Justia U.S. 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs, a group of current and former retail sales employees of Sterling Jewelers, filed suit alleging that they were paid less than their male counterparts, on account of their gender, in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Equal Pay Act. After an arbitrator certified a class of Sterling Jewelers employees that included employees who did not affirmatively opt in to the arbitration proceeding, the district court held that the arbitrator exceeded her authority in purporting to bind those absent class members to class arbitration.The Second Circuit reversed, holding that the arbitrator was within her authority in purporting to bind the absent class members to class proceedings because, by signing the operative arbitration agreement, the absent class members, no less than the parties, bargained for the arbitrator's construction of their agreement with respect to class arbitrability. The court remanded to the district court to consider, in the first instance, the issue of whether the arbitrator exceeded her authority in certifying an opt-out class. View "Jock v. Sterling Jewelers Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a 42 U.S.C. 1983 action against four state defendants, alleging that they violated his Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights by holding him in state custody for four months after the expiration of his federal sentence, where the state sentencing court had originally directed that plaintiff's state and federal sentences should run concurrently. The district court denied the state defendants' motion for summary judgment.The Second Circuit held that, under Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976), the state defendants violated the Due Process Clause by implementing plaintiff's sentence in the manner they did without providing adequate notice to the state sentencing court and the attorneys present at plaintiff's state sentencing. The court held, nonetheless, that the state defendants were entitled to qualified immunity from all of plaintiff's constitutional claims. In regard to the Fourteenth Amendment claim, the court held that there was no clearly established law considering whether prison officials implementing a state sentence violate the Constitution by failing to provide notice to the sentencing court and attorneys. Likewise, in regard to the Eighth Amendment claim, there was not clearly established right the state defendants violated in this case. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded with instructions to grant the motion for summary judgment. View "Francis v. Fiacco" on Justia Law

Presidential immunity does not bar the enforcement of a state grand jury subpoena directing a third party to produce non‐privileged material, even when the subject matter under investigation pertains to the President.President Trump filed suit seeking declaratory and injunctive relief to prevent the District Attorney of New York County from enforcing a grand jury subpoena served on a third-party custodian of the President's financial records. The district court dismissed the complaint under Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), abstaining from exercising jurisdiction. In the alternative, the district court held that the President was not entitled to injunctive relief.The Second Circuit held that Younger abstention did not apply to the circumstances here, because the President raised novel and serious claims that were more appropriately adjudicated in federal court. The court held, however, that any presidential immunity from state criminal process did not extend to investigative steps like the grand jury subpoena in this case. Accordingly, the court affirmed as to the immunity question, vacated as to the Younger abstention issue, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Trump v. Vance" on Justia Law

The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's sua sponte dismissal of plaintiff's complaint, claiming that various individuals involved in his pending divorce and child custody proceedings, including his wife, their marriage counselor, and a family court judge, violated his constitutional rights and New York state law.The court held that the district court correctly determined that, at all relevant times, the family court judge was entitled to judicial immunity. Furthermore, even if the judge erred in extending the temporary protection order against plaintiff shortly after recusing herself, any such error fell far short of an act taken in the complete absence of all jurisdiction. The court also held that the domestic relations abstention doctrine articulated in American Airlines, Inc. v. Block, 905 F.2d 12 (2d Cir. 1990), applies in federal‐question cases. The court clarified that, although the domestic relations "exception" to subject matter jurisdiction recognized by the Supreme Court in Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 504 U.S. 689 (1992), did not apply in federal‐question cases, the domestic relations abstention doctrine articulated in American Airlines did. Therefore, the court affirmed the district court's dismissal of plaintiff's federal claims on abstention grounds. View "Deem v. DiMella-Deem" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs Atterbury and Hauschild filed suit alleging that they were improperly discharged as Court Security Officers (CSOs). The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the USMC.The Second Circuit held that a discharged public employee, like plaintiffs here, working for a federal government contractor has a property interest in continued employment. The court also held that plaintiffs' discharges did not comply with the requirements of procedural due process. In this case, although plaintiffs were informed of the initial misconduct allegations that gave rise to the relevant investigations, USMS provided no explanation of the reasons for its decisions that they be removed from the CSO program. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded in Atterbury's case, and affirmed and remanded in Hauschild's case. View "Atterbury v. United States Marshals Service" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against the City and an officer in his individual capacity, alleging claims of excessive force against the officer and state law claims against the City for assault and battery and negligence. Plaintiff's claim stemmed from a handcuffing incident during her voluntary surrender to police custody in connection with a misdemeanor complaint of domestic stalking and harassment filed by her estranged sister.The Second Circuit held that plaintiff sufficiently established her constitutional claim for excessive force for purposes of surviving a motion for summary judgment. In this case, a reasonable jury could find that the officer's actions in handcuffing plaintiff were objectively unreasonable in light of, inter alia, the minor nature of plaintiff's crime, the circumstances of her arrest, and the fact that she posed no apparent risk of flight or physical threat to the officers or others. However, the court held that, at the time of plaintiff's arrest, the officer's actions did not violate clearly established constitutional law. Therefore, the district court correctly concluded that his actions were protected by qualified immunity and summary judgment was proper on that basis. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's judgment. View "Cugini v. City of New York" on Justia Law

