Justia U.S. 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Keepers appealed, and the City cross-appealed, from partial summary judgment awards. At issue are two questions related to Chapter 2.3 of Milford’s municipal code, which regulates “adult‐oriented establishments.” First, whether the district court improperly considered the affidavit of the police chief in granting partial summary judgment to the City. The court concluded that the district court did not “abuse its discretion” in considering the affidavit and therefore affirmed as to this issue. Second, whether the City’s requirement that sexually oriented businesses publicly post the names of their operators, officers, and significant owners violates the First Amendment. The court concluded that the district court should not have reached the merits of that issue, nor does this Court do so, because Keepers’ First Amendment challenge does not present a justiciable case or controversy under Article III of the U.S. Constitution. Even if Keepers originally had standing to challenge the public‐posting requirement based on its asserted right against compelled speech, the case has become moot on appeal. Therefore, the court vacated as to this issue and remanded with directions. View "Keepers Inc. v. City of Milford" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, members of an electrical union, appealed the dismissal of their claims against their union. Plaintiff alleged age discrimination in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA), 29 U.S.C.621 et seq., violations of the Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959 (LMRDA), 29 U.S.C. 411 et seq., the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, 29 U.S.C. 141 et seq., and the union’s duty of fair representation (DFR), as well as unlawful retaliation for complaints. The court concluded that the district court erroneously ruled that a union official’s expressions of resentment of plaintiffs’ claims of age discrimination could not evince retaliatory animus existing prior to the time the resentful statements were made. Therefore, the court vacated and remanded with respect to the ADEA claims to which the magistrate judge’s recommendation of dismissal was based solely on the fact that the referral occurred prior to the February 2009 union meeting. The court affirmed in all other respects. View "Kazolias v. IBEW" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against defendants, alleging violation of his due process rights and that defendants acted arbitrarily and capriciously by terminating his employment. The district court dismissed his complaint for failure to state a claim and for lack of subject‐matter jurisdiction. The court agreed with the district court that plaintiff does not have a private right of action under the Due Process Clause of the sort recognized in Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics. Therefore, the court concluded that this claim was properly dismissed. However, the court found that the district court erred in determining that it lacked subject‐matter jurisdiction over plaintiff's claim under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. 702. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded. View "Atterbury v. U.S. Marshals Service" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against defendants, alleging that CUNY violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000‐e et seq., and that the individual defendants violated the Equal Protection Clause and the New York City Human Rights Law (NYCHRL), N.Y. City Admin. Code 8‐107. Plaintiff alleged that defendants discriminated against her on the basis of her race, gender, and national origin, and retaliated against her for an internal complaint that she filed. The district court granted summary judgment to all defendants. The court concluded that the district court was correct that, assuming plaintiff established a prima facie case of retaliation, CUNY offered a non-retaliatory explanation for its reappointment decision and plaintiff failed to present sufficient evidence from which a reasonable jury could conclude that the desire to retaliate was the but‐for cause of CUNY’s action. The court also concluded that plaintiff failed to show circumstances that would be sufficient to permit a rational finder of fact to infer that either their views or CUNY’s employment decisions were more likely than not based in whole or in part on discrimination. Finally, after conducting a separate analysis of plaintiff's NYCHRL claims, the court concluded that the district court's grant of summary judgment to the individual defendants was correct. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Ya-Chen Chen v. City University of New York" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against her employer, alleging a claim of discrimination under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. 12112-12117, and seeking damages. Plaintiff's claim is based on her employer’s decision to reduce her discretionary bonus after she was absent from work for four months. The district court granted summary judgment for the defendant. The court concluded that the district court erred in ruling that denial or reduction of a bonus could not constitute an adverse employment action solely because the employer had discretion whether to pay a bonus. The court further concluded that, despite this error, the district court correctly determined that, even if plaintiff established an adverse employment action, she failed to present evidence that would support the necessary finding of discriminatory motivation. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Davis v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Edu." on Justia Law

