Justia U.S. 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Civil Rights
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John D. Whitfield's application for a job as a Youth Development Specialist with the New York City Administration for Children’s Services (ACS) was rejected. Whitfield alleged that the rejection was discriminatory and violated his First and Fourteenth Amendment rights. He initially challenged the decision in New York State Supreme Court through an Article 78 proceeding, which was dismissed. He then initiated a federal court action, which was also dismissed by the District Court on res judicata grounds. The District Court determined that the state court proceeding was a “hybrid” proceeding where Whitfield could have pursued the claims he raises in the federal action.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit disagreed, concluding that the state court adjudicated the matter as a pure Article 78 proceeding, not as a hybrid. Therefore, the state court lacked the power to award Whitfield the full scope of relief he now seeks in this action, and the District Court erred by dismissing the amended complaint on res judicata grounds. The judgment of the District Court was vacated and the case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Whitfield v. City of New York" on Justia Law

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In the early morning hours of September 8, 2018, Mabior Jok was standing outside a bar in Burlington, Vermont, when Joseph Corrow, an officer of the Burlington Police Department, approached the group. The details of what happened next are fiercely disputed, but it's agreed that Corrow took Jok to the ground, resulting in Jok hitting his head, losing consciousness and being taken to the hospital. Jok was charged with disorderly conduct, but the charge was later dismissed. Subsequently, Jok brought a lawsuit against Corrow and others, alleging, among other things, that Corrow used excessive force against him in violation of his Fourth Amendment rights.Corrow moved for summary judgment on several grounds, including that he was entitled to qualified immunity. The United States District Court for the District of Vermont denied the motion, concluding that there were genuine disputes of material fact and hence, summary judgment could not be granted on the basis of qualified immunity. Corrow then filed an interlocutory appeal of the denial.The United States Court of Appeals For the Second Circuit found that Corrow failed to establish appellate jurisdiction because he continued to assert disputes of fact, and no pure question of law was presented for review. The Court concluded that it did not have jurisdiction to review the denial of qualified immunity as the denial was based on the presence of disputed material facts. Therefore, the interlocutory appeal was dismissed due to lack of appellate jurisdiction. View "Jok v. City of Burlington" on Justia Law

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The plaintiff-appellant, Maurice Cotton, an inmate, filed a civil rights lawsuit against corrections officials at the Green Haven Correctional Facility. He alleged that he was wrongfully denied a transfer to another prison facility and retaliated against for filing grievances related to the transfer request. Cotton sought permission to proceed in forma pauperis (IFP), which allows indigent prisoners to pay filing fees through a structured payment plan linked to their prison accounts. The district court denied Cotton's IFP request, concluding that he had accumulated "at least three" strikes under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) due to previous lawsuit dismissals.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit vacated and remanded the district court's decision, ruling that the district court erred in its interpretation of the three previous lawsuits. According to the appellate court, not all of Cotton's previous lawsuits counted as PLRA strikes. The court further explained that a dismissal under Heck v. Humphrey does not automatically count as a PLRA strike, arguing that the key consideration is whether the dismissal is based on the merits of the case or if it was merely a matter of timing or sequencing. Therefore, the appellate court concluded that the district court incorrectly denied Cotton's request for IFP status, warranting a remand for further proceedings. View "Cotton v. New York State Office" on Justia Law

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The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed a decision made by the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York. The plaintiff, Do No Harm, a membership organization, filed a suit against Pfizer Inc., alleging that a Pfizer fellowship program unlawfully excluded white and Asian-American applicants on the basis of race. The plaintiff sought a preliminary injunction, which was denied by the district court. The district court dismissed the case without prejudice because Do No Harm lacked Article III standing. The court reasoned that the organization failed to identify by name a single injured member.The Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's decision. It upheld that to establish standing under Article III, an association relying on injuries to individual members must name at least one injured member. The court also held that if a plaintiff fails to establish standing in the context of a motion for a preliminary injunction, the district court must dismiss their claims without prejudice rather than allowing the case to proceed if the plaintiff alleged sufficient facts to establish standing under the less onerous standard applicable at the pleading stage. View "Do No Harm v. Pfizer Inc." on Justia Law

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The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York's dismissal of a lawsuit brought by BMG Monroe I, LLC. BMG, a developer, had sued the Village of Monroe, New York, alleging that the Village's denial of its applications for building permits on five lots violated the Fair Housing Act and the Equal Protection Clause due to a discriminatory animus towards the Hasidic Jewish community. The Village denied the applications due to non-compliance with the architectural criteria established in the Smith Farm Project's approval conditions. The Court of Appeals agreed with the district court that the claims were unripe because BMG had not exhausted its administrative remedies. In order to satisfy the finality requirement under ripeness doctrine, BMG needed to appeal the adverse planning-board decision to a zoning board of appeals and submit at least one meaningful application for a variance. BMG could not claim that further actions were futile based on the Village's indication that it would likely not be receptive to a variance request that had yet to be made. View "BMG Monroe I, LLC v. Village of Monroe" on Justia Law

