Justia U.S. 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Freeman was convicted in New York of second-degree assault, second-degree vehicular assault, common law driving while intoxicated, and leaving the scene of an accident. He filed a petition for habeas corpus, arguing that the state court unreasonably applied clearly established federal law in identifying as harmless the erroneous admission of evidence obtained from a blood draw compelled pursuant to a warrant found invalid under state law. The Second Circuit affirmed denial. The challenged harmlessness determination regarding an error of state law was itself a decision of state law that cannot form the basis for federal habeas relief. View "Freeman v. Kadien" on Justia Law

Hearing that Warren had called him an insulting name, Darnell notified his friends to leave the area, entered the store, followed by his brother, Darryl. Darryl grabbed Warren and said “I told you to stay out of this store.” Darryl’s gun fired. Darnell drew his gun and pointed it at another. Darryl fired four more shots into Warren. After Darryl pleaded guilty to second-degree intentional murder, Darnell was convicted of second-degree depraved-indifference murder and sentenced to 17-1/2 years to life in prison, the same sentence received by his brother. The appellate court affirmed, finding the evidence sufficient to convict Darnell as an accomplice to depraved-indifference murder. Before the conviction became final, the New York supreme court reversed a depraved-indifference murder conviction based on accomplice liability where the attack on the victim was “quintessentially intentional.” State courts rejected a motion to vacate Darnell’s conviction. He filed a habeas corpus petition, 28 U.S.C. 2254. The district court denied the petition. The Second Circuit affirmed, noting that this was the fourth case to advance the “somewhat perverse argument” that petitioner should be released from custody because the evidence suggests he is more culpable than he was found to be. View "Epps v. Poole" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a state inmate proceeding pro se, was knocked unconscious and injured when a prison transport bus, in which he was riding with his wrists and ankles shackled, took a sharp turn. He claimed defendants violated his rights under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments by transporting him on a bus without a seatbelt. The district court dismissed. The Second Circuit affirmed. Failure of prison officials to provide seatbelts to prison inmates does not, standing alone, violate the Eighth or Fourteenth Amendments. View "Jabbar v. Fischer" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, black and Hispanic registered voters in Albany County, sued the County and the Board of Elections (collectively, defendants) for enacting a redistricting plan for the Albany County Legislature (Local Law C) in response to the 2010 United States census that allegedly diluted black and Hispanic voting strength in violation of Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act (VRA), 42 U.S.C. 1973, by failing to provide for five majority-minority districts (MMDs). The court concluded that plaintiffs' appeal was not moot, even though the challenged elections have not taken place. While the court identified legal error in the district court's determination that plaintiffs failed to make the majority-minority showing required to satisfy the first step of a vote dilution claim as identified in Thornburg v. Gingles, the court identified no error in the district court's determination that plaintiffs failed to demonstrate a likelihood of success as the third majority bloc-voting step of the Gingles inquiry, or in the court's denial of preliminary injunctive relief on that ground. View "Pope v. County of Albany" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, appealed an order of the district court dismissing her 42 U.S.C. 1983 claim for failure of timely service and a subsequent order denying her Rule 60(b) "motion to open." The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing plaintiff's action or in denying Rule 60(b) relief, despite her attempt to effect service with the aid of the U.S. Marshals Service. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Meilleur v. Strong" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs appealed from a grant of summary judgment dismissing their challenge to the legislative prayer practice at Town Board meetings in the Town of Greece, New York. Since 1999, the town has begun its Town Board meetings with a short prayer. The court held that the district court erred in rejecting plaintiffs' argument that the town's prayer practice affiliated the town with a single creed, Christianity, in violation of the Establishment Clause. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Galloway v. Town of Greece" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a follower of Islam, was incarcerated at the Federal Correctional Institution in Otisville, New York (FCI Otisville). Plaintiff's religious beliefs required participation in congregational prayer five times a day but under the FCI Otisville policy, the prison chapel was available only once a day and no other space within the facility was made available to plaintiff and others in his faith. Plaintiff subsequently appealed from the district court's dismissal of his claims that defendants violated his rights under the First Amendment and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 42 U.S.C. 2000bb-1, based on a finding that plaintiff had failed to exhaust his administrative remedies concerning his congregational prayer policy claim. Because the court found that plaintiff did indeed exhaust his administrative remedies, the court vacated the judgment and remanded for further proceedings. View "Johnson v. Killian" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs appeal from an order of the district court dismissing their complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. Plaintiffs argued that New York's Kosher Law Protection Act of 2004 (Kosher Act), N.Y. Agric. & Mkts. Law 201-a-201-d, violated the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses of the First Amendment and was unconstitutionally vague. The court held that the Kosher Act did not violate the Establishment Clause because it neither advanced or impeded religion, had a secular purpose, and did not create an excessive entanglement between state and religion. The court further held that the Kosher Act did not violate the Free Exercise Clause because it was neutral, generally applicable, minimally burdensome, and had a rational basis. Finally, even under the strictest scrutiny, the inspection provision was not void for vagueness. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Commack Self-Service Kosher v. Hooker" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Townsend alleged that she was sexually harassed by defendant, who was the husband of the President of her company, the sole corporate Vice President, as well as a shareholder of the company. Before Plaintiff Grey-Allen, the Human Resources Director of the company, completed an internal investigation of these allegations, she was fired by defendants. On appeal, the parties challenged the decisions of the district court that granted summary judgment dismissing Grey-Allen's Title VII retaliation claim; denied defendants' post-trial motion for judgment as a matter of law or, in the alternative for a new trial; and awarded Townsend attorney's fees and costs. The court considered all of the arguments of the parties and affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Townsend v. Benjamin Enterprises, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed from a judgment of the district court dismissing her complaint alleging disparate treatment on the basis of race and gender, retaliation, and sexual harassment by her employer, the State Parole Division, in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e et seq. On appeal, plaintiff contended that her supervisor's touchings were sufficiently abusive to support her hostile work environment claim and that summary judgment was inappropriate because there were genuine issues of fact to be tried. The court agreed that summary judgment dismissing the hostile work environment claim was inappropriate and vacated so much of the judgment as dismissed that claim, remanding for further proceedings. View "Redd v. NYS Division of Parole" on Justia Law