Justia U.S. 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries
Articles Posted in Civil Procedure
Spetner v. PIB
Plaintiffs-Appellants are American victims and the relatives and estates of victims of terrorist attacks in Israel between 2001 and 2003. Plaintiffs alleged that Palestine Investment Bank ("PIB") facilitated the attacks, in violation of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 18 U.S.C. 2213-39D. The district court dismissed the case on the ground that it lacked personal jurisdiction over PIB.Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(k)(1)(A) permits a federal court to exercise personal jurisdiction over a defendant to the extent allowed by the law of the state in which it sits. New York's long-arm statute, C.P.L.R. 302(a)(1) authorizes personal jurisdiction over a foreign defendant for causes of action that arise out of “transact[ing] any business within the state,” whether in person or through an agent. in this context, transacting business means “purposeful activity—some act by which the defendant purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum State," invoking the benefits of the state's laws.Here, the PIB's actions indicated that it availed itself of the benefits of New York's financial system and that Plaintiff's claim arose from these activities. View "Spetner v. PIB" on Justia Law
In re: Purdue Pharma L.P.
Appellants appealed from a district court’s order reversing an order of the United States Bankruptcy Court confirming a Chapter 11 plan that included nonconsensual third-party releases of direct claims against non-debtors.
The Second Circuit reversed the district court’s order holding that the Bankruptcy Code does not permit nonconsensual third-party releases against non-debtors, affirmed the bankruptcy court’s approval of the Plan, and remanded the case to the district court for such further proceedings as may be required. The court also affirmed the district court’s denial of the Canadian Creditors’ cross-appeal. The court held that nonconsensual third-party releases of such direct claims are statutorily permitted under 11 U.S.C. 10 Sections 105(a) and 1123(b)(6) of the Bankruptcy Code. The court further concluded that the court’s case law also allows for nonconsensual third-party claim releases in specific circumstances, such as those presented in this appeal. View "In re: Purdue Pharma L.P." on Justia Law
Posted in:
Bankruptcy, Civil Procedure
Barnes v. City of New York
Plaintiff brought an action against several police officers and the City of New York, asserting various claims under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 and New York state law based on his allegation that police officers falsely claimed that they observed him selling drugs. After his criminal trial, Plaintiff was acquitted of a drug sale charge and convicted of a drug possession charge. Plaintiff subsequently filed this civil action, and the district court dismissed all of Plaintiff’s claims.
The Second Circuit affirmed in part and vacated in part the district court’s dismissal of Plaintiff’s claims and remanded. The court wrote that it agreed with the district court’s dismissal of all of the federal claims except for the dismissal of Plaintiff’s due process claim based on the use of fabricated evidence regarding the drug sale charge of which he was acquitted. Specifically, the district court erred in concluding that because Plaintiff was arrested, detained, prosecuted, and convicted for drug possession simultaneous to the drug sale proceedings, this precludes, as a matter of law, his ability to plead a deprivation of liberty caused by the drug sale prosecution. Because the prosecution of an individual based on fabricated evidence may itself constitute a deprivation of liberty, even in the absence of custody or a conviction, Plaintiff was not required to show that his drug sale prosecution resulted in additional custody or a conviction in order to sufficiently allege a claim at the pleading stage. View "Barnes v. City of New York" on Justia Law
The Insurance Company of the State of Pennsylvania v. Equitas Insurance
Defendant, a reinsurer, appealed from a district court’s ruling granting summary judgment to Plaintiff, its reinsured. On appeal, Defendant argues that the district court erroneously held that its reinsurance obligations to Plaintiff are co-extensive with Appellee’s separate insurance obligations to a third party and that it presented no triable issue of fact on its late-notice defense.
The Second Circuit affirmed. The court wrote that the district court correctly determined that English law, which governs the relevant reinsurance policy, would interpret that policy to provide coverage that is coextensive with Plaintiff’s separate insurance obligations. The district court also correctly rejected Defendant’s late-notice defense because Defendant has not shown the extreme facts necessary under English law to support recognition of that defense where, as here, timely notice is not a condition precedent to coverage. View "The Insurance Company of the State of Pennsylvania v. Equitas Insurance" on Justia Law
Souza v. Exotic Island Enterprises, Inc.