The Second Circuit reversed the district court's judgment for plaintiffs on their 42 U.S.C. 1983 false arrest claim. The longstanding exemption from municipal limitations on sidewalk vending for disabled veterans, codified in New York General Business Law 35, entitles "any honorably discharged member of the armed forces of the United States who is physically disabled as a result of injuries received while in the service of said armed forces" to vend in "any street, avenue, alley, lane or park" of the City, so long as he or she has been issued a license to do so.The court held that New York General Business Law 35‐a(7)(i) does require curbside vending. In this case, plaintiffs, five disabled veterans, alleged a claim of false arrest on the theory that they were in compliance with section 35‐a(7)(i) such that there was no probable cause to issue summonses. The summonses were issued by officers for plaintiffs' failure to comply with orders to relocate their vending carts, because plaintiffs were operating their carts more than three feet from the curb. Because of the curbside vending requirement, the officers did not lack a basis to issue the summonses. View "Crescenzi v. City of New York" on Justia Law

In this interlocutory appeal, defendants challenged the district court's denial of their motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction a complaint alleging that Connecticutʹs redistricting plan, which counts incarcerated individuals in the district in which their prison is located rather than the district in which they permanently reside, violates the ʺone person, one voteʺ principle of the Fourteenth Amendment.The Second Circuit affirmed in part the district court's order to the extent it held that the Eleventh Amendment bar on suits against states does not apply to plaintiffsʹ claim and denied defendantsʹ motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. However, the court held that the district court lacked jurisdiction to deny defendants' motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, because this case involves a challenge to the constitutionality of the apportionment of a statewide legislative body, which must be heard by a three-judge district court under 28 U.S.C. 2284(a). Therefore, because this case falls within section 2284(a) and plaintiffs' claim presents a substantial federal question, the court remanded for the district court to refer the matter to a three-judge court for further proceedings. View "NAACP v. Merrill" on Justia Law

The Second Circuit vacated the district court's dismissal of plaintiff's complaint, alleging associational discrimination under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). The court held that plaintiff has stated a claim for association discrimination under the ADA, because the complaint supports an inference that plaintiff was qualified for his position and that he was fired because his supervisor assumed he would be distracted by his daughter's disability. In this case, plaintiff's allegations provide all that was needed to raise a minimal inference that plaintiff's employer thought plaintiff's daughter was a distraction, and concern over distraction was a determining factor in plaintiff's termination. View "Kelleher v. Fred A. Cook, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed the district court's dismissal of his claims alleging that he was wrongfully detained by local authorities pursuant to a federal immigration detainer.The Second Circuit held that the district court erred as to plaintiff's false arrest and false imprisonment claim against the government, because no reasonable officer would have issued the detainer under the circumstances without conducting an inquiry. Furthermore, the complaint alleged facts from which a reasonable inquiry would have revealed that plaintiff was a citizen who could not have been subject to an immigration detainer. The court also held that the district court erred as to plaintiff's official policy claim against the city, because the complaint plausibly alleged that but for the detainer, plaintiff would have been released, and that the city confined him not for his failure to post bail but because of the detainer. Furthermore, the complaint plausibly alleged that the city refused to release plaintiff because of its policy, the city would have seen that plaintiff was not subject to an immigration detainer if it had checked, and the city policy caused plaintiff's deprivation of rights. Finally, the court held that the district court properly dismissed the remaining claims. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded. View "Hernandez v. United States" on Justia Law