Justia U.S. 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

FASORP brought suit against the NYU Defendants, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief pursuant to Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972. In an Amended Complaint, FASORP pleads that its members have standing to challenge the Law Review's article-selection and editor-selection processes, as well as the Law School's faculty-hiring processes, all of which FASORP alleges violated Title VI and Title IX by impermissibly considering sex and race in its selection and hiring decisions.The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of the complaint without prejudice and held that FASORP does not have standing to sue NYU because it has failed to demonstrate injuries to its members. In this case, even if FASORP's pleadings were found to sufficiently identify members who have suffered the requisite harm, FASORP fails to demonstrate that those members have experienced an invasion of a legally protected interest that is certainly impending or that there is a substantial risk that the harm will occur. The court explained that, without any "description of concrete plans" to apply for employment, submit an article, or of having submitted an article, that will or has been accepted for publication, FASORP's allegations exhibit the kind of "some day intentions" that cannot "support a finding of [] actual or imminent injury." View "Faculty, Alumni, and Students Opposed to Racial Preferences v. New York University" on Justia Law

The Second Circuit vacated the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of defendants in an action brought by a certified class of individuals with disabilities, together with six disability-rights organizations, alleging that the failure to adequately maintain subway-station elevators violates the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), the Rehabilitation Act (RA), and the New York City Human Rights Law (NYCHRL).As a preliminary matter, the court rejected the MTA's argument that this case is nonjusticiable, and the MTA's argument that the court must consider the accessibility of the transit system as a single unit that includes subways, buses and paratransit. The court concluded that there are genuine disputes of material fact as to whether frequent and inconvenient elevator outages deprive at least some passengers with disabilities of adequate access to the subway. However, the court explained that summary judgment would nonetheless be proper if it can be determined as a matter of law that reasonable accommodations are provided during those outages. Because the district court did not reach the issue of reasonable accommodations and did not sufficiently consider the NYCHRL claim, the court remanded for further proceedings. View "Brooklyn Center for Independence of the Disabled v. Metropolitan Transportation Authority" on Justia Law

An organization that is not directly regulated or affected by a challenged law or regulation cannot establish injury-in-fact for purposes of organizational standing absent a showing that it suffered an involuntary and material burden on its established core activities.CTPU filed suit alleging that Connecticut's standards regarding the racial composition of its interdistrict magnet schools violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution. The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of the complaint, concluding that CTPU has not established an injury-in-fact for purposes of demonstrating organizational standing. In this case, CTPU is an organization that is not directly regulated or affected by the challenged standards and CTPU has failed to show that it suffered an involuntary, material burden on its core activities. View "Connecticut Parents Union v. Russell-Tucker" on Justia Law

An organization that is not directly regulated or affected by a challenged law or regulation cannot establish injury-in-fact for purposes of organizational standing absent a showing that it suffered an involuntary and material burden on its established core activities.The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of CTPU's complaint alleging that Connecticut's standards regarding the racial composition of its interdistrict magnet schools violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution. The court concluded that the district court properly dismissed the complaint based on lack of Article III standing. In this case, because CTPU is an organization that is not directly regulated or affected by the challenged standards and because CTPU has failed to show that it suffered an involuntary, material burden on its core activities, the court concluded that CTPU has not established an injury-in-fact for purposes of demonstrating organizational standing. View "Connecticut Parents Union v. Russell-Tucker" on Justia Law

Perez was born in rural Mexico in 1989 and entered the U.S. without authorization at age 13. He has two children, who were born in the U.S., whom he visits and helps support financially. In July 2016, Perez was attending a barbeque when a violent fight broke out. Several young men wielding bats and machetes were attacking a member of a rival gang. Perez borrowed a firearm from an acquaintance and fired several shots into the air. Hearing the gunshots, the young men scattered, and Perez returned to the barbeque and returned the gun to his acquaintance. Days later, the NYPD obtained a video recording of the incident, identified Perez, and identified the firearm.Perez was charged with possession of a firearm and ammunition while being an alien illegally and unlawfully in the U.S., 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(5). Perez unsuccessfully moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing that section 922(g)(5) on its face violated the Second Amendment by erecting a categorical bar on the possession of firearms by illegal or unlawful aliens. The Second Circuit affirmed. Assuming without deciding that, even as an undocumented alien, Perez is entitled to Second Amendment protection, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(5), as applied to Perez, withstands intermediate scrutiny. View "United States v. Perez" on Justia Law

