Justia U.S. 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Dr. Ahmed Diaa Eldin Ali Hussein, a dual citizen of Egypt and the United States, sought to enforce an Egyptian administrative court ruling and a related ministerial decree in the United States. These rulings purportedly entitled him to compensation for the expropriation of his shares in the SIMO Middle East Paper Company by the Egyptian government in the 1990s. Hussein filed an enforcement action in New York State court against Dr. Mohamed Ahmed Maait, the Egyptian Minister of Finance, in his official capacity.The case was removed to the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York by Maait, albeit after the 30-day deadline for removal. The District Court found that Egypt was the real party in interest and allowed the late removal under Section 1441(d) of the U.S. Code, which permits enlargement of the removal period for cause. The court then dismissed the suit under Rule 12(b)(1) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, concluding that Egypt was immune under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA) and that no exceptions to this immunity applied.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the District Court's decision. The appellate court agreed that Egypt was the real party in interest, as Hussein's claims were fundamentally against the Egyptian government and sought compensation from the public treasury. The court also upheld the District Court's finding of cause to extend the removal period, noting the lack of prejudice to Hussein and the procedural challenges faced by Maait in securing U.S. counsel. Finally, the appellate court determined that Hussein had waived any argument regarding exceptions to FSIA immunity by not raising them on appeal. Thus, the dismissal for lack of jurisdiction was affirmed. View "Hussein v. Maait" on Justia Law

Richard Hoffer filed a lawsuit against the City of Yonkers, the City of Yonkers Police Department, and several individual police officers under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, claiming that the officers used excessive force during his arrest. The case went to trial, and the jury returned a verdict in favor of the officers. Hoffer appealed the district court's decision, specifically challenging the court's denial of his request for an adverse inference instruction due to a missing video of him being tased.The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York presided over the initial trial. Hoffer requested an adverse inference instruction based on the missing video, arguing that the video was crucial evidence. The district court denied this request, finding insufficient evidence to prove that the video was intentionally destroyed to deprive Hoffer of its use in litigation. The jury ultimately found in favor of the officers, and Hoffer's subsequent motion to set aside the verdict was also denied.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that to impose sanctions under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37(e)(2), it must be proven by a preponderance of the evidence that a party acted with an "intent to deprive" another party of the lost information. The court clarified that the lesser "culpable state of mind" standard, which includes negligence, does not apply to Rule 37(e)(2) sanctions. Applying this standard, the Second Circuit concluded that the district court did not err in denying Hoffer's request for an adverse inference instruction and affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Hoffer v. Tellone" on Justia Law

John Doe, an individual with a serious mental illness, sued James V. McDonald, M.D., New York’s Commissioner of Health, and other defendants, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief under the Americans with Disabilities Act, the Rehabilitation Act, the Fair Housing Act, and Article 78 of the New York Civil Practice Law and Rules. Doe alleged that New York State regulations discriminated against him by preventing his readmission to Oceanview Manor Home for Adults, a Transitional Adult Home (TAH) where he previously resided. After filing the suit, the State allowed Doe to return to Oceanview, amended the regulations to permit readmission of former TAH residents with serious mental illness, and removed Oceanview’s classification as a TAH.The United States District Court for the Northern District of New York denied the State’s motion for summary judgment, which argued that Doe lacked standing. The district court granted the State leave to file an interlocutory appeal. On appeal, the State contended that the district court erred in finding standing because Doe lacked a concrete plan to leave and seek readmission to Oceanview.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case and determined that the State’s jurisdictional challenge should be assessed as a question of mootness, not standing, because it addressed events occurring after Doe filed the suit. The court found that Doe’s suit was moot because the State had allowed Doe to return to Oceanview, amended the regulations, and removed Oceanview’s TAH classification. Consequently, there was no reasonable expectation that the alleged violation would recur.The Second Circuit dismissed the appeal, vacated the district court’s order, and remanded the case with instructions to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. View "Doe v. McDonald" on Justia Law

