Justia U.S. 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff sued Defendant Cable News Network, Inc. (“CNN”) for defamation and civil conspiracy in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia. The case was transferred to the Southern District of New York. Plaintiff argues that the Virginia Supreme Court would determine that New York is the “place of the wrong.” Alternatively, that he was primarily injured in either the District of Columbia or Virginia or at least that the choice-of-law determination cannot be made without discovery. Second, he argues that even if California law does apply, section 48a does not apply under Virginia’s choice-of-law rules; and that even if section 48a does apply, he should have been granted leave to further amend his complaint so he could plead special damages. Plaintiff also requests that the court certifies to the Virginia Supreme Court the question of how lex loci delicti applies to multistate defamation cases like Plaintiff’s.The court concluded that the Virginia Supreme Court would apply California law, including its retraction statute, to Plaintiff’s multistate defamation claim. The court reasoned that the Virginia Supreme Court would apply the substantive law of the state where the plaintiff incurred the greatest reputational injury, with a presumption that absent countervailing circumstances, a plaintiff suffers the most harm in his state of domicile. Further, the court did not err in failing to sua sponte grant Plainitff’s leave to amend. Thus, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court dismissing the complaint with prejudice. View "Nunes v. Cable News Network, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs Aenergy, S.A., and Combined Cycle Power Plant Soyo, S.A. (together, “AE”), sued various Angolan Government entities (together, “Angola”), plus General Electric Co. and related entities (together, “GE”). AE alleges that Angola wrongfully cancelled AE’s Angolan power plant contracts and seized its related property in violation of state and international law and that GE interfered with its contracts and prospective business relations.The court found that the standard principles of forum non conveniens applies to AE’s lawsuit brought pursuant to exceptions to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (“FSIA”), 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1605. The court reasoned that forum non conveniens does not require a case-by-case consideration of comity, and therefore is consistent with the FSIA’s purpose in establishing a “comprehensive set of legal standards.”The court concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing AE’s complaint on forum non conveniens grounds. AE argues that the district court erred in applying the three-step forum non conveniens analysis. The court held that the district court reasonably found that AE’s forum choice was entitled to minimal deference; that Angola is an adequate alternative forum; and that the public and private Gilbert factors favor Angola. Thus the court affirmed the district court’s orders. View "Aenergy, S.A. v. Republic of Angola" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed this federal action after a Connecticut probate court issued an order recognizing the validity of a state lien against plaintiff's interest in an estate. The district court applied the doctrine established in Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), and abstained from adjudicating plaintiff's suit because of the ongoing state probate proceedings.The Second Circuit clarified that Younger abstention applies only to a narrow class of state civil proceedings. Civil probate proceedings are no more invulnerable to federal court interference than any other state civil proceedings, unless the state order at issue protects the State's administration of its judicial system or its process for compelling compliance with the judgments of its courts. The court concluded that the district court appears to have misunderstood the narrow scope of Younger abstention to extend to state probate proceedings that concern the validity of a lien. The court considered the Commissioner's remaining arguments and found them to be without merit. Therefore, the court vacated the district court's decision and remanded for further proceedings. View "Cavanaugh v. Geballe" on Justia Law

Exxon appealed the dismissal of its complaint against the New York and Massachusetts Attorneys General, alleging that the states' investigations into Exxon's purportedly deceptive speech regarding climate change were motivated by viewpoint discrimination and violated Exxon's constitutional rights. During the pendency of this appeal, the New York Attorney General closed the New York investigation and started an enforcement action, which resolved in Exxon's favor and is not being appealed by the state.The Second Circuit concluded that these events mooted Exxon's claims against the New York Attorney General and thus the court lacked jurisdiction over those claims. In regard to claims against the Massachusetts Attorney General, the court concluded that the claims are barred under the doctrine of res judicata because Exxon could have pursued the relief it now seeks in an earlier Massachusetts state court proceeding arising from the same events that underlie the present suit. Accordingly, the court dismissed in part and affirmed in part. View "Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Healey" on Justia Law

The Second Circuit certified the following questions to the Connecticut Supreme Court: 1. Under Connecticut law, can a proceeding before a nongovernment entity ever be deemed quasi-judicial for purposes of affording absolute immunity to proceeding participants? 2. If the answer to the first question is “yes,” what requirements must be satisfied for a non-government proceeding to be recognized as quasi-judicial? Specifically, a. Must an entity apply controlling law, and not simply its own rules, to facts at issue in the proceeding? See Petyan v. Ellis, 200 Conn. at 246, 510 A.2d 1337; see also W. Keeton, D. Dobbs, R. Keeton & D. Owen, Prosser & Keeton on Law of Torts 114, at 818-19 (5th ed. 1984). b. How, if at all, do the “power” factors enumerated in Kelley v. Bonney, 221 Conn. at 567, 606 A.2d 693, and Craig v. Stafford Construction, Inc., 271 Conn. at 85, 856 A.2d 372, apply to the identification of a non-government entity as quasi-judicial; and, if they do apply, are these factors “in addition” to, id., or independent of, a preliminary law-tofact requirement? c. How, if at all, does public policy inform the identification of a non-government entity as quasi-judicial and, if it does, is this consideration in addition to, or independent of, a law-to-fact requirement and the enumerated Kelley/Craig factors? d. How, if at all, do procedures usually associated with traditional judicial proceedings—such as notice and the opportunity to be heard; the ability to be physically present throughout a proceeding; an oath requirement; the ability to call, examine, confront, and cross-examine witnesses; the ability to be represented by counsel—inform the identification of a proceeding as quasi-judicial? See Craig v. Stafford Const., Inc., 271 Conn. at 87-88, 856 A.2d 372; Kelley v. Bonney, 221 Conn. at 568-70, 606 A.2d 693.3. If it is possible under Connecticut law to identify a nongovernment proceeding as quasi-judicial, then, in light of responses to the above questions, was the 2018 Yale University UWC proceeding at issue on this appeal properly recognized as quasi-judicial? 4. If the answer to Question 3 is “yes,” would Connecticut extend absolute quasi-judicial immunity to defendant Jane Doe for her statements in that UWC proceeding? 5. If the answer to Question 3 is “no,” would Connecticut afford defendant Jane Doe qualified immunity or no immunity at all? View "Khan v. Yale University" on Justia Law

