Justia U.S. 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs filed suit against defendants under the Fair Housing Act (FHA), 42 U.S.C. 3604(f), and New York State Human Rights Law, N.Y. Exec. Law 296(5) and (18)(2). Plaintiffs alleged that defendants denied their application for a lease because of the disability of their son, who suffers from major depression, and that they were denied reasonable accommodation for his condition. On appeal, plaintiffs principally contend that the district court erred in dismissing their claims as a matter of law and that it should have granted judgment as a matter of law in favor of plaintiffs on their reasonable accommodation claim. The court concluded that the district court properly declined to grant judgment as a matter of law in favor of plaintiffs on the reasonable accommodation claim, but that, as to all of plaintiffs' claims, the evidence was sufficient to preclude the granting of judgment in favor of defendants as a matter of law. Accordingly, the court vacated the judgment and remanded for trial.View "Olsen v. Stark Holmes, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against DPS under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e et seq., against DPS. The court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment as to the Title VII retaliation claim regarding plaintiff's Casino Unit transfer and the jury's verdict in favor of DPS as to the Title VII retaliation claim; vacated the district court's grant of summary judgment of the Title VII race discrimination claims where, balancing the McDonnell Douglas factors, the court concluded that it was simply too close to call and should be a question for a jury; vacated the corresponding race discrimination claim brought under the Equal Protection Clause under 42 U.S.C. 1983; and remanded for further proceedings.View "Abrams v. Dept. of Pub. Safety" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, an inmate and practicing Muslim, filed suit against prison officials alleging that they unconstitutionally burdened his religious exercise when they ordered him to provide a urine sample within a three-hour window while he fasted in observance of Ramadan. On appeal, plaintiff challenged the district court's entry of judgment in favor of the officials. The court concluded that the choice either to provide a urine sample by drinking water during plaintiff's fast or to face disciplinary action placed a substantial burden on his religious exercise. Therefore, the court vacated the district court's judgment insofar as it concerns defendant's claim for damages under the First Amendment's Free Exercise Clause and remanded for further consideration of the claim. The court affirmed the judgment in favor of the officials on plaintiff's Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), 42 U.S.C. 2000cc et seq., claim, his Fourteenth Amendment claim, his First Amendment retaliation claim, and his free exercise claim for an injunction.View "Holland v. Goord" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against BGVAC and others under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that various disciplinary charges levied against her by BGVAC and her suspension as an officer of BGVAC without a hearing violated her First and Fourteenth Amendment rights. BGVAC is a private, non-profit membership corporation that contracts with the Town to provide emergency medical services and general ambulance services to the members of that community. The district court granted summary judgment to defendants. The court concluded that plaintiff failed to demonstrate a sufficiently close nexus between the State or Town governmental entities and the disciplinary actions taken against her. Consequently, BGVAC's actions cannot be fairly attributed to the State or the Town and BGVAC could not be held liable under section 1983. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Grogan v. Blooming Grove Volunteer Ambulance Corps" on Justia Law

Chabad and Rabbi Joseph Eisenbach filed suit against defendants, alleging that defendants violated their rights by denying an application to expand an existing property to accommodate Chabad's religious mission. Chabad filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, 1985, and 1986; the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), 42 U.S.C. 2000cc et seq.; and Connecticut state law, seeking damages, injunctive and declaratory relief, attorneys' fees, and the appointment of a federal monitor. The court concluded that the district court erred in dismissing Rabbi Eisenbach's RLUIPA claims for lack of standing; vacated the district court's ruling insofar as it concerned the Rabbi and remanded for consideration, instead, whether the Rabbi failed to state a claim under RLUIPA; affirmed the remainder of the judgment due to the Rabbi's failure to brief his remaining claims; concluded that the HDC's review of the Chabad's application was an "individual assessment" subject to RLUIPA's substantial burden provision and that the Chabad need not cite an "identical" comparator to establish a claim under RLUIPA's nondiscrimination provision; vacated the district court's judgment insofar as it concerned these RLUIPA claims and remanded for consideration whether these claims survive summary judgment; and affirmed the remainder of the district court's February 2012 judgment largely due to the Chabad's failure to brief most of its remaining claims. View "Chabad Lubavitch of Litchfield v. Litchfield Historic District Commission" on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of his former employers, BoA, on his claim of age