While incarcerated at Woodborne Correctional Facility, Antonio Mallet sought medical care for urinary obstruction and painful urination, symptoms indicative of prostate cancer. Despite a cystoscopy revealing concerning results, prison doctors did not conduct further tests for prostate cancer, instead prescribing medication for a benign enlarged prostate. Mallet was released on parole in January 2019 and was diagnosed with late-stage prostate cancer in May 2021. He filed a lawsuit on February 25, 2022, against the State of New York, the New York State Department of Corrections and Community Supervision (DOCCS), its acting commissioner, and three medical providers, alleging deliberate indifference to his medical needs and other constitutional violations, as well as state law claims for malpractice and negligence.The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York dismissed Mallet’s constitutional claims as untimely, reasoning that the claims accrued by the time he was released from custody in January 2019, thus falling outside the three-year statute of limitations for Section 1983 claims in New York. The court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit found it plausible that Mallet’s deliberate indifference claim had not accrued by February 25, 2019, making his complaint potentially timely. The court reversed the district court’s dismissal of the deliberate indifference claims against Dr. Makram and Dr. Stellato, finding them plausible, but affirmed the dismissal of the claim against Professor Ritaccio and the constitutional claims against New York State, DOCCS, and Annucci due to sovereign immunity. The court vacated the dismissal of the remaining constitutional claims and state law claims, remanding the case for further proceedings. View "Mallet v. New York State Department of Corrections and Community Supervision" on Justia Law

In 1960, the Cuban government seized Banco Nuñez and Banco Pujol, two privately held Cuban banks, and absorbed their assets into Banco Nacional de Cuba (BNC). Decades later, in 1996, the U.S. Congress passed the Helms-Burton Act, which allows U.S. nationals to sue any person trafficking in property confiscated by the Cuban regime. The plaintiffs, successors-in-interest to the assets of Banco Nuñez and Banco Pujol, brought a Helms-Burton action against Société Générale and BNP Paribas, alleging that the banks trafficked in their confiscated property by providing financial services to BNC.The plaintiffs initially filed their suits in the Southern District of Florida and the Southern District of New York. The district courts dismissed the complaints, holding that most of the allegations were time-barred under 22 U.S.C. § 6084, which they construed as a statute of repose. The courts also found that the remaining allegations failed to plausibly allege trafficking as defined by the Helms-Burton Act.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the plaintiffs had Article III standing to bring their claims. However, it affirmed the district courts' rulings that 22 U.S.C. § 6084 is a statute of repose, not subject to equitable tolling, and that the presidential suspensions of the right to bring an action under the Act did not toll the time bar. The court also concluded that the plaintiffs' allegations of conduct after 2010 were insufficient to state a plausible claim of trafficking under the Helms-Burton Act. Consequently, the Second Circuit affirmed the judgments of the district courts, dismissing the plaintiffs' actions. View "Moreira v. Société Générale,S.A." on Justia Law

Clint Edwards, a pretrial detainee in a Westchester County Department of Corrections (WCDOC) jail, filed a lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging violations of his Fourteenth Amendment rights. Edwards claimed that Correction Officer Christopher Arocho failed to protect him and incited other inmates to attack him. He also alleged that several WCDOC officials subjected him to unsanitary and unhealthy conditions in administrative segregation and that his placement in administrative segregation without notice or a hearing violated his procedural due process rights.The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York dismissed Edwards’s conditions of confinement and procedural due process claims for failure to state a claim. The court also granted summary judgment in favor of Arocho on the failure to protect claim, determining that Edwards had not exhausted his administrative remedies as required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA).The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case and concluded that Edwards had adequately stated claims for conditions of confinement and procedural due process violations under the Fourteenth Amendment. The court also found that Edwards raised a factual dispute regarding whether he exhausted his administrative remedies, which precluded summary judgment on the failure to protect claim. The court vacated the District Court’s judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Edwards v. Arocho" on Justia Law

Steven M. Camburn, a former sales specialist for Novartis Pharmaceuticals Corporation, filed a qui tam action under the False Claims Act (FCA) and equivalent state and municipal laws. Camburn alleged that Novartis violated the Anti-Kickback Statute (AKS) by offering remuneration to physicians to induce them to prescribe its drug Gilenya, which treats multiple sclerosis. He claimed that Novartis used its peer-to-peer speaker program and other forms of illicit remuneration to influence physicians' prescribing practices.The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York dismissed Camburn's Third Amended Complaint (TAC) with prejudice, concluding that he had not pleaded his allegations with the particularity required under Rule 9(b) to support a strong inference of an AKS-based FCA violation. The court found that Camburn's allegations did not adequately demonstrate the existence of a kickback scheme.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case and held that a plaintiff states an AKS violation if they allege with particularity that at least one purpose of the purported scheme was to induce fraudulent conduct. The court found that Camburn had adequately pleaded certain categories of factual allegations that gave rise to a strong inference of an AKS violation. Specifically, Camburn sufficiently alleged that Novartis held sham speaker events with no legitimate attendees, excessively compensated physician speakers for canceled events, and selected and retained speakers to incentivize prescription-writing.The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal in part but vacated the judgment and remanded the case in part. The court instructed the district court to evaluate whether Camburn had stated all the elements of an FCA claim with respect to the adequately pleaded AKS violations and to assess the adequacy of Camburn's claims under state and municipal law. View "Camburn v. Novartis Pharmaceuticals Corporation" on Justia Law

