Justia U.S. 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs are participants in the physical and derivatives markets for platinum and palladium and seek monetary and injunctive relief for violations of the antitrust laws and the Commodities Exchange Act (“CEA”). According to Plaintiffs, Defendants—mostly foreign companies engaged in trading these metals—manipulated the benchmark prices for platinum and palladium by collusively trading on the futures market to depress the price of these metals and by abusing the process for setting the benchmark prices. Defendants allegedly benefited from this conduct via trading in the physical markets and holding short positions in the futures market. The district court held that it had personal jurisdiction over two of the foreign Defendants, but it dismissed Plaintiffs’ antitrust claims for lack of antitrust standing and the Plaintiffs’ CEA claims for being impermissibly extraterritorial. Plaintiffs appealed the dismissal of these claims.   The Second Circuit reversed in part, vacated in part, and affirmed in part. The court reversed the district court’s holding that the “Exchange Plaintiffs” lacked antitrust standing to sue for the manipulation of the New York Mercantile Exchange futures market in platinum and palladium. The court explained that as traders in that market, the Exchange Plaintiffs are the most efficient enforcers of the antitrust laws for that injury. But the court affirmed the district court’s conclusion that KPFF Investment, Inc. did not have antitrust standing. Additionally, the court vacated the district court’s dismissal of Plaintiffs’ CEA claims. View "In re Platinum and Palladium Antitrust Litigation" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, as a receiver for debtor FutureNet Group, Inc., sued FutureNet’s judgment creditors – GTR Source, LLC (“GTR”) and Capital Merchant Services, LLC (“CMS”) – and the New York City Marshal for allegedly violating New York’s procedural rules when they executed state-court judgments against FutureNet. In the action against GTR and the Marshal, the district court dismissed Plaintiff’s claims, concluding principally that FutureNet would not suffer any injury even if the executions and levies were procedurally defective, since the seized property was used to satisfy valid underlying judgments. In a similar action against CMS, the district court dismissed the suit based on issue preclusion, finding that Plaintiff’s claims hinged on the same question of law at the heart of the GTR case. The district court also held that, absent preclusion, dismissal was appropriate because FutureNet suffered no damages. Plaintiff was subsequently replaced by two of FutureNet’s senior creditors, Plymouth Venture Partners, II, L.P. and Plymouth Management Company, which now challenge both district-court decisions.   Now guided by the New York Court of Appeals’s decision that Article 52 of the CPLR is a judgment debtor’s exclusive avenue for relief from a procedurally defective execution and levy, the Second Circuit affirmed the district courts’ judgments dismissing Plaintiffs’ actions. The court explained that the New York Court of Appeals unequivocally held that a judgment debtor must “bring an appropriate action pursuant to CPLR 12 Article 52” for relief from a procedurally defective execution and levy. Here, FutureNet has not done so. Thus, the court affirmed the district court’s dismissal. View "Plymouth Venture Partners, II, L.P. v. GTR Source, LLC; Cap. Merch. Servs.," on Justia Law

Plaintiff brought this putative class action against more than twenty banks and brokers, alleging a conspiracy to manipulate two benchmark rates known as Yen-LIBOR and Euroyen TIBOR. Plaintiff brought claims under the Commodity Exchange Act (“CEA”), and the Sherman Antitrust Act, and sought leave to assert claims under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”). The district court dismissed the CEA and antitrust claims and denied leave to add the RICO claims. Plaintiff appealed, arguing that the district court erred by holding that the CEA claims were impermissibly extraterritorial, that he lacked antitrust standing to assert a Sherman Act claim, and that he failed to allege proximate causation for his proposed RICO claims.   The Second Circuit affirmed. The court explained that the conduct—i.e., that the bank defendants presented fraudulent submissions to an organization based in London that set a benchmark rate related to a foreign currency—occurred almost entirely overseas. Indeed, Plaintiff fails to allege any significant acts that took place in the United States. Plaintiff’s CEA claims are based predominantly on foreign conduct and are thus impermissibly extraterritorial. Further, the court wrote that the district court also correctly concluded that Plaintiff lacked antitrust standing because he would not be an efficient enforcer of the antitrust laws. Lastly, the court agreed that Plaintiff failed to allege proximate causation for his RICO claims. View "Laydon v. Coöperatieve Rabobank U.A., et al." on Justia Law

