Justia U.S. 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Connecticut Governor Ned Lamont and the state's Commissioner of the Department of Emergency Services and Public Protection James Rovella appeal from the district court's order granting a preliminary injunction ordering that the Governor repeal, in light of the COVID-19 pandemic, a provision to suspend collection of fingerprints in connection with applications for authorization to obtain firearms. The injunction also ordered that the Governor repeal that provision of the executive order and that the DESPP Commissioner resume fingerprinting services at that agency.The Second Circuit vacated the preliminary injunction and concluded that: (1) with respect to the individual plaintiffs, the preliminary injunction motion became moot in the district court; and (2) CCDL lacked organizational standing. Because the motion was moot and CCDL lacked standing, the district court had no jurisdiction to issue the preliminary injunction. View "Connecticut Citizens Defense League, Inc. v. Lamont" on Justia Law

Gater sought to renew a default judgment, which the district court entered in 2000, that enforced a Russian arbitration award in favor of Lloyd's Underwriters against appellants. Lloyd's assigned its default judgment to Gater in 2012. The district court entered a renewal judgment in Gater's favor after concluding that it had personal jurisdiction over appellants as well as subject-matter jurisdiction over the renewal claims.The Second Circuit vacated the district court's judgment in Gater's renewal action, concluding that the district court lacked personal jurisdiction over Moldovagaz. The court explained that the Due Process Clause prohibits federal courts from exercising personal jurisdiction over Moldovagaz because Moldovagaz has no contacts with the United States. Furthermore, Moldovagaz is not an alter ego of the Republic of Moldova.The court also concluded that the district court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over Gater's claim for renewal against the Republic of Moldova. The court explained that the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA) provides that federal courts lack subject matter jurisdiction over claims brought against foreign states unless one of the FSIA's immunity exceptions applies. In this case, the Republic of Moldova is a foreign state and no immunity exception applies to Gater's claims against it. Furthermore, the Republic of Moldova was not a party to the underlying arbitration agreement and no equitable theory, even assuming such theories apply under 28 U.S.C. 1605(a)(6), supports abrogating the Republic's sovereign immunity here. Accordingly, the court remanded with instructions to dismiss the renewal action for lack of jurisdiction. The court nevertheless affirmed the district court's refusal to vacate its original default judgment because appellants have failed to demonstrate that the district court had no arguable basis to exercise jurisdiction to enter that judgment. View "Gater Assets Ltd. v. AO Moldovagaz" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a civilly confined person under Article 10 of the New York Mental Hygiene Law, filed claims under 42 U.S.C. 1983, challenging the constitutionality of aspects of his Article 10 proceedings. The district court dismissed the complaint because he filed his claims after the expiration of the applicable three-year statute of limitations. During the pendency of his appeal, the Second Circuit has deducted court fees from plaintiff's institutional account at the Central New York Psychiatric Center pursuant to the filing fee requirement of the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) that applies to a "prisoner" proceeding in forma pauperis. Plaintiff now moves for restoration of those fees.The Second Circuit granted plaintiff's motion for restoration of fees deducted from his patient account and directed the Clerk of Court to refund those fees and to cease further collections. The court concluded that plaintiff, as a civil detainee who completed his criminal sentence, was no longer a "prisoner" under the PLRA when he filed his lawsuit. Therefore, he is not subject to the fee provisions under the PLRA. View "Jones v. Cuomo" on Justia Law

In 2017, Swiss law enforcement officers seized more than a thousand pieces of ancient art owned by the plaintiffs as part of an ongoing investigation into the illegal trafficking of cultural property. The plaintiffs sued the Swiss government entities and instrumentalities in the Southern District of New York, alleging that the seizure was arbitrary and made without probable cause. The district court dismissed the cases, holding that it lacked jurisdiction over the defendants under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 28 U.S.C. 1605(a)(3).The Second Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument that jurisdiction was proper under the statute’s “expropriation exception,” which applies in cases involving property taken by a foreign state in violation of international law. A routine law enforcement seizure does not ordinarily constitute a taking at all, let alone a taking in violation of international law, because it falls within a state’s traditional police powers. Although there are a handful of narrow exceptions to that general rule, such as when the seizure is not rationally related to a public purpose and is a pretextual attempt to nationalize property without compensation, or (has continued for an unreasonable amount of time, none of those exceptions applies here. View "Beierwaltes v. L'Office Fédérale de la Culture de la Confederation Suisse" on Justia Law

The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's order dismissing plaintiff's claims against CLA and its principal for lack of Article III standing. Plaintiff and two other non-appealing plaintiffs filed a class action complaint alleging state law claims against CLA and its principal based on an errant email sent to all of CLA's employees containing the sensitive personal identifiable information (PII) of approximately 130 current and former CLA workers. On appeal, plaintiff argues that, even though she did not allege that her PII had actually been misused as a result of CLA's errant email, she alleged an increased risk of identity theft sufficient to confer Article III standing.The court agreed that in the context of unauthorized data disclosures, plaintiffs may establish an Article III injury in fact based solely on a substantial risk of identity theft or fraud, even when those plaintiffs have not yet been the victims of such identity theft or fraud. Nevertheless, the court concluded that the district court correctly concluded that plaintiff failed to establish an injury in fact in this case. The court explained that plaintiff fails to allege that her PII was subject to a targeted data breach or alleges any facts suggesting that her PII (or that of any others) was misused. The court considered plaintiff's remaining arguments and found them to be without merit. View "McMorris v. Carlos Lopez & Assocs., LLC" on Justia Law

