Justia U.S. 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Corsair obtained a $5,443,171.33 judgment against the defendants. Corsair learned that one of the defendants had a contract with National Resources, entitling the defendant to a payment of more than $3,000,000 and obtained a writ of execution.  Corsair engaged Connecticut State Marshall Pesiri, who successfully served the writ. National Resources ignored it, relinquishing $2,308,504 to Corsair only after Corsair instituted and won a subsequent turnover action. Perisi sued, seeking a statutory commission. The Second Circuit concluded that Connecticut state law was insufficiently developed for the court to answer the question raised on appeal. The court certified questions to the Connecticut Supreme Court. The court responded that Marshal Pesiri was entitled to a 15 percent fee under CONN. GEN. STAT. 52‐8 261(a)(F). It does not matter that the writ was ignored and that the monies that were the subject of the writ were procured only after the judgment creditor, not the marshal, pursued further enforcement proceedings in the courts. The Second Circuit then affirmed the district court’s fee award in the amount of $346,275.60. View "Corsair Special Situations Fund, L.P. v. Pesiri" on Justia Law

Corsair obtained a $5,443,171.33 judgment against the defendants. Corsair learned that one of the defendants had a contract with National Resources, entitling the defendant to a payment of more than $3,000,000 and obtained a writ of execution.  Corsair engaged Connecticut State Marshall Pesiri, who successfully served the writ. National Resources ignored it, relinquishing $2,308,504 to Corsair only after Corsair instituted and won a subsequent turnover action. Perisi sued, seeking a statutory commission. The Second Circuit concluded that Connecticut state law was insufficiently developed for the court to answer the question raised on appeal. The court certified questions to the Connecticut Supreme Court. The court responded that Marshal Pesiri was entitled to a 15 percent fee under CONN. GEN. STAT. 52‐8 261(a)(F). It does not matter that the writ was ignored and that the monies that were the subject of the writ were procured only after the judgment creditor, not the marshal, pursued further enforcement proceedings in the courts. The Second Circuit then affirmed the district court’s fee award in the amount of $346,275.60. View "Corsair Special Situations Fund, L.P. v. Pesiri" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed a putative class action, alleging that defendants (insurance providers, banks, and credit card companies) targeted credit card holders with fraudulent solicitations for illegal accidental disability and medical expense insurance policies. Plaintiffs were among the cardholders who purchased those policies, which plaintiffs allege were void ab initio because they violated New York insurance law. Although plaintiffs did not suffer qualifying losses or make claims for coverage, they argued that they are nevertheless entitled to reimbursement of the premiums and fees they paid defendants, plus enhanced damages, based on quasi‐contract, civil fraud, and statutory claims. The district court dismissed the suit, reasoning that plaintiffs could not establish the injury‐in‐fact element of Article III standing. The court concluded the policies were not void ab initio because under a New York savings statute, plaintiffs would have received coverage had they filed claims for qualifying losses, N.Y. Ins. Law 3103. The Second Circuit vacated, stating that an Article III court must resolve the threshold jurisdictional standing inquiry before it addresses the claim's merits. The district court’s analysis conflated the requirement for an injury in fact with the underlying validity of plaintiffs’ arguments, and engaged a question of New York state law that the state courts have yet to answer. View "DuBuisson v. Stonebridge Life Insurance Co." on Justia Law

Flores, a native of Ecuador, legally entered the U.S. in 1978 but overstayed his visa. He obtained legal permanent resident (LPR) status in 1979 and a passport stamp reading “temporary evidence of lawful admission for permanent residence valid until 1‐2‐80.” In November 1979, INS denied Flores’ application for adjustment of status and granted voluntary departure. Flores remained. In 1994, an immigration judge ordered his deportation. The BIA dismissed his appeal. In 2008, Flores was arrested and placed in detention. After three months, he was placed on supervised release. The BIA granted a motion to reopen; an IJ terminated the removal proceedings in 2010. The BIA closed the case in 2011. Flores subsequently received a notice from USCIS requesting that he report for a “[r]eview of your IJ decision, and LPR status.” Flores appeared and received a second passport stamp. He received his green card in 2012. In 2013, Flores sent administrative claims to federal entities under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), 28 U.S.C. 1346(b), 2671‐2680. After those entities denied his claims, Flores filed suit under the FTCA, alleging false arrest and imprisonment and other claims. The Second Circuit affirmed summary judgment for the government. Flores failed to present his claims within the two‐year statute of limitations; the “continuing violation doctrine” did not apply to this action and Flores failed to establish entitlement to equitable tolling of the limitations period. Flores’s injuries ceased after the IJ’s 2010 order. View "Flores v. United States" on Justia Law

