Justia U.S. 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

American Girl, LLC, a manufacturer of dolls and related products, sued Zembrka, a Chinese entity operating through websites, for selling counterfeit American Girl products. American Girl alleged that Zembrka's websites sold and shipped counterfeit products to New York, using American Girl's trademarks. The case was filed in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York.The District Court granted Zembrka's motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, emphasizing that American Girl failed to show that Zembrka shipped the counterfeit products to New York. The court concluded that without evidence of shipment, the "transacting business" requirement under New York's long-arm statute, C.P.L.R. § 302(a)(1), was not met. American Girl's motion for reconsideration, which included new evidence of New York customers purchasing counterfeit products, was also denied.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case. The court found that American Girl had adequately demonstrated that Zembrka transacted business in New York. Evidence showed that Zembrka accepted orders from New York, sent order confirmations, and received payments, which constituted purposeful activity within the state. The court held that actual shipment of goods was not necessary to establish personal jurisdiction under § 302(a)(1). The court also determined that exercising jurisdiction over Zembrka was consistent with due process, given New York's strong interest in protecting its consumers and businesses from counterfeit goods.The Second Circuit reversed the District Court's dismissal and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "American Girl, LLC v. Zembrka" on Justia Law

Bessy Orbelina Castellanos-Ventura, a citizen of Honduras, sought asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture (CAT) in the United States. She claimed past persecution due to her membership in a social group of Honduran women, citing physical and sexual abuse by family members and a local criminal. She did not report the abuse to authorities, believing they would not help her.The Immigration Judge (IJ) assumed without deciding that Castellanos-Ventura's social group was cognizable and that she suffered persecution. However, the IJ denied her application, finding she failed to show that the Honduran government was "unable or unwilling to control" her persecutors. The IJ noted her failure to report the abuse and pointed to her mother's success in obtaining a restraining order as evidence of government action. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed the IJ's decision, adopting the same reasoning.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case. The court found that the agency incorrectly applied the "unable or unwilling to control" standard. It noted the agency failed to consider whether it would have been futile or dangerous for Castellanos-Ventura, as an abused child, to seek protection. Additionally, the agency did not evaluate significant evidence indicating the Honduran government's inability to protect women and children from violence. The court granted the petition for review and remanded the case to the BIA for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "Castellanos-Ventura v. Garland" on Justia Law

The case involves Plaintiff-Appellant Joel J. Malek, who filed a complaint alleging that Defendants-Appellees, including Leonard Feigenbaum and AXA Equitable Life Insurance Co., engaged in a deceptive marketing scheme to trick him and others into replacing their existing life insurance policies with more expensive and less valuable ones. Malek claimed violations of New York law and the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO).The United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York dismissed Malek’s complaint and denied him leave to amend. The court found that Malek’s New York claims were time-barred and that he failed to plead the existence of a RICO enterprise. Malek served a motion for reconsideration on the Defendants but did not file it with the court until after the deadline. The district court subsequently denied the motion for reconsideration.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case. The Defendants moved to dismiss the appeal, arguing that Malek’s notice of appeal was untimely because he did not file his motion for reconsideration within the required timeframe, thus failing to toll the deadline for filing a notice of appeal. The Second Circuit reiterated its holding in Weitzner v. Cynosure, Inc. that Appellate Rule 4(a)(4)(A) requires timely filing, not just service, of a post-judgment motion to toll the appeal deadline. The court also concluded that under Nutraceutical Corp. v. Lambert, Appellate Rule 4(a)(4)(A) is a mandatory claim-processing rule not subject to equitable tolling.The Second Circuit found that Malek’s notice of appeal was untimely and dismissed the appeal for lack of appellate jurisdiction. The court also determined that Malek’s notice of appeal could not be construed to include the order denying reconsideration. View "Malek v. Feigenbaum" on Justia Law

