Justia U.S. 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that New York City officers used excessive force when arresting her. On appeal, plaintiff primarily seeks a new trial on damages and challenges portions of the district court's order awarding attorney's fees and costs incurred prior to the date of defendants' Rule 68 Offer. The court concluded that the district court did not err in refusing to give a separate charge as to future damages and plaintiff failed to establish that any potentially improper conduct by defense counsel prejudiced the jury's award of punitive damages. The district court properly applied Rule 68 and did not abuse its discretion by reducing the reasonable hourly rate of plaintiff's lead counsel. The court held that Rule 68 offers need not, as a per se rule, expressly apportion damages among multiple defendants. With respect to apportionment, a Rule 68 offer is operative so long as it is capable of being compared to the prevailing plaintiff's ultimate recovery. Because the Offer meets this standard, the court affirmed the district court's decision. The court rejected plaintiff's claim that the district court erred in reducing the amount of her awardable attorney's fees. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment and order of the district court. View "Stanczyk v. City of New York, et al." on Justia Law

Sonera, a Dutch holding corporation, filed suit in district court to enforce a final arbitration award against Cukurova, the parent company of a large Turkish conglomerate. The district court held that it had personal jurisdiction over Cukurova based primarily on the New York contacts of several companies with which Cukurova is affiliated. The Supreme Court's decision in Daimler AG v. Bauman reaffirms that general jurisdiction extends beyond an entity's state of incorporation and principal place of business only in the exceptional case where its contacts with another forum are so substantial as to render it "at home" in that state. Even assuming that the activities of Cukurova's affiliates can be ascribed to it for the purpose of general jurisdiction analysis, Cukurova lacks sufficient contacts with New York to render it "at home" there. Accordingly, the court reversed in part, vacated in part, and remanded. View "Sonera Holding B.V. v. Cukurova Holding A.S." on Justia Law

The European Community filed suit against RJR, alleging that RJR directed, managed, and controlled a global money-laundering scheme with organized crime groups in violation of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) statute, 18 U.S.C. 1961 et seq., laundered money through New York-based financial institutions and repatriated the profits of the scheme to the United States, and committed various common law torts in violation of New York state law. The court concluded that the district court erred in dismissing the federal and state law claims; the court disagreed with the district court's conclusion that RICO cannot apply to a foreign enterprise or to extraterritorial conduct; the court concluded that, with respect to a number of offenses that constitute predicates for RICO liability and were alleged in this case, Congress had clearly manifested an intent that they apply extraterritorially; and, as to the other alleged offenses, the Complaint alleged sufficiently important domestic activity to come within RICO's coverage. The court also concluded that the district court erred in ruling that the European Community's participation as a plaintiff in this lawsuit destroyed complete diversity; the European Community is an "agency or instrumentality of a foreign state" under 28 U.S.C. 1603(b) and therefore, qualified as a "foreign state" for purposes of 28 U.S.C. 1332(a)(4); and its suit against "citizens of a State or of different States" came within the diversity jurisdiction. Accordingly, the court vacated and remanded for further proceedings. View "European Community v. RJR Nabisco, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed a putative class action against MERS in state court asserting claims related to MERS's facilitation of the provision of "Esign" mortgages to consumer-borrowers. MERS appealed the district court's grant of a motion to remand to New York state court on the ground that MERS's notice of removal was untimely. The court reversed and held that, in Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA) cases, the 30-day removal periods of 28 U.S.C. 1446(b)(1) and (b)(3) are not triggered until the plaintiff serves the defendant with an initial pleading or other paper that explicitly specifies the amount of monetary damages sought or sets forth facts from which an amount in controversy in excess of $5,000,000 can be ascertained. The court also held that where a plaintiff's papers failed to trigger the removal clocks of sections 1446(b)(1) and (b)(3), a defendant may remove a case when, upon its own independent investigation, it determines that the case is removable. Therefore, the 30-day removal periods of sections 1446(b)(1) and (b)(3) are not the exclusive authorizations for removal in CAFA cases. In this instance, plaintiffs never served MERS with a complaint or subsequent document explicitly stating the amount in controversy or providing MERS with sufficient information to conclude the threshold amount in controversy was satisfied. Therefore, the removal clocks of section 1446(b)(1) and (b)(3) did not commence. After MERS determined upon its independent investigation that section 1332(d) conveyed CAFA federal jurisdiction because the amount in controversy, number of plaintiffs, and minimal diversity requirements were satisfied, it properly removed the case by alleging facts adequate to establish the amount in controversy in its notice of removal. Accordingly, the court vacated and remanded. View "Cutrone v. Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc." on Justia Law

