Justia U.S. 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Following a disturbance at a hospital, two New York City police officers arrested Plaintiff and transported her to another hospital for a psychiatric evaluation. Plaintiff asserted false arrest claims, alleging that the police officers lacked probable cause to arrest her for a mental health examination. The district court granted Defendants’ motion for summary judgment, holding that because the police officers had probable cause to arrest Plaintiff for a misdemeanor trespass, her false arrest claim was precluded. The district court did not reach the issue of the existence of probable cause for a mental health arrest. The district court also held, in the alternative, that the officers were protected by qualified immunity because they had arguable probable cause to make a mental health arrest.   The Second Circuit affirmed, concluding that while the district court erred in its probable cause analysis, the officers were protected by qualified immunity. The court explained that even where actual probable cause does not exist, police officers may be entitled to qualified immunity from a Section 1983 false arrest claim if their actions did not violate "clearly established" rights or if "arguable probable cause" existed at the time of the arrest.   Here, the parties disagree as to whether the officers had probable cause to arrest her for an emergency mental health evaluation. The court held that the existence of probable cause to arrest an individual for a criminal violation does not preclude a false arrest claim based on a wrongful arrest for a mental health evaluation. However, nonetheless, the officers here are protected by qualified immunity. View "Guan v. City of New York" on Justia Law

Plaintiff worked as a flight attendant for Delta Air Lines. She alleged that, while working on an airplane, she heard a passenger refer to her using a racist remark and reported the passenger’s remark to the pilot. The pilot responded by demanding that Plaintiff “step out on the jet bridge with the passenger,” and when she refused the pilot had her removed from the plane. Plaintiff reported the pilot’s conduct to her supervisor, and within two months of these events Plaintiff alleged she was subjected to random drug testing, wrongfully suspended, and ultimately fired. She filed a complaint in state court, alleging retaliation and vicarious liability under the New York City Human Rights Law. (“NYCHRL”) Delta removed the case to federal district court and moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim. The district court granted the motion, holding that Leroy failed adequately to allege that Delta had discriminated against her and that she therefore failed to allege retaliation for a protected activity under the NYCHRL.   The Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s ruling dismissing Plaintiff’s claims finding that her complaint did not allege facts adequate to support a good-faith, reasonable belief that Delta engaged in discrimination against her. The court explained that the NYCHRL prohibits retaliation for “opposing [the] employer’s discrimination.” To succeed on a retaliation claim, the plaintiff must at least have a good-faith, reasonable belief that she was opposing an unlawful employment practice. On the facts as alleged, Plaintiff could not have reasonably and in good faith believed that the passenger’s comment or the pilot’s conduct was an unlawful employment practice. View "Leroy v. Delta Air Lines, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed from the district court’s ruling granting summary judgment on all claims to Defendants-Appellees Chautauqua County (“the County”) and Correction Officers (“the Officers”) in this civil rights suit concerning the County’s policy of handcuffing inmates in an allegedly painful manner and the Officers’ use of force in extracting Plaintiff from his cell at the Chautauqua County Jail (“the Jail”).   The Second Circuit held that the district court did not err in granting summary judgment on exhaustion grounds with regard to Plaintiff’s claims against the Officers, but that it did err in doing so with regard to his claim against the County. The court explained that that the district court was correct that Plaintiff failed to present sufficient evidence to create a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether he had submitted a timely grievance related to his claims against the Officers. The district court erred, however, in holding that the Chautauqua County Jail’s grievance policy applied to his separate claim against the County. By its plain terms, the grievance procedures did not apply to matters outside the jail captain’s control, such as the County handcuffing policy that Plaintiff challenges, and thus there were no administrative remedies for Plaintiff to exhaust with respect to that claim. View "Saeli v. Chautauqua County" on Justia Law

A former faculty member appealed the district court’s judgment dismissing (A) claims against the university principally for violation of his right to due process, and for gender and national origin discrimination in violation of, respectively, Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 and Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964; and (B) claims that documents issued by the United States Department of Education violated the Administrative Procedure Act and the  Spending Clause of the Constitution. The district court granted the university's motion for judgment on the pleadings finding that Title IX does not authorize a private right of action for discrimination in employment and that the complaint failed to state a claim for national-origin discrimination under Title VI. The court granted the United States Defendants' motion to dismiss the claims.   The Second Circuit vacated the judgment in part finding merit only in Plaintiff’s contention that Title IX allows a private right of action for a university's intentional gender-based discrimination against a faculty member. The court found that the complaint contained sufficient factual assertions to permit a plausible inference that Plaintiff was disciplined following irregular investigative procedures in circumstances permitting a plausible inference of bias on the basis of gender in violation of Title IX. Plaintiff’s Title VI claim, viewed within the same analytical framework as that applicable to his Title IX claim, lacks sufficient factual assertions to permit a plausible inference that Plaintiff was disciplined in whole or in part on the basis of his national origin in violation of Title VI. View "Vengalattore v. Cornell University" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a federal action against the State of Connecticut, a colonel in his official capacity, and a retired detective in her individual capacity, alleging three constitutional claims under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983. Plaintiff alleged that those provisions of Connecticut’s sex offender registration statute that required him to disclose his email address and other internet communication identifiers and periodically to verify his residence violated the First Amendment and the Ex Post Facto Clause. Plaintiff further alleged that the detective engaged in malicious prosecution in violation of the Fourth Amendment by seeking an arrest warrant for Plaintiff’s alleged failure to disclose one of his email addresses. The district court dismissed all of Plaintiff’s claims.The Second Circuit reversed the district court’s dismissal of Plaintiff’s First Amendment claim and affirmed the district court’s dismissal of his Post Facto Clause and malicious prosecution claims. The court concluded that the burden of demonstrating that the disclosure requirement satisfied intermediate scrutiny fell on the government and the government must show that the challenged law advances important governmental interests and is narrowly tailored to those interests. The court found that the government did not make the showing.The court further found that because the residence verification provision has not been applied to Plaintiff retroactively, the Ex Post Facto Clause is not implicated. Finally, although the history between Plaintiff and the Sex Offender Registry Unit suggests a motivation to harass him, an officer cannot be liable for a vexatious motivation as long as she acts with arguable probable cause. View "Cornelio v. Connecticut" on Justia Law

