Justia U.S. 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs, individuals employed by the DSNY, filed a putative class action under the Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Clause; 42 U.S.C. 1981; Title VII, 42 U.S.C. 2000e; and New York State and City human rights laws, alleging that defendants discriminated against them and others similarly situated on the basis of their race and/or national origin in the DSNY's promotional practices. The district court dismissed all of plaintiffs’ claims. The court concluded that the district court’s decision granting defendants’ motion to dismiss the Equal Protection and section 1981 claims is affirmed. The court held that, to show discriminatory intent in a section 1981 or Equal Protection case based on statistics alone, the statistics must not only be statistically significant in the mathematical sense, but they must also be of a level that makes other plausible non-discriminatory explanations very unlikely. In this case, plaintiffs have failed to allege statistics that meet these standards. Furthermore, the fact that each of the plaintiffs has been promoted at some point undermines their allegations of discrimination in the promotion of sanitation workers to supervisors. The court also concluded that the Title VII claim must be dismissed for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Burgis v. New York City Dep’t of Sanitation" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit alleging that defendants violated 42 U.S.C. 1983 and 1985(3) by retaliating against him for exercising his First Amendment right as a member of the Inmate Liaison Committee (ILC) at a correctional facility. The district court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim. The court held, however, that action as a member of an ILC, i.e. the filing or voicing of grievances on behalf of a prison population, qualifies as constitutionally protected conduct under the First and Fourteenth Amendments and that retaliation for such conduct is therefore actionable under Section 1983. The court further concluded that the district court properly dismissed the conspiracy claim because plaintiff failed to allege membership in a class protected under Section 1985(3). The court appointed plaintiff counsel in the district court. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Dolan v. Connolly" on Justia Law

In 2002, knowing that Plaintiff‐Appellant Natasha Davis was a Type I diabetic, Defendant‐Appellee Bombardier Transportation Holdings (USA) Inc. hired her as a Customer Service Agent (later renaming the position as an Air Train Agent or "ATA"). In 2007, Davis went on disability leave for diabetic retinopathy. Davis underwent at least six eye surgeries during her leave. In August, Davis notified Bombardier that she was prepared to return to work, and submitted to a physical. Bombardier informed Davis that she failed the physical and eye exams, but Davis contended she passed. Bombardier thereafter determined that Davis could no longer operate as an "ATA II." On September 1, 2007, Bombardier “demoted” Davis to the ATA I position, which paid 75 cents less per hour than the ATA II position. Davis filed suit against Bombardier, bringing claims of disability-based employment discrimination and retaliation. The district court granted Bombardier's motion for summary judgment, finding (in relevant part) that Davis' demotion-based claim was time barred. On appeal, Davis argued that the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009 applied to and revived her claims. The Ledbetter Act made it unlawful to apply a discriminatory compensation decision to an employee and starts a new statute of limitations clock with each paycheck that reflected that decision. Davis argued that Bombardier’s demotion decision was made with disability‐based discriminatory intent and, as a result, reduced her compensation. Thus, she contended that her claim was timely when measured from her last paycheck and not the date of her demotion. After review, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed judgment in favor of Bombardier, concluding that the Ledbetter Act did not encompass a claim of a discriminatory demotion decision that results in lower wages where, as here, the plaintiff had not offered any proof that the compensation itself was set in a discriminatory manner. A plaintiff must plead and prove the elements of a pay-discrimination claim to benefit from the Ledbetter Act’s accrual provisions. View "Davis v. Bombardier Transp. Holdings" on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed the district court's dismissal of his complaint under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). The court affirmed the dismissal of plaintiff's wrongful termination claims because the court concluded that an affidavit attached as an exhibit to a complaint is not a "written instrument" that is deemed part of the complaint under Rule 10(c); affirmed the dismissal of plaintiff's remaining claims for lack of standing and for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted; and affirmed the district court's denial of plaintiff's motion for leave to amend his complaint, a motion which was first made following the entry of the final judgment. View "Smith v. Hogan" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit challenging the constitutionality of a Connecticut rule restricting the use of certain teeth‐whitening procedures to licensed dentists. Specifically, the rule stated that only a licensed dentist could shine a light emitting diode (“LED”) lamp at the mouth of a consumer during a teeth‐whitening procedure. The court concluded that the rule does not violate either due process or equal protection given that at least some evidence exists that LED lights may cause some harm to consumers, and given that there is some relationship between the rule and the harm it seeks to prevent. The court joined the Tenth Circuit and concluded that economic favoritism is rational for purposes of its review of state action under the Fourteenth Amendment. Even if the only conceivable reason for the LED restriction was to shield licensed dentists from competition, the court would still be compelled by an unbroken line of precedent to approve the Commission’s action. The court concluded that there are a number of constitutionally rational rounds for the rule and affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment for defendants. View "Sensational Smiles, LLC v. Mullen, Dr." