Justia U.S. 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Fahs, a general contractor, filed suit against defendant, a construction supervisor with DOT, alleging First Amendment and Equal Protection claims. On appeal, Fahs challenged the district court dismissal of its claims. The court affirmed the dismissal of the First Amendment claim where Fahs's speech was not on a matter of public concern but rather on matters of purely personal significance, and affirmed the dismissal of the Equal Protection claim where the only differential treatment alleged in the complaint took place outside the limitations period. The court considered Fahs's remaining arguments and found them unpersuasive. View "Fahs Construction Group, Inc. v. Gray" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed a due-process complaint against the DOE seeking tuition reimbursement after plaintiffs enrolled their autistic child in a private school because the DOE failed to provide the child with a free and appropriate public education under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Improvement Act (IDEA), 20 U.S.C. 1400 et seq. The court affirmed the state review officer's determination that the hearing record did not support the impartial hearing officer's determination that the lack of a functional behavior assessment (FBA) rose to the level of denying the child a free and appropriate public education (FAPE) where the individualized education program (IEP) addressed behavioral needs. Further, the IEP's failure to include parental counseling did not deny the child a FAPE; the SRO did not rely upon impermissible retrospection and the court deferred to her analysis; and the court found plaintiffs' remaining arguments to be without merit. Accordingly, the court affirmed the grant of summary judgment in favor of defendants. View "M.W. v. New York City Dep't of Educ." on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a recipient of Supplemental Security Income (SSI) benefits, appealed from the district court's judgment sua sponte dismissing his amended complaint under 28 U.S.C. 1915(e)(2)(B). Plaintiff sought an Order to Show Cause, a temporary restraining order, and a preliminary injunction enjoining defendants from levying against his SSI benefits to enforce a child support order. At issue was whether 42 U.S.C. 659(a) authorized levy against SSI benefits provided under the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. 301 et seq., to satisfy the benefits recipient's child support obligations. The court concluded that SSI benefits were not based upon remuneration for employment within the meaning of section 659(a); section 659(a) did not preclude plaintiff's claims; and the Rooker-Feldman doctrine and the exception to federal jurisdiction for divorce matters did not preclude the district court from exercising jurisdiction over the matter. Accordingly, the court vacated the judgment to the extent the district court dismissed plaintiff's claims against the agency defendants and remanded for further proceedings. However, the court affirmed the portion of the judgment dismissing plaintiff's claims against Bank of America because his complaint had not alleged facts establishing that the bank was a state actor for purposes of 42 U.S.C. 1983. View "Sykes v. Bank of America" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, the Animal Rights Front (ARF) and two of its members, filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 alleging that defendant, a Hartford Police Sergeant, violated their constitutional rights when he arrested two of ARF's members at a children's foot race while they were protesting the treatment of animals by the race sponsor Ringling Brothers. The court concluded that the district court properly entered judgment in favor of defendant on the basis of qualified immunity because there was arguable probable cause that plaintiffs engaged in disorderly conduct with the predominant intent required by Conn. Gen. Stat. 53a-182(a)(5). The court remanded for clarification as to whether the district court awarded costs pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil of Procedure 26(g)(3). Accordingly, the court affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Zalaski v. City of Hartford" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs challenged Section 1021(b)(2) of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012 (2012 NDAA), Pub. L. 112-81, 125 Stat. 1298, which appears to permit the President to detain anyone who was part of, or has substantially supported, al-Qaeda, the Taliban, or associated forces. Plaintiffs, journalists and activists, sought an injunction barring enforcement of Section 1021 and a declaration that it violated, among other things, their rights under the First and Fifth Amendments. The court concluded that the American citizen plaintiffs lacked standing because Section 1021 says nothing at all about the President's authority to detain American citizens; while section 1021 had no real bearing on those who were neither citizens nor lawful residents and who were apprehended abroad, the non-citizen plaintiffs also failed to establish standing because they had not shown a sufficient threat that the government would detain them under Section 1021; and, therefore, the court vacated the permanent injunction, having no need to address the merits of plaintiffs' claims. View "Hedges v. Obama" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs appealed the district court's grant of summary judgment dismissing their complaint challenging the constitutionality of New York State Penal Law 400.00(14). Penal Law 400.00(14) permits New York City to set and collect a residential handgun licensing fee that exceeds the maximum fee allowable under state law in other parts of New York State. The court affirmed the judgment, holding that Admin. Code 10-131(a)(2), which sets the residential handgun licensing fee in New York City at $340 for a three-year license, was a constitutionally permissible licensing fee; the court need not definitively answer the question of whether Admin. Code 10-131(a)(2) should be subject to any form of heightened scrutiny because the court concluded that it survived "intermediate scrutiny" in any event; Penal Law 400.00(14) was subject only to "rational basis" review under the Equal Protection Clause because it "neither burdens a fundamental right nor targets a suspect class;" and Penal Law 400.00(14) survived "rational basis" review. View "Kwong, et al. v. Bloomberg, et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against the SPCA and others, seeking damages as a result of a search of her property and her arrest based on allegations of equine abuse. The district court applied claim splitting principles to dismiss plaintiff's 42 U.S.C. 1983 action because she filed a suit for tort damages based on the same facts in state court. Applying the Supreme Court's Colorado River abstention standard, the court concluded, however, that the district court's decision to dismiss the federal claim because of a similar pending state court litigation was erroneous. The court held that the district court erred in dismissing plaintiff's declaratory judgment claim because Brillhart/Wilton abstention could not apply when plaintiff sought damages in addition to declaratory relief. Accordingly, the court vacated and remanded for further proceedings. View "Kanciper v. Suffolk County SPCA" on Justia Law

Plaintiff brought this action under 42 U.S.C. 1983 against defendant, the officer who arrested her, alleging false arrest and malicious prosecution. On appeal, defendant challenged the district court's denial of his motion for summary judgment. The court concluded that the record established uncontroverted facts that, taken together, provided probable cause for the arrest and prosecution of plaintiff. Therefore, defendant was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded with instructions for the district court to grant defendant's motion for summary judgment. View "Stansbury v. Wertman" on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed the district court's denial of his motion to proceed in forma pauperis (IFP) and dismissal of his civil rights complaint. At issue was the interpretation of the three strikes provision of the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), 28 U.S.C. 1915(g). The court concluded that neither the dismissal of plaintiff's 28 U.S.C. 2254 petition seeking to vacate his conviction in the Jones v. Herbert case nor the dismissal of his appeals related to that petition constituted strikes under the PLRA. Because this holding negated three of plaintiff's five alleged strikes, the district court erred in denying plaintiff IFP status under the three strikes provision. Accordingly, the court reversed the judgment of the district court and ordered the court to permit plaintiff to proceed with his complaint in forma pauperis. View "Jones v. Smith" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a pro se complaint under 42 U.S.C. 1983 against defendants, alleging, inter alia, the denial of visitation rights, telephone usage, and access to a law library, and deprivation of proper temperature control, ventilation, and various amenities. On appeal, plaintiff challenged the district court's dismissal of his complaint under 28 U.S.C. 1915A(b)(1). The district court dismissed plaintiff's action with prejudice on the basis of his initial pleading, denying him leave to file an amended complaint alleging that he in fact sent his letter to the Warden complaining of prison conditions. Therefore, the court vacated the judgment of the district court to the extent that it dismissed the claims against the Warden in his individual capacity with prejudice and without leave to file an amended complaint, and remanded for further proceedings. The court affirmed in all other respects. View "Grullon v. City of New Haven" on Justia Law