The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of summary judgment as to absolute and qualified immunity in an action raising Fourth Amendment claims of false arrest and malicious prosecution brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 1983. The court agreed with the district court that absolute prosecutorial immunity did not apply to appellants' participation in obtaining the arrest warrant for plaintiff. The court explained that long-standing precedent makes clear that swearing to an arrest warrant affidavit and executing an arrest are traditional police functions, and performing such functions at the direction of a prosecutor does not transform them into prosecutorial acts protected by absolute immunity.The court also concluded that the district court correctly determined that summary judgment on the issue of qualified immunity was unwarranted given the factual disputes here. In this case, the district court identified relevant and exculpatory omissions from the arrest warrant affidavit related to plaintiff's intent and credibility that, construing the evidence in a manner most favorable to plaintiff, could have materially impacted a magistrate judge's determination as to whether probable cause existed for plaintiff's arrest, and such factual issues preclude summary judgment for appellants on the ground of qualified immunity at this stage of litigation. The court remanded for further proceedings. View "Washington v. Napolitano" on Justia Law

The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of plaintiff's complaint, alleging violations of regulations promulgated pursuant to the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA). Plaintiff, who uses a wheelchair and is disabled, did not assert in the complaint that he visited West Point Realty's website with the intention of visiting the hotel run by West Point Realty; rather, he alleged that he frequently visits hotel websites to determine whether those websites comply with ADA regulations. The court agreed with the district court that plaintiff failed to allege a concrete injury in fact and therefore lacked standing to assert a claim under the ADA. The court also concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion by considering only the allegations in plaintiff's complaint when deciding West Point Realty's motion to dismiss. View "Harty v. West Point Realty, Inc." on Justia Law

Exxon appealed the dismissal of its complaint against the New York and Massachusetts Attorneys General, alleging that the states' investigations into Exxon's purportedly deceptive speech regarding climate change were motivated by viewpoint discrimination and violated Exxon's constitutional rights. During the pendency of this appeal, the New York Attorney General closed the New York investigation and started an enforcement action, which resolved in Exxon's favor and is not being appealed by the state.The Second Circuit concluded that these events mooted Exxon's claims against the New York Attorney General and thus the court lacked jurisdiction over those claims. In regard to claims against the Massachusetts Attorney General, the court concluded that the claims are barred under the doctrine of res judicata because Exxon could have pursued the relief it now seeks in an earlier Massachusetts state court proceeding arising from the same events that underlie the present suit. Accordingly, the court dismissed in part and affirmed in part. View "Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Healey" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, ten nurses and their former attorney, filed claims under 42 U.S.C. 1983 as well as common law claims of false arrest and malicious prosecution under New York law against defendants, alleging that Defendants Spota and Lato improperly prosecuted them for child endangerment, endangerment of a physically disabled person, and related charges by fabricating evidence and engaging in other improper conduct before a grand jury, in violation of plaintiffs' federal constitutional rights and New York state law. The district court found that Spota and Lato were entitled to absolute immunity for starting the criminal prosecution and presenting the case to the grand jury, and it dismissed plaintiffs' claims arising from any alleged misconduct during that prosecutorial stage. The district court then granted summary judgment in favor of the prosecutors and the DA's Office as to the remaining claims.The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment, concluding that although Spota and Lato may have unlawfully penalized plaintiffs for exercising the right to quit their jobs on the advice of counsel, under the court's precedent both of them are entitled to absolute immunity for their actions during the judicial phase of the criminal process. In regard to plaintiffs' claim that Spota and Lato fabricated evidence during the investigative phase of the criminal process, the court agreed with the district court that there was insufficient admissible evidence of fabrication to defeat summary judgment. View "Anilao v. Spota" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit alleging that the USTA discriminated and retaliated against him in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and discriminatorily interfered with his employment contract with AJ Squared Security, in violation of 42 U.S.C. 1981, by rejecting his temporary assignment as a security guard for the 2016 U.S. Open.The Second Circuit concurred with the district court that plaintiff has failed to state any claim for relief under Title VII or section 1981. The court concluded that plaintiff did not plausibly allege the existence of an employer-employee relationship necessary to sustain his Title VII claims. Furthermore, plaintiff did not allege any facts to support his claim under section 1981 that, but for his race, the USTA would not have interfered with his employment contract. However, because plaintiff—represented by court-appointed counsel for the first time on appeal—has indicated that he can plead further allegations of a "joint employer" relationship, and because he has plausibly alleged that the USTA rejected his assignment in retaliation for his protected activities against a USTA subcontractor, the court vacated the district court's dismissal of plaintiff's Title VII retaliation claim under 42 U.S.C. 2000e–3(a), and remanded with instructions that plaintiff be permitted to amend his complaint as to that claim. The court affirmed as to the Title VII and section 1981 claims. View "Felder v. United States Tennis Association" on Justia Law