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The case involves an appeal by a plaintiff against the dismissal of his lawsuit against the City of Buffalo and some of its police officers. The plaintiff was arrested and charged with violating a city noise ordinance after he shouted at a police officer, who was driving without headlights, to turn his lights on. The plaintiff filed a lawsuit, asserting that his arrest violated his First Amendment right to free speech and amounted to false arrest and malicious prosecution.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit found that the district court erred in ruling that the plaintiff's shout was not protected by the First Amendment, given that it was a warning about a public safety issue. The court further concluded that there were genuine issues of fact concerning whether there was probable cause to arrest the plaintiff, which should have been resolved by a jury rather than at summary judgment.The court vacated the part of the district court's judgment dismissing the plaintiff's claims of false arrest, malicious prosecution, and First Amendment retaliation, as well as his claims related to failure to intervene and respondeat superior. The court affirmed the part of the district court's dismissal of the plaintiff's claim that the noise ordinance was unconstitutional as applied to him. The case was remanded for trial on the reinstated claims. View "Rupp v. City of Buffalo" on Justia Law

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This case is about a dispute between Richard Roe and St. John’s University (SJU) and Jane Doe. Roe, a male student at SJU, was accused of sexually assaulting two female students, Doe and Mary Smith, on separate occasions. SJU's disciplinary board found Roe guilty of non-consensual sexual contact with both Doe and Smith and imposed sanctions, including a suspension and eventual expulsion. Roe then sued SJU, alleging that his rights under Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 and state contract law had been violated. He also sued Doe for allegedly defaming him in an anonymous tweet accusing him of sexual assault. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York dismissed Roe's Title IX and state law claims, and declined to exercise jurisdiction over his defamation claim. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the district court's decision, holding that Roe's complaint failed to state a plausible claim of sex discrimination under Title IX. The court found that, while Roe had identified some procedural irregularities in SJU's disciplinary proceedings, these were not sufficient to support a minimal plausible inference of sex discrimination. Furthermore, the court ruled that Roe's hostile environment claim was fatally deficient, as the single anonymous tweet at the center of his claim was not, standing alone, sufficiently severe to support a claim of a hostile educational environment under Title IX. View "Roe v. St. John's University" on Justia Law

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In the case of Veronica-May Clark, an incarcerated transgender woman, against corrections officers who allegedly sexually assaulted her, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the decision of the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut. The District Court had dismissed Clark's case as untimely, denying her claim for equitable tolling of the statute of limitations due to the effects of the abuse. The Court of Appeals found that the District Court did not err in holding an evidentiary hearing to resolve Clark’s equitable tolling claim and did not make any factual findings that infringed the Seventh Amendment. The court also found no abuse of discretion in the District Court's determination that Clark had failed to demonstrate circumstances that would warrant equitable tolling. In effect, the court ruled that Clark had not sufficiently proven that her trauma and fear of retaliation prevented her from filing the lawsuit within the required time frame. View "Clark v. Hanley" on Justia Law

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The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit dismissed an interlocutory appeal from the City of New Haven and three of its police officers (collectively, "the City"), who sought to challenge the district court's denial of their motion for summary judgment on the claims of Solomon Maye. Maye alleged that the City violated his constitutional rights by evicting him from his place of business. The district court had denied the City's motion for summary judgment, which was based on the defense of qualified immunity, because the motion was filed more than six months after the court's deadline for dispositive motions. The Court of Appeals held that a district court's denial of a motion for summary judgment as untimely is not a "denial of a claim of qualified immunity" that turns on an issue of law and is thus not subject to immediate appeal under the collateral order doctrine. Consequently, the Court of Appeals found no jurisdiction to hear the City's interlocutory appeal and dismissed it. View "Maye v. City of New Haven" on Justia Law

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In 2011, Veronica-May Clark, an incarcerated transgender woman, was repeatedly sexually assaulted by corrections officer Thomas Hanley. More than seven years after the abuse, Clark filed a lawsuit against Hanley and other officers, alleging violations of her Eighth Amendment rights and seeking equitable tolling of the statute of limitations due to the traumatic effects of the abuse. After holding an evidentiary hearing on the issue of equitable tolling, the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut (Meyer, J.) denied Clark's claim for equitable tolling and dismissed her case as untimely. Clark appealed, claiming that the court improperly conducted factfinding at the pleading stage and violated her Seventh Amendment rights. The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the district court's ruling, finding that the court properly resolved Clark's equitable tolling claim and did not infringe her Seventh Amendment rights. View "Clark v. Hanley" on Justia Law