Plaintiffs, a group of current and former professional models, appealed the district court’s judgment against them on a variety of claims arising from the use of their images in social media posts promoting a “gentlemen’s club” operated by Defendants. On appeal, Plaintiffs argued, among other things, that the district court misapplied this Court’s framework for evaluating the likelihood of consumer confusion in the context of a Lanham Act false endorsement claim, misconstrued Supreme Court guidance constraining the Lanham Act’s reach in the false advertising context, and applied the wrong statute of limitations to Plaintiffs’ state law right of publicity claims.
The Second Circuit affirmed. The court concluded that the district court properly granted summary judgment on Plaintiffs’ federal claims and the majority of their state law claims and permissibly declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over their remaining claims. The Plaintiff’s argument is foreclosed in this specific context by Electra, which held under effectively identical circumstances that the same three factors were sufficient to definitively tilt the Polaroid balance at the summary judgment stage. Further, the court held that here, there is no evidence that Plaintiffs – professional models who have brought this lawsuit precisely because they object to the suggestion that they are even associated with Defendants’ marketplace – directly compete with Defendants. The district court was, therefore, correct to grant summary judgment to Defendants on Plaintiffs’ false advertising claims. Finally, the court wrote that the district court correctly determined the majority of Plaintiffs’ right of publicity claims to be time-barred and permissibly declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining timely claims. View "Souza v. Exotic Island Enterprises, Inc." on Justia Law
Posted in:
Civil Procedure, Personal Injury
United States v. Swartz Family Trust
In pleading guilty to wire fraud and tax evasion, Defendant agreed to forfeit to the Government his interests in Jreck Subs, a franchised chain of sandwich shops that he used to perpetrate his fraud. Claimants, the Swartz Family Trust and Orienta Investors, LLC filed third-party petitions asserting an interest in the forfeited property. The district court granted the Government’s motions to dismiss the petitions, finding that the Trust’s petition was not submitted before the thirty-day deadline to file such petitions expired and that Orienta failed to state a claim under the forfeiture statute, as either the holder of an interest superior to the Government or as a bona fide purchaser for value. The district court also denied Orienta’s motion for reconsideration, as well as Orienta’s motion for leave to amend its petition.
The court affirmed in part and vacated in part. The court concluded that the Trust’s petition was correctly dismissed as untimely and that Orienta’s petition does not state a claim. The court remanded, however, to allow the district court to further consider Orienta’s motion for leave to amend its petition with respect to its claim that it is a bona fide purchaser for value. The court explained that here, two things potentially tip the scales in favor of granting Orienta leave to amend its bona fide purchaser claim. First, the district court based its dismissal of that claim primarily on a technical issue. Second, the Government acknowledged that additional factual development was necessary to resolve whether Orienta’s petition stated a bona fide purchaser for value claim. View "United States v. Swartz Family Trust" on Justia Law
Local Union 97, Int’l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, AFL-CIO v. Niagara Mohawk
Defendant Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation (the "Company"), which does business as National Grid, is an electric and natural gas utility that operates throughout New York State. According to Plaintiff Local Union 97, International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, AFL-CIO (the "Union"), Defendant agreed to provide to certain retired employees, former members of the Union. The Union filed a motion to compel arbitration pursuant to section 301(a) of the Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. Section 185(a). The same day, the Company filed a motion for summary judgment dismissing the Complaint. The district court granted the Union's motion to compel arbitration, denied the Company's motion for summary judgment, and ordered that the case be closed.
