Justia U.S. 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs, New York inmates with complicated histories of incarceration, claimed that their release dates were incorrectly calculated. Their due process claims (42 U.S.C. 1983) were dismissed on grounds that prison system officers and employees were entitled to qualified immunity. The Second Circuit affirmed. The state defendants could not necessarily “fairly be said to ‘know’” that due process required that the inmate be afforded certain credits and cited precedent, by its terms, does not instruct prison administrators as to the calculation of release dates when multiple sentences are at issue.One sentencing judge’s instructions may conflict with that of another. View "Sudler v. City of NY" on Justia Law

Harrington is serving a statutorily mandated 15-year prison sentence under the Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. 924(e), on his guilty plea to possession of a firearm by a convicted felon in violation of 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1). The district court rejected his challenge to the sentence. The Second Circuit affirmed. Harrington’s vagueness challenge to the ACCA was barred because it was not presented to the district court. First degree unlawful restraint under Conn. Gen. Stat. 53a-95, is a violent felony under the ACCA’s residual clause, that together with two prior first-degree robbery convictions compelled imposition of the statutorily mandated minimum 15-year prison term. View "Harrington v. United States" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed a class action on behalf of themselves and other New York State prisoners convicted of violent felonies, alleging that they were denied parole as a result of an “unwritten policy” to deny parole to violent felons, and that this unofficial policy violates the Due Process, Equal Protection Clause, and Ex Post Facto Clauses. The district court dismissed. The Second Circuit affirmed. To state a claim for violation of due process rights, plaintiffs would have to allege that they were denied parole based on an “inappropriate consideration of a protected classification or an irrational distinction.” They did not do so. Equal protection is not a license for courts to judge the wisdom, fairness, or logic of legislative choices, and prisoners either in the aggregate or specified by offense are not a suspect class. The rational basis for a distinction in parole determinations is preventing early release of potentially violent inmates who may pose a greater danger to others. The Ex Post Facto Clause does not apply to guidelines that do not create mandatory rules for release but are promulgated simply to guide the parole board in the exercise of its discretion. View "Graziano v. Pataki" on Justia Law

McGarry claimed that while he was a pretrial detainee at the Vermont Chittenden Regional Correction Facility, facing charges related to a domestic dispute, prison officials compelled him to work in the prison laundry under threat of physical restraint and legal process. His pro se complaint alleged violation of his Thirteenth Amendment right to be free from involuntary servitude. The district court dismissed, reasoning that McGarry did not allege that his work in the laundry was “like the slavery that gave rise to the enactment of [the Thirteenth] Amendment.” The Second Circuit reversed. The complaint plausibly stated a claim; defendants did not establish entitlement to qualified immunity. Correctional institutions may require inmates to perform personal housekeeping chores such as cleaning the areas in or around their cells without violating the Thirteenth Amendment, but it is “clearly established” that requiring hard labor of pretrial detainees (persons not “duly convicted”) violates the Thirteenth Amendment. A pretrial detainee’s compelled work in a laundry for up to 14 hours a day for three days a week doing other inmates’ laundry cannot reasonably be construed as personally related housekeeping chores and officers of reasonable competence could not disagree. View "McGarry v. Pallito" on Justia Law

Taylor, an attorney who allegedly suffers from clinical depression, lived in a private community managed by HPHA. Graser was president of HPHA’s board. For years, Taylor’s glass-enclosed patio, visible from the main thoroughfare, was described as a “pigsty.” Taylor generally declined offers to help with cleanup. While she was away, Cramp, noticed that Taylor’s garage door was open. Taylor gave him permission to retrieve her opener and close the door. Cramp, Graser, and another closed her garage door and cleaned up Taylor’s patio, consolidating items in Taylor’s garage. Taylor filed a police report complaining of trespass and burglary and filed a complaint against HPHA with the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) and the New York State Division of Human Rights (DHR). DHR issued a Determination that there was no evidence of disability or that the accumulation of or clearing of clutter is related to a disability. HUD affirmed. Taylor filed suit against the HPHA and Graser, claiming failure to accommodate, 42 U.S.C. 3601, trespass, and conversion. The district court rejected all claims. The Second Circuit dismissed her appeal for failure to comply with appellate rules. Calling Taylor’s FHA claim “frivolous,” the court held that HPHA and Graser were entitled to attorneys’ fees. View "Taylor v. Harbour Pointe Homeowners Assoc." on Justia Law