The Sears Holdings Corporation and its affiliates (collectively, the “Debtors” or “Sears”) carried approximately $2.68 billion of first- and second-lien secured debt at the time of its bankruptcy petition. The holders of the second-lien debt alleged that they were paid less than the value of the collateral that secured their claims. To recoup the difference, the second-lien holders sought relief under section 507(b) of the Bankruptcy Code, arguing that the value of their collateral decreased during the course of the bankruptcy proceeding, which entitled them to priority payment of the difference. The bankruptcy court disagreed, finding that the value of the second-lien holders’ collateral had not decreased since the date the Debtors filed for bankruptcy and that, in fact, the second-lien holders had received more than the value of their collateral.   On appeal, the second-lien holders raise a number of objections to the bankruptcy court’s valuation methodology, as well as to its valuation of several specific categories of collateral. The Second Circuit affirmed. The court explained that the bankruptcy court committed no legal or factual error in its decision to value the collateral based on NOLV. The bankruptcy court reasonably concluded that the second-lien holders failed to meet their burden of demonstrating the NBB’s value, and therefore did not err by valuing the NBB at zero. Similarly, the bankruptcy court did not err by deducting their full face value from the value of the collateral. Accordingly, the bankruptcy court did not commit clear error by denying the second-lien holders’ section 507(b) claims. View "In re Sears Holdings Corp." on Justia Law

On appeal from the district court’s judgment declaring valid and enforceable against Appellants instruments governing a debt issue—notes, indenture, and pledge agreement. The district court granted Appellees’ motion for summary judgment, holding the notes, pledge agreement, and indenture valid and enforceable under New York law, and denied Appellants’ cross-motion, which argued the documents were void under the law of Venezuela, the jurisdiction of the issuer of the notes, and that the court should decline to enforce the notes on the basis of the act-of-state doctrine.   The Second Circuit deferred a decision and certified the following questions on the issue to the New York Court of Appeals: 1. Given PDVSA’s argument that the Governing Documents are invalid and unenforceable for lack of approval by the National Assembly, does New York Uniform Commercial Code section 8-110(a)(1) require that the validity of the Governing Documents be determined under the Law of Venezuela, “the local law of the issuer’s jurisdiction”? 2. Does any principle of New York common law require that a New York court apply Venezuelan substantive law rather than New York substantive law in determining the validity of the Governing Documents? 3. Are the Governing Documents valid under New York law, notwithstanding the PDV Entities’ arguments regarding Venezuelan law? View "PDVSA, et al. v. MUFG Union Bank, GLAS Americas" on Justia Law

International Flavors & Fragrances Inc. (“IFF”), a U.S.-based seller of flavoring and fragrance products, acquired Frutarom Industries Ltd. (“Frutarom”), an Israeli firm in the same industry. Leading up to the merger, Frutarom allegedly made material misstatements about its compliance with anti-bribery laws and the source of its business growth. Plaintiffs, who bought stock in IFF, sued Frutarom, alleging that those misstatements violated Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (“Exchange Act”) and Rule 10b-5 thereunder.   The Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of Plaintiffs’ complaint. The court concluded that Plaintiffs lack statutory standing to sue. Under the purchaser-seller rule, standing to bring a claim under Section 10(b) is limited to purchasers or sellers of securities issued by the company about which a misstatement was made. Plaintiffs here lack standing to sue based on alleged misstatements that Frutarom made about itself because they never bought or sold shares of Frutarom. View "Menora Mivtachim Ins. Ltd. v. Frutarom Indus. Ltd." on Justia Law