These two appeals challenge gun-control legislation prohibiting the possession of certain semiautomatic “assault weapons” and large‐capacity magazines. The district courts granted summary judgment in favor of defendants. The court held that the core provisions of the New York and Connecticut laws prohibiting possession of semiautomatic assault weapons and large‐capacity magazines do not violate the Second Amendment, and that the challenged individual provisions are not void for vagueness; the particular provision of New York’s law regulating load limits, however, does not survive the requisite scrutiny; and Connecticut’s prohibition on the non‐semiautomatic Remington 7615 unconstitutionally infringes upon the Second Amendment right. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part the judgment of the district court insofar as it upheld the prohibition of semiautomatic assault weapons and large-capacity magazines; reversed in part its holding with respect to the Remington 7615; reversed in part certain vagueness holdings; and otherwise affirmed the judgment insofar as it upheld the prohibition of semiautomatic assault weapons and large-capacity magazines and invalidated the load limit. View "New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Cuomo" on Justia Law

TAG filed suit against the City, arguing that the City's zoning policies perpetuated racial segregation and had a disparate impact, thus violating the Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. 3604. In 2010, a jury returned a verdict in favor of TAG on the disparate impact claim, but the district court granted the City's motion for a new trial. In 2012, a second jury returned a verdict in favor of the City on both TAG's perpetuation of segregation and disparate impact claims. The court held that TAG’s lost upfront economic expenditures on a detailed development proposal for a specific piece of property, coupled with the denial of a necessary special use permit, constitute injuries-in-fact that are fairly traceable to the City’s actions, thus affording TAG standing to maintain this action. The court also held that the City waived its argument regarding the inconsistency of the jury verdict; the district court should not have reached the merits of that argument, and it therefore erred when it ordered a new trial on that ground. Further, having concluded that the district court erred in ordering a new trial, and that the City has waived its remaining claims of error relating to the 2010 trial, the court reinstated the 2010 judgment in favor of TAG on its disparate impact claim; remanded with instructions that the district court grant a new trial limited only to the issue of damages unless TAG agrees to a remittitur reducing its award to $100,000; and denied reassignment on remand. View "The Anderson Group v. City of Saratoga Springs" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against defendants, alleging claims under, inter alia, Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. 12132; Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. 794; and 42 U.S.C. 1983 for alleged violations of the Due Process Clause. On appeal, plaintiff challenged the district court's grant of summary judgment for defendants on these claims. The court concluded that the district court erred in granting summary judgment on the ADA and Rehabilitation Act claims because a trier of fact could find that defendants did not grant the accommodation plaintiff requested for his mental‐health condition and failed to provide a “plainly reasonable” alternative or attempt to show that plaintiff’s proposed modification was unreasonable. The court concluded, however, that having received notice of potential termination from the program and a“careful and deliberate” decision plaintiff was, as a matter of law, provided the procedural process due for an academic dismissal. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded. View "Dean v. Univ. at Buffalo Sch. of Medicine and Biomedical Sciences" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that prison officials violated his procedural due process rights in connection with a disciplinary hearing. Plaintiff moves for appointment of counsel in his appeal from the district court's dismissal of his complaint. The court extended its reasoning in Bedoya v. Coughlin and concluded that an inmate may likewise implicitly waive the right to attend his disciplinary hearing by refusing to attend after receiving notice and being given an opportunity to attend. Accordingly, the court denied the motion and dismissed the appeal as frivolous. View "Smith v. Fischer" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit claiming that New York General Business Law Section 518 violates the First Amendment’s Free Speech Clause and is void for vagueness under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. Section 518 provides that “[n]o seller in any sales transaction may impose a surcharge on a holder who elects to use a credit card in lieu of payment by cash, check, or similar means.” The district court entered a final judgment declaring Section 518 unconstitutional and permanently enjoined its enforcement. The court reversed, concluding that Section 518 does not violate the First Amendment as applied to single-sticker‐price sellers. And, because it is unclear whether the law applies outside that specific context, there is no basis for the court to conclude that the law violates the First Amendment in any of its applications, much less on its face. The district court also erred in holding that Section 518 is unconstitutionally vague under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Having concluded that Section 518 enjoys a core set of applications in which it is not unconstitutionally vague - namely, its application to sellers who post single sticker-prices - the court found abstention appropriate in this context also, and therefore did not reach the balance of plaintiffs’ vagueness challenge. The court remanded for dismissal of plaintiffs' claims. View "Expressions Hair Design v. Schneiderman" on Justia Law