Justia U.S. 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The Second Circuit held that plaintiff did not "lose" in state court such that his federal complaint was an appeal from an adverse state-court judgment, and thus the Rooker-Feldman doctrine did not apply.Plaintiff had filed suit against McMillen in Connecticut state court, filed two amended complaints, and then two substitute complaints. After the state court dismissed the second amended complaint and the first substitute complaint for failure to state a claim or as barred by the applicable statutes of limitations, it later dismissed the case for failure to prosecute. Plaintiff then filed this instant action in federal district court based on substantially the same facts as pleaded in the state proceedings and asserting the same claims as those in the second substitute complaint that was dismissed for failure to prosecute. Because the district court's decision was solely grounded in the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, the court vacated and remanded for further proceedings. View "Edwards v. McMillen Capital, LLC" on Justia Law

The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment for defendants in a wage-and-hour practices and policies action under the Fair Labor Standards Act, the New York Labor Law, the New York Business General Business Law, and 26 U.S.C. 7434. The district court treated defendants' opposition to plaintiffs' motion for conditional collective certification as a cross‐motion for summary judgment as to plaintiffs, and as a motion to dismiss without prejudice as to putative opt-in plaintiffs.The court held that plaintiffs had reason to recognize the motion could be converted into one for summary judgment and that the district court appropriately applied Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a)(1)(B), dismissing the complaint based on plaintiffs' two prior voluntary dismissals in New York State court and in the Eastern District of New York. The court considered plaintiffs' remaining arguments and found them to be without merit. View "Lin v. Shanghai City Corp." on Justia Law

BBVA appealed the district court's judgment entered following the Second Circuit's mandate in Vera v. Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria, S.A., 729 Fed. App'x 106 (2d Cir. 2018). The judgment rendered final several of its previous orders requiring BBVA to turn over funds to petitioners from a blocked electronic fund transfer originated by the Cuban Import‐Export Corporation, an instrumentality of the Republic of Cuba. The turnover orders rested on the district court's grant of full faith and credit to default judgments that petitioners secured against Cuba in the Florida state courts. The Florida state courts had jurisdiction under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA).The court reversed the judgment, vacated the turnover orders, and remanded with instructions, holding that the district court did not have subject matter jurisdiction over the enforcement proceeding under the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act (TRIA). In this case, petitioners failed to show under 28 U.S.C. 1605A either that (1) Cuba was designated as a state sponsor of terrorism "as a result" of the pre‐1982 acts underlying their judgments or that (2) the acts underlying their judgments occurred after 1982. Therefore, without either showing, the state-sponsored terrorism exception did not permit the district court to exercise jurisdiction over Cuba's assets under section 201(a) of TRIA. View "Vera v. Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria, S.A." on Justia Law

Conn. Genn. Stat. 4‐183(c) supplies an "explicit time limitation" of forty‐five days for appeals of final agency decisions under section 1415(i)(2)(B) of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA). The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of plaintiffs' complaint under the IDEA as time-barred. In this case, plaintiffs waited ninety days to commence their action and thus the district court properly concluded that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the case. View "P.M.B. v. Ridgefield Board of Education" on Justia Law

Atlantic sought a declaratory judgment that the insurance policy it had issued to Coastal was void ab initio or, in the alternative, that there was no coverage for the loss of the barge or damage to an adjacent pier. District Court Judge Wexler passed away prior to issuing his findings of fact and conclusions of law. The case was transferred to Judge Azrack, who, after no party requested the recall of any witness under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 63, issued findings of fact and conclusions of law in her role as successor judge and entered judgment finding Atlantic liable to Coastal under the terms of the policy.Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a)(6), factual findings of successor judges who have certified their familiarity with the record are subject to the "clearly erroneous" standard of review. The Second Circuit also held that, under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 63, a successor judge is under no independent obligation to recall witnesses unless requested by one of the parties. In this case, the court found no reversible error in Judge Azrack's findings of fact and conclusions of law, including findings that Coastal did not breach its duty of uberrimae fidei, and thus the policy was not void; Atlantic failed to prove that the vessel was unseaworthy; the loss of the vessel was due to a "peril of the sea" and was covered by the policy; Coastal was entitled to damages for contractual payments withheld by its contractor for repairs to a pier; and Coastal proved its damages using only a summary spreadsheet of invoices, as evidence. View "Atlantic Specialty Insurance Co. v. Coastal Environmental Group Inc." on Justia Law

