Justia U.S. 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Civil Procedure
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The case involves a Ukrainian couple, Yasamin Karimi and Roman Tereshchenko, who divorced and disputed custody of their two children. Following Russia's invasion of Ukraine, Tereshchenko agreed to Karimi removing the children from Ukraine for safety reasons, but requested that she bring them to him in Dubai. Instead, Karimi took the children to undisclosed locations, including the United States. Tereshchenko filed a petition under the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction for the return of the children. The District Court granted Tereshchenko’s petition and ordered the children returned to him in France, where he was currently residing.Karimi appealed the decision, challenging the District Court's jurisdiction and arguing that Tereshchenko had consented to the children's removal. The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the District Court's jurisdiction and rejected Karimi's argument that Tereshchenko had consented to the children's removal. The Court of Appeals also found that the District Court had erred in determining that the children would not be exposed to a grave risk of harm if they were returned to western Ukraine. However, the Court of Appeals concluded that the District Court was permitted to order the return of the children to Tereshchenko in a third country, France, as a temporary measure due to the grave risk of harm in Ukraine. The case was remanded to the District Court to modify the order to maintain the Ukrainian courts’ authority over an ultimate custody determination. View "Tereshchenko v. Karimi" on Justia Law

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The case involves a dispute over the antitrust implications of a settlement agreement between Forest Laboratories, a brand manufacturer of the high-blood pressure drug Bystolic, and seven manufacturers of generic versions of Bystolic. The settlement agreement was reached after Forest Laboratories initiated patent-infringement litigation against the generic manufacturers. As part of the settlement, Forest Laboratories entered into separate business transactions with each generic manufacturer, paying them for goods and services.The plaintiffs, purchasers of Bystolic and its generic equivalents, filed a lawsuit against Forest Laboratories and the generic manufacturers, alleging that the payments constituted unlawful “reverse” settlement payments intended to delay the market entry of generic Bystolic. The plaintiffs' claims were dismissed twice by the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York for failure to state a claim.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The court found that the plaintiffs failed to plausibly allege that any of Forest’s payments were unjustified or unexplained, instead of constituting fair value for goods and services obtained as a result of arms-length dealings. The court also held that the district court’s application of the pleading law was appropriate. The court concluded that the plaintiffs did not plausibly allege that Forest’s payments were a pretext for nefarious anticompetitive motives rather than payments that constituted fair value for goods and services obtained as a result of arms-length dealings. View "In re Bystolic Antitrust Litigation" on Justia Law

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This case involves Commerzbank AG, a German bank, and U.S. Bank, N.A., an American bank. Commerzbank sued U.S. Bank, alleging that it had failed to fulfill its duties as a trustee for residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS) that Commerzbank had purchased. The case revolved around three main issues: whether Commerzbank could bring claims related to trusts with "No Action Clauses"; whether Commerzbank's claims related to certificates held through German entities were timely; and whether Commerzbank could bring claims related to certificates it had sold to third parties.The district court had previously dismissed Commerzbank's claims related to trusts with No Action Clauses, granted judgment in favor of U.S. Bank on the timeliness of Commerzbank's claims related to the German certificates, and denied Commerzbank's claims related to the sold certificates. Commerzbank appealed these decisions.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the district court's decisions on the timeliness of the German certificate claims and the denial of the sold certificate claims. However, it vacated the district court's dismissal of Commerzbank's claims related to trusts with No Action Clauses and remanded the case for further proceedings. The court found that Commerzbank's failure to make pre-suit demands on parties other than trustees could be excused in certain circumstances where these parties are sufficiently conflicted. View "Commerzbank AG v. U.S. Bank, N.A." on Justia Law

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The case involves Jane Doe, who sued the Franklin Square Union Free School District on behalf of herself and her minor daughter, Sarah Doe. The lawsuit was filed after the school district refused to grant Sarah an exemption from a school mask mandate implemented in response to the COVID-19 pandemic. Jane Doe argued that the school district violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and her claims under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York dismissed Jane Doe's constitutional claim, concluding that the school district's conduct survived rational basis review. The court also dismissed her federal statutory claims for failure to exhaust administrative remedies under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA).On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit concluded that the school district did not violate Jane Doe or Sarah’s constitutional rights by denying their request for an accommodation. However, the court agreed with Jane Doe that she was not required to satisfy the exhaustion requirement of the IDEA and held that the district court erred in dismissing Jane Doe’s ADA and § 504 claims. The court affirmed in part and reversed in part the judgment of the district court and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Doe v. Franklin Square Union Free Sch. Dist." on Justia Law

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In this case handled by the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, the plaintiff, Alexis Marquez, an attorney who represented herself, claimed that an Acting New York State Supreme Court Justice harassed her and subjected her to inappropriate behavior during her service as his court attorney. Marquez challenged two interlocutory rulings that dismissed the complaint as to one defendant and denied reconsideration. However, the district court dismissed the case as a penalty for Marquez's failure to comply with discovery orders, which Marquez did not challenge in this appeal.The Court of Appeals held that it lacked jurisdiction to consider Marquez's challenge to the interlocutory orders as it was not an appeal from a final decision of the district court. The Court explained that the merger rule, which allows an interlocutory order to merge into the final judgment, does not apply when a district court enters a dismissal as a sanction. If Marquez successfully challenges the sanction dismissal, she would then have the opportunity to challenge the interlocutory orders as part of any appeal from a final judgment on the merits. In this situation, however, the Court dismissed the appeal without prejudice due to lack of jurisdiction. View "Marquez v. Silver" on Justia Law