Bellin brought a putative class action under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that managed long-term care plans (MLTCs) that contract with New York State violate Medicaid beneficiaries’ due process rights by denying them the right to appeal an MLTC’s initial determination of the personal care services hours the MLTC will provide the beneficiary if they choose to enroll with the MLTC. Bellin also alleged that beneficiaries are entitled to this appeal right, and to notice of the right, under federal statutory and constitutional law. Bellin brought her claims against ElderServe, an MLTC that she alleges denied her these rights, and Zucker, in his official capacity as Commissioner of the New York State Department of Health, for his alleged failure to enforce these asserted rights.The Second Circuit affirmed the dismissal of Bellin’s federal law claims on the grounds that the relevant federal statutes do not provide Medicaid beneficiaries a right to appeal initial personal care services hours determinations. The court vacated the dismissal of Bellin’s Fourteenth Amendment due process claims; Bellin plausibly alleged a constitutionally protected property interest in the determination of her personal care services hours. View "Bellin v. Zucker" on Justia Law

Connecticut Governor Ned Lamont and the state's Commissioner of the Department of Emergency Services and Public Protection James Rovella appeal from the district court's order granting a preliminary injunction ordering that the Governor repeal, in light of the COVID-19 pandemic, a provision to suspend collection of fingerprints in connection with applications for authorization to obtain firearms. The injunction also ordered that the Governor repeal that provision of the executive order and that the DESPP Commissioner resume fingerprinting services at that agency.The Second Circuit vacated the preliminary injunction and concluded that: (1) with respect to the individual plaintiffs, the preliminary injunction motion became moot in the district court; and (2) CCDL lacked organizational standing. Because the motion was moot and CCDL lacked standing, the district court had no jurisdiction to issue the preliminary injunction. View "Connecticut Citizens Defense League, Inc. v. Lamont" on Justia Law

After the County formally revoked plaintiff's pistol license and prohibited him from possessing any firearms following the dismissal of a Family Court matter and temporary order of protection that was dissolved, he filed suit against the County alleging the violation of his Second Amendment rights. The district court applied intermediate scrutiny and held that plaintiff failed to state a Second Amendment claim.The Second Circuit reversed, concluding that the complaint plausibly alleges that the County did not have substantial evidence that plaintiff is a danger to the safety of others. The court explained that because these allegations, accepted as true, would mean that the County's actions were not substantially related to its interests in public safety and crime prevention, the complaint should not have been dismissed for failure to state a claim under intermediate scrutiny. Accordingly, the court remanded for further proceedings. The court affirmed the district court's dismissal of plaintiff's other claims. View "Henry v. Nassau County" on Justia Law

After plaintiff was terminated by his former employer for violating company policies prohibiting sexual harassment in the workplace, he filed suit alleging that the stated basis for his termination was pretext and that the real reason he was fired was age discrimination and retaliation, in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA). The district court granted defendants judgment on the pleadings under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c).Although on a Rule 12(c) motion the district court should not have weighed the plausibility of competing allegations in the movant's pleading or considered evidence extrinsic to the non-movant's pleading, the court affirmed the district court's judgment because plaintiff's complaint failed to plead that either his age or protected speech was a but-for cause of his termination. Likewise, plaintiff's retaliation claim fails for similar reasons. View "Lively v. WAFRA Investment Advisory Group, Inc." on Justia Law

The Second Circuit vacated its previous opinion and filed an amended opinion in its place.Plaintiff and Church United filed suit against Vimeo, alleging that the company discriminated against them by deleting Church United’s account from its online video hosting platform. Plaintiffs claimed that Vimeo discriminated against them based on sexual orientation and religion under federal and state law. The district court concluded that Vimeo deleted Church United's account because of its violation of one of Vimeo's published content policies barring the promotion of sexual orientation change efforts (SOCE) on its platform.The court agreed with the district court that Section 230(c)(2) of the Communications Decency Act protects Vimeo from this suit and that plaintiffs have failed to state a claim for relief. In this case, plaintiffs argue that Vimeo demonstrated bad faith by discriminating against them based on their religion and sexual orientation, which they term "former" homosexuality; deleting Church United's entire account, as opposed to only the videos at issue; and permitting other videos with titles referring to homosexuality to remain on the website. However, the court concluded that plaintiffs' conclusory allegations are insufficient to raise a plausible inference of bad faith sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss. The court explained that Vimeo removed plaintiffs' account for expressing pro-SOCE views which it in good faith considers objectionable, and plaintiffs, while implicitly acknowledging that their content violated Vimeo's Terms of Service, nevertheless ignored Vimeo's notice of violation, resulting in Vimeo deleting their account.Plaintiffs have also failed to state a claim under either the New York Sexual Orientation Non-Discrimination Act or the California Unruh Act. Because plaintiffs make no allegation suggesting that Vimeo removed their content for any reason other than this violation of the Terms of Service, plaintiffs' allegations lack the substance required to support an inference of discriminatory intent. View "Domen v. Vimeo, Inc." on Justia Law