A former chauffeur, Hyunhuy Nam, filed a lawsuit against the Permanent Mission of the Republic of Korea to the United Nations, alleging violations of federal, state, and city wage-and-hour and anti-discrimination laws. Nam, a South Korean citizen and U.S. permanent resident, was employed by the Mission as a chauffeur. His duties included driving high-level officials, adhering to diplomatic protocols, and maintaining confidentiality of classified information. Nam was required to undergo a high-level security clearance and sign annual confidentiality agreements. He was eventually terminated at age 61, after his contract was extended due to his wife's job loss during the pandemic.The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York denied the Mission's motion to dismiss, holding that Nam's employment fell within the "commercial activity" exception to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA). The court later granted Nam's motion for partial summary judgment, awarding him damages and interest on his wage-and-hour claims, while the remaining claims were set for trial. The Mission appealed, arguing that it was immune under the FSIA.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit vacated the district court's decision and remanded the case for further proceedings. The appellate court held that the district court erred in granting summary judgment to Nam without resolving factual disputes regarding the nature of his employment. The court emphasized that the district court should have considered whether Nam's employment was governmental or commercial in nature, taking into account the context of his duties and the security measures involved. The appellate court instructed the district court to weigh the evidence, resolve conflicts, and, if necessary, conduct an evidentiary hearing to determine the applicability of the FSIA's commercial activity exception. View "Nam v. Permanent Mission of the Republic of Korea to the United" on Justia Law

In 2019, Joseph Srour was denied a permit to possess rifles and shotguns in his home by the New York City Police Department (NYPD) License Division. Srour subsequently filed a lawsuit seeking injunctive, declaratory, and monetary relief, challenging the constitutionality of various provisions of the New York City Administrative Code and the Rules of the City of New York, particularly the requirement that an applicant have "good moral character" to be issued a permit.The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York granted Srour's motion for summary judgment regarding the New York City Administrative Code, enjoining the enforcement of the "good moral character" and "good cause" requirements, and declaring them unconstitutional. The district court did not decide the amount of damages. The City of New York and the NYPD Police Commissioner filed an interlocutory appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, seeking review of the district court's judgment.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that the case was moot because Srour had been granted the rifle and shotgun permit he sought. The court found that there was no reasonable expectation that the City would resume the challenged conduct, as Srour's permit was subject to automatic renewal unless he violated laws or was rearrested. Consequently, the court vacated the district court's judgment enjoining the enforcement of the "good moral character" requirement and declaring it unconstitutional, dismissed the appeal as moot, and remanded the case to the district court with instructions to dismiss Srour's claims for injunctive and declaratory relief as moot. View "Srour v. New York City" on Justia Law

In this case, Denise Kemp, a manager at Regeneron Pharmaceuticals, Inc., worked remotely in June 2016 to care for her child with a serious medical condition. Regeneron then restricted her remote work to one day per week and required her to use intermittent leave under the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) for additional time away. Kemp sued Regeneron, alleging interference with her FMLA rights, and discrimination, retaliation, and constructive discharge under the New York State Human Rights Law (NYSHRL).The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York dismissed Kemp’s FMLA claim, reasoning that Regeneron had not denied her FMLA benefits and that the claim was time-barred. The court also dismissed her NYSHRL claims on the merits.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that an employer can violate the FMLA by interfering with an employee’s use of FMLA benefits, even if the benefits are ultimately granted. However, the court affirmed the dismissal of Kemp’s FMLA claim as time-barred, finding no evidence of a willful violation by Regeneron to extend the statute of limitations. The court also affirmed the dismissal of Kemp’s NYSHRL claims for discrimination and retaliation as time-barred, noting that Kemp was informed of the adverse actions before the relevant date. Lastly, the court upheld the dismissal of Kemp’s constructive discharge claim, concluding that her working conditions were not intolerable enough to compel resignation.The Second Circuit affirmed the District Court’s judgment, dismissing all of Kemp’s claims. View "Kemp v. Regeneron Pharm., Inc." on Justia Law

Robert Guthrie, a former employee of Rainbow Fencing Inc. (RFI), filed a lawsuit seeking unpaid wages and statutory damages for RFI's failure to provide wage notices and wage statements as required by New York law. Guthrie worked as a welder for RFI from 2014 to 2021 and claimed he was not paid for overtime hours. The district court entered a default judgment for the unpaid wages but dismissed Guthrie's claim for statutory damages, ruling that he lacked standing because he did not allege an injury-in-fact resulting from the failure to provide the required notices and statements.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York initially reviewed the case. The court granted a default judgment for Guthrie's unpaid wages but dismissed his claim for statutory damages due to lack of standing. The court concluded that Guthrie did not allege a concrete injury-in-fact caused by the absence of wage notices and statements, which is necessary to meet the case-or-controversy requirement of Article III.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case on appeal. The court affirmed the district court's decision, agreeing that Guthrie lacked standing to pursue statutory damages. The appellate court held that a plaintiff must allege a concrete injury-in-fact resulting from the statutory violation to have standing. Guthrie's general claims about potential harms did not suffice, as he failed to link these potential harms to any actual injury he experienced. Therefore, the court concluded that Guthrie did not meet the requirements for Article III standing and affirmed the dismissal of his claim for statutory damages. View "Guthrie v. Rainbow Fencing Inc." on Justia Law