The PBA appeals the district court's order denying its motion to intervene in the consolidated cases captioned In re New York City Policing During Summer 2020 Demonstrations, asserting interests in the litigation that it argues the parties to the actions cannot adequately represent. Therefore, the PBA claims it is entitled to intervene as of right pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24(a).The Second Circuit held that the district court erred in holding that the PBA did not have a cognizable interest in the personal safety of its member officers at the merits stages of the actions seeking injunctive or declaratory relief and that such interests were adequately represented. Accordingly, the court reversed the district court's denial of intervention with respect to the actions seeking declaratory injunction relief, and affirmed the district court's denial of intervention with respect to those actions seeking neither declaratory nor injunctive relief. View "Payne v. City of New York" on Justia Law

The Second Circuit vacated the district court's order vacating its earlier grant of Nigeria's application for discovery from VR under 28 U.S.C. 1782, holding that the district court's decision was based on an error of law, and thus amounted to an abuse of discretion as it effectively erected an impermissible extra-statutory barrier to discovery under section 1782. The court explained that the Treaty Between the Government of the United States of America and the Federal Republic of Nigeria on Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters by its plain terms does not restrict Nigeria's use of other lawful means to access evidence in the United States for use in criminal matters. Rather, it expands such access, supplementing rather than replacing other evidence-gathering tools such as section 1782. Therefore, Nigeria does not circumvent the Treaty by applying directly to the district court for discovery under section 1782.The court also concluded that the district court erred by concluding that Nigeria's potential use of the discovery materials sought in a related proceeding challenging an arbitration award before an English court would be "improper" and by considering such potential use as a negative factor in addressing Nigeria's section 1782 application. Accordingly, the court remanded for further consideration. View "Federal Republic of Nigeria v. VR Advisory Services, Ltd." on Justia Law

Civil Practice Law and Rules section 205(a), New York's "Saving Statute," does not permit a litigant to file an otherwise untimely "new action" within six months of a prior action, where that "prior action" was, itself, only made timely by a previous application of section 205(a).The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's order granting defendant's motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), on the grounds that the complaint was time-barred. In this case, the Second Circuit dismissed the 2018 Federal Action in a summary order dated January 23, 2020; defendant filed his initial complaint in the 2020 Action on July 8, 2020; and the court rejected defendant's contention that because the 2020 Action was filed within six months of the court's dismissal of the 2018 Federal Action (which was, itself, timely based on section 205(a), having been filed within six months of the affirmance of the dismissal of the 2014 Action), the 2020 Action is timely. View "Ray v. Ray" on Justia Law

The Second Circuit denied a petition for review challenging an FCC order removing the Solicited Fax Rule from the Code of Federal Regulations. The order was issued in response to the D.C. Circuit's decision holding that the Solicited Fax Rule was unlawful, and vacating a 2014 order of the FCC that affirmed the validity of the Rule. The court concluded that it is bound by the D.C. Circuit's decision and that the agency did not err by repealing the Rule following the D.C. Circuit's ruling. Pursuant to the Hobbs Act's channeling mechanism, the court explained that the D.C. Circuit became the sole forum for addressing the validity of the Rule. Therefore, once the D.C. Circuit invalidated the 2014 Order and the Rule, that holding became binding in effect on every circuit in which the regulation's validity is challenged. Accordingly, the FCC was bound to comply with the D.C. Circuit's mandate and could not pursue a policy of nonacquiescence. View "Gorss Motels, Inc. v. Federal Communications Commission" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) and the New York Labor Law, alleging that she was entitled to unpaid overtime wages, liquidated damages, and attorneys' fees. The Second Circuit certified to the New York Court of Appeals a question regarding what preclusive effect a judgment of the small claims court has on a subsequent wage-and-hour action. Guided by the Court of Appeals' ruling that traditional claim preclusion principles apply to judgments of the small claims court, the court affirmed the district court's dismissal of plaintiff's suit on claim-preclusion grounds. The court also held that claim preclusion is a valid defense to an action brought under the FLSA. View "Simmons v. Trans Express Inc." on Justia Law