Tze Wung and related appellants moved the bankruptcy court to eliminate or suspend discharge under the bankruptcy plan of a judgment by Trendi Sportswear against debtor, Indu Craft. The bankruptcy court denied the motions and subsequently denied appellants' motions for reconsideration. Appellants then appealed to the district court, which affirmed the bankruptcy court's orders. Tze Wung later appealed the district court's denial of its motion to reconsider under Rule 59(e) after the district court entered its judgment and past the 30-day time limit that was prescribed by Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a)(1)(A) and incorporated into bankruptcy appeals through Rule 6(b)(1). Bank of Baroda moved to consolidate the three separate appeals, but Bank of Baroda made no mention of the fact that Tze Wung's appeal was untimely. The court concluded that Rule 6(b)(1) is a nonjurisdictional rule. Where an opposing party fails to object to an untimely appeal to a court of appeals from a bankruptcy appellate panel or district court exercising appellate jurisdiction, the opposing party forfeits the objection, and the court has jurisdiction over the untimely appeal. Because Bank of Baroda waived its objection to Tze Wung's untimely appeal by failing to make such an objection, the court acted within its jurisdiction in allowing Tze Wung's appeal to proceed along with that of the other appellants in this matter. View "Tze Wung Consultants, Ltd. v. Bank of Baroda" on Justia Law

This case arose when plaintiff filed a qui tam action against various providers of home health-care services and their officers, including Nursing Personnel. Plaintiff and the United States settled the claim against Nursing Personnel and the action remains pending against other defendants. Plaintiff subsequently moved to dismiss two appeals of Nursing Personnel from an interlocutory order entered by the district court awarding plaintiff attorney's fees. The court concluded that the fee award did not have to be appealed until entry of an appealable judgment, and that the pending collateral order appeal in Case No. 13-1688, taken in the absence of an appealable judgment, has become moot upon the entry of a Rule 54(b) partial judgment. The court also concluded that the appeal in Case No. 14-251 from the Rule 54(b) partial judgment was timely. Therefore the court denied the collateral order appeal and dismissed that appeal as moot. The court denied the motion to dismiss and directed briefing of that appeal in the normal course. View "United States ex rel. Maurice v. Nursing Personnel Home Care" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a qui tam action against defendants under the federal False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. 3729 et seq., and under the New York False Claims Act, N.Y. Fin. Law 187 et seq. Before defendants filed an answer or made a motion for summary judgment, plaintiff sought to voluntarily dismiss the action. The district court dismissed the action without prejudice as to the United States and the State of New York, but with prejudice as to plaintiff. The court disagreed with the district court that the statement by plaintiff's counsel that plaintiff would not "pursue this matter any further" constituted "the plain English equivalent of a request that the Court dismiss the claim with prejudice." The court concluded that the plain language of the letter supplied no reason to conclude that plaintiff's counsel was requesting a dismissal with prejudice. In the absence of any indication by the plaintiff, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a), which governs the voluntary dismissal of an action, presumes that a voluntary dismissal under these circumstances is without prejudice. Accordingly, the district court erred by dismissing the case with prejudice. The court also rejected defendants' alternative argument that the dismissal should be analyzed under Rule 41(a)(2). The court vacated and remanded. View "Youseff v. Tishman Construction Corp." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit alleging claims of medical malpractice, breach of contract, and negligence based on alleged failures by SGU to appropriately treat plaintiff's son's mental illness. The court concluded that the case was properly removed where a real party defendant in interest that owns and operates a non-juridical entity that was improperly sued in state court may remove a diversity case to federal court without filing an appearance in the state court prior to attempting removal. The court also concluded that the complaint was properly dismissed as time-barred where New York's rule tolling a limitations period because of a plaintiff's insanity, N.Y. C.P.L.R. 208, applied to the facts of this case. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "La Russo v. St. George's University School of Medicine" on Justia Law