Justia U.S. 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs filed a class action suit against defendants, alleging that they charged plaintiffs more than the statutory maximum fees allowed by N.Y. Pub. Health Law 18(2)(d) and (e) for providing copies of plaintiffs' medical records. The district court granted defendants' motions to dismiss the action pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) on the ground that the complaint alleged that the requested records had been paid for by plaintiffs' attorneys, ruling that the complaint therefore did not plead injury-in-fact to plaintiffs themselves and that plaintiffs lacked Article III standing. The court concluded that, in light of the ordinary principles of agency, the complaint's allegations that each named plaintiff "through [her or his] counsel" "paid" the charges demanded by defendants for providing the records and that "Plaintiffs" bore "the ultimate expense" for those records, plausibly alleged that plaintiffs themselves were injured by the claimed violations of New York law. Because the district court erred in dismissing the suit under Rule 12(b)(1), the court vacated and remanded. View "Carter v. HealthPort Technologies, LLC" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, an inmate at the Attica Correctional Facility, filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that while he was incarcerated at Attica, defendant corrections officers Dennis Fleckenstein and Chester Kosmowski subjected him to cruel and unusual punishment by depriving him of meals and defendant Fleckenstein physically assaulted him in violation of his Eighth Amendment rights. At trial, the jury found that both defendants violated plaintiff's constitutional right to nutritionally adequate food and awarded him nominal and punitive damages. On appeal, defendants challenged the district court's admission of a prison monitoring report conducted by a private, nonprofit corporation. The court concluded that the report is hearsay that does not fall within the Business Records Exception nor the Public Records Exception. Furthermore, the report was inadmissible because it further contains hearsay in the form of statements from inmates complaining about abuse at Attica. Because admission of the report was not harmless error, the district court abused its discretion in admitting it. Accordingly, the court vacated and remanded for further proceedings. View "Abascal v. Fleckenstein" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Vikas Goel founded and managed a computer‐equipment distribution company called eSys Informatics, Ltd. Plaintiff contracted to sell fifty‐one percent of eSys’s shares to Teledata, an Indian company purporting to be in the software business, at the price of $105 million. Plaintiff alleges that Teledata was a sham operation; that it carried on no legitimate business; and that it was only through the connivance of defendants, who participated with Teledata in a complex scheme that involved illegal loans used to generate profits from interest‐rate arbitrage, that Teledata was made to appear an attractive investment partner. On appeal, Goel and Rainforest Trading challenged the dismissal of their claims under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 18 U.S.C. 1961 et seq. The district court also declined to exercised supplemental jurisdiction over their state-law claims. The court rejected plaintiffs' contention that their claims are timely under New York's so-called "savings statute," NY CPLR 205(a), and agreed with the district court's conclusion that plaintiffs' claims are untimely. However, the court concluded that the district court erred by relying on materials outside the pleadings in deciding motions to dismiss brought by defendants. Presented with documents extrinsic to the complaint at the motion‐to‐dismiss stage, the district court should have either excluded the documents or, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(d), treated the motions to dismiss as motions for summary judgment. Accordingly, the court vacated and remanded. View "Goel v. Bunge, Ltd." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 against defendants, asserting various First and Fourth Amendment claims. On appeal, plaintiff challenged the district court's dismissal of his action with prejudice. The district court ordered the dismissal based on plaintiff's failure to seek timely reinstatement following a conditional dismissal order the district court entered to effectuate a then‐pending settlement agreement, which one defendant refused to join. Plaintiff also appealed, separately and on the merits, the district court’s earlier order, dated January 9, 2013, which granted a motion for partial summary judgment in favor of three of the defendants. The court concluded that the passage of 69 days before requesting reinstatement, standing alone, does not justify the extreme sanction of involuntary dismissal. Moreover, defendants suffered no prejudice from plaintiff's delay. Therefore, the district court abused its discretion in dismissing plaintiff's action and therefore, the court vacated the dismissal and remanded for further proceedings. The motion of defendants to strike portions of plaintiff's brief and appendices is moot, and their motion for damages is denied. View "Hoefer v. Bd. of Educ. of Middletown" on Justia Law