In 1997, Malik Jones, an African-American male, was shot and killed by a member of the East Haven Police Department. Plaintiff Jones, mother of Malik Jones, filed suit against the town and officers under 42 U.S.C. 1983, claiming that the town’s custom, policy, or usage of deliberate indifference to the rights of black people caused the killing of her son in violation of the Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments. At trial, the jury found in favor of the police officers, but found the town liable and awarded damages. The Second Circuit affirmed, finding that plaintiff’s evidence was legally insufficient to demonstrate a custom, policy, or usage of deliberate indifference which caused Jones’s death. View "Emma Jones v. East Haven" on Justia Law

African-American firefighters brought a Title VII discrimination (42 U.S.C. 2000e) claim, based on 1998 and 2002 promotional examinations for the position of fire lieutenant. The district court ruled in favor of the city, finding that Buffalo had demonstrated that the test was job related and consistent with business necessity, despite the disparate impact of the 1998 examination on African Americans, and that plaintiffs were barred from challenging the job relatedness and business necessity of similarly derived examinations. The Second Circuit affirmed: an employer can show that examinations having a disparate impact on a protected class are job related and supported by business necessity when the analysis that produced the test relied on data not specific to that employer. While employer-specific data may make it easier for an employer to carry its burden in Title VII analysis, such evidence is not required as a matter of law. In this case, an independent state agency determined, based on empirical, expert, and anecdotal evidence drawn from fire departments across New York and the nation, that the job of fire lieutenant, wherever performed, involves common tasks requiring essentially the same skills, knowledge, abilities, and personal characteristics; and developed a general test based on those findings. View "M.O.C.H.A. Soc'y, Inc. v. City of Buffalo" on Justia Law

In 1986, minority inmates commenced a class action, alleging racial discrimination in housing, job assignment, and discipline. The trial judge found a “pattern of racism” and, in 1993, issued a decision requiring that the percentage of minority inmates in “preferred” jobs, including jobs in the print shop, correspond to the percentage of minority inmates in the general prison population. In 1999, plaintiffs, inmates formerly employed in the print shop, filed complaints alleging racial discrimination by civilian supervisors and prison administrators. After four years of discovery, plaintiffs sought to file an amended class action complaint. In addition to claims under 42 U.S.C. 1981, 1983, 1985, and 1986, the complaint claimed violations of the earlier order, and the state Human Rights Law and constitution. Plaintiffs contended that the pattern-or-practice method of proof used in Title VII class actions could be employed against individual defendants. The court denied class certification and leave to amend and analyzed plaintiffs’ individual complaints under the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework generally employed in assessing individual disparate treatment claims under Title VI and granted defendants summary judgment on individual claims. The Second Circuit affirmed; the pattern-or-practice framework is ill-suited to establish liability of individual defendants named in the proposed amended complaint. View "Reynolds v. Barrett" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, 11 Asian-Americans currently or formerly Port Authority police officers, sued under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 2000e, alleging that they were passed over for promotions because of race. The plaintiffs asserted: individual disparate treatment, pattern-or-practice disparate treatment, and disparate impact. A jury found liability for discrimination against seven plaintiffs and awarded back pay and compensatory damages. The district court also granted prevailing plaintiffs retroactive promotions, seniority benefits, and salary and pension adjustments corresponding with hypothetical promotion dates. The Second Circuit affirmed in part. With regard to individual disparate treatment allegations, the district court properly admitted background evidence predating onset of the limitations period; there was sufficient evidence to conclude that the Port Authority discriminated within the limitations period. The district court erred in: submitting the pattern-or-practice disparate treatment theory to the jury in a private, nonclass action and concluding that the “continuing violation” doctrine applied to the disparate impact theory so that the jury could award back pay and compensatory damages for harms predating the statute of limitations. The court remanded for reconsideration of damages and equitable relief to the extent that relief was premised on failures to promote outside the limitations period. View "Port Auth. Police Asian Jade Soc'y v. The Port Auth. of NY & NJ" on Justia Law

Rivas, serving an indeterminate life sentence in New York for the second-degree murder of his former girlfriend, sought habeas corpus, 28 U.S.C. 2254. The district court dismissed the petition as barred by the statute's one-year limitations period. On remand, the district court again dismissed, after hearing evidence of actual innocence. The Second Circuit reversed, finding that Rivas raised a credible and compelling claim of actual innocence, based on new information not presented to the jury that dramatically undermines the central forensic evidence linking him to the crime of which he was convicted. There was essentially unchallenged testimony from a respected forensic pathologist, that the victim was almost certainly killed at a time when he had an uncontested alibi, and not earlier. That evidence warrants an equitable exception to AEDPA’s limitation period, allowing the petitioner to have his otherwise time-barred claims heard by a federal court. View "Rivas v. Fischer" on Justia Law