets ruling but the settlement had disposed of that issue and cross-appeal. The court concluded that the transfer of the Margin Assets to Barclays was contemplated in the Asset Purchase Agreement and confirmed in the Clarification Letter. The court agreed with the district court that extrinsic evidence showed an intent to transfer the CBAs to Barclays. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court.View "In Re: Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc." on Justia Law

The New York State Legislature amended N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5206 in 2005, increasing the state's homestead exemption from $10,000 to $50,000. At issue was whether the 2005 Amendment's increased homestead exemption applied to judgment liens perfected prior to the amendment's effective date and, if so, whether application of the law to pre-enactment judgment liens violates the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment. The court held that the 2005 Amendment applies to all creditors and all obligations, including pre-existing obligations, regardless of whether the debt was reduced to a judgment lien prior to the statute's enactment; and (2) that retroactive application of the exemption does not constitute an uncompensated taking of pre-enactment judgment liens in violation of the Takings Clause. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court affirming the bankruptcy court's conclusion that there was been no taking of claimant's property.View "1256 Hertel Avenue Associates v. Calloway" on Justia Law

Bradley Ian Berger and his law firm filed suit against debtor and his law partner in state court for outstanding fees owed to plaintiffs under a referral agreement between the parties. Berger had difficulty proving the amount of fees owed because debtor's partnership failed to file certain documents with the State. The failure led to discovery sanctions and the parties eventually settled. Berger subsequently filed an adversary proceeding against debtor in the bankruptcy court, arguing that 11 U.S.C. 727(a)(3) prevented debtor from obtaining bankruptcy relief. The court concluded that Berger failed to show that the facts of this case fell within the scope of section 727(a)(3) and the court rejected Berger's contention that the court's ruling permits debtor to evade his "legal and ethical duties" where debtor had already been sanctioned by the state court for failure to keep legally required documents. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's affirmance of the bankruptcy court's grant of debtor's motion for summary judgment.View "Berger & Assocs. Attorneys, P.C. v. Kran" on Justia Law