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Elaine Bart, a former supermarket manager, brought a lawsuit against her former employer, Golub Corporation, alleging gender discrimination under Title VII and state law. She was fired for falsifying food logs, a violation she admitted to but argued was not the sole reason for her termination. Bart claimed that her supervisor made several remarks indicating that women were not fit for managerial roles, suggesting a gender bias.The United States District Court for the District of Connecticut granted summary judgment to Golub, reasoning that Bart's admission of the violation, which was the company's stated reason for her termination, resolved the pretext inquiry, defeating her claims. Bart appealed this decision.The United States Court of Appeals For the Second Circuit disagreed with the lower court's ruling. The Appeals Court held that a plaintiff need not necessarily show at the third stage of the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting test that the employer’s stated justification for its adverse action was a pretext for discrimination. A plaintiff may also satisfy this burden by providing evidence that even if the employer had mixed motives, the plaintiff’s membership in a protected class was at least one motivating factor in the employer’s adverse action. Given Bart's testimony about her supervisor's remarks indicating gender bias, the court concluded that Bart met this burden, thus precluding summary judgment.Therefore, the Court of Appeals vacated the district court’s judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "Bart v. Golub Corp." on Justia Law

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In the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, the appellant, Brittany Jones, claimed she was sexually abused by a teacher between 2009 and 2011, when she was a high school student. She brought her claims under the Child Victims Act (CVA) of New York, which revived time-barred claims of child sexual abuse victims, and provided a two-year window from August 14, 2019 to August 14, 2021 for the filing of such claims. However, Jones filed her suit four months before the commencement of this window. The United States District Court for the Western District of New York, in a summary judgment, ruled in favor of the school district, holding that Jones's premature filing created a valid statute-of-limitations defense for the school district.This decision was appealed and the key question before the appellate court was whether the six-month waiting period created by the CVA was a statute of limitations. The appellate court concluded that neither the text of the CVA nor any precedent from New York courts provided clear guidance on this issue. Given the significant state policy interests implicated by the CVA, the appellate court decided to certify the question to the New York Court of Appeals: whether the six-month waiting period for claims under the CVA establishes a statute of limitations, a condition precedent to bringing suit, or some other affirmative defense. The court reserved its decision on the appeal pending the response from the New York Court of Appeals. View "Jones v. Cattaraugus-Little Valley Central School District" on Justia Law

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The plaintiff-Appellant, Kristen King, claimed that her employer, Aramark Services Inc., subjected her to a sex-based hostile work environment, discrimination, and retaliation in violation of the New York State Human Rights Law and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The United States District Court for the Western District of New York dismissed King’s claims. However, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the lower court’s decision on the New York State Human Rights Law claims but vacated the decision on the Title VII claims.The Court of Appeals agreed with the lower court that the impact of Aramark’s alleged discriminatory acts were only incidentally felt in New York. Regarding the Title VII hostile work environment claim, the court found that King’s termination was not only a discrete act supporting a distinct claim for damages, but also part of the pattern of discriminatory conduct that comprises her hostile environment claim. The court held that because King’s termination occurred within the limitations period, the continuing violation doctrine rendered King’s hostile work environment claim timely. Therefore, the court affirmed the lower court’s dismissal of King’s New York State Human Rights Law claims but vacated the dismissal of King’s Title VII claims and remanded the case for further proceedings on those claims. View "King v. Aramark Services Inc." on Justia Law

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The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit heard an appeal by Christopher Callahan against a judgment by the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York. The district court had granted summary judgment to Suffolk County Police Officer Thomas Wilson and the County of Suffolk on claims related to the death of Callahan's brother, Kevin Callahan, which Callahan argued violated excessive force regulations under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The appellate court ruled that the district court violated the mandate rule by not conducting a new trial as earlier instructed by the appellate court. The court found that there were disputed issues of material fact regarding Wilson's entitlement to qualified immunity, thus summary judgment was not warranted. However, the appellate court affirmed the district court's denial of Callahan's motion to amend his complaint to add a state law claim for battery. The case was remanded for a new trial. View "Callahan v. County of Suffolk" on Justia Law

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The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit heard an appeal involving Timothy Daileader, the independent director and manager of an affiliated group of companies, collectively known as "Oaktree," which were in financial distress. Daileader was seeking coverage from his insurer, Certain Underwriters at Lloyds London Syndicate 1861 (Syndicate 1861), for his defense in litigation involving Oaktree. However, Syndicate 1861 denied Daileader’s insurance claim. Daileader subsequently sought a preliminary injunction to enforce Syndicate 1861’s duty to defend. The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York denied Daileader’s motion, and Daileader appealed.The Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's decision, finding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Daileader's motion for a preliminary injunction. The court held that Daileader had not shown a clear or substantial likelihood of success on the merits of his claim. The court also found that Daileader had not made a strong showing of irreparable harm. The court concluded that the Syndicate's refusal to continue paying under its policy did not disrupt the status quo of ongoing payments between the two parties. Therefore, the court determined that Daileader's desired injunction was mandatory and not prohibitory, thus subject to a more stringent standard for relief. View "Daileader v. Certain Underwriters" on Justia Law