A dental hygienist brought claims for sex discrimination, retaliation, and negligence against her former employer and supervisors. She alleged that her supervisor made repeated sexual advances and harassed her throughout her employment. The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants on the retaliation claims and allowed the other claims to proceed to trial. A jury awarded the plaintiff $575,000 in emotional distress damages and $2 million in punitive damages. However, the district court granted a motion for a new trial, finding the damages excessive and indicative of unfair prejudice. In the second trial, the court precluded certain evidence, and the jury awarded the plaintiff only $1 in nominal damages.The plaintiff appealed the district court’s summary judgment ruling, the order granting a new trial, and the evidentiary rulings. The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court’s summary judgment on the retaliation claims, agreeing that the plaintiff did not engage in protected activity as required for such claims. The court also upheld the district court’s decision to grant a new trial, finding no abuse of discretion in the determination that the jury’s damages award was excessive and indicative of prejudice. Additionally, the court affirmed the district court’s evidentiary rulings, including the exclusion of the plaintiff’s psychiatric records, portions of a coworker’s deposition testimony, and an anonymous fax.The Second Circuit concluded that the district court did not err in any of its challenged rulings and affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Qorrolli v. Metropolitan Dental Associates" on Justia Law

Phhhoto Inc. filed a lawsuit against Meta Platforms, Inc., alleging that Meta engaged in anticompetitive practices that harmed Phhhoto's business. Phhhoto claimed that Meta's introduction of an algorithmic feed on Instagram in March 2016 suppressed Phhhoto's content, leading to a significant decline in user engagement and new registrations. Phhhoto argued that Meta's actions, including withdrawing access to Instagram's Find Friends API, terminating a joint project, and releasing a competing app called Boomerang, were part of a scheme to monopolize the market and eliminate Phhhoto as a competitor.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York dismissed Phhhoto's claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), ruling that it was time-barred by the four-year statute of limitations under the Sherman Act. The court found that Phhhoto's claim accrued outside the limitations period and that equitable tolling did not apply because Phhhoto failed to demonstrate fraudulent concealment by Meta.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case de novo and concluded that Phhhoto sufficiently alleged that the statute of limitations should be equitably tolled due to Meta's fraudulent concealment. The court found that Meta's public statements about the algorithmic feed were misleading and constituted affirmative acts of concealment. The court also determined that Phhhoto did not have actual or inquiry notice of its antitrust claim until October 25, 2017, when it discovered evidence suggesting Meta's anticompetitive behavior. The court held that Phhhoto's continued ignorance of the claim was not due to a lack of diligence.The Second Circuit vacated the district court's judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings, allowing Phhhoto's antitrust claim to proceed. View "Phhhoto Inc. v. Meta Platforms, Inc." on Justia Law

In 2016, James E. Moore, Jr., also known as Kevin Thompson, filed a lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against corrections officer Troy Booth and four other officers at Fishkill Correctional Facility, alleging excessive force. The officers, represented by the New York State Attorney General, claimed Thompson failed to exhaust administrative remedies as required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA). In 2020, the Attorney General withdrew as Booth's counsel due to his non-participation. Booth subsequently failed to appear for a deposition and a pre-motion conference, leading the district court to strike his answer as a sanction. The district court dismissed the claims against the other officers for failure to exhaust administrative remedies but granted a default judgment against Booth, awarding $50,000 in damages.The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York dismissed the claims against the four other officers on the grounds that Thompson had not exhausted administrative remedies. However, it granted a default judgment against Booth because his answer, which included the exhaustion defense, had been struck due to his non-participation.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case and concluded that the district court abused its discretion by granting a default judgment against Booth while dismissing the claims against the other officers on the merits. The appellate court held that, according to the principle set forth in Frow v. De La Vega, once the district court determined that Thompson could not maintain his claims against the litigating defendants due to failure to exhaust administrative remedies, it should have dismissed the claims against Booth for the same reason. The Second Circuit vacated the default judgment and remanded the case to the district court with instructions to enter a judgment in favor of Booth. View "Thompson v. Booth" on Justia Law