Defendants JABA Associates LP and its general partners appealed the district court’s judgment granting summary judgment to Plaintiff, (“Trustee”), pursuant to the Securities Investor Protection Act of 1970 (“SIPA”). JABA was a good faith customer of Bernard L. Madoff Investment Securities LLC (“BLMIS”) and held BLMIS Account Number 1EM357 (the “JABA Account”). The Trustee brought this action to recover the allegedly fictitious profits transferred from BLMIS to Defendants in the two years prior to BLMIS’s filing for bankruptcy. The district court granted recovery of $2,925,000 that BLMIS transferred to Defendants in the two years prior to BLMIS’s filing for bankruptcy, which made it recoverable property under SIPA.Defendants appealed the district court’s grant of summary judgment. The Second Appellate District affirmed reasoning that because is no genuine dispute of material fact that Bernard L. Madoff transferred the assets of his business to Defendants, which made it recoverable property under SIPA, the district court properly granted summary judgment to Plaintiff. The court reasoned that here Here, Defendants argue that the Bankruptcy Code does not authorize an award of prejudgment interest because the statute is silent. Yet Defendants do not make any argument that this silence is dispositive. Further, the court wrote that prejudgment interest has been awarded against other similarly situated defendants in related SIPA litigation. Thus, the district court appropriately balanced the equities between the parties. Given this, the district court did not abuse its discretion in granting an award of 4 percent prejudgment interest to the Trustee. View "In re: Bernard L. Madoff Investment Securities LLC" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Citibank, N.A, the Administrative Agent for the lenders on a $1.8 billion seven-year syndicated loan to Revlon Inc., appeals from the judgment of the district court in favor of Defendants, the Loan Managers for certain lenders, who received and refused to return  Citibank’s accidental, unintended early repayment of the loan. The district court, after a bench trial, relying on Banque Worms v. BankAmerica International, 570 N.E.2d 189 (N.Y. 1991), ruled that the rule of discharge for value provided a defense against Citibank’s suit for restitution.   The Second Circuit vacated the district court’s ruling. The court held because the Defendants had notice of the mistake and because the lenders were not entitled to repayment at the time, the rule of Banque Worms does not protect the Defendants. The court explained that the Court of Appeals’ specified requirement of entitlement to the money, combined with the cases it cited as precedents for the rule, and its continued espousal of New York’s general rule that mistaken payments should be returned, lead the court to conclude that, in New York, a creditor may not invoke the discharge-for-value rule unless the debt at issue is presently payable. Here, the debt on which Citibank mistakenly made a payment was not due for another three years. As a result, Defendants may not invoke the discharge-for-value rule as a shield against Citibank’s claims for restitution. View "In re: Citibank August 11, 2020" on Justia Law

A group of public servants who had contacted Navient for help repaying their loans (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) filed a putative class action lawsuit, alleging that Navient had not “lived up to its obligation to help vulnerable borrowers get on the best possible repayment plan and qualify for PSLF.”   Navient moved to dismiss the amended complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim, which the district court granted in part, dismissing all claims except “the claim brought under New York’s General Business Law Section 349”. The district court certified a class for settlement purposes under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(2) and approved the settlement as “fair, reasonable, adequate,” and “in the best interest of the Settlement Class as a whole.”   Two objectors now appeal that judgment, arguing that the district court erred in certifying the class, approving the settlement, and approving service awards of $15,000 to the named Plaintiffs. The Second Circuit affirmed concluding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in making any of these determinations. The court explained that here, the amended complaint plausibly alleged that the named Plaintiffs were likely to suffer future harm because they continued to rely on Navient for information about repaying their student loans. At least six of the named Plaintiffs continue to have a relationship with Navient. That is enough to confer standing on the entire class. Further, the court explained individual class members [in fact] retain their right to bring individual lawsuits,” and the settlement does not prevent absent class members from pursuing monetary claims. View "Hyland v. Navient Corporation" on Justia Law

In an appeal from a district court ruling reducing an order of attachment in aid of arbitration. The district court had initially granted an ex parte order in favor of Petitioner, an Iraqi cell phone company (“Telecom”), attaching up to $100 million of the assets of Respondent, a Lebanese bank. Thereafter, the district court exercised its discretion and reduced the amount of the attachment to $3 million in part because of concerns the attachment would have an adverse impact on the Lebanese economy.Telecom appealed arguing that (1) it established a probability of success in the pending arbitration and was therefore entitled to an attachment of $100 million and (2) the district court lacked authority to consider extraordinary circumstances in reducing the attachment.The Second Circuit affirmed to the extent that the district court held that it had the discretion to consider extraordinary circumstances and that Telecom demonstrated a continuing need for the attachment, and to the extent that the district court attached $3 million; vacated to the extent the district court attached only $3 million based on the existence of extraordinary circumstances without considering how those circumstances might change given an attachment greater than $3 million but less than $42 million; and remanded as to (a) Telecom's probability of success, (b) the assessment of extraordinary circumstances, and (c) the amount of the attachment above $3 million. View "Iraq Telecom Ltd. v. IBL Bank S.A.L." on Justia Law