After plaintiff filed suit against her employer for violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act's overtime provisions, the employer made an offer of judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 68(a) and plaintiff accepted. Before the judgment was entered, the district court sua sponte ordered the parties to submit the settlement agreement to the court for a fairness review and judicial approval, which the district court believed was required under the Second Circuit's decision in Cheeks v. Freeport Pancake House, Inc., 796 F.3d 199 (2d Cir. 2015).The court held, however, that judicial approval was not required of Rule 68(a) offers of judgment settling FLSA claims. The court considered amici's other arguments and found them to be without merit. Accordingly, the court reversed and vacated the district court's order, remanding with instructions. View "Mei Xing Yu v. Hasaki Restaurant, Inc." on Justia Law

The Second Circuit vacated the district court's grant of Navidea's motion to dismiss on grounds that Platinum-Montaur lacked Article III standing. The court held that the district court erred by failing to determine whether there was complete diversity of citizenship between the parties and thus it was unclear whether it had subject matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 1332. Accordingly, the court remanded for further proceedings. View "Platinum-Montaur Life Sciences, LLC v. Navidea Biopharmaceuticals, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed the district court's grant of Healthport's motion for summary judgment in an action involving claims of excessive charges for medical records under the New York Public Health Law.The Second Circuit vacated the district court's judgment, because the court anticipates certifying certain questions to the New York Court of Appeals after a final judgment is entered, and wishes to avoid multiple, unnecessary proceedings. Therefore, the court remanded to the district court with instructions to reinstate Beth Israel as a party and to adjudicate the case to a final judgment. The court also remanded along the lines of the procedures set out in United States v. Jacobson, 15 F.3d 19, 22 (2d Cir. 1994), so that any new appeal will be referred to this panel. View "Ruzhinskaya v. HealthPort Technologies, LLC" on Justia Law

At issue are motions by several news organizations to intervene in a pending appeal and to unseal an unredacted letter filed by Deutsche Bank on August 27, 2019. Deutsche Bank filed the letter in an appeal from an order denying a preliminary injunction sought by President Trump and others to prevent compliance with subpoenas seeking production of numerous documents, including tax returns.The Second Circuit granted the motions to intervene, because news media have a right to intervene to seek unsealing of documents filed in a court proceeding. However, the court denied the motions for unsealing, because the sealed letter was not relevant to any issue in the underlying appeal and thus it was not a judicial document within the meaning of the decisions requiring unsealing of documents with a court. Furthermore, the letter was not a record of any court which, absent special circumstances, would be available for public scrutiny. View "Trump v. Deutsche Bank AG" on Justia Law

Petitioners filed two applications in the Southern District of New York under 28 U.S.C. 1782 seeking discovery from Santander and its New York‐based affiliate, SIS, concerning the financial status of BPE. Santander had acquired BPE after a government-forced sale.The Second Circuit held that the language in section 1782 that requires that a person or entity "resides or is found" within the district in which discovery is sought, extends section 1782's reach to the limits of personal jurisdiction consistent with due process. Nonetheless, the court held that Santander's contacts with the Southern District of New York were insufficient to subject it to the district court's personal jurisdiction. The court also held that there was no per se bar to the extraterritorial application of section 1782, and the district court may exercise its discretion as to whether to allow such discovery. Therefore, the court held that the district court acted within its discretion in this case by allowing discovery from SIS. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's orders. View "In re del Valle Ruiz" on Justia Law