Justia U.S. 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Smith alleged that New York State Trooper Campbell began harassing her in 2007, tailgating her in an off-duty vehicle, parking behind her, and questioning Smith about her driving. Smith’s adult son, Tom and Campbell exchanged heated words; Campbell indicated that Smith would receive another ticket because of Tom’s actions. Tom stated that he would speak to Campbell’s supervisor. Campbell left without issuing any tickets. Smith complained about Campbell’s conduct. Hours later, Campbell appeared at Smith’s home and delivered three tickets related to the incident. Smith wrote letters complaining of Campbell’s conduct. Smith’s accusations were dismissed; Smith was convicted on the tickets. Three days later Tom remarked, at a restaurant, that Campbell was harassing his mother. Campbell appeared at Smith’s home that day with another Trooper, resulting in a confrontation with Lilly, Smith’s son-in-law. Two years later, Smith and Lilly filed a 42 U.S.C. 1983 suit. The judge identified: a First Amendment peaceable assembly claim asserted by Lilly, a retaliatory prosecution claim by Smith, an unlawful seizure claim by Lilly, and an intentional infliction of emotional distress claim by both. The district court dismissed, finding the retaliatory prosecution claim time-barred and that Lilly improperly identified the unlawful seizure claim as arising under the Fourth Amendment rather than under section 1983. The Second Circuit vacated as to the unlawful seizure claim, View "Smith v. Campbell" on Justia Law

Taylor sued Nassau County, its police department, and officers and supervisors, alleging that officer Rogich used excessive force when he shot Taylor while apprehending him. After dismissals and partial summary judgment, the only defendant was Rogich. The district judge held that Rogich was not entitled to summary judgment on his claim of qualified immunity, because the claim depended on the resolution of disputed issues of fact and the jury’s assessment of the credibility of witnesses. At the close of the liability phase of the trial, the jury found that Rogich used excessive force that caused Taylor injury. Rogich moved for judgment as a matter of law, arguing that the plaintiff had provided no coherent version of events which a jury could have credited one way or the other. Rogich’s motion was denied because his assertion of qualified immunity depended on a view of the facts that was explicitly rejected by the jury” The Second Circuit dismissed an appeal for lack of jurisdiction to decide an interlocutory appeal from a denial of a claim of qualified immunity to the extent that the denial involves only a question of evidence sufficiency. View "Taylor v. Rogich" on Justia Law

Robinson worked for Concentra as a medical assistant from 2003 until she was terminated in 2010. Robinson applied for Social Security disability benefits four days after being terminated, claiming that she had multiple sclerosis that rendered her unable to work. The initial application was denied. An ALJ reversed, summarizing Robinson’s statements that: she must use a cane to walk because of leg numbness; she has poor vision; her hands frequently cramp and she has difficulty holding objects; and she needs help with all household chores. Robinson then filed suit against Concentra under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. 1981, and the Family and Medical Leave Act, claiming that she had been terminated on the basis of her race and color and in retaliation for filing a complaint with the EEOC and taking FMLA leave and that Concentra had interfered with her ability to take FMLA leave. The court entered summary judgment, finding that Robinson was estopped from showing that she was qualified for her position when she was terminated in September 2010, because she received disability benefits based on her statement that she was fully disabled as of June 2010. The Second Circuit affirmed, noting that Robinson failed to “proffer a sufficient explanation” for the contradictory statements. View "Robinson v. Concentra Health Servs.,Inc." on Justia Law

Over the past several years, Arzuaga, who is currently incarcerated in Connecticut, filed three separate actions against prison officials under 42 U.S.C. 1983. Although the district court initially granted Arzuaga’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis (IFP), the court later revoked Arzuaga’s IFP status because Arzuaga had received approximately $6,000 in past‐due Social Security benefits that he had not reported to the court. Arzuaga subsequently failed to pay the filing fees. The district court dismissed all three actions. The Second Circuit vacated. Arzuaga’s past‐due Social Security benefits did not provide a basis for revoking his IFP status because the No Social Security Benefits for Prisoners Act of 2009 barred Arzuaga from accessing those benefits while incarcerated, 42 U.S.C. 404(a)(1)(B)(ii). After the three complaints were filed, Arzuaga received a separate deposit of $350 into his prisoner trust account and spent that money on consumer goods rather than filing fees. The court rejected an argument that by failing to apply these funds to filing fees, Arzuaga made himself ineligible for IFP status. View "Arzuaga v. Quiros" on Justia Law