21 U.S.C. 853(n) proceedings are civil and thus governed by the time limits in Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a), which are jurisdictional because they implement the requirements of 28 U.S.C. 2107. The clock starts to run at the issuance of the first order and does not reset at the issuance of the second order. In this case, the Second Circuit held that appellants did not file their notice of appeal within sixty days of the district court's order, as required by Rule 4(a). Therefore, the court dismissed the appeal based on lack of jurisdiction. View "United States v. Ohle" on Justia Law

SPV, the assignee of Optimal Strategic, filed suit against UBS and its affiliated entities and individuals (collectively, Access), alleging that UBS and Access aided and abetted the Bernard L. Madoff Investment Securities LLC and Bernard L. Madoff by sponsoring and providing support for two European-based feeder funds. The district court subsequently denied SPV's motion to remand the matter to state court and then granted separate motions to dismiss the complaint. The Second Circuit held that it had jurisdiction over this appeal; this litigation was "related to" the Madoff/BLMIS bankruptcies; the USB defendants lacked sufficient contacts with the United States to allow the exercise of general jurisdiction; the connections between the USB Defendants, SPV's claims, and its chosen New York forum were too tenuous to support the exercise of specific jurisdiction; and the court rejected SPV's two different theories of proximate cause. View "SPV OSUS Ltd. v. UBS AG" on Justia Law

The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of plaintiff's complaint sua sponte on the ground of res judicata. Plaintiff filed the present case after the dismissal of his first case, alleging nearly identical claims with a single additional claim that defendants terminated his employment in retaliation for filing the first case. The court held that the termination claim could have been raised in the prior action and was, and that res judicata precluded plaintiff from asserting the claim in this subsequent action. In this case, the termination claim was reasonably related to the original administrative charge so the exhaustion requirement would not have foreclosed raising the claim added in the first case. Nonetheless, the court also held that the requirement to exhaust administrative remedies did not disturb the court's holding that the termination claim was barred by res judicata. View "Soules v. Connecticut" on Justia Law

The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of DC-Rendite's motion for a maritime attachment and garnishment under Rule B of the Supplemental Rules for Admiralty or Maritime Claims and Asset Forfeiture Actions. In this classic quasi in rem proceeding, the court held that DC-Rendite's complaint and affidavit did not allege sufficient allegations that identifiable property of defendants, tangible or intangible, was in the hands of garnishees. Even assuming that defendants and garnishees were somehow affiliates or subsidiaries of the same group, it did not follow that there was a specific entitlement of one of the defendants to a debt owed by a garnishee. View "DS-Rendite v. Essar Capital Americas" on Justia Law

ePRO filed an interlocutory appeal challenging the imposition of discovery sanctions. The Second Circuit found no error in the district court's factual findings and concluded that the monetary sanctions it awarded properly compensated Klipsch for the corrective discovery efforts it undertook with court permission in response to ePRO's misconduct. The court held that discovery sanctions should be commensurate with the costs unnecessarily created by the sanctionable behavior. The court held that a monetary sanction in the amount of the cost of discovery efforts that appeared to be reasonable to undertake ex ante did not become impermissibly punitive simply because those efforts did not ultimately uncover more significant spoliation and fraud, or increase the likely damages in the underlying case. View "Klipsch Group, Inc. v. ePRO E-Commerce Ltd." on Justia Law

Third-party garnishees challenged the district court's judgment directing them to turn over $1,056,444.15 to a judgment creditor to satisfy a judgment against a judgment debtor. The Second Circuit agreed with the district court that CSX was permitted to seek relief from garnishees by motion under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 69(a), rather than by instituting a special proceeding pursuant to New York law; the plain meaning of C.P.L.R. 5222(b) did not support garnishees' argument that they did not violate the Restraining Notices because they transferred the restrained funds under the statute; and, the district court abused its discretion by failing to hold a hearing to resolve factual issues concerning the relative priorities of judgment creditors ‐‐ a necessary predicate to determining the proper amount of damages, if any, sustained by CSX. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded. View "CSX Transp., Inc. v. Island Rail Terminal, Inc." on Justia Law