The Second Circuit affirmed, holding that the agreement covers the dispute. The court explained that when it negotiated the Agreement, the Union bargained both for health insurance benefits for retired employees and for a grievance procedure that included, where necessary, access to arbitration. The court explained that it expressed no view on the merits of the Union's grievance; that is a question for the arbitrator. But interpreting the collective bargaining agreement in light of the principles the Supreme Court reaffirmed in Granite Rock, it is clear that the parties intended to arbitrate this dispute. View "Local Union 97, Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, AFL-CIO v. Niagara Mohawk" on Justia Law
Bugliotti v. Republic of Argentina
Plaintiffs appealed the district court’s judgment dismissing their claims against the Republic of Argentina (“Argentina”) in connection with sovereign bonds issued by Argentina and purchased by Plaintiffs. The Second Circuit vacated in part the district court’s previous judgment of dismissal and remanded the case for the district court to determine in the first instance whether Plaintiffs are entitled to bring suit under Argentine law. The district court found on remand that Plaintiffs were not. Plaintiffs appealed again, arguing that the district court’s findings are erroneous and that Rule 17 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure offers them an alternative avenue to enforce their rights under the bonds in federal court.
The Second Circuit affirmed, holding that Plaintiffs are not entitled to bring suit under Argentine law and that nothing in Rule 17 can be read to alter that result. The court explained that under Rule 17(a)(3), “[t]he court may not dismiss an action for failure to prosecute in the name of the real party in interest until, after an objection, a reasonable time has been allowed for the real party in interest to ratify, join, or be substituted into the action.” The court wrote that it has already concluded that Plaintiffs do not have the right to recover the bonds under Argentine law – the applicable substantive law in this case. That being so, Rule 17 provides no alternative avenue for Plaintiffs to bring suit in federal court. View "Bugliotti v. Republic of Argentina" on Justia Law
Posted in:
Civil Procedure, International Law
MacNaughton v. Young Living Essential Oils, LC
The National Advertising Division (“NAD”), a self-regulatory organization, concluded that Defendant Young Living Essential Oils, LC’s (“Young Living”) claims that its oils are “therapeutic-grade” and impart physical and/or mental health benefits are “unsupported,” and recommended that Young Living stop making these claims. Plaintiff had already spent money on Young Living’s products, including lavender oil advertised to “promote [a] feeling of calm and fight occasional nervous tension” and peppermint oil that allegedly “helps to maintain energy levels.” Feeling misled by claims that the products would have effects like “promoting feelings of relaxation & tranquility,” Plaintiff sued, on behalf of herself and other similarly situated individuals, asserting claims under common law and various state statutes that she believes protect consumers like her against companies like Young Living. The district court dismissed Plaintiff’s suit, finding that Young Living’s claims that its products would do things like “help to maintain energy levels” was run-of-the-mill puffery that companies use when trying to persuade potential customers to part with their dollars.
The Second Circuit vacated in part and affirmed in part. The court vacated the district court’s ruling insofar as it dismissed the New York General Business Law claims for being based on statements of non-actionable puffery and the unjust enrichment claim for not satisfying the Rule 9(b) requirement. The court affirmed the ruling as to the dismissal of the breach of warranty claims. The court found that Plaintiff’s stated the circumstances constituting fraud with sufficient particularity to satisfy Rule 9(b) and certainly with enough particularity to give fair notice of her claim and enable the preparation of a defense. View "MacNaughton v. Young Living Essential Oils, LC" on Justia Law
Brokamp v. James
Plaintiff, a Virginia-licensed mental health counselor, appealed from a district court judgment dismissing her First Amendment and Due Process challenges to a New York law requiring her to obtain a further license in that state to provide mental health counseling to New York residents. Plaintiff argued that the district court erred in (1) dismissing her as-applied challenges for lack of standing, (2) construing her First Amendment facial challenge as alleging overbreadth and concluding therefrom that she failed to state a plausible claim for relief, and (3) overlooking her facial Due Process claim.
The Second Circuit affirmed. The court explained that because Plaintiff need not satisfy the particular requirements for initial licensure to provide mental health counseling to New York residents, she can allege no injury from, and therefore has no standing to challenge, that part of the law. Moreover, as to Plaintiff’s First Amendment claims, the court explained that New York’s license requirement withstands intermediate scrutiny as a matter of law because there is no question that the law (i) serves an important government interest in promoting and protecting public health, specifically, public mental health; and (ii) is narrowly tailored by statutory definition and exemptions to advance that interest without unduly burdening speech. View "Brokamp v. James" on Justia Law