Smith was charged with murder, based on a 1996 Bronx armed robbery. The prosecution called an incarcerated witness, Ferguson, to whom Smith had made incriminating statements while in jail, indicating that Ferguson was not a government agent. Ferguson later admitted that he had previously been a paid informant. Defense never moved to suppress the incriminating statements. Following his conviction, Smith’s new counsel uncovered undisclosed evidence that Ferguson had collaborated with law enforcement for four years before Smith’s trial. State courts rejected direct appeals. Smith, pro se, moved to vacate his conviction. The state court denied the motion as unsupported by the record. Smith, through counsel, filed another motion, arguing for the first time that counsel was ineffective for failing to move to suppress. The state court denied the motion as “procedurally barred and meritless … defendant was in the position to adequately raise all issues … in the previous motion [and] failed to establish … ineffective assistance of counsel.” Smith sought habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. 2254, reasserting the ineffective assistance claim. The district court granted the writ, finding that the state court decision rested on procedural grounds. The Second Circuit reversed: the decision was adjudication on the merits, entitled to AEDPA deference, and not so lacking in justification as to warrant habeas relief. View "Fischer v. Smith" on Justia Law

In 1993, a jury found Rivas guilty of second-degree murder for killing his former girlfriend (Hill) on March 27, 1987. Rivas was sentenced to an indeterminate term of imprisonment of 25 years to life. In 1999, Rivas sought post-conviction relief (NY Criminal Procedure Law 440.10), claiming ineffective assistance of counsel and presenting essentially unchallenged expert testimony persuasively demonstrating that Hill could not have died on Friday, March 27, 1987. The Onondaga County trial court denied Rivas’s petition. In 2002, Rivas filed an amended federal petition for habeas corpus. After a remand, the district court dismissed the petition as time-barred. The Second Circuit reversed, holding that a credible and compelling showing of actual innocence warrants an equitable exception to the limitation period set forth by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act and that Rivas had made such a showing. The court stated that a reasonable juror, apprised of all the evidence in the record, would more likely than not vote to acquit. On second remand, the court denied Rivas’s petition in its entirety. The Second Circuit reversed, finding that the state court’s denial of Rivas’s ineffective-assistance claim involved an unreasonable application of the Supreme Court’s decision, Strickland v. Washington. View "Rivas v. Fischer" on Justia Law

Officer Matthews sued, alleging that the City of New York retaliated against him for speaking to his commanding officers about an arrest quota policy at his precinct. The district court granted the defendants summary judgment, holding that Matthews spoke as a public employee, not as a citizen, and that his speech was, therefore, not protected by the First Amendment. The Second Circuit vacated, reasoning that because Matthews’s comments on precinct policy did not fall within his official duties and because he elected a channel with a civilian analogue to pursue his complaint, he spoke as a citizen. View "Matthews v. City of New York" on Justia Law

In 1984, V.J. was raped. She lost an eye and suffered broken ribs. The NYPD collected a rape kit, with pubic and head hair, swabs, and microscope slides. Based on line‐ups, V.J. and a witness identified Newton as her assailant. The rape kit was not tested for DNA. Newton was convicted. In 1988, by court order, the sample was tested by the Chief Medical Examiner, which reported that it contained no testable spermatozoa. In 1994, based on new law, Newton sought testing, alleging that technological advances had enabled testing of samples previously deemed untestable. The District Attorney’s Office responded that the evidence could not be found. Newton’s motion was denied. In 1995 Newton sought habeas corpus (28 U.S.C. 2254), unsuccessfully, because the evidence was not found. In 1998, Newton again sought testing; the DA’s Office indicated that the kit “must have been destroyed,” noting a 1995 fire and that the Property Clerk had a practice of destroying records after six years. In 2005 Newton again requested a search; the evidence was found. The Chief Medical Examiner concluded that the rape kit DNA profile did not match Newton. The state court vacated Newton’s conviction. Newton sued the city and NYPD officials, claiming that the inadequate evidence management system had deprived him of due process and access to the courts. The district court set aside a verdict in Newton’s favor. The Second Circuit vacated. New York law does provide a convicted prisoner a liberty interest in demonstrating his innocence with newly available DNA evidence and such a prisoner is entitled to reasonable procedures that permit him to vindicate that interest. View "Newton v. City of New York" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, an adjunct professor, filed suit against WCC, alleging violations of her state and federal constitutional rights when WCC terminated her employment for purportedly making offensive comments in class. On appeal, WCC challenged the district court's partial denial of its motion to dismiss based on Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity grounds. The court held that WCC is not an arm of the state entitled to sovereign immunity under the Eleventh Amendment. The court concluded that a finding of sovereign immunity for WCC would not serve the twin aims of the Eleventh Amendment because immunity would not further the state's interest in preserving its treasury, nor would it protect the integrity of the state. View "Leitner v. Westchester Community College" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against defendants, alleging violations of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), 29 U.S.C. 621-634, and the New York City Human Rights Law (NYCHRL), N.Y.C. Admin. Code 8-101 et seq. The district court granted summary judgment to defendants. Although the court affirmed the ADEA portion of the judgment, the court reiterated that district courts who exercise pendant jurisdiction over NYCHRL claims are required by the Local Civil Rights Restoration Act of 2005, N.Y.C. Local L. No. 85, to analyze those claims under a different standard from that applicable to parallel federal and state law claims. In this case, the court vacated the NYCHRL portion of the judgment and remanded to the district court because the district court did not analyze plaintiff's claim separately and independently. View "Velazco v. Columbus Citizens" on Justia Law