The City filed suit against five multinational oil companies under New York tort law seeking to recover damages for the harms caused by global warming. In this case, the City asserts that its taxpayers should not have to shoulder the burden of financing the City's preparations to mitigate the effects of global warming. Rather, the City suggests that a group of large fossil fuel producers are primarily responsible for global warming and should bear the brunt of these costs.The Second Circuit held that municipalities may not utilize state tort law to hold multinational oil companies liable for the damages caused by global greenhouse gas emissions. The court explained that global warming is a uniquely international concern that touches upon issues of federalism and foreign policy. Consequently, it calls for the application of federal common law, not state law. The court also held that the Clean Air Act grants the Environmental Protection Agency – not federal courts – the authority to regulate domestic greenhouse gas emissions. Therefore, federal common law actions concerning such emissions are displaced. Finally, the court held that while the Clean Air Act has nothing to say about regulating foreign emissions, judicial caution and foreign policy concerns counsel against permitting such claims to proceed under federal common law absent congressional direction. Because no such permission exists, the court concluded that each of the City's claims is barred and the complaint must be dismissed. View "City of New York v. Chevron Corp." on Justia Law

The Second Circuit vacated the district court's grant of defendants' Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss plaintiff's claim as time-barred. The court held that plaintiff's disability discrimination claim arises under the Affordable Care Act for the purposes of 28 U.S.C. 1658(a), which grants a four-year catchall statute of limitations period for all Acts of Congress enacted after December 1, 1990, and thus the district court erred in applying a three-year statute of limitations period. Accordingly, the court remanded for further proceedings. View "Vega-Ruiz v. Northwell Health" on Justia Law

Article III is satisfied so long as a party with standing to prosecute the specific claim in question exists at the time the pleading is filed. If that party (the real party in interest) is not named in the complaint, then it must ratify, join, or be substituted into the action within a reasonable time. Only if the real party in interest either fails to materialize or lacks standing itself should the case be dismissed for want of subject-matter jurisdiction.Two Cayman Islands investment funds filed a class action in 2016, alleging that numerous banks had conspired to manipulate certain benchmark interest rates. A year later, the banks discovered that the two plaintiff funds had been dissolved years earlier, and that the case was actually being prosecuted by a separate entity, Fund Liquidation. Fund Liquidation maintains that it was assigned the dissolved entities' claims, but the district court dismissed the case with prejudice.The Second Circuit vacated, concluding that although the dissolved funds lacked standing at the time the case was commenced, Article III was nonetheless satisfied because Fund Liquidation, the real party in interest, has had standing at all relevant times and may step into the dissolved entities' shoes without initiating a new action from scratch. The court explained that its precedent and Article III does not require application of the nullity doctrine. Accordingly, the court remanded for further proceedings. View "Fund Liquidation Holdings LLC v. Bank of America Corp." on Justia Law

A court need not wait until it is defrauded before it may impose monetary sanctions on a party who knowingly prosecutes a frivolous claim in bad faith. That remains true even if the misbehaving litigant made only a single misrepresentation to the court.In this contract dispute, plaintiff appealed the district court's dismissal of its breach of contract claim and denial of its request for leave to file a fourth amended complaint. Defendant cross-appealed the denial of the district court's motion for sanctions related to plaintiff's misrepresentations to the district court during the litigation.The Second Circuit vacated the district court's order denying sanctions and remanding for further proceedings. The court concluded that the district court misconstrued the court's precedent regarding the court's inherent power to impose sanctions – which makes clear that even a single bad-faith filing may warrant monetary sanctions, regardless of whether that conduct actually misled the court. The court affirmed in all other respects in a separately filed summary order. View "International Technologies Marketing, Inc. v. Verint Systems, Ltd." on Justia Law

The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of plaintiff's complaint against the New York Times. Plaintiff alleged defamation based on the Times's print and online articles about gender bias, favoritism, and groping at the Justice Department. The article details a Times investigation into a series of complaints, using records derived from an EEOC complaint and a sex discrimination and retaliation suit. One of the declarations described an incident between plaintiff and an intern. Plaintiff alleged that the language from this declaration was false and defamatory per se and that the fair report privilege did not apply.The court concluded that the district court performed the proper choice-of-law analysis, applying New York law to the conflict; correctly reasoned that New York was the state with the most significant interests in the litigation and applied New York's fair report privilege; and then properly dismissed plaintiff's complaint as barred by the fair report privilege because the alleged defamatory statement was attributed to an official proceeding. View "Kinsey v. New York Times Co." on Justia Law