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against a police officer under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and New York State law for false arrest. The officer arrested plaintiff for theft of services after she rebuffed his flirtatious advances, entered the back door of the bus she was intending to ride because the driver could not fix the stuck lift at the front entrance and told passengers to enter through the rear. When she was in line to swipe her MetroCard, the officer intercepted her and made her get off the bus. On appeal, plaintiff challenged portions of the district court's summary judgment order in favor of the officer on the false arrest claims. The court concluded that there is a genuine issue for a jury as to whether a reasonable officer in this officer's position could have had reasonable grounds to believe that she intended to commit, or was committing, theft of services and whether the officer had probable cause to arrest or reasonably hold the mistaken belief that he did. Therefore, the officer is not entitled to summary judgment on either the section 1983 or state law false arrest claims. Accordingly, the court vacated and remanded. View "Simpson v. City of New York" on Justia Law

Petitioner sought review of the BIA's denial of his motion to reopen removal proceedings relating to his claim of derivative citizenship. Under the statute in effect when petitioner was born - the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 (the 1952 Act) - a child born abroad to an unwed citizen mother and non‐citizen father has citizenship at birth so long as the mother was present in the United States or one of its outlying possessions for a continuous period of at least one year at some point prior to the child’s birth. A child born abroad to an unwed citizen father and non‐citizen mother has citizenship at birth only if the father was present in the United States or one of its outlying possessions prior to the child’s birth for a period or periods totaling at least ten years, with at least five of those years occurring after the age of fourteen. In this case, petitioner's father satisfied the requirements for transmitting citizenship applicable to unwed mothers but not the more stringent requirements applicable to unwed mothers. Applying intermediate scrutiny, the court concluded that the gender‐based distinction at the heart of the 1952 Act’s physical presence requirements is not substantially related to the achievement of a permissible, non‐stereotype‐based objective. The court saw no reason that unwed fathers need more time than unwed mothers in the United States prior to their child’s birth in order to assimilate the values that the statute seeks to ensure are passed on to citizen children born abroad. Conforming the immigration laws Congress enacted with the Constitution’s guarantee of equal protection, the court concluded that petitioner is a citizen as of his birth. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded. View "Morales-Santana v. Lynch" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 against DSS to enforce the Food Stamp Act's, 7 U.S.C. 2020(e)(3) and (9), time limits for awarding food stamp benefits. The district court certified a class consisting of all past, current, and future Connecticut food stamp applicants whose applications are not processed in a timely manner and the district court issued a preliminary injunction requiring DSS to process food stamp applications within the statutory deadlines. The court concluded that plaintiff can maintain a private lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 to enforce the statutory time limits in section 2020(e)(3) and (9). The court also concluded that federal regulations do not excuse DSS from processing food stamp applications within the statutory time limits. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Briggs v. Bremby" on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed from the district court's grant of summary judgment dismissing his claims of discrimination and hostile work environment under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e et seq.; the New York State Human Rights Law, 26 N.Y. Exec. Law 296 et seq.; and 42 U.S.C. 1981, as well as his defamation claims. The court affirmed the judgment of the district court except with respect to the discrimination claims, as to which there are genuine disputes as to material facts that preclude summary judgment based on plaintiff's prima facie case of discrimination. Plaintiff submitted evidence that the principal of the school changed the person who conducted plaintiff's year-end evaluation without providing notice to plaintiff, that the principal relied on the 2008-2009 evaluations at issue in isolation, and that the unsatisfactory performance reviews were aberrational. These irregularities, when combined with the principal's alleged remarks, are sufficient to establish a prima facie case of discrimination. View "Tolbert v. Smith" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, eight male, "out-of-status" aliens who were arrested on immigration charges and detained following the September 11th attacks, filed a putative class action asserting various claims arising out of the discriminatory and punitive treatment they suffered while confined at the Metropolitan Detention Center (MDC) or the Passaic County Jail (Passaic). The district court granted in part and denied in part defendants' motion to dismiss. The court concluded that: (1) the MDC plaintiffs have plausibly alleged a substantive due process claim against the DOJ defendants, against Hasty with regard to both official and unofficial conditions, and against Sherman with regard to official conditions only, and these defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity on this claim; (2) the MDC plaintiffs have plausibly alleged an equal protection claim against the DOJ defendants, Hasty, and Sherman, and these defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity on this claim; (3) the free exercise claim is dismissed as to all defendants; (4) the MDC plaintiffs have plausibly alleged their Fourth Amendment strip search claim against Hasty and Sherman, and these defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity on this claim; (5) the MDC plaintiffs have plausibly alleged the Section 1985(3) conspiracy claim against the DOJ defendants, Hasty, and Sherman, and these defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity on this claim; and (6) the MDC plaintiffs have not plausibly alleged any claims against Zenk.  The court affirmed the dismissal of the claims brought by the Passaic plaintiffs. View "Turkmen v. Hasty, et al." on Justia Law