This case originated in a sex‐discrimination lawsuit by plaintiffs against their former employer, Lyons. Interested party-appellant Garrison appealed various factual determinations made by the district court in granting a motion to enforce a judgment. The court concluded that the district court properly construed plaintiffs’ motion pursuant to New York Civil Practice Law and Rules 5225 as a plenary action pursuant to New York’s substantive law of fraudulent transfers. In this case, the district court found that the book of business at issue was in fact transferred to Garrison, that the book of business was worth at least $300,000, that it originally belonged to LPS (not Lyons), and that LPS itself received no consideration for the transfer. The court concluded that the district court did not err, much less clearly err, in making these factual findings. View "Mitchell v. Garrison Protective Servs., Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed the award of costs against it in a False Claims Act (FCA), 31 U.S.C. 3729-3733, case, arguing that the district court improperly ordered it to pay defendants the costs of deposition transcripts under FRCP 54(d)(1) and 28 U.S.C. 190. Because "costs" and "expenses" have distinct meanings under Rule 54(d), section 1920, and the FCA, the court concluded that 31 U.S.C. 3730(d)(4) does not preclude the award of the costs for deposition transcripts. Plaintiff forfeited its argument under 28 U.S.C. 1920; and, even if appropriately presented, the argument has no merit where the court has stated clearly that section 1920 permits the taxation of deposition expenses, when necessarily incurred for use of the deposition in the case. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Associates Against Outlier Fraud v. Huron" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against defendants, alleging common-law fraud and violations of the Truth in Lending Act (TILA), 15 U.S.C. 1601 et seq. Plaintiff alleged that she never agreed to the mortgage loan at issue. The court concluded that the district court acted within its discretion in admitting an attorney's testimony under FRE 406 regarding the fact that he had met with plaintiff and had not asked her to sign blank sheets of paper; the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the loan documents at issue under FRE 901(a) for authenticated records and the court rejected plaintiff's argument that admission of the photocopies violated the best evidence rule where the original documents had been lost; plaintiff's FRCP 50 argument fails where the evidence was more than adequate to warrant the jury in finding for defendants' on the case's central issue; and the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying plaintiff's FRCP 59 motion for a new trial where nothing in the record warranted upsetting the verdict. Accordingly, the court found no error and affirmed the judgment. View "Crawford v. Franklin Credit Mgmt. Corp." on Justia Law

This appeal stemmed from a dispute regarding a contract the parties entered into, which gave Lewmar the exclusive right to manufacture and sell Steinerʹs patented sailboat winch handle, a device used to control the lines and sails of a sailboat. The parties resolved the dispute when Lewmar made, and Steiner accepted, an offer of judgment under Rule 68 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. After judgment was entered, Steiner moved for attorneysʹ fees of $383,804 and costs of $41,470. The district court denied attorneysʹ fees but awarded costs of $2,926. The court concluded that Steiner was precluded from seeking fees pursuant to the Agreement in addition to the $175,000 settlement amount because claims under the Agreement were unambiguously included in the Offer; Steiner was not precluded from seeking attorneysʹ fees under the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act (CUTPA), Conn. Gen. Stat. 42‐110g(d), because the Offer did not unambiguously encompass claims for attorneysʹ fees under CUTPA; and the court remanded for the district court to clarify whether it considered the claim for attorneys' fees under CUTPA on the merits and if not, to do so. Finally, the court concluded that the district court correctly added costs under the ʺcosts then accruedʺ provision of Rule 68. View "Steiner v. Lewmar, Inc." on Justia Law

Hapag‐Lloyd filed an Interpleader Complaint and moved ex parte for an anti‐suit injunction under 28 U.S.C. 2361. The district court granted the motion and enjoined named defendants. The court concluded that adjudication of Hapag‐Lloyd’s obligation to pay for the fuel bunkers at issue involves inextricably intertwined claims, and interpleader jurisdiction is proper under the broad and remedial nature of 28 U.S.C. 1335. The court also concluded that by initiating an interpleader concerning certain in rem claims and posting adequate security for those claims, Hapag‐Lloyd consented to the district court’s jurisdiction over its interests, which is sufficient to confer jurisdiction. However, the court remanded to the district court with instructions to enter an order that eliminates or retains the foreign scope of the injunction, with specific determinations applying the test in China Trade & Dev. Corp. v. M.V. Choong Yong. View "Hapag-Lloyd Aktiengesellschaft v. U.S. Oil Trading LLC" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against his former law firm and five of its partners, alleging that he had been forced to resign after blowing the whistle on what he considered to be the firm’s unethical litigation conduct. The parties eventually settled the suit and then sought an order directing the clerk of the court to close the file while leaving it permanently sealed. The district court denied the parties' request. The court held that pleadings, even in settled cases, are judicial records subject to a presumption of public access. The court concluded that the district court engaged in a thoughtful analysis of the competing interests at stake and the district court's conclusions were amply supported. Finally, the court concluded that sealing of the complaint is not justified in order to protect “confidential client information.” Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Bernstein v. Bernstein Litowitz Berger & Grossmann LLP" on Justia Law