discrimination under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA), 29 U.S.C. 621 et seq., and breach of contract. Under the McDonald Douglas Corp v. Green framework, assuming arguendo that plaintiff met his burden of demonstrating a prima facie case of age discrimination, the court agreed with the district court that BoA has satisfied its burden to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for plaintiff's termination. BoA has explained that plaintiff's employment was terminated as part of a company-wide reduction in force; two months prior to his termination, plaintiff received a negative mid-year performance review; and as of September 2010, plaintiff was ranked 136th across all BoA sales personnel for the year and his performance was the worse of all employees in his group. In regards to the breach of contract claim, the district court correctly determined that plaintiff was an at-will employee and that although annual bonuses were discretionary, there is no record evidence, or even an allegation, indicating that plaintiff was promised a mid-year bonus. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Delaney v. Bank of America Corp." on Justia Law

VRLC is a non-profit corporation and VRLC-FIPE is a political committee formed under Vermont law. VRLC challenged three disclosure provisions of Vermont's election laws as unconstitutionally vague and violating freedom of speech. The court concluded that the Vermont statutory disclosure provisions concerning electioneering communications and mass media activities are constitutional and did not violate the Fourteenth Amendment's due process guarantee due to vagueness nor the First Amendment's free speech guarantee; Vermont's "political committee" definition did not violate the Fourteenth Amendment's due process guarantee because of vagueness nor violate the First Amendment's free speech guarantee; and Vermont may impose contribution limits on VRLC-PC, an entity that makes contributions to candidates, and the statute's contribution limits were constitutionally applied to VRLC-FIPE, which claims to be an independent-expenditure-only PAC. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment to defendants. View "Vermont Right to Life Committee v. Sorrell, et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed the district court's dismissal of his original complaint against DIL and his amended complaint against DIL's wholly-owned subsidiary, Daikin America. Plaintiff, a white male of United States origin, alleged that DIL and Daikin discriminated against him on the basis of his race and national origin. Plaintiff claimed that, for discriminatory reasons, Daikin America did not consider terminating any of the Japanese rotational employees or any employees of Japanese national origin who had been hired directly by Daikin America. The court concluded that, under the standards articulated in Cook v. Arrowsmith Shelburne, Inc., plaintiff sufficiently alleged that DIL was part of a "single integrated enterprise" with Daikin America to be properly named as a codefendant; plaintiff plausibly alleged a claim of race and national origin discrimination against both defendants; and, therefore, the court vacated and remanded for further proceedings. The court affirmed the judgment of the district court dismissing plaintiff's breach of contract claim because he failed to allege that either defendant maintained a written policy of terminating employees only for cause. View "Brown v. Daikin America Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against defendants after she was temporarily removed from the office of the Clinton County Election Commissioner during her candidacy for Beekmantown Town Justice. Plaintiff alleged that her removal from office under Clinton County Local Law No. 1 was an unconstitutional retaliation for the exercise of her First Amendment rights in running for elective office. The court agreed with the district court that plaintiff's evidence failed to show a genuine issue of material fact supporting her claim of unconstitutional retaliation. The court affirmed the district court's judgment insofar as it dismissed her federal claim. The court vacated, however, the district court's grant of summary judgment for defendants on plaintiff's claim seeking a declaratory judgment that Local Law No. 1 is void under New York state law. The timing of the claim raises a substantial question whether the claim was moot. Therefore, the court remanded to the district court to consider the question of mootness in the first instance. View "Castine v. Zurlo" on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed from the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the Governor and DCJS on plaintiff's as-applied constitutional challenges to the enforcement of certain amendments to the New York State Sex Offender Registration Act (SORA), N.Y. Correct. Law 168-h. The amendments were enacted after plaintiff pleaded guilty to misdemeanor attempted possession of a sexual performance by a child, as a result of which he was classified as a level-one sex offender required to register under SORA. The court concluded, among other things, that requiring plaintiff to comply with these post-plea amendments did not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause, the Fourth Amendment, nor deprived him of due process and equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment, in violation of 42 U.S.C. 1983. The court considered plaintiff's remaining arguments and concluded that they were without merit. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Doe v. Cuomo" on Justia Law