Sarah Palin filed a defamation lawsuit against The New York Times and its former Opinion Editor, James Bennet, alleging that an editorial falsely linked her political action committee's map to the 2011 shooting of Congresswoman Gabrielle Giffords. The editorial claimed a "clear" and "direct" link between the map and the shooting, which Palin argued was defamatory.Initially, the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York dismissed Palin's complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). The Second Circuit Court of Appeals reinstated the case in 2019, finding that Palin had plausibly stated a defamation claim. The case proceeded to trial, where the jury deliberated but the district court dismissed the case again under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50, ruling that Palin had not proven actual malice by clear and convincing evidence. Despite this, the jury returned a verdict finding the defendants "not liable."The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case and found that the district court's Rule 50 ruling improperly intruded on the jury's role by making credibility determinations and weighing evidence. The appellate court noted several trial errors, including the exclusion of relevant evidence, an inaccurate jury instruction, and jurors learning of the district court's Rule 50 dismissal during deliberations. These issues undermined the reliability of the jury's verdict.The Second Circuit vacated the district court's Rule 50 judgment and the jury's verdict, remanding the case for a new trial. The appellate court emphasized the importance of the jury's role in determining credibility and weighing evidence, and found that the errors at trial necessitated a retrial. View "Palin v. New York Times Co." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs Moses Lugo and Cheryl Seaton, who use motorized wheelchairs, sued the City of Troy, New York, under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (RA). They alleged that the city failed to maintain accessible pedestrian pathways. After discovery, Plaintiffs moved for summary judgment, while the City of Troy moved to dismiss the complaint for lack of standing or, alternatively, for summary judgment. The district court dismissed the complaint, finding the factual allegations insufficient to establish standing, without considering the full summary-judgment record.The United States District Court for the Northern District of New York dismissed the complaint based on the pleadings, concluding that the allegations were too generic to establish standing for city-wide remedies and that the specific obstacles mentioned had been remedied, thus mooting those claims. The court did not evaluate whether the evidence from discovery could establish standing.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case. The appellate court found that the district court erred by resolving the standing issue based solely on the pleadings rather than the full summary-judgment record. The appellate court held that the district court should have considered the evidence developed during discovery to determine whether Plaintiffs had standing. Consequently, the Second Circuit vacated the district court's judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings, instructing the lower court to evaluate the standing issue based on the complete evidentiary record and to determine if summary judgment is warranted or if Plaintiffs should be allowed to amend their complaint. View "Lugo v. The City of Troy, New York" on Justia Law

In the early 1990s, the Republic of Argentina issued collateralized bonds as part of a sovereign-debt-relief plan. Argentina retained reversionary interests in the collateral, which would revert to Argentina if the bonds were fully paid. However, Argentina defaulted on the bonds in 2001. Two decades later, holders of other defaulted Argentine bonds sought to attach these reversionary interests to satisfy judgments from Argentina’s default. They argued that the reversionary interests were used for commercial activity in the U.S., thus falling under an exception to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA).The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York granted the attachment of the reversionary interests. During the appeal, the bonds matured, and the district court ordered the turnover of the reversionary interests to the bondholders. Argentina appealed both the attachment and turnover orders, leading to a consolidated appeal.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s orders. The court held that Argentina’s reversionary interests were not protected by the FSIA because Argentina used them in commercial activity in the U.S. The court also found Argentina’s arguments against the turnover under New York law to be meritless. Additionally, the court ordered the parties to resubmit their briefs and appendices with narrow redactions, as the reasons for sealing the case were no longer compelling. The court denied the motion to supplement the record and granted the motion to limit the scope of sealing. View "Attestor Master Value Fund LP